

THE

# DUBLIN REVIEW.

---

OCTOBER, 1869.

---

## ART. I.—THE RELIGIOUS TENDENCIES OF INDIA.

*Christian Missions.* By T. W. M. MARSHALL. Second Edition. London : Longmans.

*The Religious Prospects of India: A Discourse read before the Society of Theistic Friends.* Calcutta. 1864.

Tracts entitled "*Inquiry after True Religion.*" English Series. Calcutta. 1862.

OUR object in the present article is to invite attention to the relation between Catholicity and the phases of religious speculation which are now to be found in restless activity in all parts of India that have been most permeated with Western civilization and education. The duties of Catholics towards the chaos of religious thought with which they find themselves brought into contact in our Eastern empire, and the attitude which ought to be assumed towards it, are fully deserving of the most careful consideration ; it is perhaps hardly too much to say that in these questions is involved the prospect of making any further progress in converting by far the greater bulk of the population of that empire to the Catholic faith.

We have selected the book first named at the head of this article as being the best and most recent work which treats from a Catholic point of view of missions to India as a whole, the more recent work, by Messrs. Strickland and Marshall, being confined to a single Catholic mission in the south of India. Without admitting our entire acquiescence in all the criticisms of Mr. Marshall, we may fairly select his as a work which contains within a readable compass all that is necessary to convey a tolerably correct impression of what has hitherto been done, both by Catholic and Protestant missions, for the conversion of India, and of the results of those efforts up to the date of the publication of his last edition. The other two pamphlets named are average specimens, selected from among scores of the publications which

are annually sent forth from the Calcutta presses, by writers belonging to the only one among many schools of neology which has any cohesive force of its own, a school which is well deserving of the attention of all who are interested in missionary work in India.

The method of treatment which Mr. Marshall has adopted, viz., successive sketches of the lives of the principal missionaries, though useful for the contrast which it was his main object to exhibit in the most striking light, is not conducive to a clear idea of the varying circumstances of the widely differing divisions of India; but if his narrative of Catholic missions is carefully examined, the following inferences which may be drawn from it, are sufficient to furnish a fair general outline of the antecedents and present circumstances of these missions.

1. During the sixteenth, seventeenth, and first half of the eighteenth century, a succession of most eminent Catholic missionaries made vital and sensible progress in the conversion of that part of India which is called the Deccan, that is, the Madras Presidency, and the French and Portuguese settlements of Pondicherry and Goa.

2. These successes had no counterpart in the North or Centre of India. With the exception of the "remarkable labours of the missionaries at the court of the Emperor Akbar,"\* in Northern India,† which, though full of promise, led to no great results, we find no record of successful missions north of the Nerbudda. This part of the country is not indeed absolutely sterile of native Catholics. At Agra, Dacca, Kishnaghur, and notably at the Catholic village of Bettiah, many congregations of native Catholic Christians numbering a thousand and upwards are to be found, while the half-castes, as they are usually termed, that is, the descendants of Portuguese, French, or English fathers and native mothers, are more than half of them Catholics, and of course form considerable congregations at large cities, such as Calcutta, Bombay, Patna, or Delhi: but such congregations bear no appreciable proportion to the population around them, and exercise little or no local influence.

3. The progress of Catholic missions in India received a terrible check in the suppression of the Jesuits, and the decline of the French and Portuguese influence in that country, whereby, "for nearly sixty years, *i.e.* from 1760 to 1820,

---

\* Marshall, p. 230.

† Mr. Marshall erroneously speaks of this as *Central India*, a term generally applied to the provinces round Nagpoor.



scarcely any care was taken of the Catholic missions, and of their numerous converts. The older missionaries gradually died out, while none arrived from Europe to fill their place." \*

4. During the last thirty years or more, missionary efforts on the part of Catholics have been revived, and enormous congregations, amounting in the whole country to nearly a million souls, have been saved from the ruin which had overtaken the labours of the older missionaries, and in many quarters fresh conversions are becoming numerous, and new progress announced.

5. In spite of these partial successes, indications are not wanting of a new state of things, brought about by the combined agencies of the English Government and of Protestant missionaries, which threatens to paralyze all Christian efforts. In Calcutta, "every influence combines to thwart" the progress of the Gospel; † and

it would be difficult to conceive a combination of more formidable impediments than those which they [Catholic missionaries] now encounter during every hour of their Apostolic toils. Opposed by the secret or open hostility of powerful officials—destitute of temporal resources—no longer contending only with the prejudices of the heathen, but with the far more fatal scandal of a nominal and contentious Christianity, which presents itself to him under twenty different forms, and which he contemplates with mingled surprise and contempt, the conditions of their warfare are less favourable than in the happier days, when martyrdom so often crowned its labours and assured its triumph. It is the mission of England, as we shall see more and more clearly in every chapter of this work, to make the conversion of the heathen impossible. Even S. Paul, and the companions of S. Paul, would hardly have struggled with success against the obstacles, hitherto unknown in the world, which Protestantism creates in every pagan land. When England has no longer an agent or a representative in India, the missionaries of the Cross will once more contend on fair terms with the evil spirits who rule her. Until that hour, which is, perhaps, not far distant, they must be content to gain a few here and a few there, and to deserve the success which they will not always obtain.‡

And lastly, "In almost every part of India," says the Rev. Mr. Percival, "the spread of the English language and literature is rapidly altering the phases of the Hindoo mind, giving it a sceptical, infidel cast." §

This last subject, viz., the religious tendency and effects of English education, to which Mr. Marshall allots a separate section, is that to which we propose mainly to devote our attention: meanwhile we cannot too strongly insist on the

\* Marshall, p. 246.

† *Id.*, p. 259.

‡ *Id.*, p. 258.

§ *Id.*, p. 353.

correctness of the description which we have quoted above of it, detailing the disadvantages under which Catholic missionaries at present labour. If, however, we were content to accept Mr. Marshall's conclusion, that until the English are driven out of India further success is practically hopeless, we would not waste any more time over this subject. But, while we admit that he faithfully echoes the common opinion which obtains as to Catholic missions in India, in the desponding tone which he adopts, it may be remembered that the Catholic Church is not unaccustomed to engage in a struggle with minds of a sceptical, infidel cast; on the contrary, she engages, and not without success, in many such contests, in most of the countries of Europe, and we cannot but think that a new field of operations is being opened to her in India, if only the opportunity, we might say the necessity, of entering upon it is not lost sight of: a field which, if not so promising as those in which S. Francis Xavier laboured in the sixteenth, and De Nobili in the seventeenth century, yet holds out a fair prospect of no niggard harvest, and of making an impression on the *intellect* of the country as formidable as that made by the latter of these illustrious missionaries, whose system alone, to our mind, presented any human probability of effecting the conversion of India.

If the possession of India has imposed on the English nation most important duties connected with the government and civilization of that country, it has no less imposed on the Catholics of England the duty of imparting, so far as in them lies, the blessings of faith to their fellow-subjects in the East; nor is the present time inopportune for looking around and examining the means by which this end may be best promoted. Our religion in this land has at length reached a point at which we feel it not merely possible but even incumbent on us to commence the work of organizing missions and sending out missionaries to other shores, and the Primate of England has openly testified his sense of the propriety of the efforts which are being made for this purpose. We do not pretend to select the field in which the earliest missionaries of S. Joseph's College are to be employed, but if we do not include in *partibus infidelium* such countries as Australia, North America, and the Cape, in which, to say the least, Catholics are proportionally as abundant as in the mother country, it may confidently be said that no place has such strong claims upon England as her possessions in India, where Catholicity is so ill provided with ministers and money, and where such as she does obtain, are almost entirely the gift of France and other foreign countries.

Before, however, we approach more closely the question to which we are specially directing attention, it is desirable to bestow a brief notice on one race, or rather collection of races, which, though included in our Eastern empire, has little or nothing in common with Hindoos or Mahomedans, and requires to be approached in a very different and far simpler manner. No one, we believe, now contests the conclusion that the Hindoos are not the aboriginal inhabitants of India: before their invasion or immigration more than a thousand years before the Christian era, other races and tribes were occupiers of the soil, who still, after the lapse of three thousand years, are unmistakably distinguished from the races which came in with the Aryan conquest. They alone are really deserving of the title of Aborigines, while Hindoos, Mahomedans, and English have only succeeded one another as conquerors.

The non-Aryan races, as they are commonly called, were driven by the Aryans into all the rugged and mountainous portions of the country. In the rugged regions of Central India they are found in great numbers under the names of Coles and Sonthals; they also hold almost all the spurs of the north-eastern Himalayas. They number, perhaps, in all from fifteen to thirty millions, and their religions, as numerous as their tribes, are all of the most primitive type: they are mostly, if not entirely, without any written language, and occupy the same rank in the human race as the New Zealander or North American Indian.

These tribes, though in many respects presenting so far more promising a field for missionary labour than the Hindoos and Mahomedans, being without the prejudices of caste, or the self-sufficiency derived from an ancient though decaying theology, have, we believe, till recently been entirely overlooked by Christian missionaries; and though we may be unintentionally unjust to some Catholic priest labouring usefully though obscurely in their midst, we believe that we are correct in saying that even now such missions as there are are exclusively Protestant, whether English, German, or American.

This is greatly to be regretted, for these tribes are in an intellectual and religious position which at present offers no obstacle whatsoever to the advance of Christianity properly taught. Few Protestants even will be hardy enough to maintain that a religion on the basis of private judgment, especially conjoined with the absence of ritual, is well adapted to primitive races, and this alone is sufficient to explain the fact that the missions we have just named have not been strikingly successful: indeed, had they not wisely portioned out the

ground among the rival sects, and abstained from encroaching on one another's preserves, probably no success at all would have been obtained. But, still, the missionaries having been thus practically saved from that which is the consequence but at the same time the nemesis of Protestantism, the babel of teachers, are, we believe, in many cases, really laying a very fair foundation for future successes among these races, though they may have obtained but few actual disciples; while one mission, that of the German Lutherans, in Chota Nagpore, has unquestionably been very productive of conversions. Till 1858 or 1859, it, like others, was almost entirely sterile; from that time, however, an impression was made, and from 12,000 to 15,000 native Christians have been collected together during the ten years which have since elapsed.

To say the least, there is no difficulty whatever in supposing that in some cases, especially where Catholicity is entirely out of the field, and where the teaching is mutilated and fragmentary truth, rather than the denial and rejection of the supplementary truths which are left untaught, Divine grace may really second the efforts of Protestant missionaries. Still more may this be so, when, as is certainly the case in the instance of the mission we are considering, the Catholic and not the Protestant rule of faith is in reality followed, and the disciples are practically required to believe without question whatever doctrines their teachers propose, and not to subject them to any independent criticism of their own. A theory of this kind is, however, by no means necessary to enable us to account for the success we have described. Lutheranism is naturally the best adapted of all forms of Protestantism to win savage races; and it is no matter of surprise that these missionaries, who have had the warm sympathy of Colonel Dalton, the chief Government official in the division, isolated from all rival teaching, coming as delegates of an avowedly superior form of civilization, and accidentally aided by an agitation regarding land tenures which has enabled them to take up the position of champions of oppressed agriculturists, should have reaped a considerable harvest in a field which was before practically fallow. In the future, however, it appears probable that this mission will have to continue the struggle amidst dissensions and schism. Recently its younger members complained to Germany of some alleged abuses on the part of their seniors: of the merits of the complaint we cannot speak, but the elder missionaries, dissatisfied with the treatment they received, tendered their services to the Church of England. The Anglican bishop of Calcutta, Dr. Milman, after a visit to Ranchee, the

head-quarters of the mission, decided on accepting the offer, while the younger missionaries have adhered to the parent society. Of the final result we have not yet heard; the law courts will, it may be presumed, uphold the right to the churches, schools, and mission-houses, of those who remain Lutherans; but the bulk of the converts will probably follow the seniors.

It is not our object, however, to dwell upon Protestant missions to the non-Aryan races, still less on one, though the most successful of them, that in Chota Nagpore. One great impediment in the way of Catholics undertaking such missions is the want of funds, and, perhaps we might add, want of men; Catholic missions are at present obliged to be far more self-supporting in India than Protestant; Dr. Wilson was able to boast in 1851, that the yearly expenditure on Protestant missions in India alone was about one-fifth more than is annually raised for Papal missions in all parts of the world:\* and among wild tribes little or no pecuniary support can be anticipated, and external aid is absolutely indispensable. A still more cogent reason for this apparent neglect may also be found in the state of destitution in which already existing Catholic congregations were left, as already described, by the religious troubles of Europe in the eighteenth century: all the efforts which have been made during the present century have not yet sufficed to fill up the gaps which were thus created. This fact must never be lost sight of in estimating at its true value the work done by Catholic missionaries; it will readily be admitted that new enterprises can hardly be undertaken while old congregations are still insufficiently provided for; and hence we fear that for many years to come it will be impossible for Catholics to organize missions to the non-Aryan races of India: had they been able to do so before Protestantism entered the field, it can scarcely be doubted that their missionaries would have obtained even greater successes than S. F. Xavier and his successors did in Southern India. Even now a missionary who mastered the languages of the tribe to which he addressed himself, for each of these tribes has a separate dialect of its own, would probably reap no barren harvest, though the preoccupation of the field by Protestant missionaries has magnified the difficulties by confusing the claims of authority, and though official countenance, a matter of great importance in India, would be conceded most certainly to his rivals.

---

\* Marshall, p. 327.

While, however, even the most cursory survey of the present state of India as a missionary field, requires that the numerous non-Aryan tribes, and the prospects which they afford to the missionary, should be carefully distinguished from the Hindoos who have driven them out of the plains, it is these latter who in the present instance mainly claim our attention. It is well known that among the Hindoos, caste has been one of the most insuperable barriers to conversion : the lower castes being already as degraded as they well could be in the social scale, have been far more willing to listen to the addresses of Christian missionaries, and to these belonged almost without exception the very numerous converts which were made by S. Francis Xavier and other Catholic missionaries before the time of De Nobili. There is good reason to believe that the lowest of the four great parent castes into which Hindoo society is divided, the Sudras, was originally composed in great part of the conquered aborigines who consented to remain in the plains and become the subjects of their invaders. The invasion coming from the north, it can readily be surmised, as indeed is confirmed by experience, that the influence of the conquerors or higher castes is far less supreme in the South than in the North of India ; and this is one of the main reasons why the extreme south of the peninsula furnishes by far the most successful fields for Protestant as well as Catholic missionary labour. But even at the very outset of missionary enterprise, this progress of Christianity among the lower castes only, tended to augment tenfold the repugnance and hostility of the Brahmins and other high caste Hindoos. It cannot be too often insisted on, that caste is a social as well as a religious distinction ; Christianity thus not only appeared in the eyes of Hindoos as a religious innovation, but as the creed of socialism and license, which allied itself with all that was lowest and most infamous in the country. In propagating opinions of any kind, it is always hazardous to ignore the natural leaders of a community, and attempt to win over the multitude without their co-operation : a well-educated ex-Pharisee was, humanly speaking, a necessary addition to the uneducated fishermen who formed the College of Apostles (and even they were supernaturally educated), and it has always been found in India, that unless some impression is made on the Brahmins, any success among the low castes is likely to prove abortive and transient. We need not wonder, therefore, that after the departure of S. Francis Xavier, a crisis came in the Catholic missions in the South of India, and " conversions were at an end. For



fourteen years, Father Gonsalvo Fernandez had laboured amongst the people of Madura without gaining so much as a single convert ;"\* and had not the problem which presented itself been faced and solved by one, whom, next to S. Francis Xavier, we consider the greatest missionary who has ever set foot in India, all further progress would probably have been for ever at an end. Robert De Nobili, also of the Society of Jesus, was the instrument under Divine Providence of overcoming the repugnance of the upper classes, which was so fatal to religion, an end which he accomplished in one word by naturalizing Christianity in India. Opposition on the score of *religion* remained of course as decided as ever, and involved him and his followers in frequent oppression and persecution ; this could not be otherwise, and he would himself have been the first to deprecate any idea of coming to terms with idolatry, or of conciliating Brahminism as a worship ; but the prejudices, if indeed they deserve that name, which are imbibed from a love of country, and respect for the station and position in society which one's parents have handed down, are deserving of very different consideration ; it may be that they ought to die down to the roots, among those who follow the counsels of perfection and embrace the religious life, but the Church has never deemed it right or necessary to set her face against these feelings among ordinary Christians, provided they be kept within moderate limits. If an English gentleman on becoming Catholic were required to drop the title of esquire, to dress like one of the working classes, and to exchange all his English manners and tastes for French or Italian, it would present but an incomplete parallel to the social and national sacrifices to which a high caste Hindoo had to submit as a necessary consequence of becoming Christian before the time of De Nobili. If, then, it was expedient for St. Paul to become to the Jews a Jew, that he might gain the Jews, to those that were under the law, as though he was under the law (though himself not under the law), that he might gain them that were under the law ; to them that were without the law, as if he were without the law (though himself not without the law of God but in the law of Christ), that he might gain them that were without the law ;† if the prejudices of Jews and Gentiles required such conciliation, that S. Paul felt himself bound to adopt Jewish or Gentile customs and rules (for he certainly does not mean to accept Jewish or Gentile errors), in order that he might gain Jews

---

\* Marshall, p. 218.

† 1 Cor. ix. 20.



and Gentiles, still more necessary was it for the missionary to Hindoos to adopt Hindoo manners and customs in order that he might gain the Hindoos; and De Nobili showed himself the true successor of S. Paul in the sacrifices which he made for that purpose. Had it not been for the malicious and interested opposition which his successes evoked, and for the disastrous delay which necessarily elapsed before any decision could be arrived at, there is good reason to suppose that the whole of Southern India would have embraced Christianity in the course of half a century. But India is proverbially the land of panics and suspicions; the seeds of distrust once having been sown, and the fear instilled that after all the nationality and self-respect of the Hindoos were at stake, and the system introduced by the Jesuits likely to be discountenanced, confidence never could be thoroughly restored. "The general movement which had been excited amongst the Brahmins from 1606 to 1610, was arrested, and was only very imperfectly revived at a later period. So true it is, that it is difficult to recover an opportunity once lost."\*

With this appreciative understanding of the requirements of the Hindoos, Father De Nobili and his co-labourers united a thorough acquaintance with the most sacred and most esteemed writings of that people; and our object in thus dwelling upon the characteristics of his much-abused and remarkable mission is twofold. First, to place in a clear light the difficulty which has hitherto proved the main obstacle to the conversion of the Hindoos: secondly, to show by example that India wants appreciative as well as pious, zealous, and devoted missionaries, and that the want of the former quality is liable to neutralize the benefits which would otherwise spring from the latter. But it is the spirit and not the letter of De Nobili's work which requires to be copied at the present day: caste, even when the Jesuits returned to India some thirty years ago, though still influential, was a less dangerous stumbling-block than it had been more than two centuries before, and the period which has since elapsed has dealt it a deadly blow, from which it will never recover. Where it still possesses vitality, it may be right to conciliate somewhat the prejudices which it inspires, and we believe that this is still done to a modified extent in the new Madura mission, which is probably the most successful in India; but its days are numbered, and it is time to prepare to cope with the evils which have succeeded it. To employ the language which we have already quoted, and which

---

\* Marshall, p. 230, quoted from a French work on the "Madura Mission."

is far more true now than when it was written ;—"the spread of the English language and literature is rapidly *altering* the phases of the Hindoo mind, giving it a sceptical infidel cast." This alteration requires a corresponding change in missionary tactics.

We must devote a short space to the consideration of the manner in which this revolution is being brought about, and are thus led to comment on the action upon the Hindoo mind of, first, Protestant missions ; secondly, the English Government.

We are far from desiring to disparage Protestant missions in India. In regard to the present time, it is hardly too much to say that, humanly speaking, their failures are due to the radical errors of the system of which they have become exponents, while such successes as they have obtained have been won in spite of those errors by the meritorious and praiseworthy exertions of individuals. It is, no doubt, true that English Protestants were late in entering the field of missionary enterprise in India ; it may be that many of the missionaries have been self-seeking, greedy of gain, and have selected their occupation as being the best and most remunerative profession which was open to them. It may be that the Anglican Church is deserving of special reproach for employing agents who rejected the doctrines which she puts forth in her prayer-book and articles, and did her no credit by their ill-concealed hostility to her : but this cannot be taken as a fair picture of the state of these missions now. Protestant missionaries do not even aim at, far less reach, the highest type of Christian life : there may be here and there in England some Anglican clergyman sufficiently impregnated with Catholic aspirations to believe that he ought to give up wife and children for Christ's sake, or to understand the counsel of S. Paul, that "he that is without a wife is solicitous for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please God. But he that is with a wife is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife, and he is divided" ;\* but if so, we doubt if a solitary instance of such a person could be found among Anglican or other Protestant missionaries in India. The "divided" state which naturally, and indeed properly, results from marriage, is the highest which they can conceive, and in this respect an impassable gap is at once placed between any of them and the *élite* of Catholic missionaries ; but with this reservation we may fairly say that as a whole Protestant missionaries in India in the present day bring no dis-

---

\* 1 Cor. vii. 32, 33.

credit on their profession, and when innocently in error, are often truly deserving of esteem and admiration. There are many men like Cotton, who, though a bishop on £5,000 a year, laboured heart and soul for the benefit of his adopted country, or Long, who has devoted himself in the truest spirit to improve the natives, and is at once the trusted adviser of Government and the intimate friend of hundreds of Hindoos who have no sympathy with his religious opinions, of whom we may truly say, "*talis cum sis, utinam noster esses.*" On the whole, the Protestant missionaries in India are fair representatives of the bodies which commission them in England and America: the Anglicans are respectable and gentlemanly; the Presbyterians and Free Church energetic and particularly active in education; the Dissenters men of an inferior stamp, but often making up for their inferiority by increased earnestness and zeal; almost all comparatively ignorant of theology, and (their one disgrace) knowing next to nothing of Catholicism, yet ready to traduce it and prejudice the natives against it in inverse proportion to their acquaintance with its real teaching.

Protestantism is essentially a negative religion, and this alone renders it naturally unadapted to the work of converting those who are not Christians. It is one thing to suggest and scatter abroad plausible objections to the truth of revealed religion, whether it be the sceptic who is using this method against Christianity in general, or the Protestant who is using it against the Catholic Church; but quite a different task to build up the fabric of religion *constructively*. Conviction is the work of Divine grace; but the motives which strike and arrest the attention of persons predisposed to conviction are in the main (1) an Authoritative claim on the part of the missionary, "That he should teach with power (or authority), and not as the Scribes."\* (2) That he should testify to the truth of his mission by a life of self-denial and mortification, and perhaps also by miracles. (3) Most especially of all, that his teaching should have the mark of unity amidst universality. This is the evidence selected by our Saviour as pre-eminently the one required for the conversion of the heathen. "Teach all nations."† And I pray "for those also who through their word shall believe in me: that they all may be one, as Thou, Father, art in me, and I in Thee; that they also may be one in us, that the world may believe that Thou hast sent Me."‡ (4) To

---

\* S. Mark i. 22.

† S. Matthew xxviii. 19.

‡ S. John xvii. 20-21.

these may be added, as a most important addition, that the disciples should lead edifying and pious lives.

The last of these advantages has unfortunately never been possessed for long by any missions in India, Catholic or Protestant; in fact, in all ages the want of it has been the bane of Christianity. *Corruptio optimi est pessima*; those who reject the greatest graces sink lowest. S. Paul, in rebuking the Corinthians, complained that they practised such wickedness "as the like is not among the heathen."\* "The city of Goa became a proverb and a scandal among the heathen."† And in the present century the vices of many of the Christians of English, Irish, and Portuguese descent, Catholics as well as Protestants, have but too often subjected missionaries to the retort which again and again occurs in the pages of Mr. Marshall, Why do you not Christianize your own countrymen before you try to convert us?

But with this exception the requisites above-named have all been found on the side of the Catholic, and none on that of the Protestant missionary: Protestant missionaries have often been glad enough to invest themselves with the semblance of authority, but such a claim is manifestly an imposture in the case of persons who reject the only possible authority, in any true sense of the word, which the Christian system furnishes; and, *unconsciously* detected often in the outset, is in constant danger of being *consciously* detected as the inquirer learns more of the religion which is proposed to him. As regards their lives, European missionaries are under any circumstances placed in great difficulty in a tropical climate: the standard of life, which is to them austere and self-denying, seems to an Asiatic comfortable and even luxurious. In such circumstances the advantage which celibacy, a self-sacrifice which almost any nation in the world can appreciate, confers, as a mark of the true missionary spirit, cannot be over-estimated. Miracles which followed the teaching of S. Francis Xavier, De Britto, and other of the leading Catholic missionaries, are not even claimed by Protestants. But it is the absence of unity which more than anything else has afflicted with sterility Protestant missions: this is admitted, or rather proclaimed, on all hands by Protestants themselves, as Mr. Marshall has clearly pointed out:—"The grand impediment which the Gospel has to contend with among idolaters arises from the multiplicity of shapes under which our visible religion presents itself to their notice. Their observation uniformly is, that they should think much better

---

\* 1 Cor. v. 1.

† Marshall, p. 217.

of Christianity if there were not quite so many different kinds of it."\* And Dr. Grant, in his well-known Bampton lectures, says, "A large portion of the sterility of our missions may be attributed to that discord which Christianity exhibits in the very sight of the unbeliever." "Must there not arise a strong presumption in the mind of the unbeliever against the Divine origin of that doctrine or system which cannot be clearly ascertained, or on which its upholders cannot unite?"† The need, and at the same time the absence, of this mark of unity is therefore admitted openly and candidly enough; but what Protestants, and often enough Hindoos also, do not perceive, is the irrefragable proof which this admission involves that Catholicity can be the only true form of Christianity. Dr. Grant openly talks of *Christianity* as exhibiting discord, and the too common idea is 'we (or you) Christians, Anglicans, Presbyterians, Baptists, Romanists, Armenians, Greeks, Syrians, &c., are deplorably divided and disunited: we are all equally guilty and responsible for this state of disunion, and all equally self-condemned by it.' Whereas it is most evident that while this state reflects but discredit on all the other forms of Christendom, it, rightly speaking, only redounds all the more to the credit of Catholicity, by the triumphant vindication which it affords of her fundamental principle. This principle is one of unity; it is that all persons who wish to be true Christians must remain in communion with the Bishop of Rome, as the successor of S. Peter; from which it follows that they must confess such doctrines as he insists upon as a necessary condition to communion, and also that the Divine promises to teach the Church all truth, and to prevent the gates of hell from prevailing against it, are to be fulfilled by the Holy Ghost preserving the Pope from ever insisting on any doctrine of faith or morals as a *sine quâ non* of communion, which is not conformable with God's truth. On the contrary, no principle of Christianity, no rule of faith put forth by any other Christian body, Anglican or Dissenter, Greek or Armenian, either logically should, or actually does, lead up to unity, and no other bishop in the world claims to be the especial successor and representative of S. Peter. The common Protestant principle does not even consistently provide the canon of the New Testament as a book of appeal, since it is both historically and logically true that this canon rests on the authority of the Catholic Church, and cannot be arrived at in the present day with any certainty by independent research, however learned

---

\* Bishop Middleton's Life, by Le Bas, c. v. p. 132.

† Bampton Lectures, App., p. 316.

and persevering the student may be. But, admitting the New Testament as being in some inconsistent manner the book of appeal among Protestants, it is still evident that there is no *a priori* reason why those who read it sincerely and learnedly should not radically differ in the religion which they deduce from it; and experience has now abundantly proved that they do thus differ, and as a consequence of the irreconcilable character of their disagreements separate into different sects, and employ different missionaries. These considerations, when properly understood, show clearly that Catholics have not, as it is often alleged they have, any position to establish: it is not incumbent on them to prove that Christ made Peter the origin of unity in His Church, easy though it is to furnish satisfactory evidence of this to any unprejudiced mind: they have not got to establish the fact that S. Peter ever was at Rome, or that he was bishop there, though few learned historians would now venture to deny the overwhelming force of the evidence for both these facts. But the Catholic argument is prior to, and independent of, any historical or scriptural evidence: it is simply this, that no other principle of unity can be found in the Christian economy except the constitution of the see of Peter as the necessary centre of unity; and no other bishop even claims to be the legitimate successor of S. Peter. If therefore it is conceded that Christianity comes from God, and if a unity which the world can see is the particular evidence of this divine mission, then it follows irresistibly that Christ must have instituted a centre of unity, that this centre of unity must be the see of Peter, and that Rome must be at the present moment the see of Peter, and Pius IX. its legitimate occupant. Given the premisses, as practically Dr. Grant, Le Bas, and so many others concede them, and no possible ingenuity can evade the cogency of the arguments which lead up to the conclusion. The unity, therefore, which the Catholic missionaries enjoyed, is the legitimate fruit of the Catholic principle; while the disunion which Protestants have had to contend against is equally the legitimate consequence of anti-Catholic principles in any form or shape. Thus while Protestants and Catholics both suffer at the present moment from missionary disunion, the former do so by their own fault, a fact which becomes the more apparent the more their principles are correctly explained and understood; while the Catholic missionary suffers innocently, and only because he cannot sufficiently obtain a hearing to explain to those in whose eyes he is prejudiced, that the schisms which injure him arise from the repudiation of his fundamental principle, and would be healed were it accepted.

Thus devoid of all the distinctive marks which are likely to



induce conviction in the minds of those who are not Christians, it might with all human certainty have been predicated beforehand that Protestant preaching and missionarizing in the ordinary manner, especially in the face of caste prejudices, would prove a total failure, even under the auspices of men such as Schwartz, Heber, and Martyn, for whom we gladly testify our admiration. And a failure they did prove. The missionaries were therefore compelled to have recourse to the internal evidences of the Scriptures, to the miracles and prophecies contained in them, and to such works as Paley's "Evidences," for inducing conviction; but arguments of this kind evidently necessitated a considerable preliminary acquaintance with Scripture and history to enable an inquirer to appreciate them. This, as well as the great ascendancy which the position of a teacher enables him to obtain over the minds of the youth confided to his teaching, coupled, too, in many cases with a sincere wish to introduce Western enlightenment into the East, led Protestant missionaries at an early period to give their attention to schools as the best channels to conversion. As Mr. Marshall says, the missionaries "resolved with characteristic energy of purpose to call into action a new system of *propaganda*, and to inaugurate a new and elaborate scheme by which they still hoped to convert defeat into victory. Having failed to convert the Hindoo by Bibles or preaching, they resolved to try the effect of education."\*

This scheme, which has found its warmest and most energetic supporters in the missions of the Free Church and Church Missionary Society, has in one respect proved an entire success. The Hindoos welcomed the opportunity of learning English and European sciences with most commendable alacrity. Von Orlich may tell us that natives are induced to attend these schools "only in the prospect of obtaining a situation, and the majority belong to the lower classes;"† but unless by lower classes he means poorer members of the *upper castes*, we must entirely demur to his statement. The prospect of employment, especially employment under Government, has undoubtedly been the dominant motive which has led Hindoo youths to English schools, aided in a minor degree by a love of knowledge; but these schools have been filled by the children of the higher castes, mostly the poorer members of them, who have eagerly accepted the chance, thus afforded them, of redeeming their prospects by employments of that kind which custom and religion have both marked out as their proper sphere. Children of the lower castes have

---

\* Marshall, p. 348.\* *Id.*, p. 350.



indeed been mixed with them, but in a minority, and, compared with their relative numbers, a vast *proportionate* minority. There may have been occasional reluctance in some instances, as well as alarm, when any actual conversion has taken place, but these are exceptional; the English schools opened by the missionaries have been, as a rule, well filled, and the teachers have been eminently successful in being brought face to face with the *élite* of Hindooism through the medium of the children of the higher classes. That the success of the movement as far as conversions are concerned has been quite out of proportion to its success as an educational movement, is too well known to need repetition; probably not one boy in a hundred who has passed through his course at a missionary school has been converted to Christianity: but to the results of this teaching we shall have again to revert, after we have described the effect upon missionary education of the parallel movement under the auspices of Government.

At the outset we are bound to admit that there is no necessary connection between the Protestant Government and the Protestant missionaries: as a matter of fact, Protestant missions are no more responsible for the delinquencies of the East India Company than the Catholic Church was for Josephism in Austria in the last century. In India, so far as there is political life at all, there may be said to be four parties, of which non-official Europeans and natives form the two extremes, and officials the mean, Protestant missionaries coming between the officials and natives. In social and political questions the missionaries and natives are generally in accord, Government and the official class holding the balance between them and the Europeans: in religious questions natives consider officials, as a rule, too partial to Christianity, while missionaries consider them not partial enough. Hence they are, as it were, in a position of standing opposition on such questions, not violent or outrageous, but persistent and resolute: they have never ceased to remonstrate with the powers that be, for insufficiently aiding their efforts and showing too much countenance to the religions of the country, and therefore they may fairly plead complete immunity from any blame which may justly attach to Government and its servants on this score. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that one must not attach by any means unreserved credence to complaints against the Government of complicity with idolatry, which may often be traced to missionary writings. Not that we mean to imply that there is no foundation for these charges, or that every act of Government can be defended; and in so far as it ever

repressed Christianity, or even threw the weight of its power against its propagation, we do not attempt to justify it; but in many cases the funds which it has been condemned for expending on temples or festivals were practically trust funds, of which it may have very intelligibly been thought that they could not honestly be alienated.

If "there is nothing, perhaps, in the annals of any Christian people which can even be compared for enormity of guilt with the conduct of England during the first two centuries of her dominion in India,"\* it ought in fairness to be remembered that there is also no parallel in the history of the world to an empire acquired in a similarly marvellous manner. The tenure by which the Company held its dominion was certainly very different from that by which Governments ordinarily rule: it can neither be said to have been by hereditary right, or entirely by right of conquest, or by the popular voice, however expressed, that the East India Company rose to power: obtaining this as a privilege, and that as a concession, a third right as the recompense for an outrage, a fourth as the reward of a useful alliance, and a fifth after a military success, the Company may be said to have crept gradually into power before it knew what an empire it was forming. Its rule, to say the least, partook largely of the nature of a trust, and was exercised under obligations which, if not definitely expressed, were at least implied and understood. Moreover, at each successive stage of development, affairs wore an anxious and critical aspect, and the confidence of its subjects was of paramount importance; it exercised its sway by prestige, and ruled by dividing the interests and passions of its opponents: to this confidence a policy of strict non-interference with the religion of Hindoos or Mahomedans was deemed absolutely essential, and a departure from it instead of benefiting Christianity, would have not improbably led to the expulsion of its patrons and itself from the country. Under these circumstances the strict neutrality policy, which Mr. Marshall is surprised to see such men as Sir John Malcolm and Lord Macaulay vindicating,† seems to us far from indefensible; and we are inclined to think that at the present day the Government is more open to reproach for practically departing from its promises of neutrality and using its power unduly to advance Christianity, than for repressing or discouraging it. Bishops, archdeacons, and a considerable staff of Anglican and Presbyterian chaplains are maintained out of revenues almost exclusively raised from Hindoos and Ma-

\* Marshall, pp. 267, 268.

† *Id.*, p. 263.

homedans: besides this, liberal rules are enacted for grants in aid of maintaining other clergy, and building or repairing churches wherever they are needed. Native converts, if not avowedly favoured, enjoy a greater share of official patronage than is their due; and the Senate of the Calcutta University, which is composed of Fellows appointed exclusively by Government, is filled with Protestant missionaries and clergy; so much so that on a recent occasion the missionary element defeated the educationalists and natives combined in regard to the retention of a particular work, patronized by the missionaries as the exclusive text-book on moral philosophy.

It must be remembered, too, that practically the rulers of India have seldom or never believed Christianity in any such sense as to justify them in imposing their opinions upon others. If English statesmen and administrators are as a rule in the habit of asking themselves, when any question arises, "Has the Christian revelation taught anything on this point? if so, I should unhesitatingly surrender my judgment to that teaching, and only rely on my own self in deducing and inferring from that teaching, and in following my own conclusions in matters which that teaching leaves open;" then they act as men who have a real and vital belief in Christianity. But if their tone is rather, "I am satisfied by my reason and experience that such and such a course is right, and should Christianity teach the contrary so much the worse *for it*, but I am glad to say that my style of Christianity is one which enables me practically to drive a coach and four through any proposition which is asserted to be derived from it, and therefore I do not feel apprehensive that I shall be reduced to the unpleasant alternative of being compelled to admit that any such contrariety exists;" if this latter is the more general form in which most Englishmen in authority reason with themselves (perhaps unconsciously), then may it not justly be said that their duty was to recommend their views to their Indian subjects on the same basis as that on which they really constructed them, viz., education, reason, and experience, rather than on that which was at best the apparent basis—the Christian revelation? And this is in effect what has really happened. Many of the governing body over India are and have been deists or sceptics; still more, rationalists and latitudinarians of the most comprehensive type: hence there has been very far from any accord as to the nature of the religious principles, if any, which should be taught, but there has been a very general agreement in the benefits to be anticipated from a wide-spread dissemination of the English language, and of the vast literature to which it forms the key, as well as of all the Western

sciences. The natives, on the other hand, have shown themselves as ready to be officially taught our sciences as they have been unwilling to be officially taught our religion: hence the participation by Government in the educational movement which promises so completely to revolutionize Hindooism.

From a very early period the Government had some schools and colleges, but the great change dates from the celebrated despatch of 1854. Since then universities, based on the model of that of London, have been established at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, having colleges affiliated to them, in all parts of the country. An English school under the control of government is now located at the head-quarters of almost every district, while liberal grant-in-aid rules have been drawn up, under which numerous schools both English and vernacular have been established. This movement is spreading throughout the entire peninsula, but it is far more active in Bengal than anywhere else; and as this province, which is the most wealthy, most populous, and most important perhaps in India, is also the most advanced in English education, we will confine ourselves more particularly to the state of religious parties in it—a state to which it may confidently be asserted that all other provinces are rapidly tending.

In Bengal, Anglo-vernacular schools have increased with wonderful rapidity, the bulk of them under the grant-in-aid rules, the vast majority of which are under native management. Annually some 1,500 candidates present themselves for matriculation at the Calcutta University, nine-tenths of whom come from Bengal: as these have to undergo an examination in English literature and language, Indian and general history and geography, four books of Euclid, and the elements of algebra, it may give some idea of the progress which English education has made. Mission schools suffer somewhat from the rivalry, and, as in the Government and native aided schools there is no religious training at all, the missionaries almost invariably condemn their influence.

The results of this wide extension of secular education are perhaps without parallel in the world: crowded as these schools have been by high-caste Hindoos, the superstitions, prejudices, and religious feelings of the upper classes are being rapidly dissipated. We believe we are not exaggerating in saying that Hindooism, as a religion, is dead: no one who has received an English education believes in it; and as this education is spreading so rapidly, and its influence is so penetrating, it may safely be said that the days of Hindooism are numbered, and that as a religious system it offers but a slender barrier to Christianity, and will offer still

less. One of the consequences of this has been to vindicate the conclusions of De Nobili, that caste was still stronger as a social than as a religious institution: many a man who has entirely lost his belief in his religion is zealous and tenacious of his position as a high-caste man, and scrupulously performs all customary rites and ceremonies. He argues as many a better man has argued before him in regard to a religion which has lost its vital hold upon him: "This is good for the reverential and superstitious feelings of the masses, it is part of a great national and social system intimately imbedded in the traditions and customs of the people; if senseless it is harmless, and why should I needlessly offend even the prejudices of my fellows?"

It might not be worth while to follow the educated Hindoos through their religious and irreligious phases, were it not that we are firmly convinced that in Bengal the conversion of the masses is out of the question unless the educated classes are taken in hand, and that Bengal only represents in this respect what all India is rapidly coming to. What with the multitudinous diversity of teachers, the obstacles arising from social ties, the ignorance of the masses, and the pressure of material want, it is hopeless to expect that the common people will be convinced if they see all their educated countrymen unbelievers. If a Catholic missionary could obtain a hearing sufficiently to make them acquainted with the marked difference in principle between his religion and the other claimants to their allegiance, he might do something; but he seems to them to be an enthusiastic dreamer like so many others, and even if they listen to him, they do not know enough of other religions to appreciate his *arguments*, and his *assertions* fall on deaf ears. True Christianity requires indeed a childlike disposition and a heart unabsorbed in the world, and as these are more commonly found among the poor and ignorant than among the rich and well-educated, it expects to number more of the former than of the latter in its ranks; but it does not submit to be silenced in the presence of educated men, nor is it incompetent to confront error however learned; and wherever it is in a healthy condition it does hold its own, and never fails to convince and win over some of the most eminent of its opponents. A missionary might in vain endeavour by himself to attract the attention of the masses, but if he made converts of a dozen educated natives, well qualified to confront their fellows and to answer objections, the influence of their example would often serve to convert numbers of the uneducated. We emphatically maintain that in India missionaries must not isolate themselves from the current of

Indian mental life, that they must address themselves to the educated,—indifferentists, sceptics, and deists as they are,—as an indispensable means of making any impression upon the masses; and we are confident that any experienced missionary in Bengal will corroborate this, and that in other parts of India, if they do not admit it now, they will find out the truth of it in a few years.

Any person who *à priori* considers the probable effect of an English secular education of the nineteenth century on a Hindoo polytheist and idolater, will be able to picture with tolerable accuracy the general character of the result: everything round him, every line he reads, every fact he learns, tends to discredit his religious ideas, and his weak and illogical belief soon totters before attacks which meet with no resistance from any other quarter. He has lost his old religion, but has gained nothing in place of it: a person who was taught nothing but classics and history would not be likely to have any profound veneration for mathematics, and as the Hindoo's religious feelings are never appealed to, it is no wonder that they lie too often dormant. His reason is being cultivated all day long, and he gets profoundly well satisfied with and self-confident in it: he reads of Christianity, it is true, and he knows well enough that scores of its missionaries are ready to convert him, but he also learns soon enough that even among Europeans it has many opponents, and his prejudices being all against it, he rather reads their works than those of its advocates. Hence Voltaire, Francis Newman, and Colenso furnish him with an armoury which enables him entirely to turn the tables upon his missionary opponents: so far from shunning the controversy, educated natives often eagerly invite it; they look down upon Christianity as superstitious, ignorant, and behind the age, are confident that it is tottering to its fall, and even believe that they are not unlikely to play an important part in effecting this result. "Europe," they are never tired of saying, "has blessed us with the gift of its science and material civilization, and we, in return, will repay it by assisting it to root out its own religious superstitions."

Still, it must not be supposed that the religious instincts of mankind can be totally obliterated; if it were so, there would be, indeed, little hope of benefiting the classes we are speaking of. A great many, it is true, having passed through the training of youth, (the proper time for forming religious convictions,) without any religion, such seed as is in them gets soon choked with the cares and pleasures of the world: these become open indifferentists, or else conform to Hindooism from motives of ease or interest. But many are too speculative,



and many others have too much good in them to acquiesce in such a numbing of all the higher aspirations and sentiments of their nature, and these, wandering hither and thither like sheep without a shepherd, incessantly beat the air in the vain pursuit after religious truth. A few become Protestants: as we have already said, not one in a hundred probably of those who are trained in Protestant schools, and still fewer among those who pass through Government schools, or aided schools under native management: a few become Atheists, a few sceptics; but, as a rule, Hindoos cannot get rid of their belief in a supreme God, and Theism decidedly prevails over Pantheism or Atheism. A gentleman in the service of Government, who is an enthusiastic disciple of Comte, not merely, as so many are, of the philosophy but also of the religion of that clear-sighted but eccentric Frenchman, has done his best to recommend Positivism to their attention, with a mixture of success and failure. Educated natives are too anxious to obtain any support in opposing Christianity, and too conscious of the necessity of some definite system of opposition, not to welcome any aid in that quarter: accordingly the *Bengallee*, one of the best papers in the English language published by the educated Hindoos of Calcutta, has been entirely placed at the service of this gentleman, who has used it to explain the Positive system in a series of elaborate articles. So much attention has the subject attracted, that a Scotch missionary has thought it necessary to take up the cudgels against this system specially, and to attack Positivism both in lectures and in a series of counter articles in the *National* paper, another Hindoo organ in the English language. But the result has shown that Positivism, as a system based on an avowed repudiation of God as any motive for human action, or as in any way known to us or knowable, is totally alien to the Hindoo constitution, and years of religious chaos must pass before it will obtain any hold of their mind.

There is, however, one religious system to which we have not yet adverted, which alone is deserving of more than a passing notice—we mean Brahminism, or the Brahmo Somaj. Brahma is the supreme god of the Hindoos; Brahminism, therefore, means "Theism," and, except in its history or natural features, has no connection whatsoever with Hindooism, which it now entirely repudiates. This alone, of all the religious opinions which European education has given rise to, possesses any organization; and though it numbers only some fifty to a hundred congregations and some two thousand members, many thousands who have not definitely joined it sympathize with it; and its adherents and sympathizers are on the whole the



most religious, most conscientious, and most sincere men to be found among educated Bengallees. It fully merits the most careful attention of the Catholic missionary. Its birthplace was Calcutta or its neighbourhood, but it is slowly extending to other provinces of India, even as remote as Madras; it was originally started as a society for reforming Hindooism, and its principle then was that all the later sacred books and commentaries were valueless, but that the original Vedas, supposed to have descended from heaven, were inspired Scripture. In reality, however, its followers held a kind of Christian morality combined with Theistic doctrine, and it was not long before a divergence appeared between their views and their authority, the Vedas. A deputation of four of their members was then sent to Benares to ascertain true Vedantic doctrine at its centre, and the result being unsatisfactory, that doctrine was entirely abandoned *as authoritative*, all revelation rejected, and pure reasoning declared to be the sole basis on which religious truth must be constructed. We need scarcely say that *their* pure reason was of a Theistic stamp, considerably moulded by old Hindoo traditions and evangelistic Christianity. Before many years had passed they began to find that, while they were very confident of their own doctrines, it was impossible to establish them by mere reasoning, and they now had recourse to intuition, or to intuition and reason combined, as the basis of theological truth. This was their last card, and before long they began to find that reason and so-called intuition led one set of men in a very different direction from that in which they led others, and some two years back a schism resulted. The one party wished to humour Hindooism as much as possible; it allowed its members to retain the Brahminical thread, and adhered to as many of the externals of the old religion as possible: the other and younger party regarded the retention of the thread as erroneous, condemned all caste distinctions, and was altogether more rationalizing. The leader of the conservatives is an old Brahmin of the well-known Tagore family, which lost caste some years ago, while that of the radicals is Keshub Chunder Sen, also of high caste, though not a Brahmin. This latter man, a most talented preacher, is the life of his party; he travels about the country lecturing generally in English, and attracts crowded audiences; for though, as we have said, the adherents of the Brahmo Somaj (or Church of God) are limited, its sympathizers are legion.

The foregoing description is sufficient, perhaps, to show that Brahminism, like Protestantism, has logically worked itself out, and has no longer any tenable basis: for it emphatically repudiates the idea of being a mere mob of indi-

viduals, of persons who accidentally agree in certain opinions, and therefore, as long as they agree, consent to work together : it claims to be a religion, to have a doctrine to teach, and to unite its members together by some bond of union ; and yet, when examined, that bond of union is only reason and intuition, which may be appealed to with equal effect by opposite parties. The moment it became apparent that reason and intuition did not lead men to doctrinal unity, from that time forward it was clear that the ground had been cut from under the feet of Brahmists : it is now, therefore, like Protestantism, either a principle leading to no doctrine, or doctrines without principle. There are several features of it which, however, are likely to contribute to its partial success for some time ; it ministers to the national vanity of the Hindoos most effectively, for it is a religion of their own manufacture, influenced to some extent by the writings of Francis Newman, Theodore Parker, Emerson, and others ; and they are never tired of asserting that theirs is the first endeavour to organize Theism and form it into a Church, which they believe destined to spread over the whole world. An acquaintance with the religious history of France during the present century might teach them that they have been anticipated by Saint-Simon and others, and if no French scheme has shown such vitality as that in Bengal, it is only because in the presence of Catholicity the French have sooner found out the hopeless inconsistencies in which any such efforts become involved ; while the adherents of Brahmism, though often charged with these defects, have not been slow to recognize that their opponents, the Protestant missionaries, are equally chargeable with them, and they are not the first persons to whom a *tu-quoque* has done service for a defence on the merits. Of the true principles of Catholicity, educated natives are unfortunately almost to a man profoundly ignorant, their impressions of it having been derived almost exclusively from such misrepresentations of it as are commonly circulated by so-called evangelical Protestants ; and such being the case, they ordinarily speak or write of it with unconcealed contempt as an obsolete and exploded superstition.

The Brahma Somaj has a weekly organ of its own in English and a press which constantly issues controversial publications ; a few extracts from the two which we have placed at the head of this article will serve to show the style of argument and illustration which is employed. The earlier publication of the two consists of a series of tracts with a preface somewhat resembling in style the

"Clifton Tracts." The first tract explains what Brahminism is; it argues that of all things that which is incomparably of the most importance to man is religion, and that true religion must date from the commencement of the world, must be universal, and sufficient for its purpose. What, then, is this religion? After enumerating the principal religions of the day it continues—

Let us divest all these religions of their peculiar tenets, the so-called vital points in each, and see if they all agree. Let us divest Christianity of the divinity of Christ, the Koran of the inspiration of Mahomed, the Poorans [Hindoo Scriptures] of the extravagant tales of its numerous gods and goddesses—the particular tenets in each, the points of attack and defence, and see what remains. . . . After such a divestiture of the peculiar tenets of each religion, there remain some truths, which are universal, and which exist from the day the first man was created. These truths are that there is a God, whom we are to love, honour, obey, fear, adore, and pray—that we are to look after the good of the society we live in—that we are to speak the truth, never curse, swear, lie, steal, and many others of like nature and tendency. Here, then, is the object of our search. Here, then, is the religion that has come down to us direct from God, and exists from the beginning of the world in numerous forms given according to the whims of men. This form, divested of all peculiar tenets, requires a name to distinguish it from all others, and we have happily a very judicious name given—Brahminism. . . . Hence it is that Brahminism is the vital part of every religion under the sun. . . . Christianity, Mahomedanism, Hindooism, or any religion whatever can be proved Brahminism, alloyed with some particular opinions and tenets, the chief source of religious disagreement. . . . Furiously indeed is Brahminism attacked by some native converts [to Protestantism] of our days. They urge how can Brahminism, which is changing with the change of winds, be called the true religion? . . . If, then, we are satisfied with what Brahminism is, with its existence from creation-time, with its universality and its sufficiency, why, then, should we not be the sincere Brahmos of our age? why, then, should we stand aloof to decry against the Brahmos while admitting the truth of Brahminism?

The second tract is entitled "Biblical Proof for the Validity of Brahminism." It consists of a somewhat weak attack on the Divinity of Christ, and argues much as Unitarians do, to show that Christ himself disclaimed any attribution of divinity. It is rather poor, and makes no attempt to handle the Trinitarian answers to these objections. The next tract is also anti-Christian, and is entitled "An Examination of the Prophecies in Matthew." It is not worth analyzing, and is most remarkable as indicating that the writer seems to assume that the English Protestant version is that particular version, the *ipsissima verba* of which are supposed to be inspired. At the

sama time, he does not seem to know that there are many different readings of the passages which he quotes.

The next tract (No. III., excluding the preface), is styled "Exhortation." It is a sermon on the vanity of the world, the evil of worldly prosperity, the duty of knowing God and practising virtue, and the necessity of repentance. It is interlarded with Scriptural phrases, and talks of heaven and hell in the most orthodox fashion. Except for the conclusion, "the way, the only way to God is Brahminism," it might easily pass muster for a Christian discourse.

Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7 are taken up with a defence against Atheism. They are a curious intermixture of the objections to the existence of God urged by European, Hindoo, and Bhoodist Atheists, all which objections are separately taken up and answered. The following extract from the answer to the Atheistic objection derived from the diversity and mutual opposition of religion is amusing and thoroughly characteristic. The drift of the reply is, that there are counterfeits in everything, but that the counterfeit rather proves than disproves the existence of the genuine article somewhere. If the Atheist

Enquires for a true religion amidst such counterfeits, then surely he will find one—one supremely bright, though followers few, as you see often the case with genuine things when their counterfeits are to be had—and that one is our heaven-born Brahminism. Brahminism, when viewed at a distance, appears like its counterfeits, just as a country-made knife looks like a Rogers when seen from two or three yards way off. But at each critical examination Brahminism, like a genuine knife, shows us its marks of distinction. None but a sincere Brahmo has understood the hidden qualities of Brahminism. He alone can speak from experience that Brahminism ennobles our mind, sweetens society, purifies the heart, leads us to virtue, to holiness, to God. He alone can cry out how sweet it is to warm ourselves under the benign rays of Brahminism, when all the tremendous and frightful affairs of this world chills every vein and silences the throbbing heart.

The series consists of eleven tracts, besides the preface, and the remaining four are devoted to "Brahminism, what is it?" Brahmos, we are told,

Do not believe in paper revelation. They say revelation of God is in the heart of every man, and in the works of nature. They say no book revelation has brought forth a truth which we cannot expect to find in the revelation within and without us. They say book revelation is a second-hand revelation; that is, it is an embodiment of the truths which man gets from the original, the primary, the direct revelation of God. They say that Mahomed, or Christ-like mediator, is not required to reconcile man to God, but that the sons of God must at once go up to the Father with the account of their

journey in this world. They say intuition is the foundation on which the whole superstructure of Brahminism stands. They say their knowledge of the existence and attributes of God is known by intuition, and the rest depends on reflection and education. They say man is an accountable creature, and he is accountable for no other reason but because he has a knowledge of the truths the practice of which in this life is essential to his salvation.

The Brahminist doctrine of repentance and atonement, which is often attacked by Protestant missionaries, is thus stated :—

Brahmos believe that as soon as a man commits sin, and thereby breaks the laws of God, he is visited by punishment, first in the form of remorse, which of course we grant varies in degrees in individual cases, and then he is said to fall one step off from God. Somebody may ask what should be their punishment whose hearts have turned callous with sin, and are never visited with remorse. To them, we say, remorse is the beginning and not the end of punishment, which will extend to future life, not *ad infinitum* but adequate to the sin committed. Brahmos believe that repentance makes no amend for sins already committed, but so forms the mind as not to commit the same sin again, and thereby the vicious tendency of the mind is turned into virtuous. Hence true repentance is efficacious enough to procure atonement, that is, a turning to God again. Brahmos believe that after a sin has been committed adequate punishment must follow, whether that sin is repented or not. The efficacy of repentance is not in freeing the soul from punishment, but freeing it from sin.

The second pamphlet we are noticing discusses the so-called four principal religions of India—Mahomedanism, Hindooism, Christianity, and Brahminism, and ends by asserting Brahminism to be that which is destined to prevail. The writer is very savage with Mahomedanism.

Whenever the word Mosulman, with its religious associations, enters the ear, different emotions of terror and indignation strike the heart at once. . . . Mahometanism analyzed offers three elements, the spiritual, the martial, and the sentimental or sensual. The spiritual element is very scanty. It consists merely in rigorous repudiation of idolatry, in hearty response to the well-known formula "there is no God but God." And the idea of this God is romantic and hazy in the extreme. A close analogy is often found to exist between Judaism and the Mahometan religion ; . . . but the spiritual intensity and the emotional grandeur of the Old Testament are absent in the Koran. . . . The martial element, agreeably to national character, is more eminently upheld in Mahometanism. And its sentiment has degraded into sensuality. Here lies the centre of all enjoyment, earthly and unearthly, according to the Mahometan idea of religion.

Finally, Mahomedanism is credited with everything bad in India.

Hindooism is dealt with very tenderly.

Hallowed by time, confirmed by usage, and endeared by all the joyful associations of the world, it blends together the fondest hopes and interests of its followers, and is held in the heart of hearts. . . . Hindooism has a twofold nature—doctrinal and social. Puranic idolatry in its present form represents its doctrines, and caste represents its society . . . idolatry is nothing peculiar ; it has lived its day in every country. Have education, have a thorough, fearless education, and the nation will outgrow its prejudices, idolatry will be no more. . . . Caste is neither so beneficent nor so injurious as many imagine it to be. To estimate its nature, tendencies, and effects is difficult. It appears to possess two aspects : the one religious, the other social, but both inseparably blended together. Its religious tendencies must have arisen from its social importance. . . . In our days, unfortunately, it has become even worse than what they (the priests) intended to make it. Caste is the enemy of brotherhood in India, the curse of nationality, the mildew of Indian progress and enlightenment. The sooner it is destroyed the better.

Apparently, however, he means by destroyed “modified,” for a little further on—

The existing system of caste cannot and must not be razed to the foundation, but it ought to be decomposed, sifted, modified, and reconstructed to suit the tendencies of the age . . . its entire absence is to be met with in no civilized community . . . its absolute destruction has too many attendant evils to be sanctioned. Destroy caste, and crimes of the deepest dye, which to this time have not ventured to appear in the light of day, will openly come out and sue their vindication. . . . Atheism, with its blasphemous taunts and sophistry, will come out in the teeth of all reformation to undermine the cause of truth.

Finally :—

No religion can effectually replace Hindooism which is not in keeping with Indian sociology, which is contradictory to Indian ideas and ways of action . . . bad as the religion of our country is, it also contains good incalculable. . . . With all its mischief, Hindooism, in a social and psychological point of view, represents the mind of India, and so long as it shall continue to do this, it is impossible to destroy its power altogether. . . . Hindooism's fate is doomed, but in its place must rise up some such religion which rejects all its evil and preserves all its good.

What strong confirmation all this affords of the tact and far-sighted wisdom of *De Nobili* !

Christianity—Christian missionaries are praised.

To them India owes much, and whether all they have taught her be right or wrong, she owns her debt of gratitude . . . with intelligence, honour, and liberty she [Christianity] has formed an inviolable sisterhood, and her name represents all that is good and great. . . . The affecting precepts of purity and love, sublime in their simplicity, which the blessed Jesus has left us



with his heavenly eloquence, have softened many an obdurate heart, and added to the merited triumph of Christianity. . . . Christianity carries besides this the prestige of being the religion of the Government, the religion of "Her Majesty"; and he who embraces it may think himself entitled to the privileges of the governing class. Thus, perhaps, you may to a certain extent account for the ridiculous mimicry and affectation prevalent among many of the native Christians of Bengal. It is, however, not to be denied, that a few are really charmed with the beauty of Christianity, and convinced of its truth. . . . If it is, indeed, true that your sorrowing soul thirsted after the water of righteousness, and that in Christianity you have found the peace which you wanted, I do not blame you. . . . But allow me to ask, do you not now and then stifle the demands of reason? . . . Christianity is, to a great extent, natural. It has juster views of human nature and of God's nature than many other systems of faith . . . [but] that very enlightenment which we have seen to be favourable to her triumph, has at last begun to outgrow her, and instead of hoping she has much to fear from it. The dreaded questions of the historic authenticity, the scientific infallibility, yea and of the very purity of all that is contained in the Bible—the dreaded questions, so often hushed and put down, have at last come to obtain, not the hearing only, but the attentive discussion of the civilized world. . . . To this we can confidently ascribe the remarkable scarcity of conversions to the Christian faith. The ebb of these conversions in this country is so very low, and the prospects of Christianity so feeble, that many Christians of eminent note openly express their fears.

In all this we can assure our readers positively that Christianity means Protestant Christianity; of Catholic Christianity, except as an historical phenomenon, these writers unfortunately know nothing and think nothing. The pamphlet now goes on to attack native converts, who are

"the outcasts of society . . . mimic the Europeans in all possible ways. . . . Why, blind to their true interests, do they hate nationality, the several innocent practices of the Hindoo society, and go to imitate foreigners, whose manners sit most awkwardly on them?"

The writer then proceeds to speak of the influence of free thought on Christianity, in which he says, "lies Christianity's danger." That is to say, he praises Christianity for admitting free thought to such an extent, but considers that this alliance, though honourable, will be fatal to it.

What do you mark in the noble era of the Reformation, but the footprints of independent thought in every direction? From the birthday of Martin Luther Europe dates her deliverance from the age of darkness, from the shackles of scholasticism, from the bulls of the Vatican, from the horrors of the feudal system, and the despotism of the Universities. From that day Christianity has received a new agency, the agency of independent thought and action.

The consequences of this agency have not been happy to Christian orthodoxy, though of immense benefit to mankind. Where does that active and intellectual liberty with which Luther started stop at last? It has passed through the infallibility of the Church of the Pope and his delegates (!); does it rest with the infallibility of the Bible? Christendom answers—No. As long as the principle of independent action could not be adopted in Christendom as at present in Hindooism, however heterodox certain individual theories might be, the unity and consistence of the Church remained entire. When it was once recognized, and recognized it must needs be with the growth of intelligence and moral perfection, its consequences could not be arrested. Through the opposing interpretations of the Bible, through the endless modifications of Christian sects, and through the endless differences of their opinion, through the diluted and equivocal forms of Bibliolatry, and through their ultimate development into pure spiritual theories, its "still small voice is heard." The Catholic Church, morally and intellectually worthless as it is (!), and destined to perish altogether at no distant day, has, in wickedly checking the principle of free thought, preserved itself entire. The Protestant Church, representative as it is of the highest culture, intellectual and moral, has, in honestly advocating it, created the cause of its own downfall. Its effects, gradually found to be alarming and fatal, though not even yet appreciated in their true seriousness, have logically proceeded from the Lutheran reformation. They could not be stopped; they could not be avoided. . . . With what reason can the Protestant Church condemn me, when centuries after, and after a corresponding degree of the world's enlightenment, I take an advance before the steps they trod, faithfully following their principles of moral independence and moral fearlessness?

Hence he concludes, that Christianity, though it dies hardest, is on the wane, and doomed to disappear.

Brahmism is, of course, the choice religion of the age. As is generally found in Brahmist controversy, criticism of Christianity is made to do service as an argument for Brahminism; but the writer is also very anxious to make out that his is no commonplace Theism.

With many it is the fashion to compare the efforts of the Brahmo Somaj to those which certain professed infidels to Christianity in former ages made to propagate their negative principles of religion and their abstract notions of the Deity. Between unbelievers in the Bible and Theists founding the principles of their faith upon the indestructible basis of man's religious consciousness there is a great difference . . . . Have research or experience ever been able to mark a period in the religious history of mankind, where a nation, enlisting the sympathy of men from various others, joined together to form a Church like the Brahmo Somaj? . . . . The Brahmo Somaj is a national movement, a developed national embodiment, an organized national Church, to spread faith and salvation such as the most enlightened of the world could desire. It is the desideratum of the age, a realized ideal of the religious wants of the civilized world, and as such com-

mands universal attention, sympathy, and respect. Such an association and alliance—such a Church is the first of its kind. . . .

Ask, again, this land of India whither she is drifting. Not to Hindooism or Islamism, of course, but to what then—to scepticism and unbelief? God forbid. In her heart she finds growing another religion, that very Theism which is Christendom's goal. We call it Brahmissm, but what's in a name? Thus Theism in Christendom—the harmony of philosophy and orthodox Christianity, the religion of nature—is Brahmissm in India. Upon the secure foundation of human nature, on the rock of consciousness, on the pedestal of true philosophy Brahmissm rests.

In the above extracts numerous faults of grammar and idiom may be detected, and the historical statements are often incorrect; still on the whole we think it will be conceded that such persons as these require to be instructed by missionaries of a high order—men well versed in the ramifications of modern unbelief, and in the methods of dealing with it. At the same time a very casual glance at the position assumed by Brahmissm is sufficient to show that it is full of inconsistencies and contradictions; and we may perhaps on another occasion be able to develop this more fully, and show its points of convergence with and divergence from true religion. It is evident, however, at a glance, that it is a mixed movement, partly conservative, moral, and religious, partly negative, rationalistic, and self-sufficient. Between these two forces, it is foundering, and must founder; and as this happens, many will go forward into scepticism, but many others, more predisposed for faith, will anxiously look around for some other refuge from infidelity. Catholicity, if properly explained to them, is precisely the system which such minds are in need of; and we venture to assert that if it were brought fairly face to face with them, and if the scarecrow which is at present before their eyes as its representative were demolished, the day is coming when it could secure many most sincere and excellent converts, whose services as pioneers to their less-educated countrymen would be invaluable.

Unfortunately, at present Catholicity makes no effort of any consequence to acquaint these classes with its true principles or to appeal to their intelligence. We do not condemn the missionaries for this, for their position is a very difficult one, and they have hardly the means of accomplishing more than they do. Calcutta, some ten years ago, was confided to the Belgian Province of Jesuits, and theirs and another of Italian priests in Central Bengal are the only missions of consequence in that province, which is the centre of intellectual activity in India. There are several priests, French, Portuguese, and Irish, scattered over the different stations in Bengal, who

minister to the Catholic half-castes, and to the fragments of old native congregations, the relics of Portuguese influence, which still show that Christianity was not always sterile in upper India: but these priests content themselves as a rule with ministering to their flocks, here and there, perhaps, making a convert, while the great intellectual and religious movements of the day pass on unknown and unnoticed as far as they are concerned. The Italian Fathers in Central Bengal support orphanages and schools, learn the language well, and often itinerate the country, preaching at the principal places in their mission. By great industry, zeal, and good management, they have, partly by education, partly by conversion, formed communities amounting to some 1,300 Christians, nearly all natives. But these also belong to the masses, and this mission, too, does not attempt to grapple with the religious problems of the day, or to influence educated natives.

The Jesuits in Calcutta have done so much that it seems ungenerous to expect that they should do more; but it must be confessed that they have hitherto not placed themselves *en rapport* with the religious workings of the Hindoo mind. They have had, it is true, many difficulties to contend against, and their failure to do so must not be hastily condemned. Calcutta contains a population of some 25,000 Christians, Europeans, half-castes, and a small number of pure natives; of these 35 to 40 per cent. are Catholics, most of whom the Jesuits found both intellectually and morally in a very degraded condition. They of course first turned their attention to the congregations thus ready to hand: the rising generation were being educated almost entirely at Protestant institutions, many of them, like the Free school or the Martinière, richly endowed; and they at once established the Collegiate School of S. F. Xavier's, which has been the head-quarters and main support of the mission ever since. This college has done wonders; in 1862 it contained about a hundred pupils, nearly all Catholic: since then, under its present rector, F. Depelchin, it has rapidly but steadily increased, till it now numbers 450 pupils, half of whom at least are Protestants, attracted by the superiority of its education. It has been affiliated to the Calcutta University, in whose examinations it has been very successful. Of the three rival colleges for European and East Indian boys, which entirely swamped it in 1861, one has been closed, and the other two have had to coalesce in their college departments. Had not one of them, the Martinière, been most richly endowed it must have collapsed, while the other, the Doveton (a Presbyterian college), is involved in great

financial difficulties, and some of the Presbyterian clergy have lately kept up a series of malicious and discreditable attacks upon the Jesuits, both in lectures and in the Calcutta daily press, in the main hope of weakening the well-deserved confidence which so many parents, Catholic and Protestant, place in them. At the same time, lower class education is well looked after by nuns and Christian brothers, and the Loretto convent school, the nuns' higher class school for European and East Indian (half-caste) girls, is even more conspicuously the first of its kind in Calcutta for girls, than that of S. F. Xavier's is for boys. Moreover the Jesuits have the charge of several churches and of the hospitals, as well as of three or four out stations, and as they are almost all Belgians, they have a great disadvantage to overcome in being obliged to master the English language before they can be of much use. Again they have been unfortunate in their want of episcopal direction: after the death of Bishop Olliffe, they were for two or three years without any bishop, and the first appointed, Dr. Van Heule, a man of great promise and energy, died a few months only after his arrival. This led to another interregnum, until Bishop Steins was transferred from Bombay and created an Archbishop *in partibus*, and Vicar Apostolic of Western Bengal (Calcutta), and his great popularity, tact in dealing with Government, and episcopal activity, promise a great accession of energy in every direction, if he is spared long enough to carry out his designs. We have, therefore, great hope for the future, but for the past it must be admitted that the Jesuits have done next to nothing to place Catholicity before the educated natives of the province in which they work: they hold almost the same relation to it which the Catholics of England did to the Tractarian movement before Dr. Wiseman drew attention to it, and pointed out how full of promise it was for the future of religion, and that at a time when numbers shook their heads and declared that it would end in nothing and produce no conversions.

On the other hand, the action of Protestantism in this matter presents a contrast, which if not discreditable, for the reasons we have pointed out, is still very mortifying. From year's end to year's end they keep themselves before the educated Hindoos in an unintermittent stream of lectures, sermons, pamphlets, and controversies. From among the converts they make the ablest are selected as ministers, catechists, or school-masters, and these again carry the controversies into the schools and village circles: it is tolerably correct to say that Protestantism is at least brought as much face to face with the

educated natives of India as Catholicity is with the educated population of England. And even this requires to be modified in favour of the former; for the large funds which are spent on Indian missions enable the missionaries to spread Protestant tracts, Bibles, and literature among the Hindoos to an extent which far exceeds any circulation of Catholic literature in England; and while English Protestants often shut their ears to Catholic controversy, educated Hindoos most rarely refuse to listen to missionary arguments. On the other hand, educated natives know perhaps less about Catholicity than educated Englishmen do about Mahomedanism.\*

Protestantism,† in spite of a really useful and honourable conversion here and there, has failed, and is failing; but it fails, not because it is ill represented, not because it is kept in the background, not because it is misunderstood, but simply because, dressed out in the best colours, it must still remain Protestantism, a system illogical and supremely inconsistent. Flourishing a book as its colours, and not knowing why it adheres to it, condemning doubt, yet itself the entrance to a maze, a Babel teaching that truth is one, denouncing evidence in the nineteenth century, which it considers unimpeachable in the first, and defending some truths with the very same arguments which it declares to be fallacious when they establish others, it cannot but fail when its task is to engender instead of to destroy conviction.

Catholicism, consistent and unchanging, appealing to men by the use of their reason, to submit their reason to the reason of Omnipotence, building on Faith, yet full of argument,

---

\* We have said nothing about Mahomedanism in this article, because the movement we have been describing is confined exclusively to Hindoos, and in a missionary point of view there is next to nothing to say of the religion of Islam. The Mahomedan influence in India is declining steadily, and the Mussulmans, as a body, stand aloof from English education. Hence the conditions of the missionary contest with them are not much altered from what they were three centuries ago. They are far less ready to listen to the missionary than Hindoos, but still in some places, notably in Kishnaghur, a good proportion of the converts, both Protestant and Catholic, are Mahomedans. A few educated Mahomedans also have become Protestants, and one of them, a recent convert, is publishing a series of controversial appeals to his late co-religionists. As the extracts we gave show, Mahomedanism, as a religion, is detested by the Hindoos.

† An article on the Brahmo Somaj from the Protestant missionary point of view appeared in the April number of the *British Quarterly Review*. It gives a fair account of the sect, but the writer totally fails to appreciate its real significance. It is a leap *beyond*, not *towards*, Protestantism, as the writer seems to hope. The extract we have given on the subject of the action of "free thought" in Christianity shows clearly that the Brahmists have taken the measure of Protestantism, and will never be deluded by it.



Catholicism, we say confidently, is the one system which alone can satisfy the religious cravings of the Hindoos. There is much, no doubt, in the religious speculations, specimens of which we have given, which springs from the evil pride, self-sufficiency, and self-complacency of man, much that must be abandoned before any agreement with the spirit of Catholicity can be effected; has it not also been shown that there is in the Anglo-Catholic party much which is incompatible with the true spirit of the Church? But in spite of this there is also a yearning after rest, after belief based upon a consistent and reasonable foundation, a clear insight into the necessity for unity and universality in any religion that can claim to be true, a conviction that religion alone is the true end of man, and a sincerity in the search after it, which promise well if that religion, which is alone adapted to the most learned as well as the most ignorant, which can alone restrain the excesses of the intellect on a clear and intelligible principle, and at the same time strengthen it and stimulate it when weak and enfeebled, is only laid before such men in its true colours and its real teaching, principles and history intelligently explained. The rock of Catholicity has many aspects, and on all sides it affords a refuge from the billows of error. Different lines of argument, it is true, are needed to convert a High Church Anglican and a Hindoo Theist, but, nevertheless, it *does* meet the true wants of the one no less than of the other, and the better qualities of each can be enlisted in its favour. In a word, India wants a *De Nobili* of the nineteenth century, a missionary who will take the measure of its wants in the year 1869, as that great man took the measure of them in 1605. We have many such men in England, though the Anglican and Protestant controversies monopolize attention too much to bring them conspicuously to the front, and in France many illustrious examples show what may be achieved by Catholic priests who understand how to grapple with the errors of the age.

We hope, in a future article, to be able to enter more fully into the arguments and opinions current among educated Hindoos, and to make it more clear that Catholicity is the goal to which the religious element in their speculations legitimately leads.

## ART. II.—PSYCHOLOGISM AND ONTOLOGISM.

*L'Ontologisme jugé par le Saint Siège : par le R. P. Kleutgen.* Paris : Gaume.

*La Philosophie scolastique exposée et défendue par le R. P. Kleutgen.\**  
Paris : Gaume.

*Padre Liberatore and the Ontologists.* By Rev. C. MEYNELL, D.D. London : Burns, Oates, & Co.

*The Carlow College Magazine for May and August, 1869.* Carlow : Fitzsimon.

WHEN the first number of the "Carlow College Magazine" reached us, we had not only finished our article on "Philosophical Axioms," but more than finished it: for the article, as we wrote it, extended to a greater length, than we thought desirable to inflict at one blow on our readers' patience. See p. 168 of our last number. On reading therefore the very interesting philosophical article presented in the new magazine, we found it impossible to do more in July than give it a brief notice. We expressed accordingly, on the one hand, our general sense of its many excellences; and we protested, on the other hand, against what we understood as "its general thesis" (p. 237). We necessarily reserved our more detailed comment on its contents to our present number, when we hoped to consider it in connection with our further treatment of Dr. Meynell's pamphlet.

We understood the writer to maintain, that "man enjoys in this life a direct and immediate cognition of God"; and we entirely concur with F. Kleutgen and Dr. Meynell, in considering this doctrine to be involved in the seven propositions condemned at Rome on September 18, 1861. We find however, with very great gratification, from the August number, that he wholly disavows any such thesis. It is with sincerest pleasure that we can hail unreservedly so thoughtful and telling a writer, as our ally and fellow-labourer, instead of our opponent, in the philosophical field.

He seems indeed to think that there was a certain want of courtesy in our ascribing to him a doctrine, which even Dr. Meynell accounts to have been "condemned by the Roman authorities as unsafe to be taught." And he asks (p. 192) whether "it would not be well if we gave credit to others for sincerity in their love of

---

\* This French translation has appeared since our last article on F. Kleutgen was written.

truth, and in their honest but humble purpose of promoting Catholic interests." We never dreamed of questioning his possession of these qualities. But we have no knowledge, to this moment, who the writer is ; and we had no clue whatever therefore to guide us, except his paper. Now the opinion which we ascribed to him has never been condemned in so many words : and several Catholics—thoroughly loyal (we believe) in intention to the Church—hold honestly, that no doctrine was proscribed in the seven propositions except direct pantheism. How were we to guess that he is not one of their number ? Even our correspondent "Vindex" (see April, 1868, p. 569), whom we know to hold very strong doctrine on the extent of the Church's infallibility and teaching authority, considers it lawful to think, that man possesses a certain "perception" of God, which is given otherwise than "through intermediate ideas." We were as far as possible from imputing to the writer before us any intentional and formal disrespect to the Church's teaching authority ; though undoubtedly we understood him as upholding a tenet, which *in fact* no Catholic is at liberty to embrace.

And now we hope he will not think us ungracious, if we proceed to explain the ground on which we rested our apprehension of his words. It would be a great fault, if we credited any one wantonly with a doctrine which we represent as unsound ; and we think therefore that we are under an obligation, on every occasion like the present, of either apologizing and confessing ourselves to blame, or else of vindicating the *objective* correctness of our interpretation. We assure him that, in doing the latter, nothing can be further from our mind, than to doubt, ever so slightly, the perfect sincerity of his disavowal.

We referred, in support of our interpretation, to some words of his in p. 15. The following is the passage which we had in view :—

We cannot think the contingent without thinking the necessary ; we cannot think the particular without thinking the universal ; we cannot think the mutable without thinking the immutable. The creature depends as completely on God in the order of thought as in the order of existence.

Now firstly, how could we understand this last sentence ? It might *imaginably* mean no more, than that men cannot think at all, unless God preserves their power of thought. But it was quite impossible to suppose that the writer merely intended to express a proposition, which is held as quite elementary by all Theists throughout the world, and which is moreover utterly irrelevant to his whole argument. The only other interpretation which occurred to us as possible was, that men can think of no creature, except dependently on their thought of God ; that the creature can no

more be *thought* by men without their previous\* *thought* of God, than it can *exist* without the previous *Existence* of God.† This opinion is well known to have been held by many ontologists. Herr Schütz e.g., whose assault on ontologism we noticed in January 1868 (pp. 235-237), mentions it as one of the three tenets which constitute their system, that "the order of knowledge must also be the order of existence": from which they infer, he says, that "God Himself is the first object known."‡ But if no creature can be thought until God has been thought previously, the "cognition of God" must be "direct and immediate." And this is the precise doctrine we ascribed to the Carlovian.

Secondly, take the *first* sentence in the above extract. It distinctly states, that men's thought of the contingent depends on their thought of the necessary. Now in the preceding page it had been laid down, that men's thought of the necessary depends on their thought of the Necessary Being. "We can have no abstract idea of necessity, which does not suppose a concrete necessary being." If therefore men's knowledge of the contingent depends on their knowledge of the necessary, and if their knowledge of the necessary depends on their knowledge of God,—it did seem irresistibly to follow, that men's knowledge both of the necessary and the contingent depends on their knowledge of God. But if so, their "cognition of God" is "direct and immediate."

Thirdly, there is a sentence in p. 17 which gave further strength to the impression received from p. 15. Is not God known *from His works*? it has been asked. "Certainly," replies the Carlovian, "*in the reflex order*." Now this is a well-known phrase, continually used by the condemned ontologists. When they speak of God being known from creatures, they are in the habit of adding this qualification "*in the reflex order*": and they do so for the sole purpose of implying, that man possesses a *direct* non-reflex knowledge of God, *antecedently* to his knowledge of creatures. Since the writer before us considers that men possess *no know-*

---

\* "Previous," not necessarily in order of time, but, at all events, in order of nature and causation.

† The writer explains his own meaning in August (p. 187). He intended to say that "what S. Thomas calls the '*participata similitudo veritatis aeternae*' is no more the creation of the human mind by abstraction or generalization, than our own existence is derived from ourselves." We think few of our readers will be surprised that we failed to elicit this sense from the sentence; though we now of course know that such was its real subjective meaning.

‡ The Rev. Dr. Brann e.g., an American priest, in his work called "Curious Questions," thus speaks:—"The logical," he says, "should be the same as the ontological order. But in the ontological order God holds the first place. . . . Hence in the logical order, or order of thought, God must be first. Besides, unless we admit the immediate vision of God, we never can have an idea of God: &c. &c." (p. 118).

ledge at all of God antecedently to their knowledge of creatures, we do not understand why he should have added that very important qualification,—“in the reflex order,”—which could not but mislead.

We must really contend then, that we ascribed no doctrine to the writer, which is not conveyed in the legitimate objective sense of his words; though we are now well aware, that he intended no such tenet as we then supposed. It was in consequence of this misapprehension and for no other reason, that we felt bound to protest against what appeared to us “the general thesis” of a writer, with whom otherwise we had so many points of sympathy. Why we ascribed this view to him, not merely as *one* of his opinions but as his “general thesis,” we will explain in the course of our article.

He suggests (p. 185) that possibly we are wishing “a little *row* in re philosophicâ.” We assure him that, as it is, we are engaged in many more “rows” than is at all to our taste; and that the very last thing we desire is to increase their number. Our purposes, on the contrary, were most pacific. We consider empiricism to be far the most formidable error of our time. We are extremely anxious therefore to bring about a union of Catholics interested in philosophy, who shall oppose this desolating unbelief; or, in other words, who shall vindicate the certain and vital truth, that there exists, to use Dr. Meynell’s words, “an *a priori* positive objective element of thought, distinct from the mind itself, and possessing the characters of necessity and universality.” It seems to us that there are at this moment two great obstacles in the way of such union. On the one hand, those who alone are properly (we think) called ontologists, confuse this certain truth with a further doctrine, which is not only not certain truth but is condemned error; the doctrine, that God Himself is presented immediately to the human intellect as an Object of thought. On the other hand—partly by way of protest against, and reaction from, this error—some of the scholastic following (as we said in July, p. 167) put far too much in the background that very vital part of the scholastic philosophy, which dwells on necessary and universal verities. The one main end, both of our preceding and our present article, is to remove these two obstacles, and thus to forward the priceless benefit of Catholic philosophical unity. And in furtherance of this purpose, we now proceed to build on one or two principles which we advocated in July.

Both Dr. Meynell and the Carlovian—following in this respect the example of many other Catholic thinkers—use the words “psychologism” and “ontologism,”\* as expressing two different

---

\* The Carlovian indeed speaks of “psychology” and “ontology.” But we think that on reflection he will admit the convenience of retaining these

schools of thought into which Catholics are divided. It seems to us, on every ground, far more suitable to do the very reverse; and to use those two words as expressing two opposite errors, against which every well-instructed Catholic is carefully on his guard. We will begin with psychologism.

F. Kleutgen (Ont., pp. 3, 4) protests against the habit, adopted by the ontologists, of giving the name "psychologists" to their Catholic opponents. This is done by the former, for the very purpose of implying, that the latter regard necessary truth as a mere product of the human mind. But no well-instructed Catholic of any school holds this latter opinion; and no well-instructed Catholic therefore should be called a psychologist. On the other hand, as the Carlovian points out (p. 15), Mr. Stuart Mill by implication calls himself a psychologist; and there is no discourtesy therefore in giving him the name.

What then is that error, which may suitably be called "psychologism"? Those, it seems to us, may suitably be called psychologists, who deny to the human mind all immediate and certain knowledge, except of its own affections and operations; those who will not admit that it possesses the power of authenticating, with infallible self-evidence, various truths, which are simply external to itself. No error can be more subversive than this of all philosophy and of all religion. "We stand face to face," eloquently and most truly says the Carlovian, "with those eternal truths. We perceive them in our reason, we feel them in our hearts, and hear their solemn voice in the inmost recesses of conscience" (p. 17). Man's knowledge of eternal truths depends, as on its foundation, on his knowledge of those "philosophical axioms" which we considered in our last number. But psychologism at all events denies to him all right of accepting those axioms as objectively certain, whether or no it admits them to be subjectively self-evident.\* Psychologism then includes the two different systems, (1) of empiricism and (2) of Kantism, which we mentioned in July (p. 145). Putting aside all reference to Mill and Bain, even Kant and Mansel ascribe to man no further knowledge of axioms as possible, than merely that he is so *constituted* as inevitably to *regard* certain truths as necessary. Here is psychologism pure and simple. On the contrary man knows, not merely that he *cannot help regarding* these truths as necessary, but that

---

two words in their ordinary sense, as merely expressing two different *classes of subjects*, which have to be treated in *every* philosophical system. We shall make no further apology therefore for making this change in our quotations from his papers.

\* That no psychologists can consistently *carry out* their principle—not only we do not deny, but we most strongly affirm. It will be one principal argument which we hope to urge against them in a future article.



they *are* necessary. His knowledge is not merely of himself and of his own mental constitution, but of certain all-important verities entirely *external* to himself. Such is the doctrine of every orthodox Catholic; and it is a direct denial of psychologistic error. We are not here professing to draw out an argument against psychologism, for that is to be the theme of a future article. But it is of much importance for our present purposes, that our reader shall sufficiently understand its character and tendency; and especially that he shall see its direct antagonism to the scholastic philosophy.

Let us consider then, what would be the condition of human knowledge on the psychologistic hypothesis. And we cannot perhaps throw off better than by saying, that this hypothesis would prevent men from reasonably denying the possible truth of that famous theory, which so perplexed Descartes, concerning a mendacious creator. We will (1) exhibit the utter desolatingness of this theory; then (2) briefly criticise Descartes' attempt to refute it; and (3) point out the utter powerlessness of a psychologist, to give it even the most superficially plausible reply.

1. The hypothesis then which so exercised Descartes was this: that mankind are under the power of a malignant creator, who gives them deceptive faculties; and accordingly, that the laws of thought are fundamentally different from the laws of truth. Let us suppose for a moment, that I had no reasonable ground for confidently denying the truth of this hypothesis. What would follow on such a supposition? I *fancy* myself to have gone through a long and continued variety of experiences, which my memory recalls. But I have no means of *knowing* that I so much as existed a minute ago; and still less, that I have had that particular history which I suppose myself to remember: for I know not but that my memory is a purely delusive faculty, implanted for the very purpose of deceiving me. I have no power of knowing even such simple truths, as that two and two make four, or that every triliteral figure is triangular: for how can I know that the intellectual dictates, which point to those truths, are not the inspirations of a mendacious creator? I have no means of knowing any *personal* facts, except my own sensations and thoughts as they exist at this moment; while as to truths or facts *external* to myself, I have no means of knowing for certain anything whatever about them. I know nothing—I *can* know nothing—of my fellow-men, of God, of moral obligation.

2. How is it that Descartes professes to refute this desolating hypothesis of a mendacious creator? He bases all human certitude on knowledge of God the Holy Creator;\* and he considers that

---

\* His doctrine was appropriated with great expressness, in a very able and eulogistic review of Dean Mansel in the "Guardian." "We look,"

men know for certain the Existence of a Holy God, because they can form of Him a clear and distinct idea. Never surely otherwise was so singular a theory invented by so able a man. When my faculties declare that two and two make four, or that every trilateral figure is triangular, Descartes tells me I cannot trust them; but when they form what he considers a clear idea of God, he declares that they thereby at once authenticate, both their own trustworthiness, and also the Existence of Him whom they contemplate.

3. Descartes however did give an answer of some kind to the difficulty which he raised; though certainly not an answer which will satisfy any reasonable mind. But the psychologist can give it no answer whatever. It is his very tenet, that the intellect knows nothing except its own affections and operations; and he cannot therefore, without self-contradiction, ascribe to it any cognizance whatever, as to the correspondence of those affections and operations with external and objective reality. We have already said, that no psychologist can carry out his principles with any consistency; and the enlarging on this theme appertains, not to our present but to a future article. But we may relieve for a moment the gravity of our discussion, by assuring our readers that we are personally acquainted with one person—and one possessing considerable power of various kinds—who goes great lengths in the direction of psychologistic consistency. He frankly accepts the conclusion, that he has no means whatever of certainly knowing—A. B. being his most intimate friend—that he ever conversed with or saw A. B. during the whole course of his life. He knows, of course, that he has at this moment the most distinct *impression* of *many* past conversations with A. B. But he is (so far) true to his psychologism; and he admits that he has really no means whatever of knowing—in consistency he should add, of ever so faintly guessing—how far these present *impressions* of the past correspond in any degree with the past itself.

We would now press on our readers' especial attention a remark, to which the preceding statements have been intended as introductory. We say then, that the one true answer to that difficulty which Descartes raised,—to that difficulty which baffles every theory of psychologism,—was supplied by scholastic and other Catholic thinkers, centuries before the difficulty itself ever entered (so far as we know) any man's imagination. God, Who gave us our faculties,

---

says the writer, "for the foundation as for the limit of our belief in our own faculties, to the deep-seated instinct which tells us that God cannot deceive. Reason cannot guarantee itself. . . . Surely the religious instinct, which bids us trust in God, is the one primary premiss of all truths. Neither reason nor sense can warrant themselves; we believe them because we believe that God gave them."

gave us, as part of them, that most precious gift, called "the light of reason" or the "intellectual light." By means of this gift, men know, not only (in this or that individual case) *what their faculties declare*, but know also, with most certain and self-evident knowledge, that such declaration *corresponds with objective truth*. Our present purpose is not to prove (as may irrefragably be proved) that this doctrine is true, and is the one satisfactory solution of Descartes' difficulty: our present purpose is merely to point out, that such is indubitably the doctrine of traditional Catholic philosophy. And with this end in view, we will begin by drawing attention to two beautiful passages, which Dr. Meynell has cited from S. Buonaventura and S. Thomas.

Certainly it is difficult to name a more priceless blessing than this "light of reason." Well may it be called a "light." When actual light is away, men are shut up each in his own company, and debarred from all direct vision of the external world. And so, were it not for this light of reason, I should be shut up without possibility of escape in the dreary region of actually present consciousness. Thanks be to God, I possess this light: and in its bright effulgence, I know my own past history; I come to know my fellow-creatures; I come to know my Almighty Creator.

Now what is the characteristic of this gift? God's great and incommunicable prerogative is, that in His own strength He knows the Truth; He knows all facts, past, present, and future; He knows the eternal and immutable principles to which those facts are subject. To man, among earthly creatures, He has given beyond all possible comparison the largest participation of this prerogative. "A light is sealed upon us," which is "*the Light of Eternal Truth*, since our mind is immediately informed by the Truth itself." (S. Buonaventura, Meynell p. 9). "The human soul knows all things" (which it knows at all) "*in the rationes æternæ; through participation in which we know all things*" (S. Thomas, Meynell p. 19). S. Thomas adds, as Dr. Meynell reminds us (*ib.*), that the Psalmist refers to this great gift, when he says "The Light of Thy countenance is signed upon us."

Again. Take any given necessary truth. We showed in July (p. 149), that this is not one truth as cognized by A.; another as cognized by B.; and another, different in kind, as cognized by God. No: *one and the same truth* is cognized both by God and by creatures. There is one vast body of objective necessary truth, which has dominion (so to speak) over the human intellect: which is fully and exhaustively intued by God; which is partially cognized by man. What we would here point out is, that such is indubitably the doctrine both of S. Augustine and S. Thomas. S. Augustine thus argues, and S. Thomas most unreservedly accepts his argument (Meynell p. 17): "If we *both* see that to be true

which *thou* sayest, and if we *both* see that to be true which *I* say, in *what* (*ubi*), I ask, do we see this? Certainly not I in thee, nor yet thou in me; but both of us *in that immutable truth, which is [in authority] over our minds.*" We may put the same thing in other words. Take any axiom you please. It is not merely that I know myself to *think* it as self-evident, and *you* know yourself to *think* it as self-evident. Both you and I know, that what we thus think is objectively *true*; that it corresponds with *objective reality*. And we know this immediately, by the intellectual light which God has given us. Accordingly, S. Thomas declares, as Catholic philosophers have frequently pointed out (*Contra Gentes*, l. 3, c. 154), "that through the natural light, the intellect is rendered certain concerning those things which it *knows by that light*; as [e.g.] concerning first principles." And he elsewhere states (*Summa I.*, q. 84, a. 5) that "the intellectual soul knows immaterial things in the *rationes æternæ*":\* not because in this life it can directly see God, "in Whom the *rationes æternæ* are contained"; but because "*the intellectual light within us is nothing else than the participated similitude of the Uncreated Light.*"

F. Kleutgen (*Phil. Scol.*, n. 57 et seq.) enters at some length on S. Thomas's doctrine in this and similar passages. Without following up such details, we do not see how any one can doubt—we are not aware of any one having ever doubted—that so much as this is taught by the Angelic Doctor. God sees all things in His Uncreated Light. He cognizes all truths, in themselves and in their mutual relation; He not only knows, but *knows* Himself to know. To man He has given a certain intellectual illumination, fashioned in its measure after the likeness of His Own. This gift is, in fact, a derived, partial, and potential enjoyment of the Divine Light itself; for it gives man the power of cognizing a large body of truths, in themselves and in their mutual relations;—a power not of knowing only, but of knowing that he knows. As F. Kleutgen urges again and again, there can be no true science, except so far as man *knows* that he knows.

It will not be denied, we suppose, that the great body of scholastics followed S. Thomas in his doctrine of man's intellectual light. We may as well however confirm our statement, by the entirely unsuspecting testimony of a very able Protestant philosopher, Dr. Noah Porter of New York:—

Many of the earlier philosophers and theologians of *modern times* (he says), *following the scholastics of the middle ages*, were accustomed to say that

---

\* He includes *material* things also in his statement; but adds that our knowledge of material things is not derived *only* from "*participatio rationum æternarum*," but also from "*species intelligibiles a rebus acceptæ*."

these ideas and truths are discerned *by the light of reason and the light of nature*, or that they are evidenced and evinced *by their own light*. . . *The fact is undoubted*, that before the critical investigations were introduced by Descartes which led to the modern psychology, these primitive ideas and primitive truths were *generally* said to be discerned *by the light of nature*. --(*"The Human Intellect,"* p. 518.)

Now it will be seen at once, that this whole doctrine of the scholastics is precisely a denial of psychologism. Psychologists say, that the human intellect knows only its own affections and operations. Scholastics say on the contrary, that it possesses an intrinsic light of its own, with which God has gifted it; and that, under the illumination of that light, it cognizes its own dictates, as corresponding infallibly\* with external and objective truth. In one word, scholastics ascribe to man's intellect that precise faculty, which psychologists deny to it. We are not here arguing (as we have already explained) that the scholastics teach truly on this matter, and the psychologists falsely; that is to be the theme of a future article. Our present point is only, that no doctrine can be more emphatically opposed to psychologism than the scholastic.

This will perhaps be the best place for answering a question, which the Carlovian presses most courteously but with much urgency on our attention. He asks (p. 190), "What is the precise nature of that objective existence which we give to necessary truth?" We explained this in July to the best of our power, from p. 148 to p. 154; and we do not know what is the particular point, on which our author desires further elucidation. He asks indeed, whether "necessary truth is *being*"; but we confess ourselves a little surprised at the inquiry. Surely there is but one Necessary Being, viz. Almighty God.

Our readers will have sufficiently understood the general drift of our argument; but at this point it will be better to pause and review our position. The second article of our July number was occupied, in vindicating to "the scholastic philosophy" what seems to us its due "authority." There have been one or two serious difficulties, in the way of this authority being universally recognized by Catholics. For (1) some thinkers, who feel strongly (it is impossible to feel *too* strongly) on the objective necessity of various truths and on the extreme momentousness of upholding that necessity,—are prejudiced against scholasticism, under the notion that it does not sufficiently enforce so vital a doctrine. Some other Catholics again (2), who see how singular is the authority ascribed

---

\* Kleutgen does not hesitate to say (Phil. Scol., n. 277, et seq.) that human reason is, in some sense and within certain limits, infallible.

by the Church to scholasticism, are perhaps not sufficiently hearty in their denunciation of psychologism, from imagining that that error has some kind of affinity with scholastic doctrine; and are thus (according to our view of the matter) led, by their very zeal for scholasticism, to disparage the true scholastic teaching. For both these reasons—following humbly in the wake of F. Kleutgen—we are extremely desirous of exhibiting the fundamental and violent antagonism of the two philosophies.

This has to be done (1) positively, and (2) negatively. It is done *positively*, by dwelling (as we have now dwelt) on the scholastic doctrine concerning man's intellectual light: for (as we have already pointed out) that is the precise doctrine which psychologists as such deny. On the other hand, our *negative* work consists in *replying* to the main *objections*, which are raised against scholasticism by earnest upholders of necessary truth. Now these objections are two in number. Firstly it is objected that, according to the scholastics, philosophical axioms are mere generalizations from experience: \* but this allegation we have already (we trust) abundantly refuted, both in our July article on axioms, and in various portions of what we have now written. The second objection is grounded on the scholastic doctrine concerning "abstraction"; and on this objection we will now say a few words. The objection is founded exclusively on the assumption—an assumption against which Fathers Kleutgen and Liberatore are never weary of protesting—that the scholastic doctrine concerning abstraction is substantially similar to the Lockian. Now what Locke and his followers mean by "abstraction," was never more clearly expressed than by F. Kleutgen in the following passage: a passage which was written (as our readers will see) for the simple purpose of emphatically disavowing Locke's doctrine. The italics are our own:—

This objection, like many others, is unintelligible, unless men confound the doctrine of the scholastics concerning abstraction with that other theory which, since Locke's time, has been in vogue among modern philosophers. According to Locke, the understanding obtains its concepts by fixing its attention on sensible representations. Eliminating differences (says Locke) it retains that wherein things agree with each other, and thus forms general representations by means of analysis and synthesis. It is commonly [and most truly] objected to this theory, that intellectual representations thus formed *would not be essentially distinguished from sensible representations*

---

\* This objection is more than once applied by the Carlovian. "Aristotle's philosophy . . . professes . . . to evolve the first principles of our reason from empirical judgments" (p. 13). Again, we must not "receive first principles, which logically make the axioms of science the results of experience" (p. 17). God forbid we should receive such first principles!



either in their objects or their principle. If the concept is formed [merely] by [mutual] comparison of what falls under sense, it can contain nothing not perceptible to the sense; and consequently it can express nothing else than the generalization of phenomena. . . . According to Locke then, the understanding would not differ from the sensitive faculty except in name. It would simply be the same faculty of knowledge, which is called the sensitive faculty when it perceives the particular, but is called the understanding when by comparison it searches for and discovers the universal. But if, on the contrary, it is certain that the understanding not only perceives phenomena but penetrates the intimate essence of things, it must first think that essence in the individual. . . .

Such was the reasoning adopted against Locke . . . but men ought to have perceived . . . that the abstraction of the scholastics is totally distinct from that of the modern empirists. (Phil. Scol., n. 69.)

In fact the Lockian doctrine of abstraction is simply a philosophical portent to be denounced. On the other hand, to set forth and defend the scholastic doctrine\* on that subject,—to descant on species sensibiles and intelligibiles, on sensus intimus and phantasy,—would require an entire article. At present therefore, we can do no more than cite various passages from Suarez and from F. Kleutgen, which will exhibit, with a clearness almost startling to many, the broad opposition between the two views. The italics throughout are our own.

A species [intelligibilis] is not said to be abstracted from phantasms as though the species were first mixed up with phantasms and separated from them by the intellectus agens . . . for it would be puerile to suppose this. . . . That the intellect abstracts a species, means nothing else, than that it forms by its own power a spiritual species, representing the same nature which the phantasm represents, but after a spiritual fashion. And it is this elevation from material to spiritual representation, which is called abstraction. (Suarez de Animâ, l. 4, c. 2, n. 18.)

The intellect, from cognition of the accidents, proceeds to contemplate those things which . . . lie hid under the accidents; and thence indeed is called intellectus, quasi intus legens. (Ib., c. 4, n. 1.)

The intellect often contemplates (intelligit) things, of which the phantasy possesses no resemblances. (Ib., c. 7, n. 1.)

Since the intellect is immaterial, it is in no respect subject to the materiality of its object; but overcomes it and (as far as possible) spiritualizes it. (Ib., c. 3, n. 20.)

---

\* We think it cannot fairly be denied, that S. Thomas's expressions are occasionally ambiguous and liable to be interpreted in a Lockian sense. But very far less can it be denied, that his doctrine, as a whole, is correctly represented by F. Kleutgen in the passages which follow. Such is apparently, on both particulars, the Carlovian's view: see p. 191 of his August article.

As we perceive *phenomena* in the object by our senses, because these correspond to the nature of our senses ; so we know by our reason that which is *exclusively* within the sphere of that faculty. (Kleutgen, Phil. Scol., n. 63.)

Should we be able, at the sight of an individual action, to conceive a maxim of morality, unless we previously possessed [in some sense] *certain notions* relative to the moral order ? Assuredly no. (Ib.)

The scholastics say, when they explain abstraction, that as in a [given] object the eye seizes the colour, the ear the sound, &c. &c., so in the same object the *intellect* perceives what it is its province to cognize : viz. the nature and the essence. (n. 69.)

It is one thing to think nothing but the phenomena, and to regard that which is common to them as being the essence of things : it is [quite] another thing to perceive the essence *through* [the veil of] the phenomena. (n. 70.)

The reason . . . no doubt primitively . . . resembles a *tabula rasa* : but it is the reason *itself*, and not the sensitive faculty, which writes on that "tabula." (n. 72.)

Since it is the same soul, which knows respectively by the senses and the reason, the presence of the sensible representation suffices, in order that the reason should be excited to *exercise its activity*, and to direct that activity on the object which the senses perceive. According to Suarez, the *sensible representation* can have no other influence than this on the origin of intellectual representations. (n. 74.)

If, instead of dwelling on certain inexact expressions [incautiously adopted by certain modern scholastics], men would study the clear and precise expressions which were *unanimously taught* by the most celebrated doctors of the school, they would be obliged to admit that, according to the scholastics, the intellectual act which forms concepts is *essentially different* from [that which forms] sensible representations or images. It is because the mind is *independent of matter in its being as in its operations*, that (according to the scholastics) the intellect . . . is capable of those highest representations which they call the *principia prima*, &c. . . . And because the intellect can perceive, by these highest representations, all which is presented to it, it is also capable of separating essence from accidents, and *penetrating through phenomena to being itself*. (n. 97.)

By the knowledge of *causation* we quit the region of things sensible and enter into the *supersensible*. Now, who could maintain that scholasticism did not recognize this truth ? The scholastics unanimously taught that the existence and nature of the supersensible are known by means of things sensible : its existence, because we ought to think it as principle and cause of the sensible ; its nature, because we ought to think it as possessing all those qualities without which it could not be such cause. (n. 100.)

Thought from the first moment at once goes beyond phenomena. (Ib.)

The scholastics taught unanimously, that the intellectual representation is not impressed on the mind by the *phantasy* ; but engendered by the intellect as such, that is as *distinct from the senses*. (n. 109.)

According to the scholastics, the *sensible representation* does not excite the intellect to think, except in this sense, that it places before the mind an object which is capable of being known intellectually. Moreover . . . the presence

[of this sensible representation] could not have any effect on the intellect, were it not that it is the same mind which cognizes both by senses and by intellect. (Ib.)

Now let it be considered, how widely F. Kleutgen has been accepted by adherents of the scholastic philosophy, as quite a representative exponent of that philosophy. Canon Walker, for example, than whom it possesses no more enthusiastic devotee, calls him "the illustrious Kleutgen" ("First Principles," p. 37, note); and implies unreserved agreement with him. Although therefore we have no space in our present article to set forth and defend the scholastic doctrine of abstraction, surely, after such testimonies as the above, we are entitled to assume what will abundantly refute the objection before us. The objection alleges it to be the scholastic doctrine, that man's intellect cannot directly apprehend supersensible ideas; that man possesses no further intellectual power, than that of combining and generalizing phenomena. But we affirm confidently—though as yet we must be content to rest the matter on Kleutgen's testimony—that such a representation is a total perversion of scholasticism; that, according to that philosophy, man possesses the power of thinking various thoughts, which are neither directly nor indirectly derived from (though they may be first *occasioned* by) sensation and experience. All which has to be said on the other side, is merely that scholastic philosophers admit, what the strongest *a priori* philosophers of this day admit also. See our July number, p. 158. The scholastics, we say, admit, that the intellect is unable in this life to *exercise* its intrinsic power, except under a certain dependence (of which we need not here determine the precise extent) on the previous and concomitant operation of the senses.

Our argument then (so far) may be thus summed up. We think the word "psychologism" may be very suitably used to express that tenet, which teaches that the intellect can cognize no objects external to its own affections and operations. And our thesis has been, that there is a fundamental and violent antagonism, between this tenet and the scholastic philosophy. We have argued for this thesis positively, by referring to that scholastic doctrine of intellectual light, which is a point blank *denial* of psychologism. We have argued for the same thesis negatively, by considering the two principal particulars, which have been alleged as instances of an affinity between the two philosophies. It has been alleged, (1) that scholasticism represents axioms as mere generalizations from experience; and (2) that it denies to the intellect all power of directly apprehending supersensible ideas: but we have maintained confidently that its doctrines are the very reverse of these. We cannot but look on our point as one of very considerable importance. For considering the Church's repeated approbation of

scholasticism, it would indeed be a most serious fact, if that philosophy disparaged ever so remotely man's cognition of objective necessary truth.

We have just referred to the fact, that F. Kleutgen is so widely accepted as a most fair representative of the scholastic philosophy. We would entreat our readers then to ponder the following passage, written indeed by S. Augustine who lived before the scholastic period, but heartily and unreservedly accepted by Kleutgen in his great philosophical work :—

It is in this that we see the superiority of that mind which thinks, over that being [the brute] which perceives exclusively by its senses. The [rational] mind *judges* the sensible world, and *in some sort commands it*. If then there exists a being to which the [rational] mind *itself* is in turn subject—and if one can establish that this power, [thus] superior to the mind, must be eternal, immutable, and infinite,—the Existence of God will at once be demonstrated. What then is that thing which *reigns as superior* over all [rational] minds? It is *the eternal and immutable truth*, which contains in itself all that is immutably true. It is placed in authority over our mind; which *judges not the truth*, but judges [all things] *according to the truth*. For all our judgments, on external things and on ourselves, are formed according to those truths which *we know to be eternal and immutable*; and of which *we seek no proof external to ourselves*. And this truth *must be placed in authority over our mind*: inasmuch as the latter obtains its perfection by *approaching it*; obtains its beatitude by appropriating it; and becomes truly free by *submitting to its empire*. This truth exists indeed in every reasonable being, by his knowledge of it; but *it belongs exclusively to no one*. It is in some sort a common good: like the sun, which all eyes contemplate, and *in whose light they see all that they see*. If then some Being, superior to this truth, governs the entire world of minds, it is He Who is God: if nothing is superior to this truth, then this truth itself is God. (Phil. Scol., n. 249.)

It is not then S. Augustine's doctrine only but F. Kleutgen's also, that man knows certain "eternal immutable truths," of which "he seeks no proof external to himself": truths which are the common heritage of mankind: truths which in so strong a sense reign over man's intellect, that, if there were no Being above them, their aggregate might in some sense be called God. F. Kleutgen indeed holds, with S. Augustine, that *in fact* God is superior to (and therefore not identical with) these various truths. Still, as he expressly endorses the expression that they are "eternal and immutable," he can mean nothing else than what he himself says in so many other places: viz., that they are founded on God's Essence, and exist necessarily because *God* necessarily exists. See our July number, pp. 154-5. Of a writer who so speaks, the very last thing which can be said is, that he disparages the existence or legitimate claims of eternal, immutable, and necessary truth.

We now come to the second part of our argument : which, though certainly very far less momentous than the first, is by no means without a certain importance of its own. Whatever sense should be affixed to the word "psychologism"—at all events we must maintain confidently, that any Catholic places himself in a thoroughly false position, who appropriates to himself the word "ontologist." Both Dr. Meynell and the Carlovian call every man an ontologist, who upholds consistently the existence of necessary truth : but in that sense, Liberatore, Dmowski, and all well-instructed Catholics without exception (so far as intention goes at least), would be ontologists. As to Kleutgen himself, instead of being an enemy to ontologism, he would be simply one of the most pronounced ontologists in the whole world. We must allege however, that the true historical sense of the word is very different ; and that this conclusion has been unanswerably demonstrated by F. Kleutgen, in the work which we have named first at the head of our article. For ourselves of course, we can only place before our readers a very small part of F. Kleutgen's matter ; yet we hope we can say enough to give a sufficient specimen of his general argument. We contend then, that the term "ontologists" is properly applied only to those, who hold doctrines more or less closely resembling the seven condemned propositions ; doctrines therefore, which no Catholic has any business to hold at all. We quoted at length the seven propositions in January, 1868 (p. 231, note). Here we will translate the first and third.

1. "The immediate knowledge of God, at least habitual, is essential to the human intellect ; so that without it [the intellect] can know nothing, inasmuch as [this knowledge] is the intellectual light itself."

3. "Universals considered objectively (*à parte rei*) are not really distinguished from God."

Now for the name "ontologism." It never existed before the beginning of this century ; when it was invented by certain zealous Catholics, chiefly French, as denoting a certain philosophical system, which they zealously maintained, and which they were very desirous of substituting for the traditional views which had (more or less) possession of the schools.\* Among the most prominent and accredited advocates of this system, have been Fabre, Brancherau, Hugonin, and Ubaghs. Fabre, one of the earliest, thus explains his own doctrine. The italics are ours :—

Ontologism is a system in which, after having proved the objective reality of general ideas, it is established that those ideas are no forms or modifications of our mind ; that they are nothing created ; that they are necessary,

---

\* Tongiorgi mentions that it was Gioberti, who actually invented the name "ontologism."

immutable, eternal, absolute objects ; that they are concentrated in the Being simply so called ; and that *that Infinite Being is the first idea seized by our mind, the first intelligible, the light in which we see all the eternal, universal, and absolute truths.* Ontologists say then, that these eternal truths *can have no reality external to the Divine Essence* ; whence they conclude that [these truths] *do not exist except as united to the Divine Substance, and that therefore in that substance only can we see them.*—(Kleutgen, p. 3.)

It is surely impossible to read this passage, and not admit the identity of its doctrine with that of the two above cited propositions.

The other three writers whom we have named, and who held a high place among those calling themselves ontologists, are in still more indisputable solidarity with the condemned propositions. Branchereau, being a most loyal Catholic, himself drew up fifteen propositions from his philosophical course, and sent them to Rome, with an inquiry whether they were involved in the recent condemnation : to which inquiry an answer speedily came in the affirmative (Kleutgen, pp. 11, 12). Then Ubaghs was required by the Holy Father to retract certain of his doctrines, on the express ground that they were "altogether similar" to the seven. See our number for January, 1868, pp. 237-240 ; 279-290. And lastly Hugonin, on being appointed to the episcopate, put forth the following retraction of his ontologism :—

Whereas I the undersigned have been informed by the French Apostolic Nuncio, that the doctrine which I set forth *concerning ontologism* in my philosophical work is *disapproved by the Holy See*, particularly because of its *favouring*, explicitly or *implicitly*, those propositions whereof the holy Roman and universal congregation of the Inquisition decreed, in the year 1861, that they could not safely be taught ;—at once, without delay, I freely and spontaneously declare, that I account and disapprove the aforesaid doctrine, in the same manner in which the Holy See has decreed, as being more or less *aberrant from the principles of sound philosophy* : and I promise at the same time that, as far as in me lies, I will take measures against it being any longer taught in the schools (p. 13).

From these facts three important conclusions are immediately deducible. Firstly, the Holy Father disapproves the doctrine of Mgr. Hugonin, not merely as "unsafe," but as "more or less aberrant from the principles of sound philosophy." Secondly, it cannot possibly be that the condemned errors were pantheistic and not ontologicistic : for no one ever dreamed that Branchereau, Hugonin, and Ubaghs had lapsed into pantheism ; and Mgr. Hugonin expressly specifies, as condemned, his doctrine concerning *ontologism*. Thirdly, it is not only the seven propositions themselves in their naked wording, which every Catholic is bound to reject : he is bound also to reject whatever "altogether resembles them" ; whatever "explicitly or implicitly favours them."



What then is the doctrine of the ontologists? We cannot see any difficulty in answering this question. Their characteristic tenets are (1) that God is presented immediately to the human intellect as its Object; \* and (2) (which would of course at once ensue from the first) that this presentation fulfils towards the soul the office of "intellectual light." It is admitted on all hands, by Kleutgen or Liberatore no less than by Fabre, that in man there is an "intellectual light," "without which the intellect can know nothing" in any true sense: but whereas Kleutgen and Liberatore regard this intellectual light as a created endowment of the soul, Fabre regarded it as consisting in a certain vision of God.

Here we can explain, why we understood this ontologistic doctrine to be the Carlovian's "general thesis." We have already (we hope) made clear how it came to pass, that we considered him to maintain it expressly and almost explicitly. But why, he may ask, instead of regarding it as *one* of his opinions, did we describe it as his *general thesis*? For this reason. The condemned ontologists used the term "psychologism" in pretty much the same sense that we have given to it throughout this article: and they always made it quite a fundamental part of their argument, that no one could consistently avoid psychologism except by help of their characteristic tenet. When therefore they inveighed against the evils of psychologism, their one end in doing so was to recommend this characteristic tenet: their one "general thesis" was the truth and necessity of this tenet. We ascribed to the Carlovian (not unnaturally, we think) a drift altogether similar. We understood his various attacks on psychologism—attacks with which, in themselves, we heartily sympathized—to be intended as ministrative to that ontologistic tenet, which we regarded therefore as his "general thesis." However, on looking back at his article as a whole, we are quite willing to admit that we arrived somewhat too hastily at this conclusion, and to express regret for our precipitance. We consider indeed, that his article gave us fully sufficient objective grounds, for considering him an ontologist in the sense now explained; and that our mistake therefore on that head was due to him and not to ourselves. But we admit that his article did *not* give us sufficient objective grounds for describing ontologism as its "general thesis."

At this point we must offer some comments on one or two of his other statements: comments which we submit to his better judgment with unfeigned respect, and with full confidence that he will appreciate our reasons for frankly expressing our view.

---

\* Thus for instance Tongiorgi (*Psychologia*, n. 409), "*Ontologi omnes in hoc conveniunt, Deum immediate perceptum omnis cognitionis fontem et originem esse: sub quo autem respectu videatur, varii varia sentiunt.*"

It is certain (he says, p. 13) that ontology [ontologism] is not condemned, as some would wish us to believe; the Church *does not condemn systems*, but propositions containing errors against the Faith. She *does not* teach any *system* of philosophy as orthodox, nor declare any *unsound*.

Why say ontology [ontologism] is condemned (he repeats in August, p. 192), if the condemnation has only reached propositions taught by some rash and inaccurate thinker who incorrectly expounded its principles?

Now we find some difficulty in expressing our precise point of dissent from these statements, because of the peculiar sense in which their author uses the word "ontology" or "ontologism." By this term he means to express that philosophical doctrine, which maintains the objective existence of necessary truth and man's power of cognizing such truth with certainty. It is very safe indeed to say that the Church has never condemned *this* doctrine; for most assuredly she *would* peremptorily condemn its *denial*.

But we do allege that she has condemned, not merely the seven particular propositions, but a certain philosophical system, called by its adherents "ontologism," which has affinity to those propositions, and which more or less explicitly favours them. Ubachs was censured, not for holding any one of the seven, but for holding propositions "altogether similar"; Hugonin was required to retract all which "explicitly or implicitly favoured" them; Branchereau's case was precisely similar. This system, as we understand the matter, is based on the fundamental doctrine, that God is in this life directly presented to the intellect as an Object of cognition. The Carlovian has himself heartily repudiated this fundamental doctrine; and is beyond all doubt therefore entirely external to the sphere of the condemned error.

He objects however, that "the Church does not condemn systems but propositions." So far as *theology* at least is concerned, surely the opposite fact is notorious. Certain propositions e. g. have been condemned of Baius, of Quesnel, of Molinos, not simply for their own sake, but as expressions of a certain unsound *system*; and the precise sense in which the individual propositions have been censured, is understood by considering them in the *light* of that general system. If the Carlovian means that the Church never does within the sphere of philosophy, what she constantly does within the sphere of theology proper,—we think he should have given his grounds for an opinion, which on the surface is paradoxical. Surely some given philosophical *system* may be no less injurious to the Faith—indeed it may probably be much *more* injurious—than some given philosophical *proposition*. To us facts appear in quite a different light from that which they present to the Carlovian. We think, for reasons which we expressed in July, that the Church has given great sanction to the scholastic system *as a system*; and we think, for reasons which we have

here set forth, that the ontologistic system, *as a system*, has been absolutely condemned.

The Carlovian says (p. 192) that no propositions have been condemned, except certain ones "taught by some rash and inaccurate thinker." We agree with him that the condemned ontologists have been "rash and inaccurate thinkers"; but what other philosophers of the party can be mentioned, who have been more free from those faults than Ubaghs, Branchereau, and Hugonin?

We will next submit a word in passing to Dr. Meynell. He speaks (p. 16) of the seven as "somewhat silly-looking propositions." From Dr. Meynell this is a little more strange than it might be from another: for surely he thinks that the three philosophers whom we have just named are eminent thinkers; and yet they have been condemned for *favoured* those "silly-looking" seven. To us the seven do not "look" more "silly," than condemned propositions usually do; not nearly so "silly," as the condemned errors of Nestorius, Eutyches, and Luther. Whatever may have been Dr. Meynell's *intention*, the *tendency* of his remark is to disparage the significance of that condemnation which ontologism has undergone; and it is for this reason that we make a passing protest.

But the chief consideration, which we would earnestly submit both to Dr. Meynell and to the Carlovian, is that they have no business whatever to call themselves ontologists. As to the fundamental doctrine—that there exists a large body of objective necessary truth which can be certainly cognized by man—this has been the Church's undoubted teaching from her very commencement. It does seem a strange thought, when you wish to express a doctrine which the Church has enforced for more than eighteen centuries, to adopt a word so circumstanced as this: a word invented only the other day, for the purpose of expressing certain philosophical tenets, which promptly received ecclesiastical condemnation. The word may in itself be a very good word, but it has been dirtied.

Doubtless, at a time when this particular doctrine of the Church has in its turn become the main object of attack—when it is against the existence of necessary truth that the envenomed enemies of religion direct their deadliest poison—it may be very desirable to give the doctrine itself some intelligible name. But why need that name be "ontologism"? Can no other be thought of? In default of a better, we would suggest "objectivism": which is more uncouth perhaps than "ontologism," but at all events not longer. We think it might be said, with complete intelligibility and great advantage, that all well-instructed Catholic philosophers from the beginning have earnestly upholden that vital and fundamental doctrine of "objectivism,"

which the ontologists indeed have corrupted, but which the psychological philosophy, whether of Mill or of Mansel, would overthrow from its foundation.

Our contention has been, that by far the most appropriate use of the terms "psychologism" and "ontologism" is as expressing two opposite forms of error, which the Church peremptorily condemns. And if it be asked which of the two is the more pernicious, we do not see how there can be a moment's doubt as to the answer. Ontologism is a particular error, which does its own serious mischief, but which leaves a considerable body of dogma unharmed; whereas psychologism lays its axe at the very root of all philosophy, of all religion, and of all morality. It is the one chief speculative misery of our time.\*

We expressed an opinion in July (p. 38), that F. Kleutgen's great work is "by far the most valuable acquisition to Catholic philosophical literature, so far as we are acquainted with that literature, since the time of Suarez." The discussions of this article will have illustrated one out of its very numerous excellences. The author may almost be called the Church's accepted champion against ontologism. It is surely then indicative of singular large-mindedness and mental balance, that so far from being driven by dislike of that error into rejecting or putting in the background the great doctrine of "objectivism," he expresses that doctrine (as our readers have seen) with perhaps greater emphasis, than any other Catholic writer who can be named.

Another of his excellences may be here mentioned, because of its accidental connection with our present subject. There is one particular argument—not indeed available for ontologism, but plausible as against the views ordinarily advocated in lieu of that system—which (we believe) no ontologist has ever mentioned, nor

---

\* Our readers should study an admirable article published in the "Spectator" of August 28th, on "President Huxley." "*The one grand controversy now raging among cultivated men,*" says the writer, "is whether the supernatural exists at all; or whether the theory of a sentient First Cause . . . is not a delusion. . . . We ask any one who knows English society at all, if we exaggerate when we say that *there are hundreds of able men in England* who, knowing nothing [themselves] of science, *disbelieve in God*, or rather in God's government, because (as they think) science has dispelled that ancient delusion."

There is a most curious similarity between portions of this article and some striking remarks in the "Month" of September, which was published on the very same day. "A lamentable sign of our present intellectual decrepitude," says this writer (p. 288), "is the way in which the so-called educated public is ready to fall down at the feet of any teacher of physical science, who has attained a certain degree of fame or even of notoriety." "Professors Huxley and Tyndall," says the "Spectator," "are regarded as *spiritual directors* are supposed to be regarded by faithful Ultramontanes."

any Catholic philosopher before Kleutgen ever touched. Kleutgen's reply to it involves a doctrine, which seems to us so profoundly important, that we devote a separate article in this number to its consideration.

The Carlovian's concluding paragraphs of May exhibit much thoughtfulness, yet (as we venture to think) a certain one-sidedness. Surely the purpose pursued in Catholic philosophical teaching should be, not merely refutation of existing philosophical error; but (quite as primarily) preservation of traditional Christian truth, and appreciation of the Church's great dogmatical expositors. So far therefore from its being desirable that recognized Catholic philosophical phrases should be dropped, it seems to us quite a sacred duty that they be carefully maintained. At the same time a supplementary task is also very needful, under the circumstances of the time. Students should be carefully taught to translate these phrases into terms of modern philosophy; and also to understand precisely, how the Catholic position bears on those various conflicting theories, which divide the non-Catholic philosophical world.

We cannot perhaps better close our article, than by the Carlovian's remarks which follow:—

We must be conservative, it is true, but our conservatism should be liberal and enlightened, lest we conserve error and repel truth. Extremes meet, and those who think they are most conservative, are sometimes most destructive. We live in an age of progress—an age, which at least calls itself enlightened. Modern thought pervades all ranks of society, and exempts nothing from its searching inquiry. Principles which had been received as axioms, things the most sacred, and names the most revered, must submit to its analysis and be tried by its laws. We cannot repress, if we would, this growing spirit of enlightenment. It is the spirit of the age, and will onward, despite every obstacle. If, then, we cannot check this torrent of thought which is flooding the world, would it not be true wisdom to endeavour to elevate, to purify, and to direct it?

To accomplish this great purpose, we must descend into the arena of strife, grapple with the enemy on his own grounds, and defeat him with his own weapons. *If we leave him the field of thought, his victory is certain.* Here the battle must be fought. *The great question of the age is—shall the Church of God or the enemies of truth guide the human intellect?* If we are to succeed, victory must be the fruit of an intellectual movement from within the Church. Where intellect, knowledge, and high mental culture lead, mankind will follow. The triumph of truth is certain, if the Church of God, which is the centre of authority, becomes also the centre of enlightenment. Let the movement begin in Catholic schools, and let the Catholic youth be thoroughly educated in literature, science, and philosophy, and sent into the world the equal in intelligence and knowledge, if not the superior, of those who are educated outside the Church's teaching.

## ART. III.—THE LADDER OF PERFECTION.

*The Scale (or Ladder) of Perfection.* By WALTER HILTON. Edited with a Preface and Notes, by ROBERT E. GUY, B.A., Priest of the Holy Order of S. Benedict. London : Richardson. 1869.

WE greatly rejoice when we see sound ascetical works brought before the attention of the English public. We are profoundly convinced that a deeper study of the subject on which F. Hilton's book treats would open out wide visions of light and splendour in the direction of heaven, and of darkness and littleness in the direction of self, which would result in an immense advance in the love of God. We do not refer to Catholics exclusively. We have in our mind and heart the millions of this teeming land who, having lost nearly all the dogmatic teaching of the Church, have sunk in some sense out of the supernatural order in which their fathers dwelt : and who, with a rare aptitude for the spiritual life, never see, even through a chink in the door, into that splendid country in which, were they once admitted, they would be glad to find rest for ever.

Happily, there have been, ever since God stamped the soul of man with the image of the Blessed Trinity, men who, feeling the touch of the finger of God, have abandoned the world, and fixed their highest faculties on the contemplation of heaven. In the Old Testament we find tokens of the ascetic life in the Nazarenes, the Rechabites, and the Essenes ; and in that splendid and pure school of the prophets, where young men waited on God with prayer, and song, and holy expectations, lest perhaps His Spirit might visit them, and prophesy through their mouths. The prophets—those lights in days of obscurity—Elias the Thesbite, Eliseus, Jeremias, prepared their souls for divine visitations, and in frail flesh manifested the grandeur and glory of God the Father. These men, in all the perfection of their lives, were but as signs and warnings of the magnificent love and humility of the New Testament. They were "men of God," and this was the manifestation of God amongst the nations, especially amongst the Jews. But the figure, however beautiful and true, after all, is not the whole truth : Judaism is not Christianity. The Jews looked for the coming of Christ, but the men of the new dispensation have



seen Christ. This is the one characteristic note of the Christian as such, viz., hearing His voice, and looking on His face. Upon this splendid Man-God, bearing all the elements of human life, with His brightness, like the long beams of the morning, striking on the eyes and sinking to the heart, the Christian looks and is transformed. Jesus is light, He is life, He is joy of heart. This is mystical theology—this was Father Hilton's aim, to teach the true science of approaching, and possessing Him. Just as the sun looks in the morning no bigger than an orange, and is shorn of all his rays, and grows to his full splendour only by degrees, so this science leads men to look upon the Sun of Justice, which, small and insignificant at first, through man's darkness and incapacity, gradually grows upon him, till at length he begins to see with no other light, to live by no other warmth, and "is changed into the same image from glory to glory even as by the Spirit of the Lord."

Now, it is through the study of mystical theology that men get hold of the science by which the saints attained to the contemplation and possession of their Supreme Good. Denis, the Areopagite, whose influence all through the Church was very considerable, was one of the earliest writers on this science in the East. Erigena, whose mind was steeped in Neo-Platonism, and who had a dangerous rationalistic turn, introduced a knowledge of him to the West. Of course, the Fathers, whose vast and original labours were the result of the joint action of love and vision, though they did not professedly treat of the mystic life, still they identified it with all their writings, and all their highest science breathes with the freedom and the spirit of supernal love. S. Augustine, Boethius, and S. Gregory, standing on the edges, as it were, of the old Roman civilization, handed over to Isidore, Bede, and Raban, who stood looking on them from the confines of the new, the learning and traditions of the ancient Church. But the monks of old, with the Rule, with the writings of S. Basil, and with Cassian, who gained his experiences of Eastern monasticism during his travels with Germanus, busied themselves rather with silently living their lives away to God, than in writing treatises on theology. They bridged over the flood, and handing down their hidden treasures, opened the way, without knowing it, to the contentions of the schools. The study of Aristotle introduced clearer divisions into theology. The intellect can fix itself on God as True; the will can fix on Him as Good. The object is one, though the powers are not identical. It was the province of Scholastic Theology, on

the basis of faith, by means of an instrument constructed by the reason, to analyze the object matter of revelation, reduce it into system, and fix upon methods for its defence. It was the province of Mystic Theology, upon the basis of revelation, to look upon the object matter of theology as Good, and consequently to be sought after, and therefore to be possessed, according to those deep words of S. Augustine: "God created the rational creature to know the Supreme Good, that knowing it and loving it he might possess it, and possessing it, might enjoy it." Hence, just as intellect and will are two sides of the same coin, so scholastic and mystic theology, far from being antagonistic, as some have wished to make out, are complementary to each other. Without knowledge there is no love, and without love knowledge is in vain. Scholastic theology makes theologians, mystic theology makes men. It is not knowledge, after all, but love, that has done the great works of the world. Scholastic theology leads to science, and mystic theology leads to reverence and love. The former develops the dialectical qualities of the mind, order, system, and analysis; the latter the contemplative spirit, charity, humility, purity of heart, which issues in those keen instincts, which, with the spontaneity of love, at once detect germs of error and latent elements of misbelief. The mystic—possessing a character the reverse of that attributed to him, for he has nothing to do with the sleepy exaggerations of the East—was ever on the alert to defend the cause of theological truth, and through reverence and love to correct pride of intellect and audacity of reason, when these were tempted to forget that faith comes before science and lays down its conditions and its limits.\* Hence it is evident, all through the history of theological activity, that the aberrations of the human mind, and the rationalism of pride, have been corrected by men whose constant study was purity, humility, and love; by men who kept their intellectual eye ever polished to see the Supreme Good, according to that canon which runs through the mystic teachings of the Church, viz.:—"Tergat ergo speculum suum, mundet spiritum, quisquis sitit videre Deum suum."† It was the clearness of this intellectual eye that made Lanfranc see his way against Berengarius,

\* This principle runs through the Fathers, and from S. Augustine through all the orthodox scholastics. "Sicut rectus ordo," says S. Anselm, "exigit ut profunda Christiane fidei credamus, priusquam ea præsumamus ratione discutere, ita negligentiae mihi videtur si postquam confirmati sumus in fide, non studemus quod credimus intelligere." (Cur Deus Homo.)

† Richard of S. Victor, De Præp. ad Contempl., cap. 72.

S. Anselm against Roscellin, S. Bernard against Abelard; and S. Thomas, who, with his vast intelligence and mighty heart, seems to unite in one the perfections of both Schools, against the terrible heresies of the East, which had eaten their way into the Paris Schools. Was it not the mystic School of S. Victor, following so closely the teachings of S. Benedict; Hugh with his contemplative life and beautiful death; Richard with his soaring mystic spirit; and the Lombard, who had been sent here by S. Bernard; was it not this School, with its love of union, and silence, and peace, and Peter with his reverence for authority and his lowly thinking of himself, that opposed and stifled the rationalistic and irreverent spirit which the brilliant fame of Abelard had introduced amongst the Schools? Would Paris have kept its balance in those boisterous days, had it not been for the influence of S. Anselm and S. Bernard, and then of S. Bonaventure and S. Thomas? Would not the withering teaching of Alfarabi, Avicenna, and that terrible Averröes, have effectively poisoned all the wells? And even later on, when the scholastics had sunk somewhat into subtleties and conceits, were they not mystics, and women too, S. Catherine of Sienna and S. Bridget, as well as Tauler and Suso, who did more than any others of their day to bring theology back to its former position?

Nor did the system depend upon Aristotle or Plato, upon nominalism or realism—nor did the mystic spirit exclude ability in the order of positive theology. Love, thank God, is above all systems, and transcends all Schools. In point of fact, the greatest mystics have been the most able scholastics. S. Anselm, the founder of scholastic theology, proves by his prayers and meditations, and above all by the history of his life, that he lived in the contemplation of Christ. S. Bernard, who is called the founder of the mystic School, was strong enough in theology to rid the Church of its greatest pests, and to rule kings, and statesmen. Hugh of S. Victor, who built on the foundation laid by S. Bernard, and who is a mystic *par excellence*, is called the second Augustine, and in his famous work "*De Sacramentis*" proves to the world his power in theology. Richard, with his rich, versatile mind, by his treatise on the Trinity, manifests metaphysical power of the highest kind. S. Bonaventure's fame as a theologian is simply eclipsed by his deep vision into the hidden way of God; while S. Thomas of Aquin, who, as Raynald his confessor declares, learnt everything he knew through infusion from above, wrote the most lucid and profound treatise on perfection that has ever been thrown into the Latin tongue.

The work which F. Guy's industry has made accessible to the public, is entitled to a high place in the literature of the ascetic life. Yet it is difficult to know in what class to put F. Hilton's "*Scale of Perfection*." It certainly does not come within the range of the subtle mysticism and deep vision of S. Theresa, nor within the compass of the scientific and soaring speculations of S. John of the Cross. The allegorical yet severe treatment of Richard of S. Victor, and his firm grasp of the various stages of contemplation; the less rich imagination of Hugh, castigated by a powerful reasoning faculty; the illuminated piety of S. Anselm; and the splendid treatise on "*Humility*" of the mellifluous S. Bernard, belong to a more refined and elevated range of thought. Nor can we name it with the pure style and divine simplicity of S. Catherine of Sienna, or with the more vehement writings of S. Bridget. It does not possess the fulness or the logical pressure of Rodriguez, nor the clearness in conception and statement of principle of Lallemand. It can hardly be ranked with Père Grou, it is less spiritual and subtle than F. Baker—perhaps it may take a place between "*The Hidden Ways of Divine Love*," by Barbanson, and "*The Confessions of a Loving Soul*," by Gertrude More.

It seems to have been written for a holy nun, and to have flowed spontaneously, though not with the persuasive words of human wisdom, from the loving heart of the pious author. His great charm is his singleness of purpose, his unaffected simplicity, and his tender love for Christ, which burn forth brightly whenever he comes near Him in his writing, and give a warmth and an elevation, and at times an eloquence, to his words, which never manifests itself when he treats on any other subject. The book is studded with deep mystic sayings, and with apt, and sometimes quaint, comparisons, some of which lead us to imagine that the author was not altogether unacquainted at one time or other of his life with English rural sports. Though not always clearly stated, the work is rich in fundamental principles of the supernatural life. Had the writer pruned his sentences, stated his fundamental principles more emphatically, and given them a greater prominence, had the outline of the work been easier to seize, it would have gained greatly in precision, and, though it might have lost a little in unction, it would have made a more satisfactory impression on the student of theology. In this the author is decidedly inferior to F. Baker, and does not approach to Lallemand, whose work is full of science, lucidity, and condensed but not confused theology, bearing a fruit which

pleases us better, is riper, sounder, and more wholesome, than any other of the same date with which we have been made acquainted.

To our mind the great merit of F. Hilton is to have given Christ, and His ever-blessed Humanity, so prominent a position in his treatise. If he be not so scientific as some might wish, here at all events he knows how to inflame the heart. He did not merely write about our Lord, but we see, or rather we feel unmistakably, that the man *loved* Him. When he says in one place, "God knows I am teaching far more than I practise" (p. 117), and in another, "In truth, and without doubt, I myself am far from knowing all I should know upon this point, and further still from practising what I do know" (p. 119), we cannot help the feeling how all the while his tender heart was burning with the love of God.

The fundamental points of his teaching, as far as we are able to understand them, are as follows:—The foundation of the spiritual life consists in "humility, firm faith, and an entire and strong will and purpose;" or, as he more clearly states it elsewhere, "There is not any virtue, nor any good work, that can make thee like our Lord, without humility and charity" (p. 84); and here he agrees with all mystic writers. He explains himself very clearly in that beautiful comparison of a man travelling to Jerusalem, whose only thought is "I am nothing, I have nothing (humility), I covet nothing but One, and that is Jesus" (love). Now, in the soul there is the "image of sin." This image of sin must give place to the "image of Jesus." "Out of the image of Jesus, if it be reformed in thee with the beams of spiritual light, will spring forth and ascend up towards heaven burning desires, pure affections, wise thoughts, and all virtue in full comeliness" (p. 86; see also pp. 89, 110). Christ is to destroy the image of sin. "Who is to help thee to break down this image? Verily, it is the Lord Jesus" (p. 137; also pp. 141, 142, 203), according to the Apostle, "My little children, of whom I am in labour again, until Christ be formed in you"\* (p. 145). How is this accomplished? We are to be "shapened to the image of Jesus by humility and charity" (p. 145). It is through Christ we arrive at the Father. "No man can come to the contemplation of the Godhead but he that is first of all reformed by perfection in humility and charity, to the likeness of Jesus in His Humanity" (p. 146). Again, "No man cometh to the Father but by Me." Under what aspect is

---

\* Gal. iv. 19.

Christ principally to be looked upon in this reformation? "The Passion is the groundwork of all reformation" (p. 155). In fact, "as the soul is the life of the body, just so is Jesus the life of the soul by His gracious presence"\* (p. 309). It is through the contemplation of the Humanity of Christ that the soul is led to a higher stage of contemplation in perceiving along with it the Divinity of our Lord. There are three stages of the spiritual life, which are compared to a man blind, a man with his eyes shut, and a man with his eyes open. The blind man does not see the sun, but believes in it: "this sufficeth for salvation." The man with shut lids "seeth through the lids of the eyes a glimmering of great light: he is a true contemplative." The man that has full sight of the sun "sees Jesus face to face in the bliss of heaven" (p. 263). Of the gift of love the author treats fully in Chap. vi., p. 278. These, humility and charity, are the two corner-stones of the spiritual fabric of F. Hilton.

We will now illustrate what we said about the position he gives our Lord. "Be thou turned wholly to our Lord Jesus Christ" (p. 1). "To the perfection of this high contemplation no man can come till he be first reformed in the soul to the likeness of Jesus" (p. 12). "This knitting or fastening of Jesus to a man's soul is wrought by a good will, and a great desire towards Him, that is towards having Him alone, and seeing Him in His bliss spiritually" (p. 17). "Remember this, that until thy heart be well cleansed by constant and diligent meditation on Christ's sacred Humanity, thou canst not have any perfect knowledge of God" (p. 21). "Christ is a spirit before our face" (p. 23). "Through steadfast thinking upon the humility of his precious Manhood shalt thou much abate the stirrings of pride" (p. 28). At p. 28 S. Gregory is quoted: "He that cannot perfectly despise himself hath never yet discovered the humble wisdom of our Lord Jesus Christ." "Thou mayest by devoutly and constantly beholding the humility of His sacred Humanity, feel the goodness and grace of His Godhead" (p. 38). Meditating on the Passion is "opening the spiritual eye upon the Humanity of Christ: and it may be called the carnal love of God, as S. Bernard saith, inasmuch as it is set upon the fleshly nature of Christ: and it is right and good and a great help towards the destruction of great sins, and so to the contemplation of the Godhead" (p. 55). "A man cannot come to the spiritual light in the contemplation of Christ's Godhead unless he be first exercised in his imagina-

---

\* S. Austin says, "Deus tuus tibi vite vita est" (Confess. x. 6).  
VOL. XIII.—NO. XXVI. [New Series.] z



tion with bitterness and compassion, and in steadfast thought upon His Humanity" (p. 56). "The name of Jesus is nothing else but spiritual health" (p. 73). "Follow Him by contemplating His Humanity and Divinity" (p. 67). "Jesus is a treasure hid in the soul" (p. 83). See how beautifully he speaks of Christ's tenderness with Judas (p. 112), and how well he explains (p. 114) how we live *in* and *for* God. "They are in a special manner His own children who bear the full shape and likeness of His Son Jesus" (p. 242).

The remarks of Hilton on humility are so deep, his sayings, some of them, are so full of wisdom, and his examples so well worth remembering, that we will touch on all three of these points.

*Humility.*—"The feeling of thy lowliness and humility will pour out of thy heart all imprudent looking into other men's actions, and drive thee wholly to behold thyself, as if there were no other being living but God and thyself" (p. 24). "The higher he may climb by bodily penance and other virtues, if he hath not this humility, the lower will he fall" (p. 28). "Him that is poor, and little, and of contrite spirit, and that trembleth at my words" (God will respect). "If therefore thou wilt have the spirit of God ruling in thy heart, have humility and reverence towards Him" (p. 32). "Men get wrong by a secret pride and an overweening idea of themselves" (pp. 41, 99). "Who can dare to be so bold as to say that he hath Christ, that he hath charity, but he alone who is perfectly and truly humble?" (p. 108). "No purity or chastity without it" (p. 123). "What is humility but truth? Verily nothing else" (p. 215).

*Sayings.*—"When thou art in darkness, thou art much nearer Jerusalem than when thou art in the midst of false light" (p. 227). He who really loves self "pretends to love God, and sometimes thanketh Him with his mouth, and sometimes he wringeth out a tear from his eye, and so thinketh that everything is safe enough" (p. 100). "He that remaineth in deadly sin cannot well withstand carnal pleasures when they come in his way, but descendeth willingly to them, as a bird of prey doth to carrion" (p. 120). "If thou wilt needs be a beggar, ask and crave within of thy Lord Jesus, for He is rich enough, and will more gladly give to thee than thou canst ask" (p. 130). "Where our love is, there is the eye of our soul" (p. 140). "A venial sin of thy own prevents thee more from feeling and perfectly loving Jesus Christ than other men's sins can do, be they ever so great" (p. 24). "If thou wilt find rest here and in heaven, do thou in accordance with the advice of one of the holy fathers: every day ask

thyslf, 'Who am I?' and judge no man" (p. 25). "Hypocrites praise and thank God with their lips, but in their hearts, like thieves, they steal His worship and praise, and direct it towards themselves" (p. 29). "He that cometh home to his house and findeth nothing but dirt, and smoke, and a scolding wife, will quickly run out of it" (p. 88). "Truth will not show itself to enemies, but to friends who love it and desire it with an humble heart" (p. 318). "Humility presumeth on truth, and not at all upon itself, and truth esteemeth well humility" (p. 318). Jesus sometimes sheweth Himself as an awful Master, and sometimes as a reverend Father, and sometimes as a lovely Spouse" (p. 225). "Truth cannot be seen by a pure soul without great delight" (p. 329). "Love and light go together in a pure soul" (p. 332).

*Examples.*—A man who has passed through trial to God "hath, as it were, so well gnawed the bitter bark or shell of the nut, that at length he hath broken it and now feeds on the kernel" (p. 20). "Cast all into the mortar of humility, break into pieces and pound it with the pestle of the fear of God, throw the powder of it into the fire of desire, and so offer it up to God" (p. 36). "Desire in prayer, when it is touched by spiritual fire, which is God, continues ever to aspire up towards Him, from Whom the fire that kindled it came" (p. 38). "A hound that runneth after the hare, only because he seeth the other hounds run, stayeth and resteth, or turneth home when it is weary; but if it runs because it seeth and is in view of the hare, it will not spare itself, weary though it be, till it hath caught it" (p. 63). So men who follow grace, and do not merely imitate others, persevere. "Jesus sleepeth in thy heart spiritually, as He once did bodily, when He was in the ship with His disciples, and they, from fear of perishing, awakened Him" (p. 83). "He is thy groat, thy piece of money, and all thy inheritance" (p. 82). "As long as Jesus findeth not His image in thee He is far from thee" (p. 84). Heartburnings "show clearly that there is much pride lying hid, as the fox in its den, in the ground of thy heart" (p. 103). "The inferior part [of the soul] is like unto woman, for it should be obedient to the other part of reason, as the woman is subject to the man" (p. 184).

"As no incense can rest upon the censer by reason of the fire within, even so no fleshly delights can rest upon a pure soul that is enveloped and warmed with the fire of love, as it glows and teems with its psalms and prayers to Jesus" (p. 313).

We might, of course, make many more extracts, and place them under the three headings above; but this is not neces-

sary. We have done enough to give the reader a fair notion of the style of F. Hilton's mystic *teaching*, and of the character of his thought. To acquire a fuller knowledge of [his method, and to appreciate the whole bearing of his mind, the reader should consult the work itself. He will find it well got up, and printed in clear type, with a thoughtful preface, and a few useful notes.

All praise is due to F. Guy for the industry with which, in the midst of the missionary anxieties of a large commercial town, he has laboured in editing the work. The words of the Bishop of Birmingham, himself a Benedictine monk, bear with them, on such subjects as these, a special weight. We cannot, therefore, do better, in closing this short review, than give his Lordship's judgment on the book, and his estimate of the method adopted by its editor. He writes to F. Guy, "I am glad you have undertaken to edit some of our old ascetic works. You have certainly shown sound judgment in commencing with the 'Ladder of Perfection.' It is perhaps the clearest, best balanced, and best adapted for wide circulation of any of them. I have looked at the specimen of editing which you have sent me, and quite approve of its method. The reader is sufficiently eased, without the character and style of the book being interfered with" (xlvi.).

#### ART. IV.—THE GALLICAN ASSEMBLY OF 1682.

*Recherches Historiques sur l'Assemblée du Clergé de France de 1682.* Par CHARLES GÉRIN, Juge au tribunal civil de la Seine. Paris : Lecoivre. 1868.

WHO can despair of the vitality of truth, when the real history of the struggle between the Holy See and Gallicanism, under Lewis XIV., after lying buried for two centuries, under a vast mountain of falsehood, has at last come to light? And yet this is by no means an overstatement of the fact. The labours of M. Gérin have dealt a fatal blow to the traditions on this subject, which have hitherto been quietly received alike by Protestants and by Catholics. We have already pointed this out in a short notice in our last number, but the importance of the subject justifies, nay demands, our returning to it. For a long cherished tradition is not at once

dispelled from men's minds even by the publication of clear and unanswerable facts which disprove it. It would be a failure in duty, if Catholics should leave off insisting upon them until the truth has got itself so firmly implanted in men's minds that it will need the courage of a Cumming, a Newdegate, or a Whalley to enable any man to stand forward and talk gravely about Gallican principles; and if we may in any degree judge from experience this will not be until many a confident writer has been called to account for assuming as admitted facts all the monstrous fictions which M. Gérin has exposed. This may be a somewhat weary task, but we feel no doubt of ultimate success; nay, we have a good hope that after a few years the *Times* itself will not only take it for granted that what used to be called the "Liberties of the Gallican Church" were really nothing more than maxims forced upon reluctant, but time-serving Catholics, by shameless tyranny on the part of Lewis XIV. and his ministers; but also that such has always been the view taken of the matter by all educated men, and especially by the writers in the Thunderer.

It would not be easy, at any period, to exaggerate the importance of establishing the truth on this subject. But, if we are not mistaken, the present crisis of the history of the world, and most especially of England, gives it a new importance. The European world is still in the middle of that great series of earthquake shocks to which future ages will look back as "the revolution" which began with the overthrow of the throne of the Bourbons in France, and as to which no one can as yet form any conjecture when it is to end. In England, especially, it is impossible that the relation of the State to religion should not be seriously altered by the great change which Mr. Disraeli has introduced into our secular institutions. That change is not really less great and momentous, because, like other great changes in England, it was brought about by constitutional means, not, after the French custom, by force; and we may calculate on seeing it result in a total change of the maxims of our Government. For ourselves we strongly think that one of its effects is likely to be to diminish the strong feeling which has long prevailed among English Liberals in favour of religious liberty, and to bring future English Governments into collisions with the Catholic Church, different, perhaps, in form, but not less serious than those which it has experienced with rulers of very different sorts in centuries gone by, and from which it has risen triumphant. If this expectation is well-founded it is clearly important that, before those collisions are even threatened, the old illusion about the Gallican liberties should be effectually swept away: for the experience of Napoleon I. shows, what indeed common-sense would have sufficed to teach, that there is nothing so welcome to men who, under a new order of things, are setting themselves to assail the Church, as,

when they are able to attack it from behind the shelter of great Catholic names of former times.

No man was less tempted to appeal to precedents in the past history of France than Napoleon I., for it was his boast to be the founder of a new order of things. It was only against the Church that he ever thought of urging precedents drawn from the maxims and policy of Lewis XIV. But he was never tired of appealing to the "declaration of the clergy of France," in May, 1682; and to the great name of Bossuet. M. d'Haussonville shows that on March 6, 1810, when railing at the Belgian clergy who remained faithful to Pius VII., he said, "You idiots. If I had not found principles like my own in the teaching of Bossuet, and in the maxims of the Gallican Church, I would have turned Protestant!"

He was wont to repeat that "the second alone of the four articles contained in the declaration of 1682 would have been enough to enable him to get rid of the Pope." Accordingly, those articles were incorporated in the "organic articles," which, with almost incredible cynicism, he added to the Concordat with Pius VII. after it was signed, and after he had, in vain, used all means of fraud, as well as of force, to get them included in it. Nay, when he seized the States of the Church, his servile Senate passed, at his dictation, a new enactment, which he published as a law of the French empire, requiring all future Popes on taking possession of their office to swear to observe the four articles of 1682. M. Gérin tells us that this law was quoted by Count Montalembert in the French Chamber of Peers (May 20, 1847), and the Assembly received it with something of incredulous surprise. "Yes, gentlemen," said the Count, "so it stands in the *Bulletin des lois*. And it is well that these monuments of human folly should, from time to time, be brought forward that men may know how glory itself can be debased by passion." (P. vi. note.)

The same lesson unquestionably is taught by the volume before us. The glory of Lewis XIV. is disgraced by the tyranny and trickery which it records in so many instances: and, alas, the far higher glory of Bossuet himself is dimmed by his unworthy concessions.

As far as Bossuet has, in times past, been under suspicion as disaffected towards the Holy See, M. Gérin clears his reputation. Bossuet, beyond all doubt, was in heart as good a Ultramontane as any one else. So far as he is to blame, it is not for being hostile to the authority of the Holy See, but for unwillingly allowing himself to be made, to a certain extent, a tool in the hands of those who desired to assail it.

This, we think, no one can doubt, who has read the documents collected by M. Gérin. And it is a fact of great importance. The weight of any man's testimony is destroyed in the judgment of

all sober men, if it turns out to have been obtained either by torture, or by the dread of it. Much more is the value of a great man's opinion upon a theological question tainted, if he has delivered it under secular inducements. It becomes, in fact, not the sentence of a judge, but the pleading of a hired advocate. Bossuet, highly gifted as he ever was, used his gifts in 1682 merely as the advocate of Lewis XIV., or rather, it should be said, of Colbert.

Nothing throws more light upon this than his own conduct, when Lewis, on a former occasion, condescended to use the clergy of France as his tool against Alexander VII.

The outlines of this disgraceful history have been given by all historians. Life and property were in those times insecure in Rome, because the ambassadors of the Catholic powers claimed privileges utterly destructive of all government. Lord Macaulay says :—

“It had long been the rule at Rome, that no officer of justice or finance could enter the dwelling inhabited by the minister who represented a Catholic state. In process of time, not only the dwelling, but a large precinct round it, was held inviolable. It was a point of honour with every ambassador to extend as widely as possible the limits of the region which was under his protection. At length half the city consisted of privileged districts, within which the Papal government had no more power than within the Louvre or the Escorial. Every asylum was thronged with contraband traders, fraudulent bankrupts, thieves, and assassins. In every asylum were collected magazines of stolen or smuggled goods. From every asylum ruffians sallied forth nightly, to plunder and stab. In no town in Christendom, consequently, was law so impotent, and wickedness so atrocious, as in the ancient capital of religion and civilization.”

It is truly amazing to find that this monstrous abuse, when loudly complained of by the Popes, was supported through false principles of honour by the monarchs of Europe. At a later period it was put a stop to by Innocent XI., “who felt on the subject,” says Macaulay, “as became a Priest and a Prince.” The unequalled outrages which Lewis XIV. then committed, in the endeavour to maintain it, we shall have to mention. We now return to 1662. On the 20th of August in that year the troops, kept on foot by the Duke of Crequi, ambassador of France, attacked some Corsican soldiers in the service of the Pope, and in the fray which followed, two Frenchmen and five Italians were killed. The Pope ascertained that, although the French were the aggressors, his own soldiers afterwards had been to blame, and actually caused two, who were found guilty, to be executed. He also sent an extraordinary minister to Paris, to explain the unfortunate event to Lewis. The King



refused to give him an audience, and adopted a line of conduct so exactly similar to that of Napoleon I. towards Pius VII., and also towards the republic of Venice, when it suited his purpose to pick a quarrel with them, that it is difficult to read the narrative without imagining that, by some accident, a page of French history has got out of its place. He gave orders that Avignon should be seized, and sent an army into Italy. That nothing might be wanting to complete his disgrace (and we must add his resemblance to Napoleon), hearing that the Pope was obtaining troops for the defence of Rome from the Catholic Cantons of Switzerland, he sent to assure them that the French troops were marching into Italy only to defend, exalt, and protect the Holy See, "after the example of his glorious ancestors;" and that the "eldest son of the Church could never think of an action so culpable as that of employing his arms against her." The Pope continued to negotiate, but Lewis demanded that, before he would consider any terms, Alexander should give practical proof of his good intentions, by depriving of his hat Cardinal Imperiali, governor of Rome; by giving up to Lewis his own brother, Don Mario, to be dealt with at the King's discretion; and by causing no less than one hundred of his own soldiers and four officers to be hanged, half in the Piazza Farnese, half in the Piazza Navona. Beside all this, the Pope was to engage to send any person whom Lewis might be pleased to name as Legate, to apologize to the King. When the Pope, said the French Ambassador, shall have taken these preliminary steps, it will become possible to believe that he is in good faith desirous to place himself in a position to give satisfaction to the King, my master. "No account of this wretched affair," says M. Gérin, "is more miserable than those given by apologists of the Court of France—for instance, by the Abbé Régnier-Desmarais, attaché to the Duke of Crequi's embassy. These monstrous demands were of course rejected by the Pope, and Lewis continued his threats. After a dispute, the details of which we pass over, the affair was ended by a treaty studiously insulting to the Pope, who was compelled to erect in his capital a pyramid, on which were inscribed its conditions; one of which was, that the whole Corsican nation was disqualified from taking service under the Roman government. "What," says the writer in the "Month," "if some one had foretold to Lewis that a Corsican dynasty would one day occupy the throne of his descendants, and a Nuncio of the Chigi family," which was that of Alexander VII., "should be accredited by the Holy See to the representative of that dynasty?"

We have said more than enough to prove that the quarrel of Lewis XIV. with Alexander VII. in 1662 was merely one of those outrages by which it was his delight to insult the other European sovereigns, such, for instance, as that in which he

indulged himself towards Genoa, when, by the threat of bombarding the city, he compelled the Doge to come in person to Versailles to apologize for an imaginary wrong, selecting this particular reparation simply because it was notoriously a fundamental law, that the Doge, during the period of his reign, might never leave the Ducal Palace and its precincts, and therefore no other submission would be equally insulting to Genoa. As a Catholic of course his offence in directing these acts of insolent aggression against the Supreme Pontiff was far greater than any other. What his motive was may be doubted. In 1662 he was only four-and-twenty, and his arrogance may have been nothing more than the natural intoxication of so young a man who had been bred up from his very childhood\* upon the grossest flattery as his daily food. But his continuance in the course of insolent aggression during his life suggests the question whether it was not adopted on calculation. His power really was irresistible, except by a combination of the European states, which was little likely to be maintained even if it were made. He might naturally believe it to be irresistible; and if he deliberately aspired to universal empire, it may have been his object both to accustom surrounding monarchs and states to regard him as set above all law, and entitled to demand from them a degree of submission which no other king would have exacted even from his own subjects, and to show to the world that to be avowedly the subject of the great king was the only condition which gave to any nation, province, or city the least chance of escaping from insult and oppression.

Be this as it may, it is certain that from the autumn of 1662 to the year 1664 it was the unconcealed object of Lewis to heap all conceivable insults upon the Pope and his government. With this view he assailed his spiritual power, exactly as with the same view he seized Avignon.

He selected as his weapon in this unholy war the faculty of theology at Paris, which before the revolution was a corporate body,† composed of the Doctors of theology in several colleges of secular and regular clergy, of which the world-famed Sorbonne was by far the most important; to which colleges "the Faculty" bore a relation analogous to that of the University

---

\* The *Etudes* of the Paris Jesuits a few months ago published a curious paper in which it appeared that Lewis XIV., when learning to write, was set as a copy the words—

"Aux Rois hommage est due, ils font ce qu'il leur plait."

The paper has been preserved on which the little monarch of six or seven had copied this corrupting maxim six times, signing the whole at the bottom "Louis," as who should say "inspected and approved."

† There were four other Catholic "faculties" of theology in France; those of Aix, Bourdeaux, Lyons, and Rouen.

to the several colleges in Oxford. The liberties of this body had already been tampered with, but it was still possessed of greater privileges and, above all, animated by more of a spirit of liberty than any other institution left in France. Thus left a solitary monument of ancient freedom in the midst of the arrogance and servility bred by habitual despotism, the faculty of theology in some measure occupied the position which, as it is confessed even by the inveterate and bigoted hatred of Gibbon, was occupied by the Catholic Church in the Roman empire.

The faculty of theology then received orders from the king to make a declaration upon the same subjects upon which that of 1682 was afterwards made—those of the power of the Pope in temporal matters beyond his own dominions, and especially in France; and his infallibility.

It is important to observe that neither this declaration nor the much more celebrated one made in 1682 was the spontaneous expression of the sentiments of the French clergy. Neither again were they or any decree called forth, as modern writers have usually assumed, by any "Papal aggression" upon the liberty of the French Church and the independent authority of the king. There was no conceivable reason why a declaration against the "deposing power" should have been made by the faculty or demanded by the king in 1663 any more than at any moment in the last three centuries. The motive was transparent. The king had quarrelled with the Pope. There were two ways in which he could strike at him. He might attack his temporal dominions, and accordingly he seized Avignon and invaded Italy. He might shake his spiritual power, and to do this he turned to the Parliament of Paris and the faculty of theology as naturally as in the other case to his troops and their commanders.

Accordingly six articles, in their contents much the same as those of the declaration of 1682, were drawn up and presented to the king by the representatives of the faculty, headed by the Archbishop of Paris, as head of the Sorbonne. The secret history of this affair is disclosed by M. Gérin in his "Introduction."

It must not be supposed that the king was urged merely by his own pride and ambition; he was surrounded by dangerous counsellors, who, says M. Gérin, were deeply imbued with animosity against the Church, and especially against the Holy See, and who had their head-quarters in the Parliament of Paris, among that class of legists who, to use the expression of M. Guizot, were at all times "a terrible and fatal instrument of tyranny in France."

It is needless to say anything of the history of this famous body, its supreme judicial authority, the influence which it gradually assumed in legislation owing to the custom which required that the king's edicts should be registered on the books of the Parliament

before they became law, its struggles to extend its own power, in which it naturally failed, because a body, however respectable, can hardly be a true check upon the master of twenty legions unless it has behind it a real constituency, and the Parliament of Paris was merely a corporation of lawyers, not a representative body. One thing, however, is certain ; it was always steadily opposed to the liberty of the Church and the authority of the supreme Pontiff. Nothing else could have been expected, for of all things that which lawyers as such hate by the strongest instinct is an "*imperium in imperio*,"—any body exercising an authority not derived from the law of the land, nor revocable by it. No individual lawyer was ever really hearty in supporting the authority of the Church, unless he was a man personally religious, and viewing the subject in a supernatural light. And such men are little likely to be the rulers in any great legal corporation. We may, then, take it for granted that any body such as the Parliament of Paris will always be hostile to the independence of the Church.

On this occasion M. Gérin shows, from the manuscript journal of a contemporary, that the Procureur-Général (an officer in many respects answering to the Attorney-General in England) taking advantage of the quarrel between Lewis and the Pope, waited on the King and asked him "whether he wished that the Pope should have the power, whenever he pleased, of taking the crown from his head," and upon this read him the Bull, *Unam Sanctam*, the novelty of which made the King open his eyes wide. Upon this M. Gérin adds, "Now this same *Unam Sanctam* was published by Boniface VIII. (1302)."

The Advocate-General Talon then moved the Parliament, and obtained an order, addressed to the Faculty, forbidding it to allow any thesis to be defended similar to one which had been complained of, in which a bachelor had maintained, in very moderate terms, the authority of the Holy See. This decree the Parliament required should be read in the "general assembly, before the Doctors, and also the Bachelors who had received their first licence, and then formally entered on the Registers of the Faculty." Two great lawyers, Talon and de Harlay, then went to the meeting of the Faculty, and required obedience in a speech of much insolence towards the Church, but which declared of the King—

The favours which we daily receive from our incomparable king ought to bind us to our duty as strongly as the indispensable necessity which Jesus Christ has imposed upon all the faithful of honouring kings.

The Church, which has just received from his piety the important place of Dunkirk, which his prudence and the necessity of his affairs had obliged him to take from her for some time, reveres him, not only as the living image of the Godhead—as a man into whose hands God has committed absolute power, but as her benefactor, her support, and her protector.

For our part we have no words to express our gratitude for his continual labours for our good, but we redouble our prayers for his exaltation. We ask of God to give him everything he can wish for the glory of his government, and for his private and domestic satisfaction; if, indeed, his kingly soul is capable of feeling any in which his subjects do not bear a part. We shall regard him as a mighty conqueror in war—as a good and tender father to his people in peace, and shall ask of God to cut short our own years in order to add them to those of his life.

And that these his public and private wishes may not be frustrated, we require that the decree of the Court be now read aloud, and that the registers of the faculty be brought, that it may be transcribed and registered in them \* (page 22).

Colbert, Controller of Finance and Secretary of State under Lewis, who was his own Prime Minister, had his tools among the members of the Faculty, and received from them reports of all that passed in the private meetings. These reports have been preserved, but their existence has not hitherto been known. M. Gérin gives them at full length. It appears that the Faculty refused the demand of the crown lawyers for the immediate registration of the decree of the Parliament, and only promised to discuss the matter. The discussion was private, and the report of it is now published for the first time. This report is followed by a list of the Doctors who "have acted amiss, or are liable to suspicion in the matter of the decree of the Parliament;" and another of "those who have done well, and who have specially distinguished themselves, on the same occasion." It is worth the notice of those who suppose that the opposition to the Pope came from the Gallican Church, that (notwithstanding the open and undisguised use of threats and promises by a despotic government) the former list contains six-and-twenty names, the last only eight. Another important fact, until now quite unknown, is that the name of Bossuet figures among the opponents of the so-called Gallican party. His character is also specially reported upon among those of its opponents. The private report also contains a list of "communities to be feared on this matter." It contains, among others, all houses of the regular clergy, and S. Sulpice, "in which ecclesiastics are trained in a spirit of perfect regularity; but it is confidently asserted that everything there is extreme for the authority of the Pope." Among the individuals who are reported against as "strong supporters of the work which all good Frenchmen and true subjects of the King are labouring to oppose," we find M. de la Motte Fénelon.

At last under open compulsion the decree was registered, April 4; but the same day a thesis, similar to that which it forbade, was

---

\* This curious passage M. Gérin publishes from one of the manuscripts in the collection of the minister Colbert.

maintained with the approbation of the Syndic of the Faculty, M. Grandin. Talon was enraged; the Syndic and several others were called before the Parliament, and Talon having declared that the Syndic, "far from asking pardon and apologizing for his offence, made himself more guilty by the terms in which he defended it," the Parliament immediately suspended him.

A decree [says M. Gérin] no more legal than if the Council of State nowadays should pass a decree suspending a bishop as a president of the Court of Appeal. This act of violence alarmed the timid, and some days afterwards the Court obtained the passing of the ambiguous six articles, signed by only sixty-six doctors, which the Parliament caused to be solemnly registered in all the universities, while it was secretly admitted with disgust that the maxims of the Parliament were condemned by the faculty. In 1682, when it again became necessary to break the resistance of the Sorbonne which refused to register the Four Articles, De Harlay, the Procureur-General, with satisfaction, reminded the Chancellor, De Tellier, of the severities suffered in 1663 by the doctors, and advised him to employ the same means to subdue them again. His manuscript (now first published) says that "the example of these will make the doctors anxious to avoid the same by taking some step which may atone for their offence against the king, as they drew up their articles in 1663, in consequence of the trouble you took about it after the interdiction of M. Grandin" (page 33).

Obtained as they were, these six articles, whatever they might have been, could have had no weight. But it is worth while to observe that they bore evident marks of being reluctantly drawn up; for, instead of speaking clearly and definitely, as men do who are expressing their own cherished opinions, the writers made them as ambiguous as they could; and this was noticed by all parties, Parliamentary as well as ecclesiastical, at the time.

It is important to observe that the moment Lewis XIV. had made up his quarrel with Alexander VII., these demonstrations against the Pope suddenly ceased. Not that the lawyers would not willingly have carried them on; but in truth, as things then were, few men dared to do anything in France, unless they had good reason to know that what they did would be acceptable to the King; and, much as the lawyers of the Parliament hated the Pope, they loved their own interest far more than they hated him.

They had to wait near seventeen years, when the next quarrel between Lewis and the Pope became serious. That quarrel was even more disgraceful to Lewis than the former, for it originated not in the wanton insolence of a youth intoxicated with the early possession of absolute power, but in a gross act of rapacious tyranny on the part of a man already in middle age.

The Kings of France had long exercised a right called the *Regale*, with regard to the temporalities of certain French Sees. They



received the revenues and exercised the patronage of those sees during vacancies, and the vacancy was held to continue until the incoming Bishop had sworn the oath of allegiance, on taking possession. M. Gérin shows that officers of the crown, at different times, had attempted to extend the claim to other sees, and that this had been expressly prohibited, by royal edicts of Lewis XII. and Henry IV., which last had been registered by the Parliament. The extension of the claim to any diocese not already subject to it had been expressly forbidden by a general Council (the second of Lyons), in 1275. In 1673 and 1675, two declarations were published by Lewis XIV., extending the Regale to all the Archbishops and Bishops of France. This was an act of sheer tyranny, besides being avowedly sacrilegious; and the bishops might well scruple even in submitting to it, as they were forbidden to do so by a decree of a General Council.

It is to be remarked that, to say nothing more, it was clearly as much an illegal act of taxation, and a violation of private right, as anything complained of, for instance, under Charles I., yet writers and speakers both in France and England, who profess to be advocates of liberty as well as justice, have taken the side of the King, only because the Pope was against him. M. Gérin shows that even in our own day, in 1861, M. Jules Favre declared, unchecked, in the Legislative Assembly, that the contest on the Pope's side was for money. This is simply false. The Pope claimed nothing. He had nothing to gain. He was maintaining merely the unquestionable rights not of the Holy See, but of the French Bishops.

Not content with extending the Regale to every diocese in France, Lewis applied it to sees which had been long filled up, requiring their holders (some of whom had been in possession for thirty years and more) to "close the Regale" by a formal act, by which they would of course admit that their successors were liable to it. So general was the fear of the royal tyranny that resistance was made only by two bishops out of those in a large number of provinces unquestionably free from it. These were Caulet, Bishop of Pamiers, and Pavillon, Bishop of Alet. Pavillon died a year later, so that Caulet was left alone. He had been bishop above thirty years; but not having "closed the Regale," the king treated him as never having taken possession, and proceeded to fill up all vacancies which he had filled in that long period. The Archbishop of Toulouse, his Metropolitan, was a creature of the Court, and took entirely against him. Caulet—a man revered for his piety and the strictness of his life—wrote to the king, and explained that it was impossible to apply the Regale to his see and chapter, because, by an ancient custom confirmed by the Pope and by Lewis XIV. himself, the cathedral was served by canons regular, who practised strict

poverty and community of goods, and the see had no property except tithes. The persons appointed to canonries under the Regale had submitted to no novitiate, and were in every way disqualified to hold the offices. The king made no answer; and the whole property of the bishop was seized by the Intendant of Montauban, a man afterwards conspicuous in the persecution of the Protestants, and a creature of Colbert's. So rigorously was the seizure executed, that the bishop lived only upon alms. He wrote a second letter to Lewis, complaining that "the bare necessities of life which are always left to the greatest criminals, had in his case been seized."

Not content with depriving me of all, it has been made a crime in some persons to have assisted me in my necessity; and a man in good position at Paris has been forced to hide himself, in order to avoid prison or exile, because it was reported to M. de Chateauneux that he had sent alms to the Bishop of Pamiers, who, as well as the greater part of his *curés*, was at the time in absolute want of everything.

This statement is confirmed by another contemporary manuscript, which shows that Lewis XIV. was, as usual, more just and more merciful than his advisers. The king had been pressed by some persons to send a man of quality to the Bastille for having sent an alms of 2,000 crowns to the Bishop of Pamiers. He checked them by this good answer: "It shall never be said that I have put any man into the Bastille for giving alms."

The clergy of the diocese remained firm to their chief, and suffered with him (p. 46).

The bishop protected his authority by canonical proceedings, but these were annulled by the metropolitan and the Parliament. He wrote again to the king and to the procureur-général. As the last resource, obtaining no redress in France, not one of the 130 bishops moving in his defence, he wrote to the Pope, Innocent XI., since declared Venerable. The Pope showed great caution and moderation. He wrote to the king, March 12, 1678, and received no answer. In the January following he sent a second brief, written as early as September, probably because he wished the king before receiving it to have private knowledge of its contents. Receiving no answer, he formally annulled the acts of the Archbishop of Toulouse. He then waited another year, after which he wrote a third time to the king.

Once more we entreat and conjure your Majesty that, remembering the words of our Lord addressed to the prelates of His Church, "He that heareth you heareth Me," you would rather hear me (me who have towards you the bowels of a father, and who give you true and salutary counsel), than those children of unbelief, whose views and affections are only of the earth, and who, by suggestions expedient in appearance, pernicious in fact, are shaking the foundations of your monarchy, which rests upon veneration for things holy, and on the defence of the rights and authority of the Church (p. 50).

He ended by expressing his fear that the judgment of God would light upon the king, and added that he should not again have recourse to letters, but should use the power which God had placed in his hands, fearing, if he omitted to do so, to be guilty of a criminal neglect in the administration of his apostolic office.

Lewis XIV. was keenly moved by language which no man on earth, except the Pope, had ever had the courage to address to him. The Gallican legists wished to go to farther measures, but they were held back by the king ; and although resolved not to satisfy the desires of the Pope, he temporized (p. 51).

It was proposed to call a national council, but it was feared that if this was done some of the bishops would openly oppose the Regale ; for some were known to speak publicly against it, and others to have protested privately. If nothing was done, it was feared that the king might be excommunicated. Another proposal was to enter into a negotiation, which might be spun out till the Pope should die. The deputies of the clergy met every fifth year to vote subsidies to the king. The king caused them to make " what is called in the jargon of our times " a *manifestation* against the Holy See, regretting the conduct of the Pope. Public opinion, however, was against them. Madame de Sévigné wrote to her daughter : " Is it possible that you have not seen the Pope's letter ? I wish you could. You will see a strange Pope. Why, he speaks with authority. You would say that he is the father of Christians. He does not tremble, he does not flatter, he threatens. It would really seem that he implies some blame against the Archbishop of Paris. What a strange man ! I cannot get Pope Sixtus out of my head." Madame de Grignan greatly amused her by comparing the French bishops to the wife in Molière, who " liked to be beaten." M. Gérin says he has found many contemporary writings condemning the French bishops, not one in their favour.

While things were in this state, a new cause of quarrel arose. Lewis had appointed a secular superior to a house of Augustinian nuns at Charonne, near Paris, in open violation of the Concordat. The archbishop, an unworthy creature of the king, took his side. The nuns appealed to the Pope ; Innocent quashed the archbishop's proceedings, and ordered that a superior for three years should be elected out of the community. The king's council and the Parliament declared the Pope's proceedings null, and the legal authorities spoke with a tone of indignant virtue of the resistance they would always offer to the Court of Rome if it thus infringed " their liberties." On the very day on which this happened, the Bishop of Pamiers died. There was a formal schism. The canons in legal and ecclesiastical possession appointed vicars-general to administer

the diocese *sede vacante*; the canons appointed under the Regale appointed another. The vicars-general, legally appointed, were arrested and imprisoned. Another was elected in their place, who was condemned to death; he escaped, and was executed in effigy. "Religious men feared, not without reason," says M. Gérin, "that the chastisements of God would fall upon the state." The executioner fled, and was brought back by force, saying that, though poor and miserable, he was a Catholic, that he was sure the late bishop was a saint, and had always retained his charity towards himself.

At Paris the defenders of "liberty" took no notice of these things, but were proceeding against the Pope's briefs. At last it was resolved to try, not a national council, but what might look like it. It was from this state of things that the assemblies of the clergy in 1681 and 1682 originated. The first was called at the time the *petite assemblée*. It consisted of the bishops who happened to be in Paris. An epigram of Racine said that it made one thing, and one only, quite clear, that we have fifty-two prelates who are not residing in their dioceses. These prelates had before them, no doubt, a task of some difficulty. As to the affair of Pamiers, for instance, it was one about which it was plainly unsafe to say much. They contented themselves with complaining of the form of the Pope's briefs as inconsistent with the "Gallican liberties." Whether the proceedings of the Government were consistent with any liberties or any justice whatever they did not say. They seemed totally ignorant of all that had passed, except that certain briefs had arrived from Rome the form of which offended their sensitive feelings about liberty. In the same way as to the affair of the nuns of Charonne, nothing was said as to the rights of the case, only the form of the Pope's brief was complained of. The result was that the assembly petitioned the king to call "a national council, or general assembly of the clergy," to be composed of two deputies of the first order, and two of the second order, from each province; the latter to have only a consultative voice, that is, in fact not a national council, but an assembly which it would be easy to the king to pack. The acts of this *petite assemblée* were printed by the king's orders, and dispersed over France and Italy.

M. Gérin shows that upon all the points in dispute all the names held in the highest authority as Gallicans, especially Bossuet and Fleury, expressed the strongest sense that right was on the side of the Pope and against the king.

On June 16, 1681, the king addressed letters requiring the archbishops of all the provinces subject to His Majesty to hold provincial assemblies, for the purpose of deputing two of the first and two of the second order as deputies to the general assembly called at Paris for the 1st of October, 1681.

The elections took place ; how—M. Gérin tells us at length in his third chapter. It were needless and weary to go as he does through the provinces one after another, and show that in each the choice of the representatives was really with the king, or rather with Colbert. The object of the choice was to find unworthy men, and no doubt it too generally succeeded. If we desired to make any man a revolutionist, we can hardly imagine anything so likely to effect that object as a careful study of this chapter and of the two which follow, in which the members of the assembly are gone through one by one, and of that on the state of ecclesiastical property under Lewis XIV. But it would be a mistake, as well as wrong, to suppose that the state of things exposed in these chapters was a fair sample of the Church of France under Lewis XIV. In justice, it must be remembered that the king, all-powerful as he was, dared not call a national council of the French clergy. Whether if he had, he might have obtained a majority in it no one can now tell. But one thing is certain, that the opposition to his acts would have been so decided, and would have come from quarters so highly and so justly respected, that the moral victory would have been wholly against him. It was to avoid this that he had recourse to an assembly which he, as well as every one else, well knew could not by possibility have any real authority. Councils (as M. Gérin points out) are either general, national, provincial, or diocesan. The assembly of 1682 could have no pretension to be either diocesan, provincial, or general. Was it a national council ? Such a council consists of all the bishops of a nation, and among Catholics its decrees have no authority until they are confirmed by the Pope. Curiously enough, it was the want of this last qualification which has obtained for the assembly of 1682 whatever respect it has obtained. Protestants and disaffected Catholics have spoken of it with reverence, because it was assembled to oppose the Pope, and because its proceedings were declared by him null and void. Had it wanted this recommendation ; had it been gathered to condemn any heresy, Jansenism, for instance ; and had its decrees been approved by the Holy Sec, they would have protested, with great truth, that it was a mere packed assembly, and represented no one except the king.

Even as it actually was, the king by no means avoided opposition among the bishops. M. Gérin publishes a very curious report addressed by M. Morant, Intendant of Aix, detailing his interview with Cardinal Grimaldi, Archbishop of Aix. The Cardinal was a man near eighty, and except on business of an indispensable nature, had never left his diocese since his appointment to it. The Intendant's report is, at least in one respect, honourable to the Government of Lewis XIV. It shows that its agents were not afraid to let the real state of things be known to their employers. M. Morant

shows himself to have been by no means scrupulous about truth. But at least he did not fear to report to the minister the least pleasant things which the Cardinal said to him, "the miseries which had always fallen upon kingdoms in which the ecclesiastical authority had been confused with the temporal,"—"that most of the present difficulties must be attributed to the maxims of the Parliament of Paris,"—"that the council called for October the first would not be legitimate, and could not be so without the authority of the Pope,"—"that it would never be regarded as anything more than a *conciliabulum*, which the best bishops of France took good care not to attend; and that the deputies to be chosen in the different provinces had been nominated by *lettres de cachet*." "This," says the Intendant," he repeated several times in order to make out whether I had not received such a letter touching his own province." The Cardinal also pointed out that the "procurator (the instructions which each province was to give to its representatives) required them beforehand to condemn the Holy See without hearing what had been done." He particularly called attention to "the evils which had ensued in a neighbouring country, without expressly naming England," in which, the reader will remember, the Protestant king had thirty years before been brought to the scaffold by his Protestant subjects. The Intendant then gives his own answer at length; after which he says the Cardinal "returned to the fact that the deputies had been named beforehand as a thing utterly odious, and which showed plainly that what was really wanted was the election of men of a complacent character. I did not think that the time had come for me to be open as to the orders I had received upon this subject; for which I waited until the assembly of the province should meet." . . . . "At last he did me the honour to read me his letter to the Chancellor, at the end of which, observing that the Chancellor had told the Cardinal that his Holiness had expressed his wish that there should be an assembly of the clergy rather than a national council, I took advantage of this information (as to the truth of which I assured his Eminence that he must not doubt) to reply to what he said about the necessity of the Pope's authority for the calling of a national council." Considering that both the Intendant, and the minister to whom he was writing, knew equally well that the statement was wholly without foundation, the gravity of this last sentence is amusing. When this report reached Colbert, he wrote, in the king's name, to ask the advice of the Archbishop of Paris under the circumstances. The Archbishop's answer is not preserved, but any one acquainted with his abject character can imagine it. The result was, that on August 23 a letter in due form, beginning *Mon cousin*, and signed by the king himself, was dispatched by a special courier to Cardinal Grimaldi, ordering him in very imperious terms to convene the Provincial



Assembly for the election of deputies, who were to be empowered by a "valid commission" to represent the province. But neither the king nor his minister at all reckoned on the Cardinal's submission, and therefore the same day orders were sent to each of his suffragans, the Bishops of Riez, Sisteron, Gap, Apt, and Frejus, commanding them to meet, with the senior among them as their president, and to act without their archbishop. The same day orders were sent to the Intendant, directing him to go to the Cardinal and assure him of his Majesty's intention to leave to the Provincial Assembly "absolute liberty both as to the nomination of the deputies and as to powers and instructions to be given to them." In case the Cardinal Archbishop still refused to obey, the Intendant was to deliver the letters to the suffragans, and to command the Bishop of Riez, in his Majesty's name, to hold the assembly, sending further instructions as to the bishop's conduct in the matter, which the Intendant was to give "as from himself." The instructions end, "If Cardinal Grimaldi convokes the assembly you must say nothing to *him* either as to the nomination of the deputies nor as to the draft of the instructions and powers to be given to them. You must communicate on these subjects with the bishops of the province, and engage them to do what you know to be his Majesty's intentions on the subject."

The documents do not enable us fully to trace out all the steps which followed. At Carpentras, however, have been found the instructions given by the Provincial Assembly of Aix to their deputies. These direct them to adhere to the rule laid down by the General Council of Lyons, forbidding the further extension of the Regale; to protest that its extension to the Churches not hitherto subject to it would be "contrary to law natural, divine, and canonical;" to declare that the Regale, where it existed, was a spiritual right, conceded to the Crown by competent ecclesiastical authority, not a temporal right attached inseparably to the Crown; to declare that the charge against the Pope in the matter of Charonne was unreasonable; lastly, to defend the prerogatives of the Holy See in the matter of the excommunication issued against the Archbishop of Toulouse in case he should persist in interfering with the administration of the diocese of Pamiers.

But all these efforts were fruitless. In the name of the liberties of the Gallican Church the seal of slavery was once more placed upon the lips of the clergy. The Assembly of Aix was unable either to choose freely its own representatives or to give them its own instructions. On the refusal of Cardinal Grimaldi, the Intendant Morant took upon himself the management of the affair, in union with Valavoin, bishop of Riez, who had been pointed out for this office by Colbert in his despatch of August 23, and who caused himself to be named as representative of the first order,

together with Luke Daquin, bishop of Frejus, and brother to the king's physician.

In all the provinces the king showed the same resolution to make himself master of the elections. The candidates excluded by him were either set aside by their colleagues, or set themselves aside in order not to engage in a contest both unequal and useless. The rigours exhibited in the diocese of Pamiers proved that the ministers had made up their minds not to shrink from any violence in putting down all opposition to the orders of Lewis XIV. (page 150).

The proofs given of this by M. Gérin in one diocese and province after another, fully establish his statement, but would fill an article by themselves. He observes that Bossuet himself bears testimony to the fact that he himself was really deputed not by the province of Paris, by which he was nominally elected, but by the Court; nay, that long before the elections were held the ministers had settled that he was not only to be a member of the Assembly, but to preach the sermon at the opening. This appears from a letter written by him from the Court at Fontainebleau, before the Provincial Assembly met at Paris, in which he announces that both points were already settled.

So far, then, was the Assembly of 1682 from being a "National Council," that it in no sense represented any one except Lewis and his ministers, by whom its members were selected and chosen. In the province of Rouen Colbert wrote to say that the Bishop of Lisieux was to be elected with the archbishop. Elected he was. But an accident made it impossible for him to attend at Paris, on which Colbert wrote to the bishop of Avranches to say that in consequence of this accident "His Majesty has made choice of you to supply the place of M. de Lisieux, who had been named; and he has caused his intentions upon this subject to be signified to the archbishop of Rouen. I doubt not that he will do all that is in his power, and that the choice his Majesty has made of you will be carried out." Accordingly the bishop of Avranches sat in the Assembly. Whether any form of election beyond Lewis's nomination was thought necessary does not appear; M. Gérin supposes that it was not.

As to what was called the "procuration," i. e., the powers and instructions to be given by each Provincial Assembly to its representatives, to which, as we have seen, Cardinal Grimaldi so strongly objected (as it required the bishops elected to condemn the Pope's proceedings before hearing anything about them), this was so little left to the provincial bishops that it was drawn up beforehand by the king's creature, De Harlay, archbishop of Paris, and orders were sent in a circular to all the Intendants throughout the kingdom, that it was to be adopted in each province "without the least change." It is

given in full by M. Gérin. It required the deputies "to take measures to set right the contraventions of the provisions of the Concordat, as to frivolous appeals, which had been committed by the Court of Rome in the matters of Charonne, Pamiers, Toulouse, and others."

It had been settled by Lewis before the assembly was summoned, that this same de Harlay was to preside. Custom, however, if not any actual rule, required that the senior archbishop present should be president. It was, therefore, determined that he should be the senior, and accordingly, although as a general rule the archbishop and one of his suffragans were chosen to represent each province, yet in every case in which the archbishop was senior to the Archbishop of Paris he was excluded. In every instance what was thus determined beforehand was, either by force or influence, carried out.

It really seems impossible after this signal exposure, that any one should claim any ecclesiastical authority for this assembly. With Catholics of course it could have had none, even if it had been a free national council, inasmuch as its proceedings were at once declared null and void by the Sovereign Pontiff. It is, however, important to show that it was absolutely without any moral weight, and this M. Gérin's work has far more than proved. Henceforth no reasonable man can believe that the decisions decreed by this assembly proved anything, except the tyranny of Lewis XIV. and the abject servility of too many of the French prelates in his reign. Still, as we have already said, we do not expect that this exposure will prevent its being appealed to by men whose only notion of liberty is the absolute power of the State in things sacred. M. Gérin shows that M. Dupin breaks out into an access of admiration about Lewis's instructions to the provincial councils. They were to choose "men distinguished for piety, learning, and experience, and whose merit was most known throughout all the provinces." "*Quelle belle loi électorale !*" exclaims M. Dupin. Gérin shows that the real meaning of this was that the Provincial Assemblies should select as the priests to represent them, not men known to the clergy of the province, but strangers chiefly in Paris and mere tools of the Court, and that this was actually done.

In fact, there remains but one thing which can give any weight to the assembly of 1682—the great name of Bossuet, who is always represented as its soul (in Carlyle's language, its king), and who actually drew up the declaration and afterwards wrote a formal defence of what had been done, which he continued to retouch till his death, and which has since been published. But we are sure that any man who reads with tolerable fairness M. Gérin's seventh chapter, will feel that this event of his life, so far as it does

anything at all, only diminishes the credit of Bossuet instead of increasing that of the assembly. It is a necessity of human nature to long to be able to make a hero of a man we admire; and we quite understand many persons wishing to be able to believe that Bossuet was altogether a hero. But it is impossible to think so. Those who knew him best felt that his great qualities were tainted by a sad want of firmness and independence. In 1663, the keen-sighted spies of Colbert, while they mentioned him as taking warmly the ultramontane side in the discussions of the "Faculty," saw the weakness of his purpose, which they thought might yet make him a useful tool to the minister. One writes,—

M. Bossuet is beyond all question a man of high talent, learned for his years, as much so as a young man who devotes himself to preaching could be, but what has made him go wrong on this occasion is perhaps chiefly his consideration for M. Cornet (whose creature he is), and his example.

Another said,—

M. Bossuet is adroit, complacent, bent upon pleasing all with whom he is, and adopting their sentiments when he knows them. He has no mind to get himself into trouble [*ne veut point se faire des affaires*]; nor to risk the success of his own projects which he thinks sure to succeed. He thinks it impossible that this, [*i.e.* the quarrel between the king and the Pope] can last. Thus he steers with extraordinary caution, and in the Faculty looks out for some middle course, some shift, when he is not on the other side, and hence he has many followers. Besides, he speaks Latin elegantly and agreeably, and has, in fact, a considerable knowledge of these subjects, because he studied before he devoted himself to preaching, and hence he has weight in the Faculty. Attached to the Jesuits and to those who have the means of making his fortune, more from interest than from inclination, for by nature he is free, keen, satirical, and looks upon many matters quite as a superior [*se mettant fort au-dessus de beaucoup de choses*]. Hence, whenever he shall see a line which leads to fortune, he will throw himself into it, be it what it may, and will be able to make himself useful to it. He manages peaceably the Dean of S. Thomas and is followed very willingly by Le Plessis-Gesté and by Thomassin.

These life-like sketches have been till now quite unknown. But other contemporary judges, who knew nothing of them, arrived independently at the same conclusion. Forty years later, in 1703, when his fame already filled France and even Europe, the writer of a manuscript entitled "Characters of the Royal Family of France, the Ministers of State, and the Principal Persons of the Court," says of the great Bossuet, "He is one of the most learned ecclesiastics and one of the keenest courtiers. An indefatigable defender of the sentiments of the Court—this circumstance taints his works. He would be more esteemed if he were more impartial."

M. Gérin quotes from a manuscript in the Imperial Library some lines of Arnauld's, which he supposes to have referred to Bossuet, in which he quotes the saying of S. Augustine about the hireling shepherd, who flies when the flock is in danger from the wolf, *fugisti quia tacuisti*. "The prelates were assembled, and none of them opened his mouth to undeceive the king" as to the severities which were going on at Pamiers. In another letter Arnauld says—

The king would have done himself more honour if he had named M. Bossuet to the cardinalate. And yet there is a *verumtamen*, as to which I fear he will have to give much account to God, and that is, that he had not the courage to represent anything to the king. This is the temper of the times, even in those who in other respects have very great qualities—abundance of light but little nobleness. Of the same bishop M. de Treville said, "he had no bone."

Before, therefore, the great name of Bossuet can really be urged in favour of the Assembly of 1682 and its proceedings, we must at least ask whether or not he took it as an opportunity of expressing what he really felt, or whether he was reluctantly following the wishes of the Court. And this point he answers for himself. Ledieu records that he

asked Bossuet who had inspired him with the plan of the propositions of the clergy upon the power of the Church. He replied that M. Colbert, then Minister and Secretary of State, was the real author of them, and the only person who determined the king in the matter. M. Colbert maintained that the quarrel with Rome about the Regale was the best opportunity for renewing the doctrine of France on the use of the power of the Popes. . . . He brought the king over to his opinion against the advice of M. de Tellier, also Minister and Secretary of State. . . . Besides, M. de Paris (Harlay de Champvallon), did nothing else in the matter than flatter the Court, catch up the words of the Ministers, and blindly follow their will like a valet (p. 385).

This is by no means the language of a man who felt that the Assembly had given him an opportunity of bearing testimony to a truth for which he cared. It appears, indeed, that he was so far from feeling this, that he himself persuaded De Tellier and his son (Archbishop of Rheims) from doing what was afterwards done, and told them "you will have the glory of having brought to a conclusion the affair of the Regale, but that glory will be dimmed by these odious propositions." "Even when the king, pressed by Colbert, La Chaise, and Harlay, had given his express orders, Bossuet still proposed that an investigation of the tradition on the subject should be made, which was nothing more than a pretext for an endless discussion"—in fact, much like what leads, among our-

selves, to the appointment of a "committee" of inquiry, on many subjects upon which honourable members do not wish to come to a vote.

Those contemporaries who disliked what was done did not impute it to Bossuet. Fénelon "wrote in his celebrated letter to Lewis XIV. : 'Your Archbishop and your Confessor involved you in the difficulties of the affair of the Regale, and in the troubles with Rome'" (p. 287).

The whole of M. Gérin's chapter on "Bossuet and the Assembly of 1682" is well worth study. He clearly shows that whenever Bossuet ventured to express his real feelings and opinions, he spoke against the side of which he is generally supposed to have been the soul. He afterwards made an apology himself that Protestant kings might be more willing to become Catholics if they saw the power of the Pope limited. But M. Gérin shows that the Protestant Leibnitz took the side of the Pope, and that the strong Gallicans, so far from attracting Protestants, put difficulties in the way of reunion.

The flattery of Lewis XIV., by the Assembly, was, we presume, too gross for Bossuet's taste, but it passed without protest from him :—

The deputies of the clergy re-echoed what the contemporary legists were writing ; "in France it has always been held that kings are not purely laymen, but in a sort of mixed condition." From the first day to the last they vied with each other to paraphrase the language of the "Promoteur" Chéron, in the sitting of November 24, who having said that Lewis XIV. surpassed David in sweetness, Solomon in wisdom, Alexander in valour, in power all the Cæsars and all the kings of the earth, applied to him this Byzantine text :—"In the army more than king, in the field more than soldier, in the kingdom more than emperor, in civil justice more than prætor, in consistory more than judge, *in the Church more than bishop*" (*from the procès verbal of the Assembly*). The Pope in his brief of April 11 reproves this base flattery, and asks, "Which of you came into the arena to stand as a bulwark for the House of Israel? Who dared to expose himself to ill-will? Who uttered so much as one voice in memory of the ancient liberty?"

It is sad to write that Bossuet, who when speaking freely condemned the Archbishop of Paris as making himself "the valet" of the ministers, was the man who moved that he should be President of the Assembly. This was the same upon whose death Madame de Coulanges wrote to Madame de Sévigné that there were only two trifling difficulties in the way of the person who was to be selected to preach his funeral oration, one was "his life," the other "his death."

It is at least pleasing to see that Bossuet was aware of this great infirmity, and asked the superior of a convent to pray for him, "that I may not have complacency for the world" (p. 305).



We must not infer that the "declaration" expressed Bossuet's real feelings because it was by him that it was drawn up. It is proved that he took this upon himself only to prevent its sense being expressed with much greater violence by men who knew much less than he what they were doing. It is recorded by Fleury that the Bishop of Tournai had drawn it up "very ill."

His propositions maintained that the Holy See as well as the Pope could fall into heresy, and thus overthrew the indefectibility of the Holy See. M. Bossuet, shocked at this doctrine, strongly opposed it. The Bishop of Tournai warmly defended it. . . . The dispute lasted long. It finished by M. de Tournai refusing to draw up the articles, and on his refusal M. Bossuet was charged with it. This anecdote is attested and given in detail by M. de Fénelon, in a Latin treatise upon the infallibility of the Pope, still in manuscript. He received it from the mouth of M. Bossuet (p. 295).

Bossuet, long afterwards, declared that he undertook the office only to serve Rome by "preventing things from being pushed to a dangerous extreme."

There is no doubt that this really was his object, and that he managed it with great skill. His conduct was that of a man who was bent upon satisfying an imperious monarch, and exercising all his ingenuity to do so at the least possible sacrifice of principle. And this intention is evident on the face of the "declaration." The articles are full of ambiguities. They were evidently intended to look violent enough to satisfy the Court and yet to be capable of an innocent interpretation. But Bossuet ought to have remembered that his words were sure to be interpreted, not merely by theologians in the schools, but by kings, and the ministers of kings intent upon depriving the Church of her most necessary liberties, and anxious to oppress her under the specious cloak of his authority. The disgrace of having his great name perpetually invoked by Napoleon I. when perpetrating his worst outrages (outrages which Bossuet would have rejected with indignation) was but too just a retribution.

M. Gérin sums up his character—

Happily Bossuet united to this infirmity of character, besides the genius which shines forth in his "Funeral Orations," in his "Discourse on Universal History," in the "Variations," a gift more admirable and more precious still—the deep piety which breathes in his "Sermons," in "Letters to La Sœur Cornuan," and in the "Meditations upon the Gospel." But whatever homage is his due, an upright judge will ever repeat with Arnault, "There is nevertheless a VERUMTAMEN, for which I fear that he had to render a great account to God" (page 331).

It is the fashion to say that the "declaration" was unopposed

in France. There would have been small cause for wonder if it had. It was voted by the Assembly, March 19th, 1682, and on March 20th a decree was issued by the king, commanding that the four articles of the declaration should be registered by every university of his kingdom, and taught by all their Professors. No man could have been surprised if such a decree from such a master had been immediately and universally obeyed. The fact, however, was far otherwise. A general opposition arose, and was only put down by sheer force. Upon this subject we would refer our readers to the very interesting chapter in M. Gérin's book entitled "Opposition to the Four Articles." It was most energetic immediately under the eye of the king and his ministers in Paris itself and in the Sorbonne. M. Gérin quotes Le Gendre, "an unsuspected witness," to prove that the opposition was almost general, and that de Harlay was specially attacked as the supposed author of the declaration. He adds, "the common and convenient assertion that it was generally received will have to be given up, and it must be admitted that the doctors opposed to the Gallican maxims were the most pious, the most learned, and the most numerous." The Gallican Fleury says they included—

Almost all the regular clergy, not only the religious orders but also the communities of priests, although without privileges and subject to the bishops. They leant to that side as most favourable to piety. The Regulars, almost the only persons who preserve the tradition of the practices of devotion, have united their opinion to this, and have promoted it by their writings, their conversation, and in the direction of consciences. The ancient [i.e. the Gallican] doctrine has remained among the doctors often less pious and less exemplary in their lives than those who teach the other. Sometimes those who have resisted the novelties (i. e., the doctrine opposed to Gallicanism) have been lawyers and politicians, profane and libertine, by whom the truths they teach have been exaggerated and made odious (page 340).

This is confirmed by the secret reports sent to Colbert. His agents gave him lists of theologians *for Rome* and *against Rome*. These lists were drawn up by declared Gallicans, and therefore the praises they give to the characters of those whom they class as "for Rome" are the less to be suspected. M. Gérin goes in detail through the different colleges of theology. We have not space to follow him at length. But he much more than makes good his assertion. The Sorbonne had 169 doctors, of whom "all but six or seven" were opposed to the declaration; at the college of Navarre all but one; at St. Sulpice and the Missions Etrangères "all but four or five;" among the orders all. As to learning and piety, he shows that the superiority of those opposed to the declaration was strongly and unanimously testified by Colbert's reports.

On the 1st of May, 1682, a deputation of the Parliament was

sent to the Sorbonne, where the "Faculty" had its meetings, to require the registration of the "declaration." So much opposition did this meet that it was not registered until after a long struggle. The feeling in the "Faculty" was so strong that the Procureur-General de Harlay reported to Colbert, June 15th, that the debate in the Faculty was adjourned till the next day, and that he judged it necessary to prevent the conclusion of this deliberation "by whatever means the king judged would be least mischievous," concluding by saying that he himself "was neither wise enough nor indiscreet enough to propose any means to be adopted, but awaited the king's commands." So great was the alarm produced at court by this report, that—

The king sent the Marquis de "Seignelay (Colbert's son) to Paris the same night, to arrange with the archbishop and the heads of the Parliament a *coup d'état* on a small scale, to be put in execution the next day." So early was the Parliament acting, that at six o'clock the next morning, June 16, an usher arrived from it, signifying to the dean of the faculty a decree already passed by the Parliament the same morning, which declared that as the doctors had presumed to debate upon the articles instead of registering the decree, their further meetings were absolutely forbidden, and the dean and six professors of the Sorbonne, the grand master, and four professors of the college of Navarre, and all others who should be indicated by the Procureur-Général, were required to attend at the bar of the Parliament at seven the same morning (page 357).

The declaration was then registered by force, the books having been sent for to the Parliament, and all future meetings of the faculty were forbidden. Eight doctors of theology were immediately sent into exile, by "lettres de cachet."

But violence of this kind was very reluctantly adopted by the Court because it was plain that if reported it would make known to all the world, and especially at Rome, that the "declaration" had been imposed upon the French clergy only by force.

It was just at this moment that the king suddenly dissolved the assembly in a manner which his creatures in it felt to be cruelly contemptuous. The Archbishop of Paris went so far as to remonstrate with Colbert, requesting that the letter dissolving it might be couched in more respectful language, and he received a very curt reply from the minister. The professed reason for this sudden step which M. Gérin finds in the memoirs of de Cosnac (a member of the assembly) was, that it was necessary that the bishops should return to their dioceses. The real reason, that matters were arranging themselves at Rome, and as the assembly had been from the beginning merely a weapon in the hands of the king to attack the Pope, it was contemptuously thrown away when no longer needed. The opposition of the clergy of Paris to the declaration no doubt

made the king more anxious to have done with it. It was on June 21 that the decree of exile was signed against the eight doctors, and on June 29 the assembly was suddenly dismissed. The king even refused to allow its proceedings to be entered on the archives of the clergy; nor were they entered until long afterwards, in 1710. The king and his ministers no doubt heartily despised the men who had degraded themselves to gain their favour. A month before, June 2, Colbert had written that the greater part of the assembly would willingly have changed their doctrine the next day if they had been allowed to do so (p. 355).

The Procureur-Général laboured to make use of this incident to get the Faculty of Theology more absolutely into the hands of the king. Its meetings were now suspended and could not be restored without royal permission. In order to save appearances it was resolved to get up among the doctors a petition to be allowed to hold their meetings. "If the petition had promised adhesion, obedience, submission to the four articles, it would have obtained no signatures. It spoke only of reverence for the king's edict and for the declaration of the clergy." M. Gérin details some curious instances of the intrigues used to obtain signatures. At last it only obtained those of 150 out of 750 doctors. The Procureur-Général de Harlay urged Colbert to use much greater severity, to deprive a very large number of their seats in the Faculty, to remove all the old professors of theology, and that instead of allowing their successors to be elected by the Faculty they should be nominated by the king, and to limit henceforth the number of the faculty to 100. Especially he desired to punish the Sorbonne, for which he proposes several measures. M. Gérin gives many interesting particulars on this subject, upon which we must not enter.

Meanwhile, it is pretty certain that the opposition of the other universities less immediately under the eye of the Government was even more energetic than it was at Paris. With regard to the University of Douai, which had been newly annexed to France, M. Gérin has found evidences of this fact. It addresses Lewis himself, expresses the strong and unanimous dislike of his new subjects in Flanders to the doctrine of the declaration, and declares "the great majority of us are ready to abandon our colleges and to renounce all promotion and dignity rather than submit to opinions repugnant to our consciences."

Nor was this a temporary opposition. M. Gérin shows that it continued and was general among the French clergy down to the time of the Revolution. As late as 1760, the Abbé Chauvelin spoke of those who were attached to what he called true [*i.e.* Gallican] maxims as "some bishops and some doctors," and the ultramon-tanes as "the great multitude," and declared it necessary to have recourse to authority to compel the Faculty of Theology to obedience

In fact, after the publication of M. Gérin's invaluable labours, we do not see how any man can in future speak of the French Church in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as having been Gallican in opinion.

And yet it cannot be denied that there was at least one part thoroughly rotten in that great body. The assembly of 1682 was only too miserable a proof of it. The king was able to collect by his mere will a meeting of two and thirty bishops, the majority of whom, there is reason to fear, were ready to vote whatever he pleased. In this is most strongly marked the contrast with the existing French Church. "Out of the ashes of the ancient church of France has sprung a new hierarchy, worthy of the name and the history of that great nation, as fervent as their S. Bernard, as tender as their S. Francis, as enterprising as their S. Lewis, as loyal to the Holy See as their Charlemagne."\* But in truth, when we look at the abuses which the French kings had introduced and established as to the disposal of church property, the real wonder is not that a portion of the French Church was corrupt, but that it had any part sound. Count Montalembert has expressed in language not more eloquent than true, the horrors of this system: "the most ancient abbeys, the most illustrious in the history of the Church and of our country, were made the appanage of the bastards of kings or of their still more unworthy favourites, sometimes the price of the foul favours of a royal favourite." Yet bad as this is, the real state of the case as laid bare by M. Gérin was worse still. For the corruption would have been much less fatal had it been confined to the circle immediately surrounding the monarch. In fact, the revenues of the Church were systematically employed as a means of bribing the whole of the upper classes. This was effected first by granting abbeys, both of men and women, *in commendam*, to persons who were not only not religious, but in very many cases were in no sense ecclesiastics, and had often not the least intention of ever being so. Henry IV. carried the matter even farther. Not content with the abbeys, he heaped bishoprics upon his lay favourites. Crillon, for instance, held the temporalities of two archbishoprics, three bishoprics, and an abbey. But we are not sure that the plan followed by Lewis XIV. was not even more mischievous. For he systematically granted large pensions, payable out of the revenues, both of bishoprics and abbeys. For instance, the Bishop of Mende wrote to Colbert, in 1668, that he had to pay one pension of 2,300 livres, three others of 1,500 each, two of 1,200, two of 1,000; altogether, 11,200 livres. His object was not to obtain relief from these payments, but to peti-

---

\* Newman's Lectures on Anglican Difficulties.

tion the king to give him some additional preferment, to enable him to meet them. Thus a bishop was never really independent in his circumstances. His proper revenues were charged with enormous payments, and he was continually a suitor to the minister, either for abbeys *in commendam*, or for similar pensions payable out of some abbey or see held by some one else. No means could have been devised so sure to combine all the evils of an endowed and a disendowed church, of wealth and of poverty. For the property of the Church being known to be great, the people felt, of course, no obligation to support their pastors, and yet these in their turn could only obtain an income by perpetual petitions to the minister. We have no room to copy instances of this; the chapter to which we have referred is full of them, all in minute detail.

No wonder that courtiers, accustomed to consider rich abbeys and bishoprics merely as funds to be given by the king to whom he would, lost all sense of any thing sacred in the property of the Church. There were not wanting men logical enough to draw the legitimate conclusion from the recognized practice, and M. Gérin shows that several writers, who might fairly be taken as representatives of the Court, avowed the principle that the property of the Church belonged to the king, and that he might do with it whatever he pleased. This was the principle which Burke denounced with equal eloquence and logic.\* But he was certainly mistaken in supposing that, in France at least, it was first introduced by the Revolution. Our author says:—

It is a common-place of our day to deplore, in the interests of royalty itself, that Lewis XIV. gave way so miserably to the spirit of his age by degrading all orders of the state under the feet of royalty. How comes it that our historians, so sensitive about the humiliation of the nobles, the parliaments, the communes, the provincial assemblies, are so little attentive to relate or blame, nay, so much disposed to praise, the incessant encroachments of the crown upon the power of the Church? Jansenistic and revolutionary prejudices, and the unpopularity with which they have surrounded the Church, are the only explanation of this injustice, against which, thank God, eloquent voices have before now protested.

---

\* It can hardly be necessary to explain that Catholics, in supporting Mr. Gladstone's measure on the Irish Establishment, did not for a moment accept these principles. That body was merely a creation of the State, and the property it held had been taken by the State from its rightful owners, and given by it to its own creatures. The right of the Establishment could never rise higher than its source. That Mr. Gladstone and his Ministry felt that their measure was really defensible only on this ground is plain by the fact that they respected all private endowments. Had the same reserve been observed in France the whole property of the Church would have been secure.



The crown desired to make the Church a slave like everything else. The French clergy did not resist with sufficient courage. It belonged to the Holy See alone to recall them to their duties, and to defend their rights. . . .

According to the theories of the French legists the Church obtained the right of holding property only by the concession of the sovereign, who had the power to withdraw it, and the maxims applied to the property of the clergy by the Constituent Assembly, the Convention, and Napoleon, were known, accepted, and favoured by the counsellors of Lewis XIV.

In 1650 Antoine Estienne, first printer and bookseller in ordinary to the king, published, with privilege, at Paris, under the pseudonym of Francis Paumier, a Remonstrance to His Majesty as to his authority over the temporalities of the Church. He said :—"The kings of France have a supreme right over the temporalities of all the Churches in the realm, with full power to use them in the necessities of the State for the benefit of their subjects, as their Council may advise. . . . One of the principal reasons why the dispensation and permission to acquire property, contrary to the ancient statutes of the kingdom, has been given to the clergy by the piety of our kings, is that they and their successors may have a resource always at hand, ready and powerful at all times, in any measure that the public necessities may suggest."

At the very period of which we are treating, a very able legist of whom Colbert had made use to attack the prerogatives of the Church, the *maître des requêtes*, De Fayer de Boutigny, composed his famous treatise on "The Authority of Kings in the Administration of the Church," in which he attributes to the king of France a supremacy over the Church both temporal and even spiritual, which made both Popes and Councils superfluous. The absolute sovereignty of the monarch as political magistrate extends over everything which is done, and over everything which exists in his kingdom, over things as well as persons ecclesiastical ; and if it be objected that the objects of the Faith, dogmas and sacraments, are not subject to him, Le Vayer boldly replies that he has both the right and the duty of taking cognizance of them in his character of Most Christian King and Protector of the Canons.

This celebrated theory, which sums up in a learned and well-connected form all the pretensions of lay Gallicanism, does not sensibly differ from the Anglican doctrine—the religious supremacy of Henry VIII. or Queen Victoria. It may well be supposed that in taking such liberties with the spiritual, the legists, Colbert's hirelings, did not spare the temporal domain of the Church (p. 80).

He shows by several quotations that they claimed for the king the most absolute power to take whatever Church property he pleased, when, as, and for what purposes he pleased.

Our author remarks that Innocent XI. not only felt it his duty to defend the temporal possessions of the Church, but that living when he did, between the so-called Reformation and the French Revolution, history gave him no example of a revolution seizing the temporalities of the Church which did not also set up a new

religion, so that he felt that he was defending the teaching of the Church as well as its possessions.

As to Lewis himself, great as were his offences, we cannot but wonder that they were not more heinous when we calmly consider that he came to the throne at four years of age, and was trained to believe that kings might do whatever they pleased, that as to morals especially, the sixth commandment did not apply to them, and also, that while the lives and properties of all their subjects were absolutely at their disposal, the Church, and all it had, belonged to them by a special and peculiar right. Contemporaries said most truly that the Gallican view was to substitute the infallibility of the king of France for the infallibility of the Pope (p. 469). Peydeau, a doctor of the Sorbonne, has left among his private papers a memorandum dated January 27, 1683:—"I find that the infallibility of the Court is not to be traced to Mazarin, who was willing enough to change, but to Colbert, who suggested it to the king." It is greatly to the honour of Lewis XIV. that instead of requiring to be restrained by his advisers, he was, as M. Gérin (and indeed all other historians) has often occasion to point out, always less unjust, less tyrannical, less rapacious than they wished him to be. We cannot help bearing this in mind in reading the history of his later years, of the reformation of his moral life, and especially of the succession of severe sorrows and humiliations, both in his kingdom and in his family, with which it pleased Him who chastises all whom He loves, to visit him in his declining years.

It is the signal punishment of kings who pollute the sanctuary of God, by lavishing upon worthless minions the property and the sacred offices of the Church, that their own minds are of necessity degraded and corrupted by finding themselves always surrounded by men of the one class most hateful and contemptible in the sight not of man alone, but of God—servile, cringing, flattering, covetous, profligate ecclesiastics. Surely out of hell itself no man could possibly be surrounded by creatures more vile. Lewis was far too able and keen-sighted not to esteem his flatterers as they deserved. It is terrible to think of the contempt with which they must have been regarded by a politician such as Colbert, before whom they were never weary of ostentatiously exposing the foulest deformities of their base characters. Hideous, indeed, are the records of this sort which M. Gérin has found preserved among the ministers' papers—for instance the letters written by Bourlemont, Bishop of Castres, to Bonzy, Bishop of Beziers, and to Colbert himself, on the occasion of the quarrel of Lewis against Alexander VII. about the Corsicans,—letters which, as M. Gérin says, lay open to us the heart of a Gallican Bishop under Lewis XIV. In reading these letters one's first feeling is, that nothing could add to the baseness they make

a parade of. Yet, surely, it does add something even to it, to find that one of them, addressed by one bishop to his friend another bishop, must have been sent by him to Colbert. He no doubt felt that he was doing his friend good service. Colbert evidently felt that the French Church was useful only because its property enabled the king to make slaves of all the nobility of his kingdom, and because it provided magnificent appanages for all his own kindred—sons, brothers, nephews, cousins. He would probably have felt it an act of virtuous and patriotic disinterestedness to have swept away it and its possessions at a stroke.

What Alexander VIII. felt of these men, he expressed to Cardinal de Bouillon—

What the king wished was the only thing that signified ; what the bishops who were nominated might do, made no difference. He knew the system of France, and the extent to which the authority of the king had been carried, well enough to be sure that the bishops would have no other sentiments and no other religion than those of the king ; that if the king wished the bishops of France to make a schism with the Holy See they would hardly hesitate to obey him ; that if, on the contrary, the king's intention were that they should declare the Pope infallible in right and in fact, the same bishops would make whatever declaration was required of them on that subject. That was his opinion of the Church of France (p. 434).

Lewis himself said of his bishops, "no thanks to these gentlemen that I have not assumed the turban. I have only three bishops in my dominions" (page 260). These were exactly those who had refused to fall in with his plans—Cardinal Grimaldi, Archbishop of Aix ; Lavardin, Bishop of Rennes ; and the Bishop of Grenoble. Fénelon was not yet a bishop. When the Abbé de Polignac had been sent to him by Alexander VIII., and had had a long conversation with him, he said, "I have been talking with a man, and that a young man, who has always contradicted me without my ever being able to be angry with him for a single moment."

No doubt it is most likely that, if Lewis had thought fit to have made himself Head of the Church in France, he would have encountered no serious opposition from such men as de Harlay or Bourlemont. Yet we can hardly doubt that, even among the least promising of his ecclesiastics, some would have been found, who would have stopped short when they saw before them the abyss into which they were required to plunge. There were some among that noble army of martyrs and confessors who threw new glory upon the Church of France a century later, from whom little would have been expected beforehand. One, at least, of the Court Prelates of the Assembly of 1682, and at that time one of the least respected of them all, Chavigny, Bishop of Troyes, sixteen years later

resigned his bishopric to retire into a life of strict penance and solitude. One of our own most glorious martyrs under Henry VIII. had in earlier life expressed himself in a manner, to say the least, very unsatisfactory upon the supremacy of the Holy See, in defence of which he gained his crown. We by no means believe that Lewis XIV., despotic as he was, could have renewed the work of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth, and have made France a Protestant nation. They were assisted by a combination of circumstances which had gone by before his time, and which, in the nature of things, can never return. Protestantism, in their day, was just rushing out from the open gate of hell (like the winds from the cavern of Æolus) a living energetic power of Satan. Such is the nature of all heresies. But not less is it their nature very soon to sink into indifference and languor, and from thence to utter death. Protestantism, which is now dead, and only dangerous by the pestilence engendered by its corrupting corpse, was already sick to death at the end of the seventeenth century. Lewis might have done much mischief, but it would have required power far greater than his, greater than all the power of earth and hell, to put new life into that dying heresy.

Neither are we to think that the wretched flatterers of Lewis XIV. were really what they called themselves, the Church of France. M. Gérin says, after going through the members of the Assembly one by one,—

Is there one among these priests and bishops whose name can be mentioned as that of a man who lived and saved souls like S. Francis of Sales, S. Charles Borromeo, S. Vincent of Paul, Berolle, Olier, Cæsar de Bus? Is there one whose name has been attached to any great Christian institution—to any important reform of discipline and manners? Which of them exercised a salutary influence on his contemporaries? Which of them whose memory is still blessed by generations who, kneeling before the altars, call him their spiritual father? (p. 259).

And then he mentions several men living at the time whose names are not to be found on the list. Lavardin, bishop of Rennes, to whom Lewis gave the testimony we have just quoted. The Abbé Aligre, and the great preachers and theologians of that age, Mascaron, Fléchier, Bourdaloue, Fénelon, Huet, Mabillon, Thomassin, Rancé, Tronson, Brisacier, Tiberge, La Salle, La Chetardie, and many more. There is but one man whose name we regret to see among the list of such a council, if it were to be held—that one is Bossuet.

We have left ourselves no room to dwell upon M. Gérin's two last chapters. The ninth details the contest between the king and the Pope. It is better known than other parts of this history, because its nature has attracted the attention of secular

historians. But upon this he has thrown much new light. Innocent XI. refused to accept any man who had taken part in the Assembly of 1682, when offered for a bishoprick. Lewis nominated two. Their Bulls were refused, and the king forbade any other of his nominees to receive his Bulls as long as theirs were refused. This went on for years, until there were more than thirty sees vacant in France. The king and his flatterers threw the blame on the Pope. The Pope published his declaration that he was ready to grant Bulls to any nominee of the king who had not been a member of the Assembly, or who, having been so, would make a fitting retraction. The dispute was further embittered by the question of the "franchises," which we have already mentioned. Innocent declared that he would receive no ambassador who did not engage to give up the claim which was destructive of the peace and moral order of Rome. Every other European king agreed to resign so odious a privilege. Lewis alone refused. The Pope sent an embassy to entreat him. The Nuncio mentioned that the emperor and all other monarchs in Europe had acceded to the desire of the Pope, but Lewis haughtily replied that God had placed him in a position to set the example to others, and to follow that of no man. He refused to surrender the franchise. Innocent declared that he would receive no ambassador by whom they were claimed. Lewis resolved to send an ambassador to Rome, in spite of the Pope's refusal, and to support him by an overwhelming military force. He selected expressly for the purpose the most haughty and overbearing man he could find, who entered Rome by force, attended with a military array. Upon this Innocent excommunicated him. The ambassador, in despite of the excommunication, went to the midnight mass at the Church of S. Lewis of France, and the Pope placed the Church under an interdict. There were not wanting men among the advisers of Lewis who urged him to make a direct schism by directing his nominations to bishoprics to the archbishop of the province, and those to archbishoprics to the provincial bishops. But unscrupulous as he was, Lewis refused to be guilty of a crime which would have placed him by the side of Henry VIII. To any length short of that he was prepared to go. He seized Avignon, and arrested a bishop living peaceably in the Pope's dominions, and by an act worthy of Napoleon himself, committed him to prison at Ré, giving instructions that he should be made uncomfortable on his journey, and should be told that he was to be transported to Canada—which in those days was not unlike being banished to another planet. He even instructed his ministers to appeal in his name to a future general council. This appeal was made in the presence of the archbishop of Paris and of the Pere La Chaise.

But he would not quite take the step, which would have summated the schism. The Pope was firm, and at last the king gave way. When Innocent XI. died he sent an ambassador to the new Pope, Alexander VIII., authorizing him to give up the claim to the "franchise." At last he allowed the men nominated to bishoprics to sue for their Bulls, and those who had been members of the Assembly made their recantation in the terms demanded by the Pope. Lewis XIV. himself wrote a letter to the Pope promising that his edict enforcing the four articles should be without force or effect. It is characteristic that care was taken to conceal this submission, and it was never known in France for a century. M. Gérin in fact gives many details about it never published until now.

We attach great importance to the publication of this work, and feel that M. Gérin has done the Church great service. Some men may be inclined to regard the question as merely historical. But in truth it is far more. It is important that the world should know that it is a mere error to suppose that Gallican principles ever were received by the Church of France; that they were merely put forward by a handful of the flatterers of Lewis XIV., not less to the disgust of the true church of France in their own days than in ours. And this M. Gérin has made so plain that nothing but ignorance or disingenuousness can in future deny it.

---

---

#### ART. V.—MR. TROLLOPE'S LAST IRISH NOVEL.

*Phineas Finn, the Irish Member.* By ANTHONY TROLLOPE. London: Virtue & Co.

MR. ANTHONY TROLLOPE wishes to be a member of Parliament. It is difficult to understand why he of all men should be smitten by such a sore temptation. He possesses an enduring fountain of fame and fortune in his own imagination. He speaks to a constituency as wide as the limits of the English language, who are never weary of hearing him. He can hardly be supposed to have retained to this time of his life any illusions as to the magic value of the letters M.P. He knows by sad experience what a nauseous task it ordinarily is to canvass a British borough. He is evidently aware of what is "behind the scenes" of the House, as well as if he had sat through half a dozen Parliaments. Yet he still feels the mysterious longing to lounge with his hat on in the presence of Mr. Speaker, and to form the 365th unit in a great party division, as strongly as any youth who leads his



side with laurels in a college debating society. Why should not some Irish constituency do itself the honour of gratifying this harmless propensity? Alas, or rather *ochone!* the standard of the Irish member of the present day, and so far as can be seen of the coming time, is not a very elevated one. A sort of curious hybrid of lawyer and grazier seems to be the favourite type of candidate rising steadily in popular favour. The Irish member of the last generation was often dissipated, sometimes disreputable; but he had generally good manners and good education, was even occasionally an accomplished scholar, and, for the rest, he did what the great Dan bade him to do. Nowadays, with a dozen to a score of exceptions, nothing can be more dull, witless, commonplace—in a word, un-Irish—than the character of the Irish members on both sides of the House. If Mr. Trollope were to get the chance from some disgusted borough, we should begin to see our way to the end of this system, for he would be irresistibly tempted to write a book with portraits of some of his colleagues; and the effect, though caustic, would be salutary. Besides, Mr. Trollope would, if he were to succeed in the House at all, succeed far better, in our opinion, as an Irish than as an English or a Scotch member. His Irish sympathies are strangely deep, and true, and tender. He has half-avowed that he would even wish to be a Catholic if he only could; and he would find it so easy in Ireland. "I love their religion," he says in his book on North America. "There is something beautiful and almost divine in the faith and obedience of a true son of the Holy Mother. I sometimes fancy that I would fain be a Roman Catholic if I could, as also I would often wish to be still a child, if that were possible." But this is exactly the way our Lord put it, when, on a memorable occasion, he said, "Amen, I say to you, unless you be converted and become as little children, you shall not enter into the kingdom of Heaven." Then Mr. Trollope would succeed admirably well, we have little doubt, in winning and in keeping the confidence of an Irish Catholic constituency, if only he were not out-bellowed and out-bribed in the first instance by some fresh combination of Smithfield and the Four Courts. Meantime, his exact apprehension of the true difficulty to be settled in Ireland is significantly indicated in his last Irish novel. It is, after its fashion, a contribution to the literature of the Land Question, and has, we imagine, by its light but effective touches, helped to shape the growing conviction among English people, who read and think, that something large and liberal must be done to meet the wishes and the wants of the Irish in regard to the land on which they live.

The qualities of Mr. Trollope's Irish novels have never, in our opinion, been adequately acknowledged. He holds a place, not only unrivalled, but undisputed, as the realistic portrayer of the middle classes of English society, and as, what we may venture to call, the "champion" delineator of the Anglican clergy. He is not a satirist like Mr. Thackeray, but his quiet humour plays a part in his pictures of domestic life like that of light reading in serious study; it comes in, and brightens up things and persons, blending pleasantly with business. He is not a sentimentalist like Mr. Dickens, but he has and avows, though he does not parade, deep feelings, which run in legitimate and wholesome channels, and are never morbid or exaggerated. The young English lady, the Government official, and the genus "clergyman," divided into all its species, are to be found in his pages, depicted with realism as complete in its effect as it is ingenious in its processes. Mr. Trollope works by slight, delicate touches; he avoids glare, and while producing the strongest and truest contrasts, never proclaims them. No humourist or satirist has ever produced two more telling pictures than those of Mark Roberts and Mr. Crawley, and yet there is nothing of "look on that picture and on this" in his style of exhibiting them. He makes his readers feel the characteristics of the young clergyman, to whom his parish is a speculation, to be worked to the best profit—quite within the bounds of honesty, no doubt—but still entirely to his own advantage, in respect of its chances of promotion, and its opportunities of society, at once socially and pecuniarily profitable. Mark Roberts is a gentleman, not in the least tinged with hypocrisy, but he is entirely free from the idea of any spiritual relation between him and his parishioners, and transacts his business quite consistently, not being chargeable with violating an ideal which he never entertained. The effect of this character is almost entirely produced by the atmosphere of the story, one of busy, bustling worldliness, and full of futile vexations. The famous character of Archdeacon Grantley is perfectly sustained throughout this story of "*Framley Parsonage*," and offers a third side of clerical variety, totally different from that of Mark Roberts, and as unlike Mr. Crawley, in whom Mr. Trollope has depicted with great success an enthusiastic mind, a cultivated but eccentric intellect, a highly sensitive conscience, an altogether superior nature, depreciated by inharmonious surroundings, harassed by circumstances and relations inconsistent with its calling, unable to impress itself upon others except by its inequalities and eccentricities, and consumed by pride and self-isolation. In each and all his portraitures, even

in that one in which alone, tempted by the applause and amusement of the public, he has slightly degenerated into caricature—Dr. Proudie—he conveys, whether intentionally or not, the instability, the disunion, the earthliness, so to speak, of the Anglican system, in which every man is a law to himself, and finds it easier to break than to define his own enactments. In the good-humoured but acute truthfulness which constitutes the subtle attraction of Mr. Trollope's writings, even in the case of those readers who are not aware that what they are instinctively pleased with in fiction is its truth, there is an argument against the possibility of such a system as that so impartially illustrated, being a living, working, spiritual means of successfully combating the world, and saving men's souls. Mr. Crawley is a very good man, and does his work diligently; but his work no more meets the needs of human souls than does that of the hen-pecked bishop, the keen and covetous arch-deacon, the cultivated, scholarly Dean Arabin, or the uncouth but earnest Mr. Saul. All these men, estimable in their way, and drawn with perfect fidelity to their types, are in the world and of it, cultivating its friendship, conforming to its ideal, and wholly devoid of any suspicion that they occupy a false position, or are the accredited servants of a mission with any other or higher purpose. In his first study of clerical life, "*The Warden*," Mr. Trollope presented a mere ideal character. There was an elevation of tone, a sweetness and simplicity about Mr. Harding quite different from the characteristics of any of his successors, but they were used to illustrate the alienation between the man and the system he lived under, and constituted him, in fact, an anachronism. Mr. Trollope's plain-spoken common sense recognizes and treats the Anglican system as the purely human institution it is, wise and beneficent in many respects, eminently respectable, and a conservative power in the state. But if the reader doubts that he has a comprehension—perhaps unconscious,—certainly not fully explained to himself or followed out to its utmost conclusions of something higher and truer, something which replies to the imperative demands of humanity in its uttermost needs, and apart from the constitution of the social polity,—let him turn from the series of admirable works which begins with "*The Warden*" and ends with "*The Last Chronicle of Barset*," to a comparatively unknown story of Irish life, called "*The MacDermots of Ballycloran*." Let him contrast the most serious passages in any of these novels, the most distinctly implicatory of the ties supposed to exist between Anglican clergymen and their parishioners (whoever thinks of using the terms "flock," or

"people," or conceives of them apart from boundaries and assessments?)—to the interview between Thady MacDermot in the condemned cell and Father Tom. The Irish parish priest, not a gentlemanly person, by no means refined, whose manners would not have entitled him to wait at Archdeacon Grantley's well-spread table, or to carry Mrs. Proudie's prayer-book; who scrupulously watches over his people's morals, settles their disputes, shares their festivities, and duns them for his "dues;" whose shrewdness is equal to his kindliness, and whose language is as homely as his dress; this man, without the least inconsistency, without any variation of his plainness and simplicity of speech, rises to extreme grandeur in that supreme hour. Before his unspeakable tenderness, the dreadful solitude, the irresistible isolation of the condemned criminal disappears; in the presence of the awful consolations which he brings the bitterness of death to a young man in the fulness of his health and strength is subdued; in the fulness of his charity the agony of condemnation, of punishment is allayed—in the sure and certain hope—to whose truth the life of the priest, at once father and friend to the young man who has to die, has been a constant witness—the poor, trembling, puzzled creature rests, and gathers firmness for the end. The simple authority of the Divine Message, the combination with it of exquisite human tenderness,—the perfect trust and submission of the young man towards the priest, and the frank communion of a warm friendship between the two, elevate this scene far above any other achievement of the author, and bear witness to his power of treating the deeper things of the heart and the spirit with as much fidelity as those more common-place and surface aspects of human life with which he habitually deals. There is a significant satisfaction to the Catholic reader in studying the instinctive recognition by this master of the realistic school of his art, of the attitude towards suffering humanity held respectively by the priests of the Church of God, and the exponents of the infinite "perhaps" into which every form of revolt against that Church inevitably drifts. He sees and feels the truth without seeking for its origin, and he portrays it without defining its source. Father Tom in the condemned cell is the authorized bearer of the Sacramental graces which overcome "the last enemy, even death," of the Divine pardon, and the Bread of Life. This, which can never belong to the minister, who, however pious and conscientious, is no more than a counsellor and consoler in the human sense of such ministrations, transfigures the humble, homely, village priest.

The beauty, the skill, and the variety of Mr. Trollope's delineations of Irish character, his good taste in resisting the temptation to caricature, the yielding to which has been the bane of native Irish novelists, his rendering of the innocent *malice* (in its French meaning) of the humour of the peasantry, and his capital pictures of the out-at-elbow condition of the impoverished gentry, in whose poverty there is nothing sordid, and everything improvident and inconvenient, can hardly be thoroughly appreciated except by readers who know Ireland well. The English public with whom he is so popular would probably feel, without exactly analyzing them, the truth and the cleverness, the quaintness, the humour, and the pathos of "the MacDermots," but we doubt whether they could appreciate "Castle Richmond," or realize the exact fidelity of the social relations set forth in "The Kellys and the O'Kellys." The difficulties and complications of the Fitzgeralds of Castle Richmond are totally unlike the difficulties and complications which sometimes beset English baronets, and are understood and discussed in a totally different spirit, and the small trading element in England has nothing in common with the proceedings of the widow Kelly, and her estimable but crafty and calculating son. The fun and ingenuity of the story every one can understand, but Anty Lynch and her brother, the young ladies at the widow's shop, and "the lord" who is not an absentee, and is consequently beloved, but who is very poor, and therefore more beloved, are best tasted in the land of their growth. And herein is one of Mr. Trollope's greatest triumphs. That he should have written Irish stories with which English readers are much pleased and amused is not surprising, but that his Irish stories should be thoroughly satisfactory to Irish readers, who know the country and the people, this is an achievement which is to be measured by its extreme rarity. The rollicking country gentlemen, the absurdly lavish and insanely quarrelsome western magnates, the preposterous priests, the impossible lawyers, the flirting, ignorant, hoydenish horsewomen, the all-conquering military puppies, who performed Irish characters under the direction of Mr. Lever, and still occasionally make a dreary re-appearance in the quavering diatribes of Cornelius O'Dowd, amused English and Irish readers alike, partly because they were genuinely though coarsely amusing, and partly because English readers believed they were really something like people who had an actual existence in Ireland, while Irish readers knew they were not. Nobody was offended by them, they were too impartially absurd. The drunken, profane, and scheming Irish priest was no more unlike reality than the drunken,

rollicking, loose-tongued English nobleman, whose vicereignty was merely a saturnalia of feasting, singing, good stories, and low company. Baby Blake was not more unlike an ordinary Irish girl of good birth than Lady Charlotte Hilton was unlike a highly-placed English matron, or than Mrs. Paul Rooney was unlike any one who ever existed in any country. But though all these grotesque creations passed muster very well and annoyed nobody, they made it a more difficult and thankless task than before for a novelist who was not Gerald Griffin, or John Banim, or William Carleton, to please and amuse English readers without depicting Irish character as it is not, and to satisfy Irish readers by exhibiting it as it is. This task Mr. Trollope has accomplished, and from its execution he has passed to one of equal difficulty, in which his success has been quite as complete, and much more generally recognized. We allude to the combination of English and Irish life and character in his late novel, "Phineas Finn."

The recognition of the great ability displayed in "Phineas Finn," of the perfection with which Mr. Trollope's well-known characteristics are reproduced, and the exhibition of some new facilities and qualities, has been sufficiently general to give this novel a marked and singular place among the author's numerous works; but the especial cleverness of it, the distinctive feature which renders it unlike its predecessors, and an advance upon them all, has not, in our opinion, been sufficiently examined. Here are phases of Irish life—types of Irish character as perfect, as true, as exhaustive as any which he has portrayed, transported into the social and political atmosphere of England, blended with those English "interiors," in the production of which he is unapproached. Apart from the hero of the story, the handsome young Irish M.P. for Loughshane, there are notable personages in this book who will be numbered with the most memorable of their predecessors. Phineas Finn is a representative man, as correctly and simply as any of the parsons, or as Adolphus Crosbie and Johnny Eames; while the only "girl" in modern fiction who can compare with Lily Dale of "The Small House" is Mary Flood Jones, of Killaloe. The two girls are entirely different, not only in the *signalement* which Mr. Trollope has the art to make so expressive that one feels as if his stories were illustrated by portraits of striking likeness, but in the development of themselves throughout, as in their tastes and their destiny; but they are both completely real, both charming, and Mary Flood Jones is as essentially an Irish as Lily Dale is thoroughly an English girl. The colloquies of Mary with Barbara Finn are as natural and spontaneous



as Lily's talks with her sister Bell, and much to the same purpose ; but the fun, the light satire, the *finesse* of the one are utterly different from the quiet wisdom, the acuteness, and the humour veiling itself from the simpler listener, and enjoying the trifling perplexities it creates, of the other. In delicacy of mind, in refinement of feeling, in all that constitutes the true gentlewoman, and which Mr. Trollope has such rare tact in conveying, the two girls are equal, but Mary Flood Jones would never have loved Adolphus Crosbie, but Lily Dale would never have forgiven Phineas Finn. The picture of the little household at Allington is as sweet, as sunny, and as true as any home picture that ever was painted, and the evenings in which Crosbie won Lily's heart are memorable. Just as minutely excellent is the entirely different picture of Dr. Malachi Finn's house at Killaloe in the county Clare, and the tea-parties at which Phineas Finn, aided assiduously by his sister Barbara, carries on his flirtation with that Mary who is "as pretty as ever she could be." This little bit of description is a match for the walk home from Uncle Dale's.

When the girls went down into the drawing-room Mary was careful to go to a part of the room quite apart from Phineas, so as to seat herself between Mrs. Finn and Dr. Finn's young partner, Mr. Elias Bodkin, from Ballinasloe. But Mrs. Finn, and the Misses Finn, and all Killaloe knew that Mary had no love for Mr. Bodkin, and when Mr. Bodkin handed her the hot cake she barely so much as smiled at him. But in two minutes Phineas was behind her chair, and then she smiled ; and in five minutes more she had got herself so twisted round that she was sitting in a corner with Phineas and his sister Barbara ; and in two more minutes Barbara had returned to Mr. Elias Bodkin, so that Phineas and Mary were uninterrupted. They manage these things very quickly and very cleverly in Killaloe.

"I shall be off to-morrow morning by the early train," said Phineas.

"So soon ; and when will you have to begin—in Parliament I mean ?"

"I shall have to take my seat on Friday. I'm going back just in time."

"But when shall we hear of your saying something ?"

"Never, probably. Not one in ten who go into Parliament ever do say anything."

"But you will, won't you ? I hope you will. I do hope you will distinguish yourself, because of your sister, and for the sake of the town, you know."

"And is that all, Mary ?"

"Isn't that enough ?"

"You don't care a bit about myself, then ?"

"You know that I do. Haven't we been friends ever since we were

children? Of course it will be a great pride to me that a person whom I have ever known should come to be talked about as a great man."

"I shall never be talked about as a great man."

"You're a great man to me already, being in Parliament. Only think,—I never saw a member of Parliament before."

"You've seen the Bishop scores of times."

"Is he in Parliament? Ah, but not like you. He couldn't come to be a cabinet minister, and one never reads anything about him in the newspapers. I shall expect to see your name very often, and I shall always look for it. 'Mr. Phineas Finn paired off with Mr. Mildmay.' What is the meaning of pairing off?"

"I'll explain it all to you when I come back, after learning my lesson."

"Mind you do come back. But I don't suppose you ever will. You will be going somewhere to see Lady Laura Standish when you are not wanted in Parliament."

"Lady Laura Standish!"

"And why shouldn't you? Of course, with your prospects you should go as much as possible among people of that sort. Is Lady Laura very pretty?"

"She's about six feet high."

"Nonsense. I don't believe that."

"She would look as though she were, standing by you."

"Because I am so insignificant and small."

"Because your figure is perfect, and she is straggling. She is as unlike you as possible in everything. She has thick lumpy red hair, while yours is all silk and softness. She has large hands and feet, and——"

"Why Phineas, you are making her out to be an ogress, and yet I know that you admire her."

"So I do, because she possesses such an appearance of power. And after all, in spite of the lumpy hair, and in spite of large hands and straggling figure, she is handsome. One can't tell what it is. One sees that she is quite contented with herself, and intends to make others contented with her. And so she does."

"I see you are in love with her, Phineas."

"No, not in love,—not with her at least. Of all men in the world, I suppose I am the last that has a right to be in love. I daresay I shall marry some day."

"I am sure I hope you will."

"But not till I am forty or perhaps fifty years old. If I was not fool enough to have what men call a high ambition, I might venture to be in love now."

"I'm sure I'm very glad that you've got a high ambition. It is what every man ought to have, and I have no doubt that we shall hear of your marriage soon,—very soon. And then,—if she can help you in your ambition, we—shall—all—be—so—glad."

Mr. Trollope does not succeed in dialogue merely because he makes it natural and characteristic, but also because he

takes the trouble of writing in the small things which people really do say, even on momentous and exceptional occasions, and which the lower orders of novelists agree to leave out. Whatever be the subject on which he makes his people talk, whether it be the familiar, finessing dialogue of flirtation, the measured speech of political discussion, the hurried language of quarrel, the "high-polite" of conversation when a great lady who is also clever holds *salon*, or the unceremonious colloquy of men of business discussing matters of money, he makes them all natural. His lovers do not talk rhapsody, his politicians do not talk pamphlets.

The departure of Phineas Finn for London is a truly Irish scene, when everybody gets up to see him off, his father gives him an extra twenty-pound note, and begs him for God's sake to be careful about his money, his mother tells him always to have an orange in his hand when he intends to speak longer than usual, and Barbara begs him never to forget dear Mary Flood Jones. The whole of his history is symbolized in those three injunctions, and every one knows how he observed them, and into what company money, politics, and love-making (which Mr. Trollope knows how to distinguish with amazing subtlety from love), brought Phineas Finn, the Irish member, "whose nature was to be pleasant."

Mr. Trollope is the one existing English novelist who writes about great people without any affectation, and with easy acquaintance with their manners and ways of life. He does not affect to despise rank, or to regard social inequality as a stupid sham, in which the man who takes precedence is usually a fool, and in everything but his name the inferior of the man whom he precedes. His noblemen are gentlemen, and the persons whom he introduces to their society are at ease in it. The Irish member, who is the son of a doctor in a small country town, is quite in his place at an earl's dinner-table, and in the drawing-room of an earl's daughter. He is neither insolent, sarcastic, nor fawning, nor are the great people who like him guilty of the insolence of patronizing, or the vulgarity of lionizing him. Lady Laura Standish is not one of Mr. Trollope's best portraits. She fails to attract that perfect sympathy, which he usually commands for every one for whom he desires it, but she is an exact representation of a woman of rank, in a great social position, and her individuality is as marked as that of any of Mr. Trollope's more interesting female characters. The Brentford family is the antithesis of the De Courcy family, and Lord Chiltern is perhaps on the whole the most dramatic and picturesque personage to be found in the writer's books, winning a certain sympathy, notwithstand-

ing his fierce, impetuous nature, and his gloomy temper, by his inexorable truthfulness. While the reader is following the fortunes of Phineas Finn in Parliament, in the flowery but unsafe ways of "society," and in his complicated sentimental relations, he is also kept *en rapport* with that racy Irish life which Phineas abandons, and which furnishes so striking a contrast to and comment upon the dignified activity of Grosvenor-square, and the ponderous wealth and sullen misery of Loughlinter, the splendid residence of Lady Laura's husband. From Loughlinter to Killaloe one turns with keen pleasure, recognizing the skill and the truth with which the great lady's loveless marriage is made to bring its swift punishment, and the enduring, unselfish faith, hope, and charity of the humble Irish girl also bear their fruit in due season. This book contains an entire gallery of highly-finished portraits, which are striking instances of the minute care and pains with which Mr. Trollope does his work. His knowledge of the machinery of Parliamentary affairs is very remarkable; he displays it in numberless ways, evidently knowing exactly the technical nature of the business of every man officially connected with the working of the great system, and taking a keen interest in every detail. Nor are his political sketches one-sided or confined to the select ranks of "the House." No writer in England, except it be the author of "Felix Holt," could have produced such a picture as that of Mr. Bunce, in whose house in Great Marlborough-street Phineas Finn takes lodgings when he relinquishes his chambers and "goes in" for fashion and "place."

Mr. Bunce was a copying journeyman, who spent ten hours a day in Carey Street, with a pen between his fingers; and after that he would spend two or three hours of the night, with a pen between his fingers, in Marlborough Street. He was a thoroughly hard-working man, doing pretty well in the world, for he had a good house over his head, and always could find raiment and bread for his eight children; but nevertheless he was an unhappy man, because he suffered from political grievances, or, I should more correctly say, that his grievances were semi-political and semi-social. He had no vote, not being himself the tenant of the house in Great Marlborough Street. The tenant was a tailor, who occupied the shop, whereas Bunce occupied the whole of the remainder of the premises. He was a lodger, and lodgers were not yet trusted with the franchise. And he had ideas, which he himself admitted to be very sad, as to the injustice of the manner in which he was paid for his work. So much a folio, without reference to the way in which his work was done, without regard to the success of his work, with no questions asked of himself, was, as he thought, no proper way of remunerating a man for his labours. He had long since joined a trades' union, and for two years past had paid a subscription of a shilling a week towards its funds. He

longed to be doing some battle against his superiors ; not that he objected personally to his employers, who always made much of him as a useful man, but because some such antagonism would be manly, and the fighting of some battle would be the right thing to do. "If Labour don't want to go to the wall himself," Bunce would say to his wife, "labour must look alive and put somebody else there." Mrs. Bunce was a comfortable, motherly woman, who loved her husband, but hated politics. As he had an aversion to his superiors in this world because they were his superiors, so had she a liking for them for the same reason. She despised people poorer than herself, and thought it a fair subject for boasting that her children always had meat for dinner. If it was ever so small a morsel she took care they had it, that the boast might be maintained. The world had once or twice been almost too much for her ; when, for instance, her husband had been ill, and again, for the last three months of that long period in which Phineas had omitted to pay his bills ; but she had kept a fine, brave heart during those troubles, and could honestly swear that the children always had a bit of meat, though she herself had been without it for days together. At such times she would be more than ordinarily courteous to the old lady who lodged in her first-floor drawing-room, and she would excuse such servility by declaring there was no knowing how soon she might want assistance. But her husband, in such emergencies, would become furious and quarrelsome, and would declare that labour was going to the wall, and that something very strong must be done at once. That shilling which Bunce paid weekly to the union she regarded as being absolutely thrown away, as much as though he had put it weekly into the Thames. And she had told him so over and over again, making heart-piercing allusions to the eight children and to the bit of meat. He would always endeavour to explain to her that there was no other way under the sun of keeping labour from being sent to the wall ; but he would do so hopelessly, and altogether ineffectually, and she had come to regard him as a lunatic to the extent of that one weekly shilling. She had a woman's instinctive partiality for comeliness in a man, and was very fond of Phineas Finn because he was handsome. And now she was very proud of him because he was a member of Parliament. She had heard from her husband, who told her the fact with much disgust, that the sons of dukes and earls go into Parliament, and she liked to think that the fine journeyman to whom she talked more or less every day should sit with the sons of dukes and earls. When Phineas had really brought distress upon her by owing her some thirty or forty pounds, she could never bring herself to be angry with him, because he was handsome, and because he dined out with lords. And she had triumphed greatly over her husband, who had desired to be severe upon his aristocratic debtor, when the money had all been paid in a lump."

Throughout the whole of the Barchester series, including "Can You Forgive Her ?" the Duke of Omnium is little more than an abstraction ; a great centre of rank and wealth ; a rallying-point for ambitious and interested scheming ; the object of homage, flattery, and apprehension ; neither so happy nor so really important a man as Plantagenet Palliser, his ex-

quisitely correct, cold-blooded heir. But in "Phineas Finn" the Duke of Omnium comes to the front, the hero of an adventure at once laughable and pathetic, and is more useful than, we suspect, Mr. Trollope had ever hitherto expected to make him. It is a smart stroke of humour to remove the Duke from the sphere of mysterious grandeur in which he had formerly dwelt, like the Dalai Lama, to render him accessory to the triumph of the Irish member, in whose favour his Grace is rejected by Madame Max Gœsler, one of the most incisively defined portraits in the author's gallery.

But the triumphs of Phineas, political and social, were not, perhaps happily for him, of long duration, and they ended in a way that is not always characteristic of Irish Parliamentary aspirants. Phineas, in a very simple, manly, and straightforward fashion, sacrifices the Under Secretaryship of the Colonies to his convictions in regard to the cause of Irish Tenant Right. Let us hope that Mr. Trollope has not effected that entirely original achievement, the writing of a historical novel in the paulopost future instead of the past tense, when he makes the crisis of his hero's fortunes concur with the disruption of a Liberal ministry on the Irish Land Question. There are at present, unfortunately, sufficient threatening symptoms of such an eventuality, though there were none when Mr. Trollope wrote his book, before even the Church question was settled. It shows Mr. Trollope's rare and thorough knowledge of the country that he was already able to state, in such a way as should not bore the readers of a novel, the conditions of that great problem of State, which is now undergoing such subtle and manifold discussion. It seems vain to inquire who are the exact originals of the leading statesmen portrayed in Phineas Finn. The figures change their shape as we observe them, blending various characteristics and precisely true to none. Mr. Turnbull has been supposed to be the pseudonym of Mr. Bright, but is not Mr. Monk much nearer to the character of the tribune turned minister?

"Come and see the country, and judge for yourself," said Phineas to Mr. Monk one day at dinner.

"I should like nothing better," said Mr. Monk.

"It has often seemed to me that men in Parliament know less about Ireland than they do of the interior of Africa," said Phineas.

"It is seldom that we know anything accurately on any subject that we have not made matter of careful study," said Mr. Monk, "and we very often do not do so even then."

Mr. Monk accordingly accepts the invitation of Phineas to  
VOL. XIII.—NO. XXVI. [*New Series.*]



visit Ireland with him during the recess, in order to study the Irish Land Question.

This trip to Ireland had been proposed in consequence of certain ideas respecting tenant-right which Mr. Monk was beginning to adopt, and as to which the minds of politicians were becoming moved. It had been all very well to put down Fenianism, and Ribandism, and Repeal, and everything that had been put down in Ireland in the way of rebellion for the last seventy-five years. England and Ireland had been apparently joined together by laws of nature so fixed that even politicians liberal as was Mr. Monk, liberal as was Mr. Turnbull, could not trust themselves to think that disunion could be for the good of the Irish. They had taught themselves that it certainly could not be good for the English. But if it was incumbent on England to force upon Ireland the maintenance of the union for her own sake and for England's sake, because England could not afford independence established so close against her own ribs, it was at any rate necessary to England's character that the bride thus bound in a compulsory wedlock should be endowed with all the best privileges that a wife can enjoy. Let her at least not be a kept mistress. Let it be bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh if we are to live together in the married state. Between husband and wife a warm word now and then matters but little, if there be a thoroughly good understanding at bottom. But let there be that good understanding at bottom. What about this Protestant Church, and what about this tenant-right? Mr. Monk had been asking himself these questions for some time past. In regard to the Church, he had long made up his mind that the Establishment in Ireland was a crying sin. A man had married a woman whom he knew to be of a different religion from his own, and then insisted that his wife should say she believed those things which he knew very well that she did not believe. But, as Mr. Monk well knew, the subject of the Protestant Endowments in Ireland was so difficult that it would require almost more than human wisdom to adjust it. It was one of those matters which almost seemed to require the interposition of some higher power—the coming of some seemingly chance event—to clear away the evil; as a fire comes, and pestilential alleys are removed; as a famine comes, and men are driven from want, and ignorance, and dirt, to seek new homes and new thoughts across the broad waters; as a war comes, and slavery is banished from the face of the earth. But in regard to tenant-right, to some arrangement by which a tenant in Ireland might be at least encouraged to lay out what little capital he might have in labour or money without being at once called upon to pay for that outlay which was his own, as well as for the land which was not his own,—Mr. Monk thought that it was possible that if a man would look hard enough, he might perhaps see his way as far as that. He had spoken to two of his colleagues on the subject, the two men in the Cabinet whom he believed to be the most thoroughly honest in their ideas as public servants, the Duke and Mr. Gresham. There was so much to be done, and then so little was known upon the subject. "I will endeavour to study it," said Mr. Monk. "If you can see your way, do," said Mr. Gresham; "but of course we cannot bind ourselves."

This is, we need hardly say, a very admirable statement of the case, and very probably a correct picture of the present situation which, however, we hope will not end in a break up of the Cabinet. Mr. Monk visits the County Clare with Phineas. Thence, he goes to Limerick, and thence to Dublin. At Limerick and in Dublin he makes speeches on the Tenant Right Question, which are not exactly to the same purpose as those which Lord Hartington and Lord Clarendon are just delivering, but on the contrary, of so popular a tendency as to involve the Minister's immediate resignation of his seat in the Cabinet.

Phineas went with Mr. Monk first to Limerick and then to Dublin ; and found himself at both places to be regarded as a hero only second to the great hero. At both places the one subject of debate was tenant-right ; could anything be done to make it profitable for men with capital to put their capital into Irish land ? The fertility of the soil was questioned by no one,—nor the sufficiency of external circumstances, such as railroads and the like ;—nor the abundance of labour—nor even security for the wealth to be produced. The only difficulty was in this, that the men who were to produce the wealth had no guarantee that it would be theirs when it was created. In England and elsewhere, such guarantees were in existence. Might it not be possible to introduce them into Ireland ? That was the question which Mr. Monk had in hand ; and in various speeches which he made both before and after the dinners given to him, he pledged himself to keep it well in hand when Parliament should meet. Of course Phineas spoke also. It was impossible that he should be silent when his friend and leader was pouring out his eloquence. Of course he spoke, and of course he pledged himself.

Mr. Monk having resigned, Phineas feels, contrary to the opinion of Mr. Monk himself, of the head of his department, Lord Cantrip, and of all his friends, private and official, that he is bound to resign too ; and resignation is to him, in a parliamentary sense, ruin. He has no income, except that derived from his office. For a seat in the House he depends on his party. Nothing remains for him except the quiet martyrdom of vacating both seat and office, and returning humbly to the practice of the bar, in order to make as much money as will enable him to marry Mary Flood Jones.

The last speech of Phineas in the House is well described :—

He spoke for about an hour, and while he was speaking he knew nothing about himself, whether he was doing it well or ill. Something of himself he did say soon after he had commenced, not quite beginning with it, as though his mind had been laden with the matter. He had, he said, found himself compelled to renounce his happy allegiance to the First Lord of the Treasury, and to quit the pleasant company in which, humble as had been his place, he

had been allowed to sit and act, by his unfortunate conviction on this great subject. He had been told, he said, that it was a misfortune in itself for one so young as he to have convictions. But his Irish birth and Irish connections had brought this misfortune of his country so closely home to him, that he had found the task of extricating himself from it to be impossible. Of what further he said, speaking on that terribly unintelligible subject, a tenant-right proposed for Irish farmers, no English reader will desire to know much.

The division on Mr. Monk's Tenant Right Bill results in the defeat of the Ministry by a majority of 23.

"And now," said Mr. Monk, as he walked home with Phineas, "the pity is that we are not a bit nearer tenant-right than we were before."

"But we are nearer to it."

"In one sense, yes. Such a debate and such a majority will make men think. But no;—think is too high a word: as a rule men don't think. But it will make them believe that there is something in it. Many who before regarded legislation on the subject as chimerical, will now fancy that it is only dangerous, or perhaps not more than difficult: and so in time it will come to be looked on as among the things possible, then among the things probable;—and so at last it will be ranged in the list of those few measures which the country requires as being absolutely needed. That is the way in which public opinion is made."

"It is no loss of time," said Phineas, "to have taken the first great step in making it."

"The first great step was taken long ago," said Mr. Monk; "taken by men who were looked upon as revolutionary demagogues, almost as traitors, because they took it. But it is a great thing to take any step that leads us onward."

It is evident that Mr. Trollope has studied the history of the Irish Tenant League, and that he understands the principles and difficulties of the land question in Ireland, in a way that not merely very few English or Scotchmen do apprehend them, but more clearly, perhaps, than the generality of Irishmen themselves. All good and sufficient reasons why, as we suggested at the opening of this article, some Irish constituency should do itself the honour of gratifying Mr. Trollope's unaccountable desire to enter Parliament. The extracts which we have given seem to us to have a curious, suggestive, we trust not prophetic pertinence to the present situation of the question. It is to be hoped, nevertheless, that Mr. Monk will not feel bound to bring in a bill of his own, and defeat the ministry upon it next Easter; that the Under-Secretary for the Colonies will not feel constrained by a conscientious sense of his duty to the Irish farmers to resign the task of managing all those dependencies, one of which, far away in

the eastern ocean, bounds the ambition of the probable prototype of Phineas Finn; and, in fine, that whatever was wise and just in the plans of the forgotten "demagogues and almost traitors" of twenty years ago, may at last become the law of the homesteads of their people.

---

#### ART. VI.—CATHOLIC CONTROVERSY.

*The "Month"* for August, 1869: Art. I.—"Liberal Catholicism." London: Simpkin, Marshall, & Co.

FOR more than two years past the "Month" has been in the habit of putting forth, from time to time, various reprehensive and somewhat sharply-expressed remarks, which many of its readers have understood as referring to this REVIEW. We have thought it on many grounds the best course consistently to ignore these. In the first place, the present are not suitable times—if, indeed, *any* times can be suitable—for defenders of orthodoxy to fall out with each other; and for no reason therefore, except some very urgent one, would we put ourselves in antagonism to the "Month." Then further, there is very great difficulty in knowing what remarks are directed against *ourselves*, and what are aimed at some totally different quarter; for in many cases the opinions censured are so utterly alien to any of which we have ever dreamed, that it was difficult to suppose we could possibly have been intended. And lastly, it seemed discourteous to treat the supposition as possible, that the "Month" writers could wish to convey to their readers' mind any serious charge against us, without indicating us so directly and unmistakably, as to give us full opportunity of making every necessary explanation. We have always assumed therefore—so far as regarded our practical course—that no remarks of that periodical can be intended as bearing on ourselves, unless we are named explicitly or equivalently.

In the first article however of the August "Month," we are equivalently named, though not explicitly. The facts are these. In November last the "Month" put forth a severe criticism on our conduct in the recent infallibility controversy. We stated therefore in January (p. 227), that we should "take an opportunity of indirectly replying to" this criti-

cism; and we did so accordingly, without making explicit mention of the "Month," in our article of last April on "Catholic controversies." Now it is one chief purpose of the "Month" paper just mentioned, to rejoin on this reply. And though the writer has been so courteous as to follow our example in not mentioning his opponent by name,—he does equivalently name us, by commenting on various ecclesiastical facts which we alleged in our defence. Nothing can be more legitimate than this; for the question raised is of much practical importance, and deserves a frank discussion. We find it impossible however to answer him indirectly; and we will therefore explicitly review as a whole his paper on Liberal Catholicism. And we are the rather disposed to do so, because the subject itself of Liberal Catholicism is one possessing peculiar interest and importance at this time.

The general drift of the article appears to us admirable; and we are greatly pleased to observe (p. 128, note) that its author has some thought of returning not unfrequently to the same field. In its main argument indeed, we have observed only one particular which we should be at all disposed to question; and even on this, our difficulty very probably arises from our misapprehending what is intended. We thoroughly concur with the statement—indeed (as the article observes) Pius IX. himself gives it much sanction—that the especial virus of Liberal Catholicism\* lies in its intimate connection with Naturalism: but we are not sure that we should ourselves analyze that fundamental and most anti-Christian error, precisely as it is analyzed from p. 116 to 118. Still, however this may be, nothing can be more just than the following remarks on its character and tendency:—

The great danger of our day is the all-invading spirit of Naturalism, and the consequent limitation or denial of the supernatural order. Naturalism infects the views of our time as to religion, as to society, as to family and civil life, as to domestic relations, and as to individual practice. The course of the three last centuries has carried it on from one important position to another. It was introduced into Christendom by the Reformers, as a principle useful for their own immediate purpose; but it was very soon to be turned against the ill-cemented fabric, which they proposed to leave behind them in the place of the Catholic religion. It conquered a legal position in modern Europe by the issue of the Thirty Years' War. In the last century Rousseau and Voltaire dressed it up as a philosophy, made it the fashion of

---

\* We use this phrase throughout in the same sense in which the "Month" uses it; viz., as expressing the opinions held by M. de Montalembert and his friends on such matters as liberty of worships, liberty of the press, &c., &c.

the most empty-headed society that ever professed to be intellectual, and imposed it as a law upon the literature of their own generation and the next. *Then it aimed at the throne of politics, and was borne to the summit of power amid the howlings and the bloodshed of the great French Revolution. Since that time it has become the principle of Governments* (p. 115).

The most subdued form of Naturalism allows the existence of [a divinely ordained spiritual] authority; which however it limits entirely to spiritual and private matters, excluding it from all that is public and temporal, *separating the life of the soul from the life of the body, the life of the Christian from the life of the citizen*, and confining the effects of the Incarnation and the supernatural order to the former member of each comparison, and so withdrawing the latter from the rightful influence of the true Church (p. 118).

A far more extreme and dangerous form of the same error, is one under influence of which

the State assumes an authority and discharges duties parallel to those which belong to the Church in the Christian system. It leaves positive religion to the individual, and supplies him with the appliances of his worship, but it takes charge of its citizens on its own account, educates them in secular knowledge, teaches them a neutral or "common" philosophy, history, literature, and morality, and solves every problem of human life and public government on principles independent of all revealed truth or law (p. 119).

This is the doctrine advocated, with great ability and consistency, by the "Pall Mall Gazette"; and which is far more formidable than other forms of the error, from the very fact that it is far profounder than the rest, and not convincible (as they are) of intrinsic inconsistency and self-contradiction.

So much on Naturalism. Next as to Liberal Catholicism, which is so intimately connected therewith. And we must begin with saying, how entirely we concur with the "Month," that the leading French Liberal Catholics are "generous and devoted" men (p. 131); and "that one may well entertain a sanguine hope," of their "never committing themselves to any want of submission to the declarations of authority," acknowledged by them as such, "on the points on which they are mistaken" (ib.). We trust, with the "Month," that in France "Liberal Catholicism . . . will very soon be absorbed in the general movement of Catholic reaction against the Revolution" (ib.); and we agree that, even as things are, every well-advised Catholic should treat its more prominent advocates "with the greatest gentleness and respect, even when it has become necessary that their mistakes should be pointed out" (p. 116). The "Month" however has come across some Catholics, who take a most different view of the case. Some



denounce these excellent men "as rebels and outcasts" (p. 114), and speak of them with "angry bitterness" (p. 131). Nay, to some Catholics the error in question "is more hateful than *heresy or infidelity itself*; to which they can be decently courteous, while Liberal Catholicism stirs their bile, and makes them *wild and abusive*" (p. 113). Our natural comment on all this would be, to express our amazement that such strangely-minded Catholics can exist, and can exist without being more generally heard of. But some readers of the "Month" have thought, that *we* are aimed at in these passages; that *we* are supposed to be among those, who call in question what "ignorance and malevolence alone can dispute" (p. 116). It may be worth while therefore to point out that, even in that article which the "Month" had before its eyes, we put in a protest by anticipation; for we drew attention to the fact, that "we have always expressed hearty respect for the zeal which has been exhibited by" Liberal Catholics, "and a profound sense of the great services they have in various ways rendered to the Church" (p. 366). But as a writer's general tone and spirit are much more satisfactorily manifested by a continuous passage than by one brief sentence, we hope our readers will excuse us for inflicting on them a repetition of what we formerly said. The "Month's" remarks have led us to italicise one particular sentence:—

The French "Liberal Catholics," as a rule, are most pious and exemplary men; enthusiastic defenders of the Pope and his civil principedom; and men who have in time past done invaluable service to the Church. On the other hand, they cling to their prejudice concerning the "modern liberties" with a certain strange fanaticism, and allow that prejudice to colour their whole view of facts both past and present. Possibly enough God, Who Alone reads the heart, may see in some of these men that a greater or less degree of venial sin and imperfection has been the cause of their not rightly discerning the Church's guidance or not truly interpreting her voice. But as to their ignorance being *gravely* culpable, we may consider this presumably incredible in men who so zealously and piously frequent the sacraments.

How does the Church act towards them? Firstly, she repeats her doctrine on the subject again and again; hardly a year passes without some fresh condemnation of "liberalismus hodiernus." She takes for granted the truth of that doctrine in all her official acts; and bases on it the whole civil constitution of the Roman States. She earnestly encourages Catholics to write in its defence. . . . All that can be said on the other side is, that she does not take any step which would compel them peremptorily and at once to choose, between expressly rebelling against the Church on the one hand, or abandoning some of their most cherished and pervasive views on the other. These views, we again repeat, being regarded by no one as actually heretical.

The question then to be considered is this. Does such forbearance as we

describe imply any disparagement whatever of the doctrine taught in the "Mirari vos," and in numberless other Apostolic Letters? Does it afford any ground whatever for doubting that the Church accounts that doctrine infallibly true, and as in real truth obligatory on the conscience? To ask such a question is surely to answer it. The "Liberal Catholic" has made his false tenet the centre, round which he has gathered a multitude of settled, habitual, and powerful convictions. Let him be required in a moment to surrender these convictions on pain of breaking with the Church, he is plunged for certain in the extreme of bewilderment and perplexity, and exposed to real danger of apostasy. *It is immeasurably a more healthy and a more hopeful process, that the truth be brought before him—not peremptorily by the Church's abrupt action,—but gradually by means of argument and persuasion.* Thus, as he comes by degrees to understand more clearly both the infallible truth of her doctrine, its obligation, and its real purport, so by proportionate degrees he learns its reasonableness, its consistency with facts, its value in behalf of true liberty, its adaptation to man's highest interests. That the Church prefers such methods as these to others of a more stringent character, is surely no presumption that she regards liberalism as in any way reconcilable with her teaching: it only shows that she chooses these means rather than those, for the promotion and enforcement of that doctrine which she has infallibly declared.

We hope, accordingly, that our own method of procedure is that most in harmony with her wishes and counsels. Our desire throughout this discussion has been, to cast no shadow of suspicion on the thorough good faith of those with whom we are at issue; to put aside all notion of achieving any sudden or startling result; to aim exclusively at promoting, as best we may be able, the gradual but sure growth of individual conviction (DUBLIN REVIEW, Jan. 1868, pp. 129, 130).

In fact, there is one adverse comment which may imaginably be made, on the "Month's" concluding remarks concerning the Church's indulgent demeanour towards Liberal Catholics (p. 132); for it might plausibly be objected by a severe critic, that those remarks have been plagiarized without acknowledgment from our own pages.

We should add however here one explanation, to prevent possible mistake. There are various unsound and minimizing Catholics who, in our humble judgment, deserve very far greater severity of language, than could, with any kind of propriety, be applied to such devoted champions of the Church as Montalembert, Falloux, and Cochin.

So much in favour of the French Liberal Catholics. On the other hand the "Month" does not deny, that in fact Supreme Pontiffs have condemned *ex cathedra* the tenets of Liberal Catholicism, and that the Episcopate has endorsed their condemnation. In other words the "Month" does not deny, that Liberal Catholics are under a material obligation,

of renouncing their characteristic tenets under pain of mortal sin.

Next as to the nature of those dangers, with which the Church is threatened by this unsound doctrinal system. The following remarks are as true in substance as they are beautifully expressed :—

We are inclined to compare Liberal Catholicism to the, sometimes, considerable surges which rock the vessels riding in security within the shelter of a land-locked harbour, while a violent storm rages without, fraught with destruction to the rash or unfortunate mariners who are exposed to its full fury on the open sea. It is the echo within the walls of the Church—drowned, it may be, in the sonorous roll of the music on which her worship soars to Heaven—of the clamours of an angry populace outside, hounded on to her destruction, without knowing what they are at, by the crafty agents of Satan. Liberal Catholicism, in short, is the result of the partial, temporary, and unconscious *adoption, within the pale of the Church, of principles and maxims which are in reality not Catholic*, though their opposition to Catholicism is concealed from the eyes of those who are influenced by them. At certain times, and under certain conditions of society, these principles are more mischievous than at others; and in our time, the bad principles with which the form of opinion of which we speak is more or less distantly connected *have acquired a fatal prominence and threaten to be terribly influential*. These are days, therefore, in which it is of the highest importance that *opinions of this kind should be unmasked, and their tendencies should be plainly pointed out*, and that those who are affected by them should be won back by persuasion and conviction from the dangerous position to which they have unwittingly advanced (p. 114).

For such reasons, it is important that Catholics should precisely understand, *what* is that error which the Church has condemned. On this head again, the “Month” speaks just as we have often spoken :—

It is one thing to assert, as the maintainers of the Naturalistic errors assert, that the best and indeed the only legitimate and progressive form of government is that in which the State is practically indifferent to religion, placing all creeds on an equality before the law, or supporting or even controlling all equally. It is another thing to assert that *under the existing circumstances of a great number of Christian countries* it is necessary that all should be tolerated equally, without reference to their orthodoxy or heterodoxy. This last may be admitted as the practical principle on which even Catholic Governments may act, either wholly or in a measure, but *it may still be necessary for the Church to set her brand of authoritative condemnation on the theory which declares such a rule of action to be simply the best in itself*—a theory which involves the equal rights of truth and error, faith and heresy, in the Christian system of society. The Church *may accept a state of things and make the best of it, and yet it may be contrary to*

Christian truth, and subversive of the fundamental principles of the Kingdom of Christ, to consider such a state of things as *normal and legitimate*. This last is the error of Naturalism of which we are speaking ; but it is quite distinct from the opinion that the connection between Church and State has been so perverted by the civil power as to have often produced greater practical evils than any which are involved in the comparative independence of the two powers, or that when nations are actually largely divided as to religion, fair toleration becomes an absolute necessity (pp. 119, 120).

The "Month" then proceeds to set forth, with much clearness and force, those historical circumstances, which have in fact occasioned the error of Liberal Catholicism, and which have led "impetuous but not very well-grounded minds" to take up with that error (pp. 120, 121). And it then makes a remark, which is very obvious indeed, but not perhaps the less necessary to be put forth explicitly. There is no *intrinsic* connection whatever (1) between Jansenism and Gallicanism or minimism ; nor (2) perhaps between Liberal Catholicism and Gallicanism or minimism ; nor (3) between Jansenism and Liberal Catholicism. Yet extrinsically there is a certain connection between all four ; arising from the fact, that both Jansenists and Liberal Catholics have been naturally led to seek shelter, in Gallicanism or minimism, from the repeated blows of Pontifical condemnation with which they have been visited (p. 123).

We heartily concur with the opinion which follows next in order ; viz., that it is of very great importance to address unsound Catholics, not only on the ground of authority, but also of more general argument.

There may be times and places at which it may be useful or even imperative to argue against the semi-Naturalism of which we are speaking simply from authority, provided that the argument proceeds from principles acknowledged by both parties. A good Catholic, holding some of these opinions, may be peremptorily silenced by an argument which shows him first, that on whatever point, and within whatever sphere, the supreme authority of the Church speaks in a certain manner, its voice is to be listened to as the utterance of infallible truth ; and, secondly, that that authority has spoken in that particular manner as to the opinions in question. But the defenders of the truth have usually gone further than this in their explanations as to erroneous opinions . . . . The reason is obvious, especially in the case of Catholics moving in the midst of a Protestant community. The opinions in question are, in reality, caught by Catholics from the atmosphere in which they live, and these opinions leaven to an immense extent the whole of European thought and society. There can be no nobler employment for the industry of Catholic writers than to labour in tracing up to their sources the various streams of error, and in laying bare the evil principles on which the dangerous system

is based. If this is done patiently and thoroughly, Catholics may expect to see the process conciliate and win over to the full truth a large number of those who are now outside the Church, but who possess to some extent the Christian theory to which these opinions are so hostile. We should always remember that we have to save not only Catholic communities but Christian society in general from the effect of these opinions; and it would be idle and foolish to attempt to confute them by the one peremptory argument of authority. A blow of immense power is struck at them, even in the estimation of right-minded persons who are not children of the Church, by the solemn declarations of the Supreme Pontiff; but the blow itself does not so much convince and explain, as arrest attention and arouse reflection. On the other hand, a great good is to be done among Anglicans and Protestants in a country like our own, by grappling with the fundamental errors of Naturalism, and following them out into their development as to Church authority or as to Christian society. No one who knows anything at all of the state of thought among Anglicans, for instance—whatever inconsistencies their system may contain—can deny that there exist among them many elements which would be attracted by such a demonstration (pp. 124-126).

This citation brings us, from our points of agreement with the "Month," to those on which we have to defend ourselves against that periodical. In fact we have had to omit one sentence of the last passage, and also to terminate our extract somewhat abruptly, in order to avoid entering prematurely on the debated ground.

We are next then to prepare our way for vindicating our argument of April against our contemporary's assault. And with this end in view, we make two preliminary observations.

He implies throughout, that our zeal against French Liberal Catholicism was the chief—almost the sole—reason, which led us to speak so constantly and emphatically on the Church's infallibility in matters external to (though connected with) the Deposit of Faith. But this is very far from having been the case. So far back as in July, 1864 (pp. 93—95), we compared the errors condemned in the Munich Brief with those condemned in the "Mirari vos"; and we said (whether we judged rightly is not the point) that the former filled us "with immeasurably greater alarm and consternation" than the latter. In fact we have laid so much stress on the Church's extent of infallibility, far more from a wish to resist Dr. Dollinger than from a wish to resist M. de Montalembert. Undoubtedly from time to time general arguments against Liberal Catholicism have appeared in our pages; and we may mention as instances, two articles on "the Principles of '89," which we published respectively in October, 1864, and April, 1865. But it has happened on various occasions, that our

only concern with Liberal Catholicism has been, the availing ourselves of its history, for the purpose of illustrating and enforcing the Church's extent of infallibility. And though undoubtedly we desired to press that doctrine against the school of Montalembert, we were far *more* desirous of pressing it against the school of Dollinger. In fact, as regards the present writer personally, he will frankly admit, that his convictions on the deadly tendency of Liberal Catholicism have been founded a good deal more on the extraordinary emphasis with which the Church has condemned it, than on his own historical and political investigations.\* His own studies and interests have lain far more in theology and philosophy, than in history and ecclesiastical politics.

This is our first preliminary comment. Our second is, that, to our great gratification, our critic upholds substantially the whole view of infallibility for which we have ever contended. He disavows (p. 123) "doctrines which confine the infallibility of the Church to matters strictly of faith and morals": and (ib.) repudiates those who "exact at all events certain stringent conditions as necessary, before a document proceeding from the Holy See can be deemed infallible." He says (p. 128) that the bishops have generally referred to "the infallible character" of the Syllabus,† as to "*an elementary portion of Christian doctrine*;" and we may assume therefore, that he himself regards this doctrine, not only as certain but even as *elementary*. Moreover, in his various criticisms on ourselves, he nowhere implies that our general doctrine on infallibility has been at all exaggerated. We anticipate very great benefit from this explicit doctrinal avowal.

We now come to our article of last April. One chief accusation for several years has been urged against our course: viz., that we sow divisions in the Church; that we draw an invidious and schismatically-savouring distinction between Catholic and Catholic; that we err against Catholic charity, in

---

\* However forbearing successive Pontiffs may have been in their language towards individual Liberal Catholics, it must not be forgotten that their language against the doctrine itself has been quite amazing in its vehemence. The proposition "that liberty of conscience is to be asserted and vindicated to every man," is denounced by them, not merely as an "absurd and erroneous opinion," but rather as an "insanity." The existing liberty of the press is characterized as "most foul, and never sufficiently to be execrated and detested."

† He is speaking expressly indeed of the "*Quantâ curâ*." But he is evidently including the Syllabus in his statement; for in the preceding page he speaks of the great "*Pontifical declaration against the errors of our time*, which will rank among the glorious acts of Pius IX."



stigmatizing persons, whom we admit to be members of the Church, with the charge of holding tenets, which are forbidden by the Church herself under pain of mortal sin. A second and very subordinate accusation against us has been, that we have gone out of our way to introduce theological discussions—especially this last infallibility discussion—into a periodical which is no fit vehicle for them. Our principal purpose then in April, was to answer the principal accusation; but we had also the subordinate purpose, of answering the subordinate accusation.

In reply then to the graver accusation, we urged firstly, that at all events the fact *is* as we have alleged it to be; that there *are* various opinions, which every Catholic is forbidden sub mortali to hold, which yet do not exclude him from the Visible Church; that if any one e. g. at the present day took up Fénelon's condemned doctrine of quietism, Catholics would be bound to speak of his views with extreme severity, and yet to admit that his doctrine has not been condemned as actually *heretical* (pp. 363-4). So far, of course, there is no divergence between the "Month" and ourselves.

But it may be rejoined (p. 364) that, though the fact *is* so, yet we had no business publicly to *allege* it; that the Catholic may appeal indeed against such unsound believers to his diocesan or to the Holy See; but that, when arguing against them *before the public*, he has no business to charge them with grave disobedience to the Church's teaching. We answered (pp. 365-9), that on the contrary this very thing had always been the habit of approved writers, in arguing against condemned non-heretical error; and that the particular error of Liberal Catholicism presents in its history some emphatic exhibitions of the fact. To this the "Month" now replies in effect (p. 125), that approved writers, in arguing against Liberal Catholics, have ordinarily devoted far more space to *other* arguments, than to that particular argument which is derived from the Church's condemnation of the error. But if our critic will consider for a moment, he will admit that such a reply is simply irrelevant to the issue. Take e. g. any given work of Bellarmine or other controversialist, against Luther and Calvin. Very little comparatively is said by such controversialist about the Church's *condemnation* of these heresiarchs, simply because the fact is so obvious and undisputed. The Catholic controversialist devotes himself almost exclusively, to arguing against Lutherans and Calvinists on more general ground. To say then that orthodox writers, in controversy with Liberal Catholicism, devote far more space to other arguments than to that particular argu-

ment which is derived from the Church's condemnation, is to say no more, than that they treat Liberal Catholicism just as they treat the Lutheran and Calvinistic heresies. The real point to be debated is, whether they do or do not make it most clear to their readers, that they regard Liberal Catholicism as a condemned error; as an error which all Catholics are under a divinely-imposed obligation of renouncing. Now we are quite sure our contemporary will not *deny*, that they make this most clear to their readers. We are quite sure indeed he will not deny, that they make it the professed basis of their whole argument.

For instance. He speaks with most just praise of the "*Civiltà Cattolica*"; and says with great truth (p. 129) that "it is hardly possible, in the range of mere literature, to have a more authoritative witness to the manner in which those champions of the Church who are most thoroughly imbued with her spirit, and who write under the eye of her supreme authority, think it best to deal with questions of the day in a periodical meant for general perusal." Now we will not take the trouble of looking for extracts through the pages of the "*Civiltà*"; because no better illustration of what we intend can be given, than the following, which we happened to have under our notice for a different reason. It is from the number for April 10, 1867 (pp. 149-151).

Listen to a [certain] Christian, calling himself Catholic and Liberal: you will doubt whether he has not gone out of his mind; and the doubt is well founded; for either he does not believe that modern constitutions contain those errors which we have above recited, or else he thinks that those various principles which we have assailed cannot be condemned as errors. If he believes the former, pray let him show us how modern constitutions have other foundations, ends, or means, than those above described; whereas, in fact, those who are their authors not only profess such principles, but make a boast of them. If, admitting these principles, he does not recognize them to be evil [iniqui], let him at least read the Encyclical and Syllabus, which the Vicar of Jesus Christ promulgated to the world not long since, and he will see what he has to think. Their formula of "Catholics with the Pope, Liberals with Italy," is simply founded on the doctrine of separation of Church and State, condemned in proposition 55. All the rights which they claim of overthrowing princes and monarchs are proscribed in prop. 67; liberty of worships in prop. 77; liberty of the press in prop. 79. All the evils connected with civil marriage are branded from prop. 65 to 74. All the secular usurpations over education are condemned from prop. 45 to 48. All the tyrannies exercised against the regular and secular clergy are denounced in prop. 49 and those succeeding. Finally, all the principles which constitute what is now called progress, liberalism, and modern civilization, are pronounced irreconcilable with the Roman Pontiff in prop. 80. If neither

one nor the other can be denied, *with what consistency can those who boast of their sincere Catholicity call themselves Liberals?* Do they haply think then that Catholicity is an empty name, the profession of which is an outward form entailing no obligations? Let them then understand once for all, that Catholic principles do not change; neither for the passing on of years, nor for difference of country, nor for novel discoveries, nor for reasons of utility. They are always those which Christ taught, which the Church proclaimed, which the Saints held, which Popes and councils defined, which doctors defended; and every one must either accept or reject them. He who accepts them in all their fulness—and let us add in all their rigour—is a Catholic; he who vacillates, hesitates, adapts himself to times, persons, and fashions, may give himself what name he likes, but *before God and the Church he cannot stand excused, unless on the ground of invincible ignorance.*

Our critic will certainly find it difficult to quote, from our own pages, any language approaching this, in its doctrinal condemnation of Liberal Catholicism: and all readers of the "Civiltà" will admit, that this passage is but a sample of a large number. So far from his having any right to invoke the "Civiltà" against us, that periodical is an authority which tells most strongly in our favour. Indeed it is this mode of controversy which has received the Church's especial sanction. The "Month" writer says most truly (p. 127) that "the Encyclical," and "other documents of a similar kind," may well be considered "as pointing out to Catholic apologists the wide field, in which their zeal against the errors of the day can best exercise itself." He adds, that the "direct object of these pronouncements is to meet and condemn certain pernicious errors." Precisely so. Their direct and primary object is, not to stimulate orthodox Catholics into *arguing* against error on a platform of equality, but to put down error directly by authoritatively condemning it. A "Catholic apologist" then puts these pronouncements to the very purpose for which they were primarily intended, when he cites them in order to put down the errors which they condemn. It seems almost impertinent indeed to argue further, for so obvious and common-sense a conclusion. But we may as well refer to Card. Caterini's letter, written by Pius IX.'s command, for the purpose of enforcing sound doctrine concerning the Pontiff's civil principedom; a letter, which the "Month" itself values so highly, that it published a translation of it last February. We borrowed that translation in our last number (pp. 185-190); and our readers will see, that the very first consideration pressed by the Cardinal, is the Church's authority. The Pope and bishops have spoken, argues the Cardinal; let the offender "hear the Church," lest he be to Catholics "as a heathen

and a publican." In like manner, as we pointed out in April (p. 368), Pius IX., in his commanded Letter\* to M. de Beaulieu, commended that nobleman "*chiefly*," because he had derived his "arms" against M. de Montalembert from "the very chair of truth"; from the theological teaching of the Holy See. And the Holy Father added, that if only the "Mirari vos" "had been received as it should have been," there would have been no "dissension or reason for doubting."†

We conclude then,—not merely that we did well in urging explicitly the obligation, divinely imposed on unsound Catholics, of abandoning their condemned tenets,—but that we should have acted very wrongly and indefensibly if we had *not* urged this. If the "Month" however merely means to say, that, in dealing with Liberal Catholics, it is very important not *only* to dwell on their infallible condemnation, but *also* to exhibit in argument the anti-religious and anti-social tendency of their doctrine,—we heartily concur; and we never thought otherwise. If it further intends to allege that we have been remiss in this particular, let it only put forth its whole meaning categorically, and we will not fail to reply. But again and again it is very easy and most important to show, by reference to the Church's determinations, that some given proposition is unorthodox; while it would require much thought and labour to

---

\* By the term "*commanded Letter*" we here mean, that though in that Letter the Pope did not express himself in the first person, yet Mgr. Mercurelli wrote it avowedly as his mere mouthpiece. The "*Month*" calls it "the letter of Mgr. Mercurelli" (p. 130, note); which certainly seems to us an inadequate expression. In April we called a Letter of the same kind simply "the Pope's Letter"; and this, on the other hand, is perhaps *too strong* an expression. So we say "the Pope's *commanded Letter*."

† In April we added (p. 368) an illustration from Pius IX.'s commanded Letter to M. Veuillot. Now certainly (1) the Holy Father expressed himself concerning M. Veuillot's writings in the strongest terms of approbation; so strong, that we doubt whether he has ever expressed himself so warmly concerning any other individual writer whomsoever. And certainly (2), as we showed in April, M. Veuillot has been in the habit of condemning Liberal Catholicism severely on theological grounds. But we added (3) that Pius IX. expressly mentioned this circumstance, as one of M. Veuillot's claims on his approbation. The "*Month*" however argues (p. 130, note), that the words we quoted refer, not to Liberal Catholicism, but to Naturalism simple. This interpretation had not occurred to us: but we cannot deny that there is great force in the "*Month's*" reasoning; and we willingly therefore withdraw the argument, which we had based on M. Veuillot's case.

The "*Month*" expresses itself, as though we had quoted Pius IX.'s words concerning M. Veuillot, for the purpose of justifying the use of severe expressions against the leading French Liberal Catholics. But if the writer will look again at our context, he will see that this is not at all the case.

encounter that proposition adequately on grounds of reason. In such cases it is the duty, we consider, of a Catholic periodical, to do at once what it *can* do at once; and to cite the Church's determinations, for the purpose of warning orthodox believers against the error. This is indeed (as we have already said) the primary purpose for which these determinations are intended.

So much then on the first and principal theme of our April article. But we said a few words incidentally and secondarily, on our reason for having introduced into this REVIEW various theological discussions on the extent of infallibility. We urged that, at all events, questions of philosophy and religious politics are peculiarly questions which concern *laymen*.

What could be more preposterous than to say, that it is a matter of indifference to Catholic laymen, whether they are or are not at liberty to advocate "liberty of conscience" as a positive good? as a positive advance in civilization? M. de Montalembert and M. de Falloux would protest against such an allegation as heartily as we should protest against it ourselves. So as to any philosophical tenet on which the Church has spoken: is it not a question which profoundly affects laymen, whether they are or are not bound to accept her decision on such tenet with interior assent? It is a matter for ever increasing amazement, how assertions of this kind can ever have been made. Certainly, if ever there were a matter on which a Catholic public writer is bound to speak—with which every educated Catholic layman is intimately concerned—it is the obligation of assenting to the Church's judgment on things primarily philosophical or political (pp. 380-81).

And we added this consideration—

It is quite imaginable, undoubtedly, that the Catholics of some given country fully recognize the obligation of accepting these judgments with firm interior assent, but that they do not care to inquire which of their number are strictly infallible. We have more than once expressly admitted, that had this been the case in England, it would have been quite indefensible on our part to intrude on their notice theological discussions about infallibility. We have expressly admitted that, on such a supposition, the controversy on the extent of infallibility should have been reserved for the theological schools. But facts were directly the other way. A constantly increasing number of educated Catholics took for granted, that those judgments (though they should not be spoken against) were altogether to be ignored; and that Catholic speculation was to proceed irrespectively of their instruction. Yet the Holy Father expressly declared in the *Quantâ curâ*, that he had condemned "the chief errors of our most unhappy age in many Encyclicals, Allocutions, and other Apostolic Letters"; and it was eminently to the teaching of such Allocutions and Apostolic Letters, that these thinkers disavowed all obligation of firm interior assent. It cannot be a small matter, that various "chief errors of this our most unhappy age" should be embraced

by children of the Church. And the evil would of course have become greater and greater, in proportion as higher education should make further advance among Catholics, without this particular mischief being corrected. If any one will explain to us, how we could have laboured with any success against the mischief in question, otherwise than by introducing these discussions about infallibility,—we will listen carefully to his suggestion. We will only say that we could not and cannot think of any other possible means. But our sole wish in the matter has been, that those various ecclesiastical judgments, which are not definitions of faith, and which pronounce on matters primarily philosophical or political, should receive that firm interior assent which is their due (*ib.*).

This is the situation of disadvantage, in which English Catholic controversialists find themselves, as compared with those of some other countries. The "*Civiltà*," as we have seen, is able to *take for granted* the Church's extent of infallibility; the French bishops, as the "*Month*" testifies (p. 128), could treat the Syllabus's infallibility as "an elementary portion of Christian doctrine." Were we able to do this in England? No one, acquainted with facts, will answer in the affirmative. Certainly it was from no uninfluential quarter,—from no quarter which we could afford to overlook,—that a criticism came forth, denying altogether,—not only the infallibility alike of "*Mirari vos*," "*Quantà curâ*," and Syllabus,—but also the existence of any Catholic obligation, to accept the teaching of these pronouncements with firm interior assent. We were obliged therefore to do, what the "*Civiltà*" writers, what French Catholic writers, are *not* obliged to do; viz., give *reasons* for the doctrine which we pressed, concerning the extent of infallibility. To this moment we cannot imagine what other course is even *alleged* to have been open.

We see very plainly that the "*Month*" intends some reply to this reasoning; but we cannot for the life of us make out what that reply is. It says that "the question of infallibility has not yet been made the subject of a formal definition" (p. 126). Certainly the Church has never formally defined her own infallibility: but if this argument availed against us, it would equally avail against those who appeal to the Church's infallibility, in order to denounce the Arian, or Nestorian, or Lutheran heresy. Men seem often to forget, that the Church has no more defined herself to be infallible in *definitions of faith*, than she has defined herself to be infallible in the Encyclical and Syllabus.

The "*Month*" further argues (p. 127), that the direct object of the "*Quantà curâ*" was "to meet and condemn certain errors; not to assert the authority of the Supreme Pontiff to condemn



all errors whatever." Most true. In like manner, the direct object of the Nicene and Tridentine Councils was to condemn certain heresies, not to assert the authority of councils to condemn all heresies whatsoever. Yet it is the very office of a theologian, to draw out, from the various circumstances attendant on this or that council, the claim of infallibility therein implied. And in like manner surely, it is the office of a theologian to draw out, from the various circumstances attendant on this or that Pontifical Act, the claim of infallibility therein implied. Moreover, as the "Month" truly observes (*ib.*), such inference is thoroughly legitimate; for these Acts "witness distinctly enough to the doctrine" of infallibility, "on which their authority is founded."

We must say then, that we cannot accept this article of the "Month", as any valid reply to our arguments of last April; though we assure our contemporary that we will give our most careful attention, to whatever he may further urge in the same direction. We have had no other wish throughout, than to follow the teaching of the Church and the practice of approved writers; and nothing can be more legitimate, than that he should appeal to that teaching and practice, as indicating a different course from that which we have pursued. Arguments of this kind will be of substantial service to the cause alike of truth and of peace. On the other hand if (which we are very unwilling to believe) he intends to credit us with "ignorance and malevolence";—to allege that Liberal Catholicism "is more hateful" to us "than heresy or infidelity itself";—to brand our language towards Liberal Catholics as "wild and abusive," and filled with "angry bitterness";—we must protest, most respectfully but most emphatically, both against the accusation itself, and against the language in which he conveys it.

---

## ART. VII.—SUBTERRANEAN ROME.

*Roma Sotterranea*; or, some Account of the Roman Catacombs, especially of the Cemetery of San Callisto, compiled from the Works of Commendatore de Rossi, with the Consent of the Author. By the Rev. J. SPENCER NORTHCOTE, D.D., President of S. Mary's College, Oscott, and Rev. W. A. BROWNLOW, M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge. 8vo. London: Longmans, Green, Reader, & Dyer. 1869.

*Roma Sotterranea Cristiana, descritta ed illustrata* dal Cav. G. B. de Rossi. Fol. Tom. I.-II. Roma. 1864-1867.

*Bulletino di Archeologia Cristiana.* Dal Cav. G. B. de Rossi. Anni 1863-1869. 4to. Roma. 1863-1869.

*Inscriptiones Christianæ Urbis Romæ septimo Sæculo antiquiores.* Edidit JOANNES BAPT. de Rossi, Romanus. Fol. Vol. primum. Romæ. 1857-1861.

**A**MONG many interesting literary projects which were born and died in the latter half of the eighteenth century, one was looked to for a time with especial expectation—a work with the attractive title, *Theologia Lapidaria*; or, “The Theology of Inscriptions,” undertaken by Danzetta, the friend and fellow labourer of the learned Jesuit, F. Zaccaria. Danzetta did not live to complete the work, and his unfinished manuscript is still preserved in the Vatican Library. Its general scope may be understood from the analogous essay of his friend Zaccaria, which is prefixed to the well known collection, *Thesaurus Theologicus*, and which the Abbé Migne has reprinted in the valuable volume of appendices to the treatise *De Ecclesiâ*, in his *Theologiæ Cursus Completus*,\* under the title *De veterum Christianarum Inscriptionum in Rebus Theologicis Usu*.

The design of the “*Theologia Lapidaria*,” as well as that of Zaccaria’s essay, is judicious, and sufficiently comprehensive, although the materials of both are meagre, and the execution hasty and imperfect. If we refer to them now, it is chiefly because they present as fair a representative as can easily be found of the views on the subject of Christian archæology which had prevailed up to that period. By the learned world in general that subject was then regarded almost exclusively from the polemical point of view. Each new discovery was

---

\* Tom. v., pp. 310-96.

curiously canvassed and eagerly pressed into the service of controversy; and men were content to argue from details, and to discuss the import of isolated facts or monuments rather than to consider them in their relations with one another, and to deal with all as parts of one great whole. The title of Danzetta's work too, as well as those of several contemporary publications, sufficiently indicates the direction of the studies of the period, and shows the ideas which prevailed as to the particular branch of Christian archæology from which doctrine was to be drawn. Inscriptions were mainly looked to as the proper monumental records of belief; and in projecting a "Theology of Inscriptions," Danzetta was but echoing a common spirit, which practically ignored all the other departments of archæology as sources of dogmatical teaching. Such was plainly the common sentiment of the time. What the Catholic advocates attempted upon their side—to reconstruct out of the inscriptions which the early explorations, and especially the recent discovery of the Roman catacombs, had brought to light, unarranged and unmethodized as they still were, the doctrinal and disciplinary system which had characterized the age to which these inscriptions belonged—was undertaken on a smaller scale, but with no less earnestness, and so far as regards assertion, with almost equal confidence, by Middleton, Poynder, and other similar writers upon the Protestant side. It has been attempted in a more ambitious form by Dr. Maitland, whose "Church in the Catacombs," if it have any polemical significance at all, must rest on the assumption that the inscriptions of the Roman catacombs, or rather of the Lapidarian Gallery in the Vatican, are to be regarded as presenting an epitome of the faith, the discipline, and the usages of the Church of the early centuries; and in Mr. Burgon's popular volume of "Letters from Rome," although the principle is by no means carried so far, there are many passages, the argument, and indeed the whole point and significance, of which are utterly lost if dissociated from the same theory.

If any one has taken up, with anticipations such as these, the handsome volume which stands first on our list, we fear he will be disappointed. The views of the writers to whom we refer, however plausible and attractive, were premature, and cannot safely be accepted even now without considerable modification. Inscriptions form but one, although an important one, among various classes of witnesses to the ancient faith and usages of the Church. Even in the class of inscriptions itself, moreover, there are many subdivisions—historical, sepulchral, liturgical, personal—each differing from the rest in import and in character; and it is only when all are fully

represented, and when they are taken in their logical connection with the various collateral records which are their natural complement, that they acquire their full significance, or at least that they receive their legitimate commentary.

The importance of inscriptions as historical records has always been acknowledged, and their value as illustrating the history of the primitive ages of Christianity was enhanced by the scantiness of the ordinary materials of history during these ages. From an early date scholars have busied themselves in forming collections of inscriptions of all kinds bearing upon the doctrine, the usages, and the history of the first ages of the Church. M. de Rossi mentions a MS. collection of inscriptions as early as the ninth century preserved in the Einsiedeln Library, and containing a section specially devoted to Christian inscriptions. A similar collection of the same date, but exclusively Christian, is among the Kloster-Neuburg MSS. Very early in the revival of letters the same project was entertained, and a collection formed by Pietro Sabini, and dedicated to Charles VIII., was discovered by M. de Rossi in the library of S. Mark's at Venice. A complete collection of ancient inscriptions, among which Christian inscriptions had their allotted place, was among the unrealized projects of Onofrio Panvini and of the younger Manuzio. Gruter devoted one of his titles to this branch of the general subject embraced by his great collection; and Doni enlarged and supplemented Gruter's collection, so as to leave little to be desired for its completeness up to the date of that publication. Every scholar of Christian antiquity since that time—Bosio, Montfaucon, Aringhi, Buonarotti, Fabretti, Muratori, Boldetti, and Marangoni, has followed in the same track, although some of them have applied themselves to other special branches in addition. It was one of the many designs of Scipio Maffei, than whom few were better qualified for the undertaking, but it was unhappily frustrated by his lamented death; and towards the close of the last century, Padre Zaccaria, whose various studies in sacred literature prepared him to appreciate the great importance of a complete and careful revision of the entire subject of Christian inscriptions, which should bring into one whole the results of the labours of the many independent collectors from the earliest times, succeeded in engaging upon an exhaustive collection of this character, one of the most learned and judicious scholars of the age—the celebrated Gaetano Marini. Marini brought together a vast body of materials; but, unhappily, before he had made any progress in the publication of his work, he was interrupted by the troubles of the French Revolution; and at his death all his

papers, in various stages of preparation, were deposited in the Vatican Library. Untoward as the failure of these hopes was at the time felt to be, we cannot now regard it as other than a fortunate circumstance. Marini's papers came into the hands of Angelo Mai, who was engaged on the publication of his well-known *Scriptorum veterum Nova Collectio*. We are old enough to recollect the feeling of blank disappointment with which, after the high expectations created by the knowledge of Marini's scholarship, and the fame of the vast and various materials which he had collected for his work, the learned world received the slender instalment of this long-looked-for collection published by Mai in the fifth volume of his collection; and still more the confession which accompanied it, that the condition of the remaining portion of Marini's papers, as regarded immediate preparation for the press, was so unsatisfactory, that Mai considered it hopeless to attempt further to prosecute the publication. It is pleasant, on the other hand, to know that what was then regarded as an untoward event, was destined by a fortunate coincidence—by one of those happy combinations of “the man and the hour,” which sometimes occur in letters as in civil affairs—to be the turning-point of a great revolution in this most interesting branch of sacred knowledge. Had Cardinal Mai been in a position to complete the publication of Marini's papers, we should have had no doubt a very complete and comprehensive collection of all the Christian inscriptions which had been discovered up to that time, but nothing more. The commission which Mai himself was unable to execute, transferred to other hands, has resulted in a complete cyclopædia of the sacred antiquities of Rome, and, it may almost be said, of the whole science of Christian archæology. The friend whom Mai induced to undertake the task which had been a mere accident in the main scheme of his own studies, and the further prosecution of which his other engagements, official and literary, now rendered impossible, was a young scholar then known but to a small circle of friends, but who has since achieved a European reputation—Giovanni Battista, Commendatore de Rossi.

The great body of those who at various times concerned themselves with Christian inscriptions, had, with a few exceptions, confined their attention mainly or exclusively to that branch of the study of Christian antiquities. Of these exceptions, one stands pre-eminent—the celebrated Antonio Bosio—one of that distinguished company of scholars whom the munificent patronage of Cardinal Francis Barberini enlisted in a great scheme for the illustration of Christian

antiquities, which he projected, and to which he freely devoted his ample fortune, his vast personal influence, and the many official aids which were at his disposal. Bosio, although a foreigner and a member of a laborious profession, had been attracted almost from his first arrival in Rome to the subject of the catacombs, which at that time, in addition to its intrinsic interest, had all the charm of novelty. For him the interest of the subject had grown in intensity with every year which he devoted to it; and his vigorous and philosophic mind quickly perceived that, in order to the right understanding, whether of inscriptions or of any other class of monumental records, it is necessary to study them with all their surroundings, to discuss each in its relations to all the rest, and as far as possible to re-invest all with the various circumstances of age, place, purpose, and historical or personal associations, which originally belonged to them. In this view Bosio's first and lifelong object was, as far as might still be possible, to restore once again the Christian Rome which lay buried beneath the modern city; to map out through its several regions, many of them distinct and far apart from each other, its long lines of streets and galleries; to trace the sites and dimensions of its numerous halls and chapels; to make accurate copies, and carefully to note the positions, of all inscriptions, pictorial representations, and objects of piety or of art; to observe all peculiarities of construction, of architecture, or of economic arrangement; in one word to reproduce by every practicable device, that "*Subterranean Rome*," whose remains form the subject of the Christian archaeologist's research. It is impossible to read the record of his researches which this enthusiastic explorer has left, without being at once carried back to the period and impressed with the soundness of the principles on which these explorations were conducted. His account of the cemeteries which he visited was most complete, and the work was admirably arranged on a principle which was suggested by his earliest explorations, and the propriety of which all subsequent investigations have confirmed. Assuming that the primitive Christian places of burial followed the common usage of their age, he concluded that their sites must have lain, like the sites of those of their pagan contemporaries, along the lines of the great roads leading from the several gates of the city. Accordingly he took in order "all the great consular roads which led out of Rome, and collected every historical notice he could find concerning the Christian cemeteries on each of them; their precise position, their founders, and the martyrs or other persons of distinction who had been buried in



them. He then, by the light of this information, examined all the catacombs he had seen, and endeavoured to assign to each its proper name and history." Owing to the scantiness and the often uncritical character of the acts of martyrs and other records, which alone at that time were within Bosio's reach, he was often betrayed into erroneous or doubtful conclusions; but it is no small tribute to the clearness and justice of his views, that the system which he followed is, now still recognized as "quite unexceptionable; indeed, the only one that can safely be followed in laying a solid foundation for a scientific treatment of the whole subject."\*

Happily, too, the bold but philosophic views which guided this explorer of the seventeenth century, are so curiously in accordance with the critical spirit of our own age, or so happily anticipated it, that it has been found possible, even in these days of ours, with all their boasted superiority, to resume the researches of Bosio almost at the point at which they were interrupted by his lamented death, and to pursue them almost in the very same detail which he himself may be supposed likely to have followed. From the date of the posthumous publication of his work, and of its translation by Aringhi, little had been done to extend the knowledge of subterranean Rome. Fabretti published an account of two catacombs which were not known by Bosio, and Marangoni devoted many years to the preparation of a continuation of Bosio's work arranged according to the same or a similar topographical outline; but unfortunately the fruit of nearly seventeen years of such labour was accidentally destroyed by fire. Marangoni's learned work on the coincidences of Christian and Pagan ritual and ceremonial observance,† and his *Acta Sancti Victorini* amply attest his ability and his fitness to continue the work which Bosio has left undone, but they add little, if anything, to our detailed knowledge of the Catacombs; and after his time the work of systematic exploration may be said to have lain in abeyance until it was resumed in our own day with an enterprising ardour and a scientific discrimination not unworthy of the olden time, by the learned Jesuit, Padre Marchi, but unhappily only to be interrupted, and in the end rendered abortive, by the political vicissitudes of the times, and by the temporary dispersion of the Roman communities of his order.

It was just, however, while F. Marchi was most earnest in the prosecution of these researches that Cardinal Mai, as has

\* *Roma Sotterranea*, p. 8.

† *Cose Gentilische Profana adoprte ad uso ed Ornamento delle Chiese*. 4to. Roma. 1744.

been already noticed, prevailed upon his young friend De Rossi to undertake the continuation of the publication of Marini's Christian Inscriptions. We have said that this transfer of the task was a fortunate one. For Mai it had been a mere accident in the main scheme of his studies: to De Rossi it has furnished the chosen work of an honoured and distinguished life. De Rossi found Roman archæology a scholarly, but desultory and unregulated pursuit: he has seen it raised to the rank of a science. He found the study broken up into a series of details, each no doubt interesting in itself, all more or less important for their individual bearing on doctrine or history; but without scientific sequence or connection, awaiting the light which might be gathered in from collateral sources, and the interpretation or illustration which it is the privilege of science to borrow from the analogies of kindred studies. In his hands light has poured in from the least anticipated quarters; facts have been carefully sifted; authorities rigorously tested; data have been collected, ascertained, classified, digested; investigation has taken the place of theory; and the severe results of careful inquiry have been substituted for hasty and often passionate assumptions, based upon preconceived ideas, and directing rather than following the investigation upon which they profess to be founded. And the result has been a practical success altogether unexampled. Dr. Northcote has happily observed of this distinguished scholar, that it was hard to say whether his talent, learning, and industry have done more for the work of discovery in subterranean Rome, or the discoveries he has made have done more for the increase of our knowledge of it. Up to the commencement of his researches, during two centuries of exploration, only three important historical monuments had been discovered, and these accidentally; whereas under De Rossi's direction the Commission of Sacred Archæology within a few years "brought to light six or seven historical monuments of the utmost value, and in every instance he had announced beforehand, with more or less accuracy, what was to be expected."\*

For although De Rossi's first direct connection with the subject lay in the collection of inscriptions, which he had undertaken to edit in continuation of Mai's edition of Gaetano Marini he soon found that a complete and thorough acquaintance with the cemeteries from which these inscriptions were for the most part derived, was an indispensable preliminary for the satisfactory execution of his task. Accordingly, although his

---

\* *Roma Satterreanea*, p. 15.

intended collection of Inscriptions was without his own knowledge publicly announced and promised in his name as early as the year 1844, he did not hesitate to lay it aside and devote himself with all his energy to the work of practical exploration; nor was it till 1857 that he gave to the public the first instalment of his collection of Christian Inscriptions. The fruits of his explorations in all the intermediate years are contained in his great work *Roma Sotterranea*; and contemporaneously with that publication, he established in 1863, partly as a record of the new incidents of a subject which is of its own nature progressive, partly as a vehicle of information which would not properly find a place in the *Roma Sotterranea*, the periodical now well known throughout Europe, "*Bullettino di Archeologia Cristiana*" written exclusively by himself, and devoted altogether to subjects directly connected with the study of Christian antiquity.

The direct subject of all these, and of several incidental publications, is the sacred archæology of Rome, and especially the Roman catacombs; but that subject is treated in a spirit so comprehensive, and is illustrated with such stores of erudition drawn from every department of sacred learning, that M. de Rossi's volumes may be truly said to form a complete cyclopædia of the science of Christian archæology. Nevertheless, valuable to scholars as is the learning which he has brought to bear upon the science, and easy of use as he has made it for the learned by the felicitous arrangement and the lucid order which he has followed, it must be felt that the general public are shut out from its advantages, as well by the vastness of the work, as by the strictly scientific and technical treatment which characterizes many of its details. It is pre-eminently a scholar's book.

The very elegant and attractive volume which is named at the head of these pages, is designed to place within the reach of ordinary readers in England the most important and striking results of M. de Rossi's researches, and especially as regards the Roman catacombs. It would be more just to say that such is the modest purpose professed by the authors of the *Roma Sotterranea*; for we are bound to state, that, in the execution of their task they have gone far beyond this modest and self-denying programme. Using De Rossi's overflowing materials unreservedly, but with such judgment and skill as to avoid all affectation of scholarship, they have freely interwoven with them facts and illustrations, partly derived from personal research, partly drawn from every writer of eminence upon the antiquities or the art of Christian Rome; and the form which the subject has taken in their hands, while it

preserves all that is best and most striking in M. de Rossi's method, is nevertheless, in some respects, entirely original, and especially in its adaptation to the necessities of popular use and to the condition of archæological science in England. To those who are acquainted with Dr. Northcote's admirable volume on the Roman catacombs, and his papers on the same subject, published at a time when it was still comparatively new, it is unnecessary to say a word as to his eminent fitness for the task; and we think it will be felt, in reading those portions of the *Roma Sotterranea* which are the especial work of his colleague, Mr. Brownlow, that Dr. Northcote could not easily have found an abler or more congenial fellow-labourer.

It will easily be felt that any attempt to present in a condensed form the contents of a single octavo volume which is designed as a popular summary of the voluminous publications already described, could be little more than a mere classified index of subjects. We must refer our readers to the *Roma Sotterranea* itself, as well for a comprehensive view of the general method, as for certain matters of detail especially bearing on the topography, construction, and local arrangements of the catacombs, which it would be hopeless to attempt to make intelligible without the aid of maps and diagrams. For these details we confidently refer to the admirably clear and precise descriptions, especially of the fifth book. After a careful comparative study of the text and the accompanying map and illustrations, we do not hesitate to say that a notion may be formed of the general character and appearance, and still more of the extent and local arrangement, of these venerable sanctuaries, more clear and more precise than is carried away by a large proportion of the ordinary sight-seers after a personal visit to the catacombs themselves.

The *Roma Sotterranea*, besides an Introduction devoted to the literature of the subject, is divided into five books, of which the first three, together with three chapters of the fourth and the Introduction, are by Dr. Northcote. The remaining chapters of the fourth and the whole of the fifth book are the work of Mr. Brownlow. Of a number of learned notes appended to the volume, one on St. Peter's Chair, which comprises the most recent information on this interesting subject, is by Mr. Brownlow: Dr. Northcote has contributed all the rest. Throughout the entire work the reader will be struck by the absence of everything approaching a polemical tone in the treatment of the subject, which contrasts very strongly with the older compilations of Catholic writers, and with the modern publications from the school of Maitland's "Church in the

Catacombs." The account is purely descriptive and explanatory; and if there be, from the very nature of the subject, occasional references to doctrine in connection with the objects described, these allusions are merely such as arise from the necessity of the description or narrative, and are indispensable to its proper understanding. The truth is, that in the view not merely of the authors of the *Roma Sotterranea*, but also of M. de Rossi himself, the time has only just arrived at which it has become possible to enter satisfactorily upon the polemical questions connected with the catacombs. The first necessity was to complete, as far as circumstances would permit, that scientific investigation of facts which alone can furnish a satisfactory basis for doctrinal discussion. And hence, in both branches of his subject—the *Roma Sotterranea* and the Collection of Inscriptions,—M. de Rossi has scrupulously abstained from theological controversy. To many readers, indeed, his great Collection of Inscriptions was in this respect a source of much disappointment, from its purely chronological arrangement, and from the absence of every attempt to turn even its most tempting materials to the uses of religious controversy. But no one can now doubt the wisdom of this course; and the rigorously philosophic method according to which, in laying the foundations of the science, he has discussed those questions of pure chronology and criticism on which the value of all monuments, and especially of inscriptions, must mainly depend, will go far with every impartial scholar, to place beyond the possibility of challenge the authority of the directly dogmatical work on Christian Inscriptions on which he is now engaged, as a sequel to the purely critical volume which he has already issued. The authors of the *Roma Sotterranea* have wisely maintained the same cautiously critical reserve.

The first three books, and also the fifth, are devoted to the origin, history, and descriptive topography of the catacombs, more particularly of that of S. Callixtus; the fifth to the history and characteristics of Christian Art, as exhibited in their decorations and monumental remains. The details of these discussions, of course, would carry us far beyond the limits of the space at our disposal. We must confine ourselves to a brief account of the results; especially in so far as they bear upon the authority of any conclusions which may be drawn from a consideration of the catacombs, regarded as depositories of monumental records, and as witnesses to the belief, the disciplinary usages, the religious and social observances, and in a word the general history of the Christians of Rome under the Cæsars.

Even for those who have not had the opportunity of a personal exploration of the Roman catacombs it may suffice, for the purpose of intelligible description, to say that they are "a vast labyrinth of galleries excavated in the bowels of the earth around the Eternal City"; that these galleries are "excavated on various levels, or *piani*, three, four, or even five, one above the other, crossing and recrossing each other on each of these levels, and so numerous that at the lowest estimated measurement their total length does not fall short of three hundred and fifty miles. They vary from two to four feet in width, and in height according to the nature of the rock in which they are dug. The walls on both sides are pierced with horizontal niches, like shelves in a book-case or berths in a steamer, and every niche once contained one or more dead bodies. At various intervals this succession of shelves is interrupted, that room may be made for a doorway opening into a small chamber; and the walls of these chambers are generally pierced with graves, in the same way as the galleries."

Such were the burial-places of the Christians of Rome from the apostolic times down to the capture of the city by Alaric, in the beginning of the fifth century. Their number was very considerable, no fewer than twenty-five principal cemeteries being known as in existence in the third century, besides about twenty of less importance. Originally they were formed in the villas or gardens of private individuals, or in sites expressly purchased for the purpose; and the titles of many are still preserved which were situated upon the several great roads, the Via Ostiensis, the Via Tiburtina, the Via Appia, the Via Ardeatina, the Via Labicana, the Via Portuensis, the Via Salaria Vetus, and the Via Salaria Nova.

One of the most important questions regarding the origin of the Roman catacombs is that as to their age; and there is no portion of our authors' subject which exhibits more pleasingly at once the ingenious learning of the original whom they follow, and the skill and fidelity with which they present in popular form every detail of the complicated argument upon which M. de Rossi's conclusions are founded.

The first difficulty which presents itself regarding the catacombs is the very problem of their formation. It is hard at first sight to realize how, in times of persecution such as those through which the early Christian Church in Rome struggled into existence, a small and oppressed community could have contrived to execute, under the eyes of a watchful and jealous adversary, a work so vast, so complicated, and



of its own nature so likely to create suspicion and alarm, as the network of subterranean chambers, galleries, and passages which are found encircling the entire of the ancient city, and which, in the hands of a race politically obnoxious as were the Christians, would seem by their very construction to constitute a source of danger to the State. Without stating this difficulty in explicit form, Dr. Northcote's masterly sketch of the condition of the Christian community in Rome, of the Roman laws as to burial, of the character of Roman burial-places, and of the usages of the Pagan Romans in regard to them, prepares the reader easily to understand, not only how all that we now see under our eyes might have grown up gradually during the centuries which preceded the Peace of the Church, but also how it naturally, and almost by necessity, resulted from the very circumstances and conditions under which the Christian community was living.

Perhaps the most novel part of the case is that which regards the social condition of the Christian community at Rome; and it is so interesting for its own sake that we think it right to transcribe the passage at length, as a specimen of the "easy learning" with which this admirable volume abounds:—

We are not unmindful of the Apostle's testimony relative to the Church at Corinth—viz, that "there were not amongst them many wise according to the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble;" nevertheless everything combines to show that the spread of Christianity among the higher classes, and even among the imperial families at Rome, was more extensive, from the very earliest times, than either the records of ecclesiastical history or the pious legends of the Church would have led us to expect. Indeed, it is easy to see how scanty and imperfect these are. Thus no memorial has reached us of the names or condition of those "of Caesar's household" to whom S. Paul sent a special salutation; of Flavius Clemens, the consul and relative of Domitian, we know little beyond the fact of his martyrdom; of Apollonius, the senator and martyr under Commodus, we only know that little which Eusebius has told us, writing so long after the event, and at so great a distance from the scene of it. Ancient metrical inscriptions have been found, celebrating the praises of another noble patrician, named Liberalis, holding the highest office in the State, and laying down his life for the faith, whose memory in all other respects is buried in oblivion. Other inscriptions also have been found, in more recent times, recording the burial, by their husbands, of noble Roman ladies of senatorial rank (*clarissimæ*), in the common graves of the galleries in the most ancient parts of the Roman cemeteries. It was only from the pages of a Pagan historian that we knew of the profession of Christianity, or at least of a great interest in it and partiality towards it, by Marcia, concubine of Commodus, until, in our own day, this intelligence has been confirmed and enlarged by the newly-discovered *Philosophumena*. Tertullian, again, writing at the beginning of

the third century, tells us that Septimius Severus protected Christian senators and their wives, but says nothing as to their names or number, excepting indeed that in another place he says boldly, before the whole Pagan world, that not only were the cities of the Roman empire full of Christian people, but even the senate and the palace.

One cause of the extreme scantiness of our information as to the early Christians in Rome is doubtless the destruction of all ecclesiastical records during the last terrible persecution by Diocletian ; and there was nothing in the temper or practices of Christianity to commend it as a special theme for Pagan writers. Nevertheless it was not altogether overlooked by them ; and we know, from the testimony of Eusebius, that some at least wrote about it whose histories have not reached us. Indeed it is to Pagan rather than to Christian writers that we are indebted for our knowledge of some of the most interesting and remarkable facts in the annals of the early Church. One of these it will be well for us to dwell upon at some length in this place, as the history of a catacomb depends upon it : we allude to the early conversion of some of the family of the Flavii Augusti, that is, of the family which gave Vespasian to the throne. His elder brother, Titus Flavius Sabinus, had been Prefect of the city in the year in which the Princes of the Apostles, SS. Peter and Paul, suffered martyrdom ; and it is certain, therefore, that he must have been brought into contact with them, and heard something of the Christian faith. He is described by the great historian of the empire as a man whose innocence and justice were unimpeachable ; a mild man, who had a horror of all unnecessary shedding of blood and violence. Towards the close of his life, he was accused by some of great inactivity and want of interest in public affairs ; others thought him only a man of moderation, anxious to spare the lives of his fellow-citizens ; others again spoke of his retiring habits as the natural result of the infirmities of old age. Whilst we listen to all these conjectures as to the cause of a certain change which seems to have come over him in his declining years, the question naturally occurs to us, whether it is possible that he can have had some leanings towards the Christian faith, or even been actually converted to it ? It is a question which cannot now be answered ; but at least it is certain that charges of this kind were commonly urged against Christians ; and the fact that some of his descendants in the next generation were undoubtedly of this faith, gives a certain degree of probability to the conjecture. Flavius Sabinus seems to have had four children, of whom the most conspicuous was Titus Flavius Clemens, the consul and martyr. He married the daughter of his cousin, who was sister to the Emperor Domitian, and called by the same name as her mother, Flavia Domitilla. Flavia Domitilla the younger bore her husband, the consul, two sons, who were named respectively Vespasian junior, and Domitian junior, having been intended to succeed to the throne ; and the famous Quinctilian was appointed by the Emperor himself to be their tutor. At what time their parents became Christians, and what was the history of their conversion, we do not know ; but the facts of Clement's martyrdom and Domitilla's banishment are attested by Dio Cassius (pp. 36-38).

Dr. Northcote truly observes, that had the facts which are thus obscurely but yet decisively indicated by Suetonius and Dio Cassius, that immediately after the death of the apostles, Christianity had thus made its way to the very steps of the imperial throne, been found in any Acts of Martyrs or similar record, "the pious legend would have been laughed to scorn by modern critics." Yet it is impossible to resist the inference which he draws from these facts, coupled with the further indications which we subjoin, that the number of converts from the higher and wealthier ranks to Christianity, almost from its very infancy in Rome, was far beyond what is popularly believed.

There was yet a third lady of the same noble family, bearing the same name of Flavia Domitilla, who was a granddaughter (on the mother's side) of Titus Flavius Sabinus, and consequently a niece of the consul. She, too, suffered banishment, like her aunt, and for the same cause—profession of the Christian faith. It is in speaking of this lady that Eusebius has that striking passage to which we have already referred, and which testifies so clearly to the marvellous spread of the Christian religion, even before the expiration of the first century. He has just had occasion to mention the latter part of Domitian's reign, and he says: "The teaching of our faith had by this time shone so far and wide, that even Pagan historians did not refuse to insert in their narratives some account of the persecution and the martyrdoms that were suffered in it. Some, too, have marked the time accurately, mentioning, amongst many others, in the fifteenth year of Domitian (A.D. 97), Flavia Domitilla, the daughter of a sister of Flavius Clemens, one of the Roman consuls of those days, who, for her testimony for Christ, was punished by exile to the island of Pontia." The same writer, in his "Chronicon," gives the name of one of the authors to whom he refers, and that name is Bruttius. It is worth remembering, for we shall meet it again in the cemetery of the very same S. Domitilla whose exile he had recorded. He was a friend the younger Pliny, and the grandfather of Crispina, wife of the Emperor Commodus.

It is generally supposed that there is another still more ancient notice, by a Pagan writer, of the conversion to Christianity of a Roman lady of rank, which ought not, therefore, to be altogether omitted; we mean that by Tacitus, of Pomponia Grecina, the wife of Plantius, who conquered Britain under Claudius. We read that, in the year 58, this lady was accused of having embraced the rites of "a foreign superstition;" that the matter was referred to the judgment of her husband, in the presence of a number of her relations, who pronounced her innocent; that she lived afterwards to a great age, but "in continual sadness;" no one, however, interfered with her in this matter any more, and in the end it was considered the glory of her character. It must be confessed that the language in which this history is recorded is not so precise as what we have read from Dio about the Flavii, neither has the history itself so intimate a connection with the catacombs;

nevertheless it has its point of contact with them, and the ordinary interpretation of the "foreign superstition," as having been intended for Christianity, has lately received considerable confirmation from an inscription found in the Catacomb of S. Callixtus, showing that a person of the same name and family was certainly a Christian in the next generation, and buried in that cemetery.

These glimpses at the social condition of the first Roman Christians, slight and imperfect as they are, are valuable; and when we come to study the first period in the history of the catacombs, they will be found to furnish some very interesting examples of "undesigned coincidences" (pp. 39-41).

The Roman law with regard to burial-places, which protected a spot once devoted to the purposes of burial, made it easy for a Christian possessing a certain social rank to secure permanently for himself, his family, and his poorer brethren, an area which might at least serve as the spot from which, without risk of discovery, subterranean excavations could be extended in any required direction; and M. de Rossi has ascertained by actual measurement that the crypt of S. Lucina, which now forms part of the catacomb of S. Callixtus, in which 700 *loculi* (grave-niches) are still to be seen and which must anciently have contained at least 2,000, was originally confined at the surface within an area of 100 ft. in front, and 180 in depth. Besides the *areæ* thus acquired by private individuals, the provisions of the Roman law relating to *collegia* or fraternities, associated for the due performance of funeral rites, afforded a further cover for the legal occupation of burial-places by the Christian community, for their unsuspected extension beneath the surface of the earth to any degree which might be necessary, and for their being occupied for the other religious uses of the faithful without suspicion, or at least without molestation. And, in fact, it is not till the beginning of the third century that we have any historical notice of popular violence being directed against them; and this occurs not at Rome, but at Carthage, where the outcry of the populace, "*Areæ, non sint!*" recorded by Tertullian, shows that they had at length attracted observation, and were marked out for destruction.

It would carry us quite beyond the prescribed limits to pursue the evidence by which M. de Rossi traces back the origin of the Roman catacombs to the time of the Apostles, or the immediately succeeding age. And yet this part of the subject is so peculiarly M. de Rossi's own, that we must at least transcribe Dr. Northcote's lucid summary, as well of the process of the investigation, as of the conclusions to which it has led,

The local traditions of ancient Christian Rome have come down to us, partly embodied in the Acts of the Martyrs ; partly in the stories that were told to foreigners visiting the city in the seventh and eighth centuries, and by them committed to writing in itineraries ; partly in the "Books of Indulgences" and in the "Book of the Wonders of Rome," compiled both for the use of strangers and of citizens ; partly also, but more sparingly, in the scattered notices of a few mediæval writers. From a diligent comparison of all these various authorities, it is gathered that some five or six of the subterranean cemeteries of Rome were believed to have had their origin in apostolic times ; and in every one of these instances, so far as we have an opportunity of examining them, something peculiar has been either noted by our predecessors, or seen by ourselves, which gives countenance to the tradition. When these peculiarities are brought together, they are found to be in perfect harmony, not only with one another, but also with what we should have been led to expect from a careful consideration of the period to which they are supposed to belong. The peculiarities are such as these:—paintings in the most classical style, and scarcely inferior in execution to the best specimens of cotemporary pagan art ; a system of ornamentation in fine stucco such as has not yet been found in any Christian subterranean work later than the second century ; crypts of considerable dimensions, not hewn out of the bare rock, but carefully, and even elegantly, built with pilasters and cornices of bricks or terra-cotta ; no narrow galleries with shelf-like graves thickly pierced in their walls, but spacious *ambulaera*, with painted walls, and recesses provided only for the reception of sarcophagi ; whole families of inscriptions, with classical names, and without any distinctly Christian forms of speech ; and lastly, actual dates of the first or second century. It is impossible that such a marvellous uniformity of phenomena, collected with most patient accuracy from different and distant cemeteries on all sides of the city, and from authors writing at so many different periods, should be the result of accident or of preconceived opinion. There never was any opinion preconceived on the subject ; or rather, the opinion that was in general vogue a few years ago was diametrically opposed to this. But the opinion which has now been enunciated by De Rossi, and is gaining universal acceptance among those who have an opportunity of examining the monuments for themselves, has been the result of careful observation ; it is the fruit of the phenomena, not their cause. Whereas, then, former writers have always taken it for granted that the first beginnings of *Roma Sotterranea* must have been poor, and mean, and insignificant, and that any appearance of subterranean works on a large scale, or richly decorated, must necessarily belong to a later and more peaceful age, it is now certain that this statement cannot be reconciled with the monuments and facts that modern discovery has brought to light. All who have any knowledge of the history of the fine arts are agreed that the decorations of the many remarkable crypts lately discovered are much more ancient than those which form the great bulk of the paintings in the catacombs with which we were familiar before, and which have been always justly regarded as the work of the third century. Nor can any thoughtful and impartial judge fail to recognise in the social and political condition of the first Roman Christians, and in the

laws and usages of Roman burial, an adequate cause for all that is thus thrown back on the first and second centuries (pp. 74-76).

The general account of De Rossi's investigations will best be illustrated by an example. Every visitor of the catacombs within the last dozen years has heard marvellous tales of the almost instinctive sagacity with which this enthusiastic scholar, seizing upon some faint and hitherto unsuspected indication, has pursued it with unwearied energy through a thousand difficulties, and, baffled at times, but again recovering the thread, has followed it up to results so clear and unquestionable as to command the assent of even the most sceptical. The story of the discovery of the crypt of S. Cornelius\* has often been told, and is familiar to many readers. We prefer to take that of the catacomb of S. Prætextatus on the Via Appia, nearly opposite to that of S. Callixtus. Having been accidentally opened in the year 1848, this catacomb, from a picture with the legend *Sustus*, was concluded to be the cemetery of S. Sixtus : but De Rossi, arguing from purely topographical grounds, derived from the ancient itineraries, read, in 1852, a paper in the *Accademia di Archeologia*, in which he pronounced it to be the cemetery of S. Prætextatus, the burial place of S. Januarius (the eldest of the martyr sons of S. Felicitas, A.D. 162), and of S. Felicissimus and Agapetus, deacons of S. Sixtus. In 1857 a further discovery was made of a very large and beautiful crypt, which De Rossi lost no time in visiting.

The vault of the chapel is most elaborately painted, in a style by no means inferior to the best classical productions of the age. It is divided into four bands of wreaths, one of roses, another of corn-sheaves, a third of vine-leaves and grapes (and in all these birds are introduced visiting their young in nests), and the last or highest of leaves of laurel or the bay-tree. Of course these represent severally the seasons of spring, summer, autumn, and winter. The last is a well-known figure or symbol of death ; and probably the laurel, as the token of victory, was intended to represent the new and Christian idea of the everlasting reward of a blessed immortality. Below these bands is another border, more indistinct, in which reapers are gathering in the corn ; and at the back of the arch is a rural scene, of which the central figure is the Good Shepherd carrying a sheep upon his shoulders. This, however, has been destroyed by graves pierced through the wall and the rock behind it, from that eager desire, of which we shall have occasion to speak elsewhere, to bury the dead of a later generation as near as possible to the tombs of the martyrs. As De Rossi proceeded to examine these graves in detail, he could hardly believe his eyes when he read around the edge of one

---

\* P. 117.



of them these words and fragments of words:— . . *mi Refrigeri Januarius Agatopus Felicissim martyres*—"Januarius, Agapetus, Felicissimus, martyrs, refresh the soul of . . ." The words had been scratched upon the mortar whilst yet it was fresh, fifteen centuries ago, as the prayer of some bereaved relative for the soul of him whom he was burying here; and now they revealed to the antiquarian of the nineteenth century the secret he was in quest of, viz., the place of burial of the saints whose aid is here invoked; for the numerous examples to be seen in other cemeteries warrant us in concluding that the bodies of the saints, to whose intercession the soul of the deceased is here recommended, were at the time of his burial lying at no great distance; and the reader will have observed that they are three of the very martyrs whose relics once rendered famous the cemetery of S. Pancratius. De Rossi, therefore, really needed no further evidence in corroboration of the topographical outline which he had sketched five years before to the Roman archaeologists; yet further evidence was in store for him, though it did not come to light until six years later, when the commission of Sacred Archaeology were persuaded to take this cemetery as the special scene of their labours. Then, amid the soil which encumbered the entrance to this crypt, three or four fragments were discovered of a large marble slab, marked by a few letters of most certain Damantine form, but of unusual size. More fragments have been discovered since, so that we are able to say with certainty that the whole inscription once stood thus:—

BEATISSIMOMARTYRI

IANVARIO

DAMASVSEPISCOP

FECIT

(pp. 78-80.)

Another curious, although perhaps not so plainly conclusive example of this happy sagacity, may be recorded in reference to the crypt of S. Lucina (in the catacomb of S. Callixtus, on the Via Appia), which, although called by the name of Lucina, stands beneath an area originally the property of the Gens Cæcilia. This family, as we know from Cicero, as well as from a columbarium and several inscriptions discovered in the beginning of this century, had their burial place on the Appian Road. In the chambers and galleries of this portion of the catacomb were discovered several epitaphs and other memorials bearing the names of Cæcili and Cæciliani, as well as of more than one Cæcilius Faustus, a Faustinus Atticus, Pompeia Attica, Attica Cæciliana, and other similar names. This juxtaposition of several family names seemed to point to a family in which these several families must have been united by alliance; and the further discovery of grave-stones, seen in two or otherwise defaced, and used to close the tombs, upon which were found the names of members of the Gens Pomponia (to which family, as well as to the Gens Cæcilia, by adoption, Cicero's friend Atticus belonged), as Pomponius

Bassus, Lucius Pomponius, &c., seemed to suggest yet another member of the alliance, the Pomponii. From the union of all these names on the same spot, De Rossi conjectured that the Cæcili, to whom the area belonged, and who undoubtedly were Christians, must have had close relations, and probably of affinity or kindred, with the Pomponii, Attici, and Bassi. Now it may be remembered, from a former extract, that there is reason to reckon among the very earliest converts to Christianity in Rome a lady of high rank, Pomponia Græcina, mentioned by Tacitus as having embraced a foreign superstition; and as the name *Lucina* ("illuminated") is a not uncommon Christian epithet of converts from paganism, De Rossi hazarded the suspicion, "hardly even deserving the name of a conjecture," that this "Lucina," who gave the name to the crypt, might be the very Pomponia Græcina of the narrative of Tacitus. All this he had ventured without possessing positive evidence, whether of any relationship between the Pomponii Bassi and the Pomponii Græcini, or of the profession of Christianity by either family; but recent excavations in the cemetery have actually brought to light two Christian epitaphs with the name of Pomponius Bassus, and one with that of Pomponius Græcinus. We need not say that, even with this additional circumstance, the argument is still far from demonstrative; but it will be felt that the coincidences are exceedingly curious, and that the train of investigation exhibits a rare combination of sagacity, boldness, and perseverance.

Among the remains of the cemetery of S. Callixtus—the special scene of De Rossi's explorations and successes—the most interesting and important is the Papal Crypt, so called as being the burial-place of the Popes, with a few exceptions, down to S. Melchiades. The history of its exploration, and the description of its actual condition, are full of interest; but it would be hopeless to convey in a brief notice any just idea of this, the most venerable monument of Christian antiquity, to the illustration of which De Rossi and his English expositors have devoted all the resources of their historical and antiquarian learning. We must refer to the pages of the *Roma Sotterranea* for a full account of the evidence by which the crypt was identified, and of the historical conclusions which are derived from its monuments, many of them sadly mutilated, but nevertheless still bearing unquestionable marks of authenticity. We shall only allude to the curious and interesting class of writings called *Graffiti* ("scratched" inscriptions), which are found in greater abundance in this catacomb than in any other ancient Christian cemetery. With the *Graffiti* of Pompeii, and those of the Palace of the Cæsars and other ruins at Rome,

the reader is probably sufficiently familiar; and much curious and valuable as well as amusing information as to the customs of social life in Rome has been collected from these light and trifling compositions. When the full significance of ancient Christian inscriptions shall come to be considered, after the body of extant inscriptions shall have been carefully collected and critically classified, the *Graffiti* of the catacombs and other buried Christian monuments will fill an important place. Even the slight sketch of the group which is found at the entrance and in the approaches of the Papal Crypt, although by no means framed with a view to controversy, cannot fail to make a profound impression. It is difficult to have under one's eyes the simple and unstudied addresses, displaying little care for grammar or orthography, rudely scribbled upon these venerable walls by the hand of the casual visitor long ages ago, evidently under some passing impulse of piety inspired by the solemnity and sacredness of the place, and not to feel that they indeed attest the spirit as well as the belief of those primitive times, with a firm assurance even more convincing than that which could attach to the polished epigram or the studied monumental verse. One pious brother has written, MARCIANUM SUCCESSUM SEVERUM SPIRITA \* SANCTA (Spiritus Sancti) IN MENTE HAVETE, ET OMNES FRATRES NOSTROS. (Ye holy souls, have in remembrance Marcianus Successus Severus and all our brethren.) Another implores the same "holy souls" to pray for "a safe and successful voyage for Verecundus and his friends": PETITE SPIRITA SANCTA UT VERECUNDUS CUM SUIS BENE NAVIGET. A third, specially addressing the martyr Pope S. Sixtus II., who enjoys a peculiar pre-eminence in this catacomb, entreats him to "remember Aurelius Repentinus in his prayers": SANTE SUSTE IN MENTE HABEAS IN HORATIONES AURELIUM REPENTINUM. And a visitor of Greek race has left a similar memorial in his native language, equally at variance with grammar rule, but attesting with equal clearness the belief upon which the rest are founded, beseeching the martyrs to "have Dionysius in remembrance": ΔΙΟΝΥΣΙΟΝ ΕΙΣ ΜΝΙΑΝ [μνηται] ΕΧΕΤΑΙ [ἐχέει]. Few, we think, will fail to recognize the justice of Dr. Northcote's graceful commentary:—

There is a simplicity and a warmth of affection about these brief petitions, which savours of the earliest ages; they are very different from the dry and ver-

---

\* The form *spiritum* for *spiritus* is frequently used in the epitaphs of the third century for the soul or spirit of a man.—*Inscriptiones Christianae*, I. cxli.

bose epitaphs of the fourth or fifth centuries; indeed, there is something almost classical about the third, reminding us, says De Rossi, of Horace's *Otium Divos rogat in patenti prensus Ægeæ*; and the phrase, which is so frequently repeated in them, *in mente habere*, points to the same antiquity. It is found on an inscription in Pompeii, on two Christian epitaphs of the third and fourth centuries, and is used by S. Cyprian in one of his letters: "Have in mind," he says, "our brothers and sisters in your prayers;" *fratres nostros ac sorores in mente habeatis in orationibus vestris*. These nameless pilgrims made the same petition to the saints in heaven that S. Cyprian made to the saints on earth, and perhaps about the same time, or not much later. For it is to be observed that many of these *Graffiti* have been spoilt, cut off in the middle, or rendered otherwise illegible, by the enlargement of the doorway, the renewal of the stucco, and other changes which were made in this chapel by S. Fabian, perhaps about the year 245, or S. Damasus in 370. One of those that has been thus mutilated is undoubtedly the most ancient of all, for it was written whilst yet the plaster was wet, and it is an apostrophe to one Pontianus, whom De Rossi believes to have been the Pope of this name, brought back from Sardinia, where he had died in exile, and buried in this very chapel by S. Fabian.

There is yet one other inscription on the entrance of the first chapel, of a somewhat different kind, but too remarkable to be passed over. Unhappily the writer never finished it; but what he did write is easily legible, and abundantly sufficient to show the enthusiastic devotion with which his heart was warmed towards the sanctuary on whose threshold he stood. It runs thus: *Gerusalem civitas et ornamentum Martyrum Domini, cujus . . .* The idea present to the writer's mind was evidently the same as we find both in Holy Scripture and in some of the earliest uninspired Christian writers, who not unfrequently speak of the glory of the Church triumphant under the title of the Holy City, the New Jerusalem. He looked upon the chapel he was about to enter as a type or figure of the future Jerusalem. It was adorned and made venerable by the remains of many martyrs of the Lord, which should one day arise to receive new life and rejoice in his presence for ever (pp. 132-134).

The Art of the catacombs is a subject in many respects even more important than that of their origin and history, although both are closely interwoven, and each borrows much light from the other. The fourth book is entirely devoted to Christian art. The details of this most charming subject are quite too large for our space; and we can only refer briefly to those general considerations which have an important bearing upon it, whether in relation to the history of the time or to the doctrinal and disciplinary system out of which the art of the catacombs originated, or to which it bears its testimony.

The most important question connected with the artistic monuments of the catacombs, whether pictorial or sculptured, is that as to their age. Upon this question, next to that of

the age of the catacombs themselves, must turn especially all considerations regarding their authority as witnesses to dogmatical teaching. In the older post-reformation controversies on the subject of image-worship, it was quietly assumed upon one side and admitted on the other, that during the ages anterior to the Peace of the Church, pictorial representations of sacred things and destined for sacred use were entirely unknown; and their supposed absence from Christian use was urged on the Protestant side as an argument of their incompatibility with the system of the new "worship in spirit and truth," and on the Catholic side was explained away, as a necessary precaution of the infant Church, against those lingering idolatrous tendencies of the converts, which might easily be revived by the use of sensible symbols, even those of a purer religion. The discovery of the catacombs and of the pictorial representations with which their sanctuaries abound, ought, it might seem, to have set this question at rest for ever. But it was not so. Partly from the limited publicity which the discoveries of Bosio obtained, partly from the uncritical method pursued by the controversialists, but most of all from the settled prepossession of the public mind, the opposite view—the theory of the sixteenth century—remained, it may almost be said, practically undisturbed down to our own time. Even after the renewed exploration of the catacombs by Padre Marchi and the later archæologists, the old belief so far maintained its ground, that the pictorial remains, whose existence could no longer be ignored or denied, were obstinately maintained to be of mediæval origin, or at least of a date not older than the end of the fourth century.

Probably the most important service, in a polemical sense, which De Rossi has rendered to the Church, is his profound and masterly treatment of this question upon grounds of severe and rigorous criticism: and we cannot conceal our admiration of the skill and fidelity with which Mr. Brownlow has compressed into the space of a few chapters, everything of importance which has been elicited in the progress of the discussion.

It is no longer doubted by any art-critic of name, that some at least of the paintings of the catacombs belong to the days of the Apostles or the age immediately succeeding. Welcker, on seeing the paintings in the crypt of S. Lucina, unhesitatingly attributed them to the first century.\* Le Normant pronounced those of S. Domitilla to be identical in style with

---

\* De Rossi, *Roma Sotterranea*, Tom. i. p. 322.

those in the tomb of Caius Sextius which was erected B.C. 32. Kugler declares that they "approach very near to the wall-paintings of the best period of the empire," and that "the light arabesques remind us of the paintings at Pompeii and in the baths of Titus." We are satisfied that no visitor of the catacombs, fresh from the sight of the Pompeian frescoes, whether those in the Museum at Naples, or those which are still preserved *in situ* upon the walls, will hesitate to confirm this criticism; and the more correct and characteristic engravings of later artists, and still more the photographic reproductions which are beginning to make the subject popular, will bring home to every unbiassed mind with the certainty of conviction, the justice of the conclusions of De Rossi, who sets down some of the paintings (as those in the crypts of S. Lucina, in the cemetery of S. Domitilla and elsewhere), as of the first or the earliest part of the second century; others as belonging to the middle and end of the second, and others at latest to the third. Even Mr. Burgon, with all his reluctance to make any admission favourable to Catholic doctrine, equivalently acquiesces in this judgment as to the age of these pictorial decorations; and explains away its bearing upon the doctrinal questions, by alleging that "the early Christians ornamented their cemeteries, not because it was congenial to Christianity so to illustrate the Faith, but because it was the heathen custom so to honour the dead."\*

Indeed, it was in the very necessity of the case that this similarity to the contemporary Pagan Art arose. Christian Art was not born full-grown. It was forced for a time to appear in the garb and to some extent in the proportions of the Pagan Art of the age. It is well observed by our authors that it was no more in the power of the early Christians to invent a new imitative language in painting than it was to produce at once a new idiom of Greek or Latin; and happily this very necessity of employing the imitative pictorial language of Pagan Rome in the first or second century, which is familiar to critics from Pagan remains of these ages of unquestionable authenticity, has proved in the hands of skilful comparative critics the means of establishing beyond question the synchronism of the analagous Christian monuments. The order of events in this curious progress from adaptation to independent invention in Christian Art is admirably described in the *Roma Sotterranea*, following in all substantial particulars the more elaborate view of De Rossi:—

---

\* Letters from Rome, p. 250.



In its first beginnings, it was intent only on creating or selecting certain necessary types or figures that might stand for the religious truths it desired to represent. It did not concern itself to make a complete provision of appropriate accessory ornaments of its own, but borrowed these without scruple from the works of the Pagan school, from the midst of which it was springing forth. The principal figure in the composition, some biblical or, at least, symbolical subject, gave the religious and Christian character to the whole. The *entourage* was then completed by an abundance of merely decorative figures, freely imitated from the types of classical Roman art, such as birds, garlands, vases of fruits or flowers, fantastic heads, winged genii, personifications of the seasons, &c., and this is the leading characteristic of the first age of Christian painting. By and by the cycle of symbolical types grew more rich and complicated by the addition of the mystical interpretation of biblical stories, and was used with great skill and freedom under the direction, it would appear, of learned theological guides. By the end of the third century, this cycle had received a fixed traditional form, and was constantly reiterated. It had become, as it were, consecrated, and Christian art was almost hieratic in its character, as in ancient Egypt or modern Greece, so fixed and immovable were its types, "always like one another, and always unlike nature." But the biblical histories had now almost superseded the use of symbols. These had already begun to decline from the middle of the third century, when the formularies of Christian epigraphy were gradually developing; and in the next century, one might almost say that they disappeared altogether. Towards the end of the fourth or beginning of the fifth century, the radical revolution which the conversion of Constantine had effected in the social and political position of Christians had set an equally distinct mark upon Christian art. The age of symbolism has passed away. Scenes from real life are now introduced. Even the details of bloody martyrdoms are painted on the tombs or the walls of churches; and the liberty and publicity of Christian worship in the basilicas finds a pleasure in the contrast, suggested by these harrowing representations (pp. 196, 197).

We wish that space would permit us to follow out the curiously elaborate but yet intelligible rules, by which M. de Rossi, failing the aid of inscriptions and other direct chronological aids, determines the age of the several pictorial styles—the absence of the *nimbus*, the use of letters upon the garments, the Christian monogram, and above all the character and style of treatment. All this is full of the deepest interest, not merely for its doctrinal bearing, but also in its relation to the history of Christian Art. We shall best illustrate the method by showing it in its application to a particular picture—one of the several representations of the Blessed Virgin Mary, of which, notwithstanding the long unquestioned prevalence of the opposite belief, a considerable number (according to De Rossi upwards of twenty), exist in the catacombs. A very careful and beautifully-finished chromolithograph of this pic-

ture will be found among the illustrations of the *Roma Sotterranea*.\* For this picture of our Blessed Lady De Rossi claims the very highest antiquity :—

He unhesitatingly says that he believes this to belong almost to the apostolic age. It is to be seen on the vaulted roof of a *loculus* in the cemetery of S. Priscilla, and represents the Blessed Virgin seated, her head partially covered by a short light veil, and with the Holy Child in her arms ; opposite to her stands a man, clothed in the pallium, holding a volume in one hand, and with the other pointing to a star which appears above and between the two figures. This star almost always accompanies our Blessed Lady, both in paintings and in sculptures, where there is an obvious historical excuse for it, *e.g.*, when she is represented with the Magi offering their gifts (Plate X. 2), or by the side of the manger with the ox and the ass ; but with a single figure, as in the present instance, it is unusual. There has been some difference of opinion, therefore, among archaeologists as to the interpretation that ought to be given of this figure. The most obvious conjecture would be that it was meant for S. Joseph, or for one of the Magi. De Rossi, however, gives many reasons for preferring the prophet Isaias, whose prophecies concerning the Messiah abound with imagery borrowed from light. This prophet is found on one of the glasses in the catacombs, standing in a similar attitude before our Blessed Lord, where his identity can hardly be disputed, since he appears in another compartment of the same glass in the act of being sawn asunder by the Jews (in accordance with the tradition mentioned by S. Jerome) ; and our Blessed Lady, as an *orante*, occupies the intervening compartment between these two figures of the prophet. Bosio has preserved to us another fresco from the cemetery of S. Callistus, still more closely resembling that upon which we are commenting from S. Priscilla ; only there is no star, but in its stead the battlements, as of some town, appear behind the Woman and Child, by which it was probably intended to denote the town of Bethlehem, as was so commonly done in the sculptures, mosaics, and other works of later art. We have already said that De Rossi considers this painting, with which we are now concerned, to have been executed, if not in apostolic times, and, as it were, under the very eyes of the Apostles themselves, yet certainly within the first hundred and fifty years of the Christian era. He first bids us carefully to study the art displayed in the design and execution of the painting, and then to compare it with the decorations of the famous Pagan tombs discovered on the Via Latina in 1858, and which are unanimously referred to the times of the Antonines, or with the paintings of the *cubicula* near the Papal crypt in San Callisto, described in our next chapter, and known to belong to the very beginning of the third century ; and he justly argues that the more classical style of the painting now under examination *oblige*s us to assign to it a still earlier date. Next, he shows that the catacomb in which it appears was one of the oldest, S. Priscilla, from whom it receives its name, having been the mother of Pudens, and a cotemporary of the

---

\* Plate x. 1.

Apostles ; and, still further, that there is good reason for believing what Bosio and others have said, that the tombs of SS. Pudentiana and Praxedes, and therefore probably of their father, S. Pudens himself, were in the immediate neighbourhood of the chapel in which this Madonna is found ; finally, that the inscriptions which are found there form a class by themselves, bearing manifest tokens of the highest antiquity (pp. 258-259).

In the *Roma Sotterranea* the paintings of the catacombs are treated under six classes—symbolical paintings, or those representing religious ideas under pictorial emblems ; allegorical paintings, chiefly exhibiting the allegories of the Gospel ; paintings representing biblical scenes or incidents, pictures of our Lord, of His Blessed Mother and the saints, legendary paintings, and liturgical paintings. We cannot speak too highly of the advantages of this division of the subject, and we only regret our inability to bring it under the reader's own notice by even a few specimens. It collects at once under the student's eye almost every important characteristic of the art of the catacombs, gathered with infinite pains from the elaborate descriptions of the individual monuments of the various catacombs, which, in De Rossi's volumes, are only to be found by pursuing them in detail according to the complicated order of their topographical distribution ; and we venture to promise that, in the few pregnant chapters into which these classes have been compressed, will be found almost everything of real importance bearing upon this interesting branch of Christian archaeology. The exposition of the true principles of early Christian symbolism, of the Christian use of symbols primitively pagan, of the rules for their interpretation, and of the light which may be thrown upon them by the judicious use of historical associations and allusions in the writings of the fathers or other contemporary authorities, is a masterpiece of sound scholarship and judicious criticism ; and the detailed treatment of particular symbols, as well the purely Christian symbols—the Anchor, the Dove, and the Fish, especially in its curious combination with the Eucharist,—as the adaptations from paganism of Orpheus and the *Syrinx* of Pan, is in the highest degree interesting and attractive. Indeed, the book can hardly fail to make its way with almost every class of readers. The chapters on the allegorical and biblical paintings of the catacombs—on the Good Shepherd, the Ark, Moses, Jonas, Daniel, and the Hebrew youths will supply to the art student a valuable supplement to the information on the more modern treatment of the same class of subjects in the popular treatises on Christian Art ; and the controversial reader will find much that is novel in the treatment

of the liturgical subjects, and those connected with the Blessed Virgin and the saints. We can only make room for a single example of the manner in which this class of subjects is treated:—

Another pair of subjects which seem in like manner to be studiously brought together from the two Testaments, are Moses striking the rock and the resurrection of Lazarus. Sometimes they are found in the same compartment of a painting; sometimes roughly sketched side by side on a gravestone; still more frequently they are together on a sarcophagus. Some antiquarians consider the point of connection between them to be the display of Divine power in bringing living water out of a dry rock, and a dead man to life out of his rocky grave; but this analogy hardly seems to be sufficiently close: any other of the miracles of our Blessed Lord might have been selected with almost equal propriety. Others, therefore, prefer to look upon these two subjects as intended to represent the beginning and the end of the Christian course; "the fountain of water springing up unto life everlasting"; God's grace and the gift of faith being typified by the water flowing from the rock, "which was Christ," and life everlasting by the victory over death and the second life vouchsafed to Lazarus. And this interpretation seems both more probable in itself and is more confirmed by ancient authority; since Tertullian distinctly identifies the water which flowed from the rock with the waters of Baptism, which is the beginning of the Christian life, as a resurrection is unquestionably the end. S. Cyprian also agrees with Tertullian, saying that it was foretold that if the Jews would thirst and seek after Christ, they should drink with us Christians, *i.e.* should obtain the grace of Baptism. "If they should thirst in the desert," says Isaias (xlviii. 21), "He will lead them out: He will bring forth water out of the rock for them, and cleave the rock, and my people shall drink." "And this was fulfilled in the gospels" (he continues) "when Christ, who is the rock, is cleft with the stroke of the lance in His Passion; Who, reminding them of what had been foretold by the prophet, cried aloud and said, 'If any man thirst, let him come and drink; he that believeth in me, as the Scripture saith, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water.' And that it might be made still more clear that the Lord spoke here about Baptism, the Evangelist has added, 'Now this He said of the Spirit, which they should receive who believed in Him;' for the Holy Spirit is received by Baptism."

Moses may sometimes also be seen in the act of taking off his shoes before approaching the burning bush; and this is treated by some of the Fathers as emblematical of those renunciations of the world, the flesh, and the devil, which all the faithful have made in Baptism; or it might typify that reverence which is required of all who approach the Christian mysteries.

In one instance, in a fresco of the cemetery of S. Calixtus, we find these two scenes in the life of Moses represented close together, almost as parts of the same picture; but the figure of Moses in the two scenes is manifestly different. In the first, where he takes off his shoes, having been called by the hand of God coming out of a cloud to go up into Mount Sinai to receive the law, he is young and without a beard; in the second, where he strikes the rock,

and the thirsty Jew is drinking, he is older and bearded; and both the general look of his hair and beard, and the outline of his features, seem to present a certain marked resemblance to the traditional figure of S. Peter (pp. 247, 248).

In connection with the liturgical subjects, we had hoped to give some account of the excellent chapter on the Gilded Glasses of the Catacombs, which contains a valuable summary of all that is best in Padre Garrucci's classical works upon the subject. But for this, as well as for the chapter on Christian Sarcophagi, we must be content with referring to the text of the *Roma Sotterranea*. We regret this, particularly in the latter case, as it is only in this portion of the book that the important subject of early Christian sculpture is even incidentally discussed.

We take leave of this most attractive volume, however, with the less regret, because we trust that we shall have occasion before long to meet its authors once again in the same field. We began by expressing our belief that the time has only recently arrived in which it has become possible to discuss satisfactorily the many important questions of doctrine, discipline, and liturgy, which lend to the study of Christian archæology its gravest and most solemn interest. If we have now approached such a point in archæological knowledge, it is not too much to say, in bringing our observations to a close, that this has been effected mainly through the unexampled energy, perseverance, and calmly critical scholarship of Commendatore De Rossi. The rare degree in which he possesses these qualities is attested by his contributions to the study of Christian epigraphy and archæology; and the authors of the *Roma Sotterranea* might well be content even if they could claim for themselves no higher merit than that of bringing before English readers in a popular form the main results of the researches which these works record. In doing this, they have scrupulously adhered to the method of their original. Their book is purely historical and critical; the conclusions which it has established may henceforth be used as the starting-point for those more important doctrinal discussions which these conclusions will inevitably suggest to the mind of every inquirer; and we confidently anticipate for the volume on Christian Epigraphy which they promise, as a sequel of *Roma Sotterranea*, and for which De Rossi's chronological collection of inscriptions has laid a sure and solid basis, a still more complete and ready acceptance. From the Catholic, fresh from the pleasing impression which the present volume

will have left, the Christian Epigraphy will receive a cordial and admiring welcome; and even those readers of the *Roma Sotterranea*, who sympathize least with its doctrinal views, will find it impossible to refuse its sequel an impartial study, if not a calm and respectful appreciation.

---

#### ART. VIII.—EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT THOUGHT.

*La Philosophie Scolastique exposée et défendue.* Par le R. P. KLEUTGEN.  
Paris : Gaume. 1869.

*Sermons preached before the University of Oxford.* By JOHN HENRY  
NEWMAN, B.D., Fellow of Oriel College. London : Rivingtons.  
1843.

THOSE who have studied the elaborate arguments drawn out in Catholic philosophical works to prove the Existence of God, may not unfrequently perhaps have been perplexed by the following difficulty. No one of course can know certainly that God exists, except on grounds of reason; and no one can make any act of *faith*, until he knows for certain that God exists. It is necessary then for all men without exception who would be saved—and not merely for philosophers—to know certainly God's Existence on grounds of reason. Yet to the enormous majority of mankind, such grounds of reason seem on the surface inaccessible. It would be very ludicrous child's play, that some given labourer, or farmer, or tradesman, or even hunting country gentleman, should explore such arguments for God's Existence as are found in Catholic philosophical works: especially if you suppose him to explore them on the principle of judging, for himself and by the perspicacity of his own intellect, how far they can be vindicated against the objections of Mill, of Huxley, or of Comte.

Such is the difficulty which must have occurred to many. And considering its obviousness and plausibility, we have always been a good deal surprised that it has not received more express treatment. But F. Kleutgen, in his great philosophical work, has handled the whole subject with such surpassing power, that instead of needing any apology, we shall on the contrary obtain our readers' gratitude, for placing before them a very long extract from this illustrious writer.



We italicise a few sentences, to which we invite especial attention.

In many places Scripture declares in the most express manner, that even for those to whom God has not manifested Himself by His prophets or by His Son, there exists a revelation of God in His works, and even within the mind of man, whereby *they can without any difficulty cognize God* their Creator and Maker, as well as His sovereign Law. It is not necessary to point out that Scripture does not in this speak of *any* [supposable] first cause ; but of the Living and True God, Who has created heaven and earth, and inscribed His law in the heart of man : and that consequently it speaks also of the moral order. Now it says in the same passages, that men who do not thus cognize their God are without excuse ; that they are insensate ; that they deserve God's wrath and all His chastisements. It necessarily follows then, that this manifestation of God by His works is such that man cannot fail by this means to cognize God with certitude, unless he commit a grave fault . . . . .

Assuredly this does not mean that it is *philosophical researches*, continued laboriously through obstacles and doubts, which can alone lead to knowledge of God. *Very few men in fact are capable of these laborious researches* : whereas Scripture speaks of all the heathens in general ; and in the Book of Wisdom it is said expressly (xiii. 1), "all men are vanity who do not possess the knowledge of God." The sacred writer even adds that this knowledge, to which he gives the name of "sight" to express *its clearness and certitude* ["*cognoscibiliter poterit Creator horum videri*," v. 5], can be obtained *with as much ease (and even more) as knowledge of this world* : which certainly does not fail any one capable of the least reflection. ["*Si tantum potuerunt scire ut possent æstimare sæculum, quomodo hujus Dominum non facilius inveniunt ?*", v. 9] . . . . *It is easier therefore to know God the Governor of the world, than to know enough of nature to admire its power and its beauty.*

It necessarily follows therefore, that *there is a knowledge of God different from philosophical knowledge* ; a knowledge so easy to acquire and so certain, that ignorance and doubt on that head cannot be explained, except either by *culpable carelessness or proud obstinacy*. Such is also . . . the common doctrine of the Holy Fathers. *They distinguished that knowledge of God which is obtained by philosophical research from that which springs up spontaneously in every man at the very sight of creation.* This latter kind of knowledge is called by them "a witness of Himself," which God gave to the soul at its creation ; "an endowment of nature" ; "an infused knowledge," *inherent in every man without preliminary instruction* ; a knowledge which springs up in some sense of itself in proportion as reason is developed ; and which cannot fail, except in a man either deprived of the use of reason or else given up to vices which have corrupted his nature. And when the Fathers of the Church declare unanimously on this head that this knowledge is really found and established in all men, the importance of their testimony is better understood by remembering that they lived in the midst of heathen populations.

God has implanted in our reasonable nature everything which is necessary,

that we may know Him, and know Him with facility.\* Now He does not [after creation] withdraw Himself from creatures, but always remains near them, co-operating with them, exciting them to act, supporting and directing each one to its end conformably to its nature. If this is true of all creatures, *how could this concurrence be refused* to the most noble of all creatures, to those whom God has created *for the very purpose of their knowing and loving Him?* Man indeed does not arrive at his end, except by using the powers which God has given him; but the Author of those gifts lends to man his concurrence, in order that he may make due use of them. Since that moral and religious life *for which man was created* is founded on a knowledge of the truths whereof we speak, God *watches over man*, in order that reason, as it is developed, may come to know them with facility and certainty. Observe the question here is not of supernatural grace, but is [of the natural order]. . . .

What would not be the misery of man [if there were no reasonable certainty without philosophical argument]? It is easy to show those [ordinary] men who are capable of any reflection at all, that their knowledge of the truth *is not scientific*; that they do not deduce it [consciously and explicitly] from the first principles of thought, and consequently *they cannot defend it against the attacks of scepticism*. If then as soon as we come to know that our knowledge *is not scientific*, the conviction of its truth were at once shaken, what on that supposition would be the lot of man? . . .

The fact is indeed not so: that consciousness which every one can interrogate within himself attests its denial; and at every period the voice of mankind has confirmed that denial. As soon as we arrive at the use of reason, *the voice of conscience awakes within us*.† Whether we choose or no, *we must cognize the distinction between good and evil*. [Again] just as it is absolutely impossible for us to doubt our own existence, [in like manner] we are absolutely compelled to regard as real the external world; [to hold] that, further, there exists a Supreme Author of our being and of all other things; and that through Him there is a certain moral order.‡ These also are truths which we cannot refuse to admit. No doubt we can do violence to ourselves in order to produce in ourselves the contrary persuasion, just as we may use efforts to regard the moral conscience itself as an illusion. But *these efforts never succeed*, or, at least, never succeed perfectly; and we feel ourselves even under an obligation of *condemning the very attempt as immoral*. The

---

\* F. Kleutgen quotes from an opusculum of S. Thomas: "*Dei cognitio nobis innata dicitur esse, in quantum per principia nobis innata de facili percipere possumus Deum esse.*"

† It is observable that here, and still more strongly in a later passage, F. Kleutgen uses the word "conscience," not as moral theologians speak of "conscientia," but to express man's natural power or faculty of knowing right and wrong.

‡ F. Kleutgen has spoken immediately before, and also speaks immediately afterwards, of "the moral conscience," the "distinction between right and wrong," as covering a *distinct* ground from this. By the present phrase then, "a moral order," he plainly intends to express God's moral government of the world.

mind of man, in fact, is *under the influence of truth which has dominion over it*, and which gives [man] certainty *even against his own wish*. Truth manifests itself to our intelligence, and engenders therein the knowledge of its reality, *even before we [explicitly] know what that truth is*. Still truth [I say] reigns over man and reveals itself to him, *however great may be his resistance as a sacred and sovereign authority which commands him and summons him before its tribunal*. And [standing] before that tribunal, he is obliged to admit the immorality of even attempting to doubt. Just as he is bound to condemn the madness, I will not say of doubting, but of trying to doubt, the reality of the external world, *so he is obliged to regard as an impiety [all] doubt in God's Existence and Providence*. . . .

Nor can it be here objected that conscience (in the proper sense of that word, moral conscience) gives us no certainty so long as its existence within us and its pronouncements are purely spontaneous. Of the conscience, more than of anything else (surtout), it may be said that *it reveals to us its own truth*; that it compels us to acknowledge *an absolute good and a sovereign rule over our wills and actions* (even though we know not its innermost nature), not only as really existing, but as *an august and sacred power which is [in authority] over us*. Whatever efforts man may make to overthrow and destroy his own intimate persuasion on the truthfulness of conscience, he will never succeed in doing so. Even though he seek by every possible means to persuade himself that nothing obliges him to regard it as truthful, nevertheless he will always feel himself compelled to acknowledge its authority, and even to condemn his own resistance to it.

It is true indeed that, though conscience *often* speaks against a man's inclinations [so loudly] as to confound (by its manifestation of its own truthfulness) all pride and all the sophistical dreams by which he might wish to stifle it,—it does not *always* so speak and raise its voice as to take from man *the power of turning from it* and refusing to listen. If he enters into himself and chooses to observe what passes within him, he will obtain that reflex knowledge which, as we said above, is required for actual certainty; he will know that he cannot prevent himself from acknowledging the truth of what the voice of conscience dictates. But it is in his power, *if not always* at least often, to abstain from entering into himself and lending his ear to that voice. He has [often] the power of not hearing it, or of giving it so little attention that he withdraws himself from that influence which would make him certain. It is in this manner that, *for a certain time at least*, notwithstanding the habitual certainty\* which nature gives him, he may remain undecided on the truthfulness of conscience, supposing that he has not yet acknowledged that truthfulness by philosophical reflection, or again that he does not seek to know it. But even though we were not able to demonstrate by the intimate experience of every man that the doubt whereof we speak is contrary to the principles of morality, we ought nevertheless to be persuaded of that truth by the judgment of all mankind.

---

\* By "habitual certainty," as he has explained just before, F. Kleutgen means to express the *proximate power* of actual certainty.

Among civilized nations in every time the necessity of philosophical studies has been admitted, and those have been held in high esteem who devoted themselves thereto, and who were regarded as sages. Nevertheless, though the nations (it is true) accepted at the hands of philosophers the solution of many questions, they have never ascribed to these men a decisive judgment on all truth without exception. As to those first truths on which all our convictions rest, *humanity bears within itself the consciousness or intimate persuasion of knowing them with certainty.* Philosophers may make these truths the subject of their speculations; but they are not allowed the right of pronouncing a definitive judgment on these truths: and if their researches lead them to deny or doubt them, those very persons who would otherwise be the disciples of these philosophers, rise up against them as judges and condemn them. Was there ever a nation which did not regard it as madness to doubt an external world? a nation which did not hold in horror a man so perverted as to acknowledge no truth superior to the senses, and reject all distinction between virtue and vice? Has not atheism among all nations been accounted a crime? And by the very fact of seeing *culpability* in denial of these truths, does not the world declare that they cannot possibly be unknown to men of good will? (Phil. Schol., nos. 226, 227, 228, 229, 231, 232.)

Now, in order to appreciate F. Kleutgen's meaning in this singularly impressive passage, it must be remembered that he consistently and peremptorily refuses to credit the human intellect with any direct and *immediate* knowledge of God. According to F. Kleutgen—indeed, according to all orthodox Catholics—God is known to man only through His works; only through creatures. The doctrine then, which F. Kleutgen lays down in the preceding passage, is to some extent represented by the two following theses.

Thesis I. A most real process of reasoning is constantly going on in the minds of men, quite distinct from any process of *philosophical* reasoning or *arguing*; and of a kind by no means available in *confutation of an opponent*. God watches with special care over mankind in their use of those intellectual faculties which He has given them, so as to assist them in arriving at the truth. Especially is this the case, as regards their arriving at a true knowledge of Himself. He created them for the very purpose that they should know and love Him. He therefore uniformly provides—except indeed where man's grave culpability interposes an obstacle to His gracious operations—that they shall be led from those true premisses which legitimately establish His Existence, to the true conclusion itself, that He does exist.

Thesis II. Among the premisses available to all mankind, which legitimately establish His existence, two in particular may be mentioned. The first, and far the most important, is

that moral voice within man's breast, which is ever testifying the necessary and eternal distinction between right and wrong, and which is ever summoning him to a virtuous life. This voice suffices by itself to prove with absolute certainty, that there exists a certain necessary Supreme Rule of morality which obliges all reasonable beings, whatever that Rule may precisely be. But there is a second premiss, or rather combination of premisses, also available for all mankind, which conspires with the former in leading them to a knowledge of God. For this visible world is within their immediate cognizance; the principle of causation is accepted by them as axiomatic; and the inference is obvious and ready, to the Great First Cause.

As to this last-named inference from the visible world, F. Kleutgen rather incidentally alludes to it than directly expresses it. And though he would doubtless say that there are various other premisses also which bear their part in the great process of conviction, we do not observe that he has expressly referred to any others. At all events, it is to the moral voice that he again and again recurs, as to the one immoveable foundation of Theism. In this respect many readers of F. Newman will be almost startled, by the singular resemblance to be found between these two great thinkers, whose philosophical history has been so entirely different. As an instance out of many which might be adduced, read F. Newman's "Occasional Sermons," from p. 84 to p. 87, and observe his profound agreement with what we have cited from F. Kleutgen.

Both these theses are of extreme importance; and it is perhaps almost difficult to know which is of the greater. Our present concern however will be exclusively with the first; and on this first thesis indeed, there is a more startling resemblance between FF. Kleutgen and Newman, than even on the second. The latter half of that volume of F. Newman's which we have named at the head of this article, is occupied with a series of essays on the relation between faith and reason. These essays contain undoubtedly one or two incidental remarks, which F. Newman would not make now that he is a Catholic; and from which indeed he has carefully refrained since his conversion, when engaged on kindred topics. But F. Newman's fundamental thought is identical with F. Kleutgen's first thesis; and is expressed indeed in the very title of one essay, "Explicit and Implicit Reason." To exhibit this thought in its full light and its general bearing, would occupy at the very least a large volume: let us hope that either F. Kleutgen or F. Newman may hereafter be in-

duced so to exhibit it ! Our present purpose is hardly more than the very elementary one, of placing the truth before our readers in its simplest aspect, with the hope that Catholic philosophical thinkers may bear it in mind and ponder on its importance.

To reason, is nothing else than to be led, by means of certain premisses which one knows, to a certain conclusion which legitimately follows from those premisses. Now it is plain, from obvious and every-day instances, that great multitudes thus reason and with great accuracy, who never reflect on their premisses or put them into shape; and who would in fact cut a very poor figure, if ever they attempted such a task.

Let a person only call to mind the clear impression he has about matters of every day's occurrence, that this man is bent on a certain object, or that that man was displeased, or another suspicious; or that one is happy, and another unhappy; and how much depends in such impressions on manner, voice, accent, words uttered, silence instead of words, and all the many subtle symptoms which are felt by the mind, but cannot be contemplated; and let him consider how very poor an account he gives of his impression, if he avows it, and is called upon to justify it (Newman, pp. 270, 271).

Take some particular case. I am intimately acquainted with a certain relative: and some fine morning I have not been with him more than five minutes, before I am perfectly convinced, and on most conclusive grounds, that (for whatever reason) he is out of sorts with me. It is little to say that I could not so analyze my grounds of conviction, as to make *another* see the force of my reasoning; I could not so analyze them, as that their exhibition shall be in the slightest degree satisfactory to *myself*. Especially in proportion as I am less philosophical and less clever in psychological analysis, all attempts at exhibiting my premisses in due form hopelessly break down. Yet none the less it remains true, both that my premisses are known to me with certainty, and that my conclusion follows from them irresistibly. There is an enormous number of past instances, in which these symptoms *have* co-existed with ill-humour; there is no single known case in which they have existed *without* it; they all admit of being referred to ill-humour as effects to their cause; they are so heterogeneous, that any other cause except ill-humour which shall account for them all is quite incredible, while it is no less incredible that they co-exist fortuitously; &c. &c. &c. Why, in all probability the very Newtonian theory of gravitation does not rest on firmer and more irrefragable grounds. Yet to *analyze* all this or any part of it—to explain what is



the peculiar character of these symptoms,—in what they precisely differ from others which superficially resemble them—*how* they are referrible to ill-humour as to a cause—or *why* it is incredible that they should co-exist fortuitously—to express all this, is utterly beyond the power of men who are not greatly versed in philosophy, and indeed of many who *are* so versed.

Another illustration :—

Consider the preternatural sagacity with which a great general knows what his friends and enemies are about, and what will be the final result, and where, of their combined movements,—and then say whether, if he were required to argue the matter in word or on paper, all his most brilliant conjectures might not be refuted, and all his producible reasons exposed as illogical (p. 210).

The *reasoning* on such matters of a really great general, would be almost infallible; while his *arguments* might be below contempt.

The whole matter is so important, that it is worth while to repeat illustrations even at the risk of wearying our readers. Take another case, then. A sharp-sighted and experienced seaman will tell you with the greatest confidence some fine evening, that there will be a violent storm before morning. It is often the case that the premisses on which he rests this conclusion are amply sufficient to bear it out; that his reasoning is absolutely faultless; that nothing short of a miracle can falsify his prediction. But ask him to argue the matter, to tell you what are the precise phenomena on which he builds, to express accurately his reason for thinking that such phenomena denote the imminence of a storm, he will be nowhere.

Then again there is a well-known story of the advice given by a sagacious judge, to magistrates possessing shrewd common sense, but an unpractised intellect. "Give your decisions confidently," he said, "but state no argument. Ten to one your decisions will be right, but a hundred to one your argument will be wrong." He did not mean, of course, that they would arrive at right decisions by guesswork or by inspiration. He meant that their reasoning would probably be sound, but their arguments almost certainly fallacious.

Once more. A singularly conscientious and upright man has a large family of sons, with whom he has lived from the first in habits of most familiar and affectionate intercourse. Hardly one of their convictions can be named which is so demonstratively established, which rests on reasoning so absolutely irresistible, as their conviction of his uprightness and conscientiousness. Though they were the best astronomers in Europe, it would not be one whit more absurd and irra-

tional that they should reject Kepler's laws, than that they should doubt their father's integrity of character. Yet, though first-rate astronomers, they may be very poor psychologists, and may be baffled in every attempt to draw out in shape their grounds for this latter conclusion. Those grounds are in fact of that vague, impalpable, indefinite character, which eludes their grasp.

It is certainly true then, of the enormous majority—we believe it to be true even of the most highly educated and philosophical—that for the most part they “advance forward” towards truth “on grounds which they cannot produce, and if they could, yet could not prove to be true; on latent grounds,” which they certainly know, but have no power of expressly assigning.

But we may take a step further. It happens again and again, not merely that men most reasonably hold this or that conviction without having analyzed its *grounds*; but that they hold it most reasonably, without even knowing (reflexly) of its *existence*. Here one single instance will suffice. There are certain persons—A, B, C, &c.—with whom I have had various intimate relations, and whom I have seen in great and critical variety of circumstances. I am asked my opinion of A's character. The very question had never occurred to me; yet on interrogating my own consciousness, I find there stored up a complete answer to the question. I may find great difficulty in *expressing* my views of A's character, and when I have done my best in that way may be very dissatisfied with my success. But that view none the less *exists*, though I may fail in its expression: and it existed, long before I had ever thought of its existence. It will at once be seen that there are numberless parallel instances to this.

Here another point is suggested, which deserves attention. How far more faithful is often the implicit representation of an object than the explicit! how far more correct and complete, e.g., is the view which I *observe within myself* of A's character, than any *expression* of that view which I find myself able to put forth! It will frequently happen indeed, that I am utterly dissatisfied with the latter; that I feel bitterly how coarse an instrument is language for the exhibition of thought. F. Newman points this moral in reference to theology in a forcible passage. We italicise a few clauses.

No analysis is subtle and delicate enough to represent adequately the state of mind under which we believe, or the subjects of belief, as they are presented to our thoughts. The end proposed is that of delineating, or, as it were, painting what the mind sees and feels; now let us consider what it is

to portray duly in form and colour things material, and we shall surely understand the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of representing the outline and character, the hues and shades in which any intellectual view really exists in the mind, or of giving it that substance and that exactness in detail in which consists its likeness to the original, or of sufficiently marking those minute differences which attach to the same general state of mind or tone of thought as found in this or that individual respectively. It is probable that *given opinions, as held by individuals*, even when of the most congenial views, *are as distinct from each other as their faces*. Now how minute is the defect in imitation which hinders the likeness of a portrait from being successful! how easy is it to recognize who is intended by it, without allowing that really he is represented! Is it not hopeless then, to expect that the most diligent and anxious investigation can end in more than in giving some very rude description of the living mind, and its feelings, thoughts, and reasonings. And if it be difficult to analyze fully any state, or frame, or opinion of *our own minds*, is it a less difficulty to delineate, as Theology professes to do, the works, dealings, providences, attributes, or nature of *Almighty God*? . . .

We are told, in human language, things concerning God Himself; concerning His Son and His Spirit; and concerning His Son's Incarnation, and the union of two natures in His One Person: truths which *even a peasant holds implicitly*, but which Almighty God, whether by His Apostles, or by His Church after them, has vouchsafed to bring together and methodize, and to commit to the keeping of science. . . .

Now all such statements are likely at first to strike coldly or harshly upon religious ears, when taken by themselves, for this reason if for no other, that they express heavenly things under earthly images, which are infinitely below the reality (pp. 264, 265).

Curiously enough, unbelievers are in the habit of urging, that the Church's dogmatic definitions imply a far more precise and accurate apprehension of Divine Objects, than men commonly possess. The fact—as F. Newman has argued in many places—is just the contrary. No amount of scientific statement can fully represent the distinct mental image, as implicitly possessed by an orthodox, well-instructed, and meditative believer.

On the whole then, it is not too much to say that men are constantly occupied—the more constantly as their mind is more living and active—in observing premisses and thence inferring conclusions; and that every one holds (on more or less sufficient grounds) a very large number of fixed convictions, which have never been placed explicitly before his mind. Even as regards those who are most given to argument and philosophy, it does not seem too much to say that a very large number, even of their most influential convictions, remain in this latent and unrecognized state.

By such considerations as these F. Newman is led to the following weighty judgment:—

It is hardly too much to say, that almost all reasons formally adduced in moral inquiries, are rather *specimens and symbols of the real grounds, than those grounds themselves*. They do but approximate to a representation of the general character of the proof, which the writer wishes to convey to another's mind. *They cannot, like mathematical proof, be passively followed*, with an attention confined to what is stated, and with the admission of nothing but what is urged. Rather, they are hints towards, and samples of, the true reasoning; and demand an active, ready, candid, and docile mind, which *can throw itself into what is said*, neglect verbal difficulties, and pursue and carry out principles. This is the true office of a writer, *to excite and direct trains of thought*; and this, on the other hand, is the too common practice of readers, to expect everything to be done for them,—to refuse to think,—to criticise the letter, instead of reaching forwards towards the sense,—and to account every argument as unsound which is illogically worded (pp. 271, 272).

Our readers then will have seen the essential distinction between *reasoning* and *argument*. To reason correctly (as we have already said) is to be led, through holding certain premisses, to hold a certain conclusion which legitimately follows from those premisses. But to *argue* quite correctly, involves a great deal more: it involves, that you shall *analyze* your process of reasoning; that you shall *reflect* on what has gone on in your mind; that you shall enumerate quite exhaustively, and express quite accurately, the various premisses on which you have relied. And nothing is more easily supposable—we imagine few things are in fact commoner—than that the better reasoner may be the worse arguer. To fall back on one of our previous illustrations. A and B may have been intimately acquainted with some third person, and have enjoyed full means of knowing his character. It may well happen that A shall have formed (by implicit observation and reasoning) a far juster view of it than B has; while B nevertheless, from being much more logically and intellectually disciplined than A, may so thoroughly out-argue him, as almost to make his view seem ridiculous.

On the other hand, it is argument, and not mere reasoning, which is the instrument of *philosophy*. Implicit thought, by the very fact of being implicit, not only remains (so to speak) each man's private property, but even in the individual mind may merely occupy its own isolated corner; it may fail grievously in influencing the judgment, on various important matters with which it is in fact connected. But it is the business of a philosopher, not only to *cognize* a truth, but to

recognise it; to know that he knows it; to contemplate it; to express it; to combine it with other truths; to refer truths back to their common cause and origin. Nor must it be supposed, from anything we have said, that we have any wish to disparage the paramount importance of philosophy. No one can suspect F. Klentgen or F. Newman of any such intention; and for ourselves, we spoke in July most strongly on the very serious evils under which Catholics lie, for want of greater philosophical agreement. Putting aside the Church's influence, we incline to think Mr. Mill hardly goes too far, when he says that the course of philosophy has more influence than all other causes put together, on the course of human thought. Certainly however we do think that the course of philosophy would be more satisfactory,—that philosophy would be in a sounder and more healthy condition,—if philosophers considered, more prominently than is their habit, the value and authority of that implicit reasoning, which is in some sense external to their own sphere.

Nor again let it be supposed, that we have any doubt whatever of a Catholic's complete argumentative victory, under fair circumstances, over any opponent whomsoever. It may happen undoubtedly, in some given time and place, that there may be very few Catholics, who have received adequate philosophical training, and who have carefully studied the anti-Catholic theories. In such cases, the superiority of argument may possibly enough be on a different side from the superiority of reasoning. But where the combatants are intellectually on anything like equal terms, we are confident that on no field will the Church's triumph be more signal, than on that of controversy and philosophy. Intellectual power and accomplishments being equal or nearly equal, it must at last be truth which determines the victory. Indeed, those anti-Catholics who are most peremptory and supercilious in expressing their argumentative contempt for Catholicity, are those very men whose arguments are the weakest; and who simply collapse, when grappled with by some sounder thinker.

Still, after every such admission the fact remains, that the number of men is comparatively very small, whose arguments in any way represent their reasonings; that the enormous majority either do not argue at all, or argue quite hap-hazard and at random. The question therefore is well worthy the attention of speculative men, whether there can be drawn out any practical "logic of implicit reasoning"; whether any practical rules can be laid down, which shall help towards guiding in true opinions that immense mass, who must depend

for their conclusions upon something entirely distinct from argument. We will not here attempt to enter otherwise on this question; but one remark frequently occurs in F. Newman's essays, which is well worthy of consideration, because it leads (we think) to practical inferences of great importance. His opinion then is, that almost all men are good (implicit) reasoners, when they are really earnest in their desire of attaining truth on the matter in hand. This is what accomplished arguers and philosophers are sometimes unwilling to think, but which seems to us true nevertheless.

Nothing is more common among men of a reasoning turn, than to consider that no one reasons well but themselves. All men of course think that they themselves are right and others wrong who differ from them; and so far all men must find fault with the reasonings of others, since no one proposes to act without reasons of some kind. Accordingly, so far as men are accustomed to analyze the opinions of others and contemplate their processes of thought, they are tempted to despise them as illogical. If any one sets about examining why his neighbours are on one side in political questions, not on another; why for or against certain measures, of a social, economical, or civil nature; why they belong to this religious party, not to that; why they hold this or that doctrine; why they have certain tastes in literature; or why they hold certain views in matters of opinion; it is needless to say that *if he measures their grounds by the reasons which they produce, he will have no difficulty in holding them up to ridicule, or even to censure.* And so again as to the deductions made from facts which come before us. From the sight of the same sky one may augur fine weather, another bad; from the signs of the times one the coming in of good, another of evil; from the same actions of individuals one moral greatness, another depravity or perversity; one simplicity, another craft; upon the same evidence one justifies, another condemns. The miracles of Christianity were in early times imputed by some to magic, others they converted; the union of its professors was ascribed to seditious and traitorous aims by some, while others it moved to say, "See how these Christians love one another." The phenomena of the physical world have given rise to a variety of theories, that is, of alleged facts, at which they are supposed to point; theories of astronomy, chemistry, and physiology; theories religious and atheistical. The same events are considered to prove a particular providence, and not; to attest the divinity of one religion or another. The downfall of the Roman empire was to Pagans a refutation, to Christians an evidence of Christianity. . . .

*Nor can it fairly be said that such varieties arise from deficiency of logical power in the multitude of men. . . .* This is what men of clear intellects are not slow to imagine. Clear, strong, steady intellects, if they are not deep, will look on these differences in deduction chiefly as failures in the reasoning faculty, and will despise them or excuse them accordingly. . . .

But surely there is no greater mistake than this. For the experience of



life contains abundant evidence that *in practical matters, when their minds are really aroused, men commonly are not bad reasoners. Men do not mistake when their interest is concerned.* They have an instinctive sense in which direction their path lies towards it, and how they must act consistently with self-preservation or self-aggrandisement. And so in the case of questions in which party spirit, or political opinion, or ethical principle, or personal feeling, is concerned, *men have a surprising sagacity, often unknown to themselves, in finding their own place.* However remote the connection between the point in question and their own creed, or habits, or feelings, the principles which they profess guide them unerringly to their legitimate issues; and thus it often happens that in apparently different practices, or usages, or expressions, or in questions of science, or politics, or literature, we can almost prophesy beforehand, from their religious or moral views, where certain persons will stand, and *often can defend them far better than they defend themselves.* . . .

All this shows, that in spite of the inaccuracy of expression or (if you will) in thought which prevails in the world, *men on the whole do not reason incorrectly.* If their reason itself were in fault, they would reason each in his own way: whereas they *form into schools*; and that not merely from imitation and sympathy, but certainly from *internal compulsion*, from the *constraining influence* of their several principles. *They may argue badly, but they reason well*; that is, their professed grounds are no sufficient measures of their real ones (pp. 204-5).

Here then, in F. Newman's opinion, is one most principal security for good (implicit) reasoning: simplicity of intention. Let us give an instance.

Suppose then A and B are two merchants, equally well acquainted with matters of business. A however has far more "simplicity of intention" than B; or, in other words, his heart is far more unreservedly devoted to money-getting. B has many literary and social tastes, while A cares for nothing but the main chance. Few men doubt that, this being the case, A will be a far better (implicit) reasoner than B, on the best mode of adding to his fortune. A thousand occasions of turning a penny will suggest themselves to one, which would never occur to the other; or, in other words, a thousand relevant premisses will actively energize in A's mind, which do not enter B's at all. And moreover, when some particular question is raised of unusual commercial moment, B will be very far from bringing the same concentrated energy as A to its examination, and is much less likely, therefore, to arrive at a sound conclusion. In other words, two different phenomena present themselves. A's mind is far more constantly peopled than B's, with the implicit thought of relevant premisses; and (2) his implicit reasoning from those premisses will be far more accurate.

This principle may be very importantly applied in the sphere of morals and religion. We will assume F. Kleutgen's doctrine, that all men, who reach the age of reason, at once accept various moral truths as axiomatic; and that they are led quite inevitably—unless indeed through their own grave sin—to accept various further doctrines. They accept the doctrine, not only that there is an indefinitely large moral Rule of Life placed in authority over them;—but also that that Rule is enforced by the Living God, Who created heaven and earth: that to please Him is the most important end of life: that through prayer they may obtain from Him greater strength for that purpose. Now it is self-evident that, among all who admit this fundamental body of truths, those alone act reasonably, who build their whole course of life predominantly on its consideration; who ever seek moral and religious truth with earnestness and simplicity of intention. In other words, a man acts more reasonably—whether he be educated or uneducated, speculative or unspeculative, matters not at all—the more constantly these primary religious doctrines occupy his mind as actively energizing premisses, carrying him forward (implicitly) to a larger and larger assemblage of practical conclusions. These men are infallibly certain of their original premisses; and the validity of their reasoning is largely secured, by their purity and earnestness of intention. They may very possibly be the worst arguers, but they are quite certainly the best reasoners in the whole world. They fly towards moral and religious truth as on eagles' wings; they often discern with the precision of an instinct the path of duty under difficult circumstances; and are found to possess quite an extraordinary power of choosing rightly for themselves, among a multitude of conflicting religious teachers.\*

The same truth is exemplified in the case of Catholic dogmata. These were revealed, not for the purpose of lying dormant in the mind, but on the contrary of motivating practical action. A Catholic then acts more reasonably and more acceptably to God, in proportion as he labours to view, by the light of these dogmata, every phenomenon of daily life with which they are in any way connected. Or in other words, in proportion as he lives more reasonably and virtuously, the

---

\* *Adest in intellectu humano inclinatio quedam naturalis a Sapientissimo Auctore indita, quæ . . . ad judicia practica, quæ vitam regendam respiciunt, proferenda pollemus. At id non cæce et sine motivo, sed ex objecti perspicentiâ sive immediatâ ut in primis principiis moralibus, sive mediâtâ ut in eorum deductionibus. Deductiones autem ejusmodi . . . a rudibus etiam fiunt.*—*Liberatore, Ethica*, n. 34.

more prominent among these verities will be actively energizing as (implicit) premisses in his mind, and will animate his whole view of society and of his fellow-men. This is equally so (just as in the former case) whether he be philosophically cultivated or otherwise; and it is in fact precisely these implicitly deduced conclusions, which are commonly called "Catholic instincts." Again and again it is not less startling than edifying, to find that some saintly Catholic sees his way (as if spontaneously) to complete harmony with the Church's mind on this or that momentous question, on which many Catholics, far abler than himself, still wrangle or rebel.

Old Catholics sometimes good-humouredly laugh at converts, for having introduced into English Catholic talk the word "realise" in a special sense of their own. It must be admitted however, that the idea intended is so important as to *need* a word for its expression; and this idea is greatly illustrated by what we have been just saying. One very important part of what a convert means when he speaks of "realising" certain truths, is the keeping those truths ever in one's mind as actively energizing premisses.

Again from what has been said, you may see the importance of Catholics being surrounded, especially during the period of their education, with what is called "a Catholic atmosphere." Non-Catholics erroneously profess a most opposite theory; and allege that moral and religious truth is normally attained, by a free and explicit comparison of conflicting arguments. We shall endeavour to expose this fundamental fallacy a few pages on; but our present concern is with a different objection. Liberals often ridicule this expression, "a Catholic atmosphere," as though it were a mere unfounded and unmeaning figure of speech, devised for the purpose of avoiding argument. We maintain, on the contrary, that never was there an expression more thoroughly philosophical. He is the best Catholic in his views and doctrines, in whom Catholic dogmata are most constantly energizing as active implicit premisses. But no other way can be named in which the mind can be kept so constantly under the control of such premisses, as by the unconscious influence of others, thoroughly possessed by them, with whom it is brought into efficacious contact. And this influence is most curiously parallel in character to those physical agencies, which constitute an "atmosphere." Even were it true—which most certainly it is *not*—that the very few who are highly educated can be sufficiently influenced by argument and explicit statements;—at all events for the vast majority, it is this contagious sympathy which alone has power to imbue them with sound reasoning.

In these later remarks we have been drawing various inferences, from one particular statement which we had made. But a very large number of practical results follow from the *whole theory* which we have so briefly sketched; and we will conclude our article by selecting a few out of their number.

1. F. Kleutgen's very pregnant remark will have been observed, that it is part of God's tender providence towards each individual soul, to watch carefully over its implicit advance from truth to truth; and moreover, that He exercises this office the more solicitously, in proportion as the truth is of more vital importance to sanctification and salvation. Unbelievers often sneer at the Catholic's *prayers*, that this or that person may be led to the Faith or to more orthodox views of doctrine. "Surely," they say, "truth is discovered by *argument*; and it will be much more to the purpose if you *argue* with him than if you *pray* for him." We reply, that moral and religious truth is indubitably obtained by *reasoning*, but to a very small extent by *argument*; and in order to solid and effective reasoning, it is necessary that the relevant premisses be duly suggested and efficaciously impressed on the mind. What more suitable office than this to that Living Creator, who is the God of Truth? And what will move him more powerfully to still wider and more gracious interpositions, than that sound so dear to His ears, the voice of prayer?

2. Another frequent gibe of unbelievers is founded on the fact, that the great mass of Catholics are so strictly forbidden to read atheistical books. "The Church," say these critics, "virtually confesses that Theism cannot bear the light of reason; for if reason were on the side of Theism, to reason Theists would eagerly appeal." There would undoubtedly be great force in this objection, if Catholics alleged that believers are commonly led to Theism by *argument*. And in the case indeed of philosophical *controversialists*, it is very important that they study atheistical works. But as to the great mass of men,—who are led to religious truth indeed by *reasoning* but who cannot *argue*,—how can you act more absurdly, than by calling on them to examine both sides? to read treatises? to study adverse arguments? They have no *arguments* on their own side; how can they do justice to arguments on the other? Take the various illustrations of implicit reasoning which we gave a few pages back, and the self-evident truth of our statement will be abundantly manifest.

To make our point clearer to all our readers, let us fix our thoughts on one case in particular: the case in which a large family of sons are firmly convinced,—and that on the most irre-

fragable ground, viz. a whole life's intimate experience,—of their father's uprightness and conscientiousness. He occupies, we will suppose, an important position (diplomatic or otherwise,) of which they know absolutely nothing beyond its existence. They are ignorant of its duties; of the circumstances under which those duties oblige; of the maxims of conduct which are appropriate to the situation: indeed, they are not sufficiently advanced in age and experience to understand these things if they tried. Their father meanwhile has certain bitter enemies, who bring against him a charge of unscrupulousness and dishonesty, based on his alleged malversation in this official sphere. What will be the duty of his sons in regard to these charges, and in regard to the arguments adduced in support thereof? Will they be bound to examine such arguments with scrupulous care and candour? How absurd! They are bound of course, in reason and common sense, utterly to disregard and disbelieve the whole. Their knowledge of his singular conscientiousness rests on demonstrative evidence; while the adverse arguments turn on considerations, entirely external to their power of apprehension.

Yet some one of them may by possibility be so contemptibly weak, as to lay stress on these allegations, and allow them to shake his firm confidence in his father. Evidently his conduct is unreasonable on the one hand, and immoral on the other hand: unreasonable, because he does not choose to keep the strength of his convictions on a level with the strength of evidence on which they rest; and immoral, because he fails egregiously and most inexcusably in filial duty. Those who have placed such arguments before him and pressed them on his attention, have simply tempted him to sin. When so tempted, his reasonable course would have been to pray for strength; that he might remain faithful to the legitimate conclusions of his reason, and that he might laugh to scorn these dangerous argumentative temptations.

The application of all this is so obvious as to need no exposition. It should only be added, that even Theistic controversialists, who examine atheistical arguments, do so purely with a view of understanding and answering them for the benefit of mankind, and in no degree whatever with a purpose of questioning their own convictions.\*

---

\* We should be very sorry if we were understood by this to disparage the extreme importance of a controversialist labouring to seize accurately his opponent's precise point of view. The value of a controversial work is to be tested, not by the praise it receives from those who are already convinced,

3. Remarks very similar may be made on what is called the Church's "evidence of credibility." It is an admitted Catholic doctrine, that no adult non-Catholic can reasonably enter the visible Church, until he has been convinced on sufficient grounds of reason that she is (as she professes to be) an infallible teacher. Now certainly a very extravagant and desolating paradox would be presented, if by this were meant what would indeed be monstrous; viz. that Hodge the Protestant carter cannot rightly be received, until he does justice to the various arguments contained in treatises "*de verâ religione*," and until he is prepared to vindicate those arguments against all exception. But a very large number of the most uneducated Protestants have access to this or that assemblage of implicit premisses, which abundantly suffice to establish the Church's credibility. And God on His side will never be wanting, to impress such premisses on the mind of this or that given individual, and conduct him to a true conclusion.\*

Here also, as in the former case, nothing can be wilder than to maintain, that every ordinary believer is bound to be a controversialist; or that his grounds of belief cannot be sufficient in reason, unless he is able to display them advantageously in argument; or that he is at liberty to enter into temptation, by studying anti-Catholic controversial books.

4. Lastly, we will apply the doctrine which we have been setting forth, to illustrate the intense dislike (we might almost say, horror) felt by all good Catholics, for mixed education in every shape. There is hardly any Catholic instinct, which non-Catholics find it so difficult to understand as this. We were a good deal amused lately by reading two different letters on the subject, which appeared the same day in the "*Times*" and "*Pall Mall Gazette*" respectively. The latter writer maintained, that denominational education, as imparted to children *below the age of sixteen*, is a simple absurdity, however useful it may be *at a later age*. The "*Times*" correspondent said just the contrary. His object was to defend Mr. Fawcett's bill about Trinity College,

---

but by its efficaciousness in leading opponents to re-examine their grounds of conviction. But no opponents will ever be influenced by a controversialist, who does not appreciate the real strength of their position.

\* Mgr. Dechamps, the present illustrious Archbishop of Malines, has written one or two very interesting works on the question, what is that evidence of credibility which, in fact, legitimately persuades uneducated persons. We cannot however enter episodically on a matter, which requires much careful adjustment and consideration.



Dublin: and his argument was, that denominational education is *necessary up to the age of sixteen or seventeen*, but that afterwards its evils preponderate over its advantages. We will consider then these two cases, which may be considered the *extremes*: viz. (1) popular education as imparted to children of the masses; and (2) higher education as imparted to youths of the leisured class. The principles, applicable to these, may easily be applied by our reader for himself to all intermediate instances.

The "Pall Mall Gazette" correspondent grounds his argument on the undoubted fact, that children can derive very little real knowledge, from merely learning by heart catechism or creed. Never was there an objection more curiously suicidal. It is precisely *because* the mere learning catechism by heart can teach so little religion, that a scheme of mixed popular education is of necessity so profoundly irreligious. We by no means under-value the advantage of a child learning his Catechism by heart; for the knowledge of its text is most useful, as binding together and retaining in his memory the various doctrines he is taught. Still Catechism is very far indeed from being the *chief* way in which he learns doctrine. The Church testifies a large body of revealed verities, which are intended most powerfully to influence the Catholic's whole interior life. What she aims at then in her education of a Catholic child, is firstly, as a foundation,—not necessarily that he shall be able *explicitly* to state these verities—but that he shall implicitly and intimately *apprehend* them; that he shall have formed in his mind the one true impression, on Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; on our Blessed Lady; on prayer; on the Sacraments, &c. &c. Then, this foundation having been laid, the second great desideratum is, that he may learn the art (one may almost say the knack) of "living to" these great verities; of imbuing his interior life with them as with its animating principle; of ever preserving their thought in his mind, as of actively energizing implicit premisses. We are not here to consider all the various methods used by her for this great purpose. But it is important to point out, that the most important of all is the "surrounding him with a Catholic atmosphere"; the securing, that those under whose influence he is brought, shall think and feel those very thoughts and feelings, with which she desires *him* to be implicitly but most efficaciously imbued.

Even Protestants admit the truth of this principle; and therefore it would be strange indeed if Catholics were less

possessed by it. We may again adduce what has already appeared in our pages (April, 1868, p. 524); a citation made by Cardinal Cullen, from two great Protestant authorities. "It is necessary," says M. Guizot, "that national education should be given and received in the midst of a religious atmosphere, and that a religious impression should penetrate all its parts. Religion is not a study, or an exercise . . . it is a faith and a law which ought to be felt everywhere." And the Royal Commissioners of 1861 give it as the view of "the principal promoters of education" that "everything which is not mechanical ought to be made the occasion of giving religious instruction."

We now pass from one extreme to the other; from the education of poor children, to that of the leisured class during the concluding years of their course. It is these years, which give to what has gone before its full meaning and significance. Hitherto the student has acquired much explicit religious and much explicit secular knowledge: the characteristic work of the last period, is blending the two into one harmonious whole. He knows Christian doctrine in itself; he has to be trained in the habit of measuring, by its standard, the whole field of philosophy, history, and literature. Here then, just as in other cases, the verities taught by the Church are to fill his mind, as actively-energizing implicit premisses, colouring instinctively and spontaneously every detail of secular knowledge. As the soul in its indivisible integrity animates alike every separate part of the human frame, and (by thus animating it) blends it into one;—so the highly-educated Catholic welds the whole mass of his knowledge into one solid and consistent organism, by the implicit presence, throughout every separate portion, of the Church's unifying doctrinal system.

It is truly amazing—not that non-Catholics refuse to *concur* with this opinion—but that they so totally fail to *apprehend* it. Our readers must be acquainted with instances in which they gravely argue, that a Protestant university is no unfit place of education for Catholics, because the Catholics who go there do not in general actually apostatize. What the Church wishes in educating her children, is certainly something more than that they shall not actually cease to *be* her children. She desires, not merely that they shall remain her children, but that they shall be her *better and more serviceable* children; not merely that they shall not *lose* the Faith, but that they shall foster and cherish it. A system under which they do no more than avoid losing it, is no Catholic system at all. Let us suppose the case of a youth, who (1) on the one hand remains a Catholic, who does not cease to accept the Church's various definitions of faith; who (2) on the other

hand has mastered and appropriated large portions, from the field of philosophy, history, and literature; but (3) who has not in any way learnt the habit, of viewing the various parts of this latter field under the light of Catholic doctrine and principle. Such a youth is a Catholic, and is a highly educated *gentleman*: what he utterly fails to be, is a decently educated *Catholic*. It is only in proportion as the Church's doctrines have been actively energizing implicit premisses throughout his course of secular study, that he has been receiving a Catholic education at all. And whether any one is likely to learn such a habit, while living among Protestant companions and learning from Protestant teachers,—we may safely leave it for men of common sense to determine. It is precisely these uncatholicly-educated Catholics, who are the Church's most dangerous enemies. If they apostatized—it would be an immeasurably greater calamity to *themselves*,—but in many respects it would lessen or even destroy their power of injuring the Church. Instead of this, as we observed on a former occasion, they will grow up a noxious school of disloyal, minimising anti-Roman Catholics; Catholic in profession, but anti-Catholic in spirit; Catholics, who combine the Church's naked dogmata with the principles of her bitterest enemies, and place the priceless gem of the Faith in a setting of the very basest metal; a constant cause of anxiety to ecclesiastical authorities; a canker eating into the Catholic body; a standing nuisance and obstruction.

Here we conclude. There is a relevant inquiry of extreme moment, on which we have said little or nothing. Philosophers who admit (what seems to us undeniably sound) the general theory laid down by FF. Kleutgen and Newman, have to explain what criterion is open to individuals, that they may assure themselves on the legitimacy of their implicit reasoning; how they are to distinguish, between their well-grounded conclusions on the one hand, and the dictates of prejudice, passion, caprice, on the other. This inquiry must occupy a very prominent place, in any complete and methodical treatment of our theme: but nothing can have been further from our intention than to give that theme such a treatment. In fact, our purpose will have been answered, if we succeed in drawing the attention of speculative Catholics to a line of thought, which hardly any other throughout the whole range of philosophy exceeds in importance.

## ART. IX.—THE LANDLORD AND TENANT QUESTION IN IRELAND.

*Two Reports for the Irish Government on the History of the Landlord and Tenant Question in Ireland, with Suggestions for Legislation.* By W. NEILSON HANCOCK, LL.D. Dublin: Thom. 1869.

*The Land Difficulty in Ireland, with an Effort to solve it.* By GERALD FITZGIBBON, Master in Chancery. London: Longmans. Dublin: M'Glashan & Gill. 1869.

*The Irish People and the Irish Land: a Letter to Lord Lifford, with Comments on the Publications of Lord Dufferin and Lord Rosse.* By ISAAC BUTT. Dublin: Falconer. London: Ridgway. 1867.

*Land Tenure in Ireland: a Plea for the Celtic Race.* By ISAAC BUTT. Third edition. Dublin: Falconer. London: Ridgway. 1868.

*Irish Emigration and the Tenure of Land in Ireland.* By the Right Hon. LORD DUFFERIN, K.P. London: Willis & Sotheran. 1867.

IT would be superfluous to adduce arguments to prove the necessity of legislative interference in order to effect an equitable adjustment of the relations between Irish landlords and Irish tenants. Successive Governments, Whig and Tory, and both Houses of Parliament, have repeatedly asserted the necessity of legislation on this subject; and the iniquity of the state of the law has recently been registered in deeds of blood in many parts of the country. No doubt, when a man has been murdered, or when an attempt has been made to murder him, such just public indignation is excited against the assassin, that the tyranny of the landlord or agent which the deed of blood brings to the notice of the public is palliated or forgotten. There is something revolting to a generous mind to recall the heartless tyranny of a man who has been basely and wickedly murdered. We do not even mean to assert that every landlord or agent who has been made the victim of agrarian outrage was a heartless and unjust man, although we happen to know that a late judge, after long experience in the Landed Estates Court, declared on hearing of one of these murders, in very strong but not very polite language, that he never knew an agrarian crime to be committed where the victim had not provoked his own doom. Of course, he did not mean to justify assassination, but simply to declare, from his experience, that such crimes were only committed when the people were provoked almost beyond endurance. The deed of assassination, with all its attendant circumstances of horror, is borne by the

magnetic wire to every portion of the empire, but the hearths which the victim and others often worse than he have desolated, the happy homesteads he in the wantonness of power has destroyed, the noble hearts he has doomed to exile, to beggary, or even to death, are never known or cared for. There can be no justification or palliation of murder, but neither can there be any excuse for perpetuating a system which leads a whole people to look for justice anywhere but from the laws of their country, and which occasionally leads the more passionate amongst them to seek redress where alone they expect to find it, in the wild justice (as it is called) of revenge.

One of the most recent and lamented victims of agrarian outrage was a Scotch gentleman, Mr. James Hunter, to whom a Mr. Smith had leased some four thousand acres of land, situated near Newfield, county Mayo. We abridge the account of the circumstances from the correspondence of the special commissioner of *The Echo*. "On a part of Mr. Smith's estate which was not leased to Mr. Hunter were a number of small holdings in the hands of poor people, who *from time immemorial had been allowed to cut turf* on that part of the estate which was leased to Mr. Hunter. *It was solely by an oversight of Mr. Smith's attorney in drawing up the lease*, that what is called the right of 'turbary,' i. e., the permission spoken of above, was not *in writing* reserved to the tenants who had always enjoyed it. It will be necessary here to remark that for these poor peasants, living as they do in a bleak and desolate region by the side of the sea, the right to cut turf is an indispensable one, for they could not live without fires, and there is nothing which will burn in the neighbourhood but turf. At all events, the right from mere usage was regarded by them as their property." As soon as Mr. Smith discovered his mistake he mentioned the matter to Mr. Hunter, and asked him to allow the poor people to cut turf as usual. This was no unreasonable request, considering that the right was not reserved simply by the attorney's mistake, "*and that cutting turf improves the soil by preparing it for culture.*" The extent of Mr. Hunter's leasehold on which turf can be cut is about 1,200 acres, and the rent is about £16 a year. Only 100 acres were used by the poor tenants. Mr. Hunter would not permit the poor people to cut their turf as they had done from time immemorial, unless he was paid for permitting them to do so, and in fact Mr. Smith had the humanity to pay him £3 per year to secure fuel for the poor people, until his estate was sold in the Landed Estates Court, in 1861. The estate was bought by Dr. Gibbings, of Trinity College, who was not aware of the charge on account of the turbary, but finding that Mr. Smith had paid £3 per year, he expressed his willingness to do the same. But Mr. Hunter now determined to extort £10 a year for the privilege of

turbary on 100 acres of a bog, consisting of 1,200 acres, for the whole of which he paid but £16 per year. Arbitration was tried in vain. Hunter "would have his bond. Dr. Gibbings should pay £10 per year, or the poor tenants, who were altogether blameless in the matter, should have no fires." Arbitration was again resorted to, but Hunter had raised his demand to £15 per year. At last an umpire was called in, who, for the sake of peace, decided that the sum should be £10 per year, and Dr. Gibbings paid £30 for three years then due; but, considering the demand unjust and extortionate, he refused to pay any more. The tenants, who had nothing to do with the quarrel between the landlord and middle man, continued to cut their turf as usual, as they were in fact in extreme necessity, and had no alternative but to procure their winter fuel or to die. Mr. Hunter determined to force the latter alternative on the tenants, and in order to effect his purpose took an action against one of them, called O'Neill, "who is by universal consent a respectable, hard-working man. The case came on at the spring assizes of the present year. There was some break-down in the legal preparation for O'Neill's defence, I believe from the man's poverty . . . . The result was that O'Neill was *finéd five shillings, and saddled with £48 costs!* . . . . Of course O'Neill possessed nothing which could be taken in execution for so large an amount, so Mr. Hunter determined to wait until the man's crop had grown; meantime letting Dr. Gibbings know that he intended to levy. . . . When Dr. Gibbings heard that Mr. Hunter was really about to seize O'Neill's crop, he so far departed from his previously declared determination to have nothing more to do with him, that he sent a gentleman to Mr. Hunter, asking him to open negotiations again, and offered £6 a year so as to meet him about half way." Hunter peremptorily refused; he seized, and as nobody could be got to act as sheriff's man, he stayed away from his kirk on Sunday to do the bailiff's duty, and in the evening he was murdered. Perhaps Mr. Hunter had a legal right to his pound of flesh, but in his mode of asserting it he undoubtedly outraged every feeling, not only of kindness but of humanity, which are as necessary to the peace and happiness of society as justice itself.

But much as the Commissioner is shocked by the cruelty with which the poor tenants were treated, he has not noticed one of the most harassing and oppressive consequences of an agrarian murder. It is this—that the very barbarity with which a tenant has been treated by the murdered man is of itself sufficient evidence to have him arrested and cast into prison on the accusation of murder. We illustrate this by Hunter's case. The murder occurred on the 29th of August last, and as if O'Neill had not suffered enough already, he was of course arrested on suspicion and



cast into prison. But, as happens in cases of this kind, the suspicion is as extensive as the oppression, and consequently a large portion of the male population of the families which claimed the right of turbary in Hunter's bog were arrested and sent to gaol on suspicion of being concerned in his murder. Before the 22nd of September; when the first magisterial investigation into the circumstances of the murder took place, no less than thirteen men had been sent to gaol on suspicion. Only nine of those who had been arrested very soon after the murder were brought before the magistrates on the day mentioned. Their names are John O'Neill, Martin Moran, James Moran, John Moran, Roderick Kean, Pat M'Goveran, John M'Goveran, Michael M'Goveran, and John Moran, jun.; the case against the other four prisoners was adjourned, for they had been put in gaol only during the week previous to the investigation, and we presume the police had not been able to rake up any evidence against them. Mr. Jordan, solicitor, prosecuted on the part of the Crown the nine prisoners who were brought forward, and Mr. O'Malley defended the prisoners. Mr. O'Malley asked Mr. Jordan against which of the prisoners he intended to proceed, to which Jordan replied *that he did not know, and if he did he would not tell.* And when Mr. O'Malley pressed the point, the chairman of the magistrates (Sir George O'Donel) said "It is the unanimous opinion of the Bench that you have no right to particularize the prisoners Mr. Jordan intends to proceed against." So that a large number of men may be arrested on a charge of murder, may be cast into gaol and arraigned before a bench of magistrates, without being told which of them is to be accused of the murder! As a matter of fact, not one tittle of evidence was adduced against four out of the nine persons brought before the magistrates, and they were accordingly discharged, after having been kept in gaol during the harvest season when their labour was most valuable, and to the great injury if not utter ruin of their families, for no other reason than that they had been threatened with persecution by a harsh and unfeeling man. No evidence was adduced against any of the others, except that some of them were accused of using threatening language against their oppressor, except O'Neill, whom Thomas Connor, the bailiff, *identified as the person on whom the execution was served.* No evidence sufficient to send any of the prisoners for trial was forthcoming, and O'Neill with four others was remanded. Thus including the four prisoners who were not brought forward, nine persons are still kept in gaol on a charge of murder, the chief evidence against them being the natural antipathy which they are supposed to have entertained against the murdered man on account of his harshness and inhumanity. Very possibly O'Neill, having been identified as the person on whom the execution was served, and two or three others who may be

identified as having cut turf on Hunter's bog, may be hanged, to satisfy public indignation on account of a brutal murder. But had this murder not been perpetrated, Hunter might have legally put perhaps a hundred human beings to a cruel, lingering death, by causing the miserably-clad wretches to pass the winter without even a fire on their hearths. The English public never hear of the cruelties which the poor Irish tenant endures until some grievous crime has been committed. Had Mr. Hunter not been murdered, a hundred poor wretches might have been subjected to an agonizing death, without any one beyond their own immediate neighbourhood hearing of their sufferings. Let the murderer be punished by all means, but let us not perpetuate laws by which hundreds of innocent persons may be legally put to death—laws, by taking advantage of which, one tyrannical man may drive a whole neighbourhood to desperation—laws which allow a man to act with so little humanity that if he be murdered every man who has been in any way subject to his power is, from the mere fact of having been so subjected to him, suspected of being his murderer. The bailiff has only to identify the tenant as the person on whom the execution was served, and he is forthwith cast into gaol on a charge of murder, and sometimes hanged, on a few other suspicious circumstances being proved against him.

The passing of the Irish Church Bill was not only an act of tardy justice,—it not only removed an evil so glaring and manifest that it scandalized all Europe,—but it has indirectly effected a far more important object by teaching the Irish people to look to Parliament for justice. This is the true way to root out Fenianism from the hearts of a naturally and traditionally loyal people. Prisons and gibbets may repress the display of disaffection, but they only increase and intensify the feeling in the hearts of the people. The circumstances of the world are now very different from what they were in 1798 or 1800. The power of steam has almost bridged over the ocean, and rendered it impossible for any nation with a large seaboard to guard its coasts effectually; the large English towns are filled with Irishmen, and millions of them dwell in the bosom of the great Transatlantic republic, and have a powerful influence in directing its councils. In the time of peace England can rule Ireland by the sword; if war should break out with America or even with France, she must conciliate or lose her. Very recently a vast number of the humbler class of the Irish people had enrolled themselves in the Fenian conspiracy, and a still larger number sympathized with the Fenians, and only abstained from joining their ranks on account of the hopelessness of contending with the gigantic power of the British Empire. Had any Lord-Lieutenant made a public progress through the south or west of Ireland at that time, he would have been received

in sullen silence, if not with groans and hisses. But the passing of one measure of justice and the confidence with which this act has inspired the people, that the minister is willing and able to deal with the land question in an equally just and comprehensive spirit—has changed the sentiments of the people as if by magic, and whilst we write, Lord Spencer is making a triumphant progress through the south and the west of Ireland, and is everywhere greeted with sentiments of the most enthusiastic loyalty. But there should be no delusion as to the cause of this sudden change in the feelings of the people. It is founded more on hope than on gratitude. The question of questions is the land question, and if Mr. Gladstone fails to satisfy the just demands of the people on this subject, the confidence with which he has inspired them will be lost as quickly as it was gained, and the distrust and hatred of English rule will be more intense than ever.

There is another lesson of very great importance to be learned from the manner in which the Act for disendowing and disestablishing the State Church in Ireland has been received by all parties. Before the Act passed, we were assured that the Bill was nothing less than a Bill for confiscation and robbery; that if it were carried, the Protestants of Ulster would rise in rebellion and resist its execution by force of arms. Instead of this, the Act has been received with the utmost resignation by Protestants, and with great satisfaction, but without any insulting manifestations of triumph, on the part of the Catholics. Those who wish to obtain an equitable adjustment of the relations between landlord and tenant have to meet the very same cry of confiscation and robbery. The landlords shall all be ruined and the rights of property destroyed. Let a just measure become law, and we shall hear no more about robbery and confiscation. It will be received with as much resignation on one side and satisfaction on the other, as has followed the passing of the Irish Church Act.

No doubt there are a great many just and humane landlords in Ireland, who, so long as they shall live, will deal justly by their tenants. But who can tell what kind of men will succeed them? Moreover, it is not right to leave a man's *property*, his just property, the produce of his capital and labour, at the mercy of any man. The very intelligent correspondent whom the proprietor of *The Irish Times* has sent to investigate the relations between landlord and tenant in Ulster, writes as follows from Bangor, in the county of Down:—

I find that nearly all the great landlords of Ulster admit tenant right, and act upon it frankly and honourably. Let us, then, take the position of the tenants, as the most assured, under the best of landlords. What is their

feeling? A most intelligent gentleman connected with the farming interest, who has been travelling through the province in the course of his business for thirty years, and has probably been on every estate in it, and has, moreover, the friendliest feelings towards the aristocracy, has declared to me in the most emphatic terms, that he never met a *single farmer who did not earnestly wish for some security that would not leave him "at the mercy of the landlord."* I will illustrate this by a single case, for which I have the best authority. A farmer who is an excellent agriculturist, has so improved the quality of his land, that it is now worth a pound an acre more than when he got it. He said to a friend "See how I am at the mercy of the landlord. I have made this land a pound an acre better than it was. He knows that, and if he chooses he can increase my rent to that amount. It would take ten years to exhaust my improvements. During that time he could make me pay for them the sum of £700."

But the law does not simply leave the produce of the tenant's capital and industry at the mercy of the landlord; it actually hands it over to him, contrary to natural right and justice. Mr. Hancock, in his elaborate and accurate history of the Landlord and Tenant question (pp. 25, 28), proves this on the authority of some of the most eminent judges who have adorned the Irish Bench. The remarks were made on a case which will be found in the Irish Chancery Reports, vol. viii., pp. 225, 511. The plaintiff was the Rev. Dr. O'Fay, PP. Croughwell, county Galway, and the defendant the landlord on whose estate Dr. O'Fay resided. Dr. O'Fay took the farm from the father of the defendant, who promised him a lease for three lives, or thirty-one years. After Dr. O'Fay entered into possession, the landlord ascertained that he could not fulfil his promise under the terms of the estate-settlement, and he therefore offered Dr. O'Fay a lease for his own life, and £20 to aid in building a house. "The priest continued in possession of the farm and paid the rent agreed on; thus, as he alleged, accepting the arrangement proposed. He was on excellent terms with the landlord, and expended £70 in permanent improvements, and did not ask for the £20 which the landlord had promised. In 1854 the landlord died, and his son, the defendant, succeeded to the property. *He gave notice to all his yearly tenants of an intention to raise their rents.* The priest claimed to have a promise of a lease, *and the agent of the property, during the landlord's absence abroad, admitted this claim, and did not raise the rent.* The landlord said he had no notice of his father's promise; he, however, allowed the priest to remain in possession, *and the priest expended £400 in buildings, in the belief that he would not be disturbed.* A dispute subsequently arose about trespass, and the fences on the boundary between the priest's farm and some land in the possession of the landlord. The landlord served notice to

quit and brought an ejectment. After some delay judgment was given in his favour, subject to an application to the Court of Chancery to compel him to fulfil his father's promise of a lease." The Master of the Rolls, in delivering his judgment on this case, said:—"If the landlord, knowing that the tenant believes he holds under a valid lease, or a valid contract for a lease, looks on at the expenditure without warning the tenant that he intends to impeach the contract, such a proceeding is a fraud, and the tenant has a remedy in equity against the landlord, though he be a remainder man, if he seeks to turn the tenant out of possession without compensation." Dr. Hancock adds:—"This state of the law applies to *past* as well as future improvements; for it is the nature of judicial decisions to have always a retrospective operation; they declare not only what the law is, but that it always was so. Such being the very simple and righteous decision in the case of tenants under a lease, or contract for a lease, we now come to the case of yearly tenants, who form the bulk of the occupying tenantry of Ireland. On this point the Master of the Rolls is equally clear:—"If a tenant, holding from year to year, *makes permanent improvements on the lands which he holds, this raises no equity as against the landlord, though he may have looked on, and not have given any warning to the tenant.*" "When," says Dr. Hancock, "it is remembered that a tenancy from year to year is the ordinary tenure in Ireland under which tenants often hold for generations, the distinction between the two cases is not easy to be perceived, and on any view of the case it must be too narrow and refined a distinction to decide cases in which the feelings and interests of an entire population are involved. The distinction, at the best, rests on judicial decisions on subtle points of real property law; . . . and how can the law be maintained when it is condemned by the Master of the Rolls in such terms as these?—

'Even,' continues the Master of the Rolls, 'if the Rev. Dr. O'Fay had no claim, *except as a tenant from year to year*, I have no hesitation in stating that, although *in point of law*, on the authorities I have referred to, and particularly the case of *Pelling v. Armitage*, the petitioner's suit could not be sustained, yet nothing can be more repugnant to the principles of natural justice than that a landlord should look on at a great expenditure, carried on by a tenant from year to year, without warning the tenant of his intention to turn him out of possession. The defendant's offer to allow Dr. O'Fay to remove the buildings was a mockery. I have no jurisdiction to administer equity in the natural sense of that term, or I should have no difficulty whatever in making a decree against the defendant. I am bound to administer an artificial system, established by the decisions of eminent judges, such as Lord Eldon and Sir W. Grant, and being so bound, I regret much that I must administer injustice in this case and dismiss the petition; but I shall dismiss

it without costs. I should be very glad, for the sake of justice, that my decision should be reversed by the court of appeal."

The case being brought before the court of appeal, it was thrown out that it was a case for amicable settlement; but the defendant's counsel believed that his client "had resolved to spend his fortune in resisting the claim of Dr. O'Fay." Lord Justice Blackburn pronounced this to be a very *irrational* determination, although he had to decide that the claim could not be sustained in law or equity. Lord Chancellor Napier concluded his judgment as follows:—"I think I am not outstepping my duty in suggesting to the respondent that, under all the circumstances of this case, he will best maintain the *character and honour* of a British officer, *satisfy the exigencies of justice, and uphold the rights of property*, by making such an arrangement with Dr. O'Fay, as to the possession of this farm, *as may leave him the full benefit of an expenditure made in good faith, and with the reasonable expectation of having the full benefit of it sufficiently secured by an undisturbed possession.*" When the landlord's counsel asked for costs, the court of appeal refused, with the pertinent declaration that "*the landlord could pay himself out of the improvements he was getting possession of.*"

It is quite clear, therefore, that the law of equity as established by the decisions of Lord Eldon and other equity judges, not only leaves the tenant at the mercy of the landlord, but actually hands over to him every shilling which the tenant expends upon the land. This is legalizing injustice. The landlord has no more right to the produce of the tenant's capital and labour than he has to the money in his pocket. We would not defraud the landlord of one penny of his just rights. When the value of the land is increased, not by the capital and industry of the tenant, but by other causes, such as the increase in value of agricultural productions, and the decrease in the value of money, by improvements made by the landlord, &c., we would by all means give the landlord the benefit of these changes. But he must be content with these, and give the tenant the profits of his own labour and improvements. The cases and opinions already adduced, as well as those which we shall presently cite, prove that this equitable compensation must be retrospective as well as prospective. The classes of improvements for which compensation should be secured are quoted in Dr. Hancock's second report (pp. 61, 62) from a Tenant Bill prepared by some Irish members. They are: 1. Thorough drainage or main drainage of land; 2. Reclaiming bog-land, or reclaiming or enclosing waste land; 3. The making of farm-roads; 4. Irrigation; 5. Protection of land by embankment from inland waters; 6. The erection of a farmhouse or any building for agricultural purposes, suitable to the holding, or the enlarging, or the extending of any



such farmhouse or building erected or to be erected thereon, so as to render the same more suitable to the holding; 7. The renewal or reconstruction of any of the foregoing works, or such alterations therein, or additions thereto, as are not required for maintaining the same, and as increase durably their value; 8. Clearing land from rocks or stones; 9. Subsoiling; and 10. Unexhausted manuring. We do not mean that it would be possible or even just to legislate on the mere principle of compensation; but that these and other just rights of the tenant should form the basis on which legislation between landlord and tenant should proceed.

"The case of the purchasers under the Incumbered Estates Act," says Dr. Hancock's first report (p. 34), "affecting about one-fourteenth of Ireland, has sometimes been brought forward as conclusive against any possible recognition of past improvements." But the truth is, that purchasers in the Incumbered Estates Court, or in the Landed Estates Court, have no right to buy from the landlord what, in natural justice and equity, is the property of the tenant; and the State, as we shall show presently, has a perfect right to secure to the tenant the value of his improvements, in spite of the landlord, no matter how he may have acquired the land. Indeed, the tenant often requires protection against the rapacity of a small purchaser in the Landed Estates Court much more than against the ancient proprietor. Dr. Hancock relates (p. 40) a case of this kind, which came under his own notice in March last:—

A hard-working man, of good character, and with a small family, held, as tenant from year to year, about eight acres (statute measure) of land, at £1. 5s. an acre. He had either purchased the preceding tenant's improvements on the farm, according to custom, or succeeded his father as tenant. After being in occupation for some time, he proposed to leave the farm, to engage in some contracts elsewhere. He had been offered £8. 15s. an acre for his interest, or £70 in all; and the landlord for the time being would have allowed him to sell. He, unfortunately for himself, changed his mind, and stayed on. In the interim, the property—some small town-land, or half town-land—was sold in the Incumbered Estates Court, and purchased by a money-lender in the neighbourhood. He immediately gave the tenant notice to quit, and refused him the slightest compensation. The tenant at once lost £70 that he believed he possessed. He owed some £20 or £25. When ejected, he was sued for these debts, and cast into prison. He came up to be discharged as an insolvent. The Assistant-Barrister, like the Master of the Rolls, dwelt on the hardship of the case. He noticed the good character of the man, and refused to keep him one hour in custody. What good purpose was served by allowing the money-lender to get the poor man's farm without compensating him, it is hard to see. If the law be not altered, the tendency will be for the unscrupulous to have an advantage over men of honour and principle in purchasing land where tenant-right prevails. A purchaser who

proposes to himself to confiscate the tenant's interests, and clear the land without allowing compensation, can afford to give a higher price for an estate than a gentleman of character and position, who would scorn to take advantage of a poor tenant. Such purchasers, if not restrained by legalizing the principles of natural equity, contemplated by the Master of the Rolls, will involve other landlords in quarrels and questions they little think of.

Now, concerning the relations between landlord and tenant, there are two things to be considered : I. How far can the State interfere without injustice, and without invading the rights of property ? and II. How far is it bound to interfere ? We are not in accordance with those who would give the State, as such, a paramount dominion of ownership in the landed property comprised within the boundaries of its territory. We believe that the property in land, when justly acquired by private individuals or by societies, is subject to their exclusive ownership, and that one of the chief objects of civil society is to secure to them the exclusive enjoyment of their property. Whenever the State claims as such the ownership of the lands of its subjects, it is guilty of a most unjust invasion of the rights of property, and subverts one of the chief ends for which civil society was instituted. On the other hand, it is self-evident that citizens, both in their persons and in their property, are subject to the just laws of the society of which they are members. Thus the State has a manifest right to impose taxes ; for otherwise it could have neither fleets, nor armies, nor police, nor judges ; and hence it could neither protect itself against foreign invasion, nor preserve peace, nor administer justice amongst its own subjects. This power is generally called the *altum dominium* of the State. It may be defined to be *the power which the State enjoys to dispose of the property of its subjects as far as public necessity or the public good requires*. The right of the State is not, therefore, founded on the *title of dominion of property*, but in the *title of what is required by the public necessities or the public good*. For instance, when the enemy approaches a city with the intention of besieging it, those who are invested with the authority of the State can pull down the houses of private individuals when this is necessary, either to repair the walls, or to deprive the enemy of the shelter which he might derive from them in making his approaches. But the title of the State is not founded in the dominion of property, but in the public necessity ; for if, after the enemy has been repelled, any of the houses should be still standing, being no longer necessary to the State, they would undoubtedly belong to their former proprietors. Again, when the State requires the lands or houses of individuals to construct harbours or fortifications, or to make roads, it compels the owner, however reluctantly, to part with his property. No doubt, in these

cases, it generally gives the owner adequate compensation; but this is simply because the public good ordinarily requires that it should act in this manner; and consequently, if the State took the property in such cases without making adequate compensation, it would commit an injustice, because it would take away the property of another without any just title. But if the road were required on account of the public good, and the State, as happens in times of war, and especially of civil strife, had not the means of compensating the owners of the houses and lands required for its construction, it could take these justly, because it could rely on the title of the public good or of the public necessity. In the present case, there can be no doubt the State could not, without gross injustice, deprive the Irish landlords of the whole or any portion of their property, if that were necessary to the settlement of the question, without giving them adequate and even ample compensation. Even Mr. Mill, who will not be suspected of being very tender towards the landlord interest, says explicitly on this point:—"It is due to landowners, and to owners of any property whatever recognised as such by the State, that they should not be dispossessed of it without receiving its pecuniary value, or an annual income equal to that they derived from it."

Let us take an instance, where it is ordained by a modern statute, 3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 27, that no person shall, after the 31st December, 1833, make an entry, or distress, or bring an action to recover any land or rent, but within twenty years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or bring such action, shall first accrue either to the person himself, or to those through whom he claims, unless he should be under some legal disability. But no matter what disability he may have been under, even during the entire period, the Act declares (s. 34) that a lapse of forty years will not only bar his *remedy*, but will have the effect of *extinguishing his right*. Here the State makes no claim to the ownership of the property, but on account of the public good, and to prevent vexatious litigation, it transfers the land from the true owner to the person who, under ordinary circumstances, has been in peaceful possession of it for twenty years. We do not here speak of fraud on the part of the possessor, which may affect his own conscience, but when he has acted *bonâ fide* there is no doubt that the State, on account of the public good, can exercise this right of dominion and hand the property over to him. The same power is exercised by the State after periods of revolution, when rapacious men have seized by force and by the utmost injustice their neighbours' property. Certainly their fraud and injustice cannot give them a just title, any more than a just title can be conferred by highway robbery. But when the robbers are so numerous and powerful that the property cannot be restored to its rightful

owners without embroiling the country in a new and doubtful civil war, the State, as far as the property of the laity is concerned, can exercise its *altum dominium* on account of the public good, and can permit the possessors to retain their rapine. The same can and has been done by the Roman Pontiffs when the Church has been plundered in similar circumstances. Indeed, this *altum dominium* of the State is fully recognized by Lord Dufferin in the end of the passage which we shall just now quote from him, and in other parts of his work. He only argues on the principle that to pass a law for the protection of the tenant would not be for the public good. We shall therefore be obliged to combat his arguments. But in doing so we wish it to be understood that we look upon him as a good and humane landlord, as well as an able man. It is on this very account that we find it necessary to combat his arguments. But he fully admits that the State might *improve the landlords* out of the country if the public good required it.

Supposing, therefore, that the public good or public necessity requires that the State should regulate by law the relations between landlord and tenant, it has an evident right to do so. It may be useful to consider for a moment how far the State has actually, and still does actually, interfere in the regulation of the property in land. The land was not given by God to any individual. It was given by the Creator to all, and for the use of all mankind. Before its actual appropriation by communities or by individuals it was, and in the unappropriated parts of the world still is, in what is called *negative community*; that is, a condition in which the land belongs to no one in particular, and each person has a right to appropriate as much of it as he requires. But the moment he ceased actually to occupy it, the land would return into the state of *negative community*, and would belong to the first occupant. But when a man built a hut for his habitation, hedged round his field, and sowed his corn, no doubt he would have acquired a more permanent property in the land, nor could any other person, even though he were temporarily absent, seize his hut or reap his corn. This hut and field would belong to him so long as he intended to occupy them; and he could if he pleased transfer his own rights to another. Whilst therefore we admit that mere occupancy would give a man a title to the spot of earth he actually occupied, we deny that it would give him a claim beyond the time of actual occupation, unless he had made it his own by industry and labour, and thus had impressed the image of man's toil on the gift of the Creator. But the moment a man died without having disposed of his hut and field, it would return to the state of negative community, and would belong to the first occupant. He came naked into the world, and must leave it naked. He cannot take his property to the grave with him. Nearly all the owners of land in the country possess it by the

law of primogeniture. Who has given them a right to all those vast territorial possessions, to the exclusion of the actual occupiers, and of their own brothers and sisters? Was it not the State alone? And if the State can, without injustice, give the whole property to one member of a family, to the exclusion of all the rest, are we to be told that it cannot make regulations between the man to whom it has given the property, and the yeomanry who form the bone and sinew of the State? We might pursue the same argument as to the lands which have been transmitted by will or by the Statute of Distributions. And as to purchasers, surely they cannot expect to be endowed with a title superior to the title of a valid inheritance.

Again, the State has almost uniformly conferred the property on the original proprietors of the land. From the earliest periods when the human race separated on the plains of Sennaar, and acquired new territories by migration or the sword, the ruling powers amongst them assumed the dominion not only of jurisdiction but of property over all the lands of the territory they occupied. These were distributed in various ways, either in perpetuity, or for life, or for years, or at will, amongst the inferior members of the community. But the distribution was made in every instance, or at least was supposed to be made, for the purpose of making the whole community great and powerful. The feudal system, from which our modern tenures are derived, had for its paramount object the military power of the community, and the distribution of property amongst individuals was made entirely subservient to this end. The Government of the United States assumed the ownership of all its vast unappropriated territory, and the title of every citizen who occupies this land is derived from the State. The same plan is adopted in our own colonies of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Will any one say that the State has divested itself of all power to interfere with the regulation of these lands as far as the public good may require? In Ireland this argument is irresistible, for, as Mr. Butt proves (*Land Tenure*, p. 73, *seq.*), "the whole title to landed property in Ireland rests on confiscations carried out entirely by English power." The undertakers have, moreover, violated the conditions on which the lands of nearly six whole counties of Ulster were given to them. Mr. Butt cites these conditions in his reply to Lord Lifford (p. 33). One of these is, "The said undertakers shall not devise any part of their lands at will, but shall make certain estates for years, for life, in tail, or in fee simple." "The English Government," as Mr. Butt truly observes, "that exercised the right of conquest, that created these estates, has surely a right now to interfere and insist that any measure shall be taken which is necessary" to reconcile the people of Ireland to these iniquitous confiscations, and to make them a

source of strength instead of weakness to the Imperial Government.

It may be asked, what are the limits to the interference of the State with private property? We answer, the limits are defined by what is required by public necessity and the public good. Take the case, for instance, of the Norman kings, who turned vast tracts of England into hunting forests. By this conduct they abused the rights of property, for the public weal requires that land in those places, where its cultivation is necessary for the support of mankind, should be devoted to the purposes for which the Creator intended it, and not merely to suit the caprice or to gratify the passions of an individual. Suppose the proprietors of six or eight counties should agree to eject all their tenantry, and to convert the lands into hunting-grounds, is it to be said that they have a right to do what they like with their own, and that it would be an invasion of the rights of property if the State interfered with them?

We maintain that the State has a perfect right to constrain the landlord by statute to give his tenant a secure tenure of his farm. We go farther, and say that it is the duty of the State to enact such a law without delay. That such a law would promote the public prosperity is proved by the flourishing condition of the tenantry who enjoy tenant-right in Ulster and in parts of England. Indeed, the thing is self-evident, and we hardly think any man would have the hardihood to assert that a tenantry would advance in prosperity and contentment by being made dependent on the caprice of the landlord both as to the possession of their land and as to the rents they pay for them.

Before quitting this part of the subject, we will notice an argument adduced by Lord Dufferin, which has been very extensively quoted:—

"A tenant," he says, "is a person who does not possess land, but who hires the use of it. He embarks his capital in another man's field, much in the same way as a trader embarks his merchandise in another man's ship. In either case the amount of hire for the use of the ship or the use of the land will be determined by competition, and will affect the balance of gain or loss on both transactions. If ships are few and land is scarce, freight and rent will rise, and the rise of each will in a great measure be regulated by the disproportion of ships to goods, and of farmers to farms. It is hardly reasonable to deny the analogy because the ship is a manufactured article and the earth is the gift of God. The land I have bought is probably itself as much a manufactured article as a ship, and the iron or wood of which the ship is built is as much the gift of God as the land; the labour or enterprise by which the land has been rendered valuable is as clearly represented by the money I gave for it, as the industry and ingenuity exercised in its construction is represented by the price the owner has paid for the ship. *It is true*



*the country of which my estate is part belongs to the nation, and consequently my property in that estate is overridden by the imperial rights of the commonwealth. But this fact cannot invest the individual who may happen to hire my land, when once his tenancy is terminated, either by lapse of time or by the violation of his contract, with any peculiar rights in excess of those which may be inherent in the community at large."*

We are sorry to see the views expressed in the first part of this quotation, put forward by a member of the present ministry. But the argument is entirely founded on fallacies which can be very easily exposed. In the first place, it proceeds on the assumption that either the present possessor or one of those from whom he has derived his title has purchased the land, which, as far, at least, as Ireland is concerned, is quite untrue, for generally the lands were originally acquired by a most unjust confiscation. But confine the case to the small portion of the land which has been acquired by purchase, and even then the comparison utterly fails. Lord Dufferin's argument requires that the purchaser should have acquired not only the lands themselves, but the tenant's improvements also. Now, to make the cases analogous, Lord Dufferin should suppose that the owner of the goods had hired a ship which required great and extensive repairs before it could be put to sea, that the owner of the goods made the repairs at his own expense, on the force of an implied contract that he should be allowed to use the ship at the present rate of freightage, so long as she continued to be seaworthy. He should suppose that there is a law by which all the repairs made by the owner of the goods are made the absolute property of the shipowner. He should suppose that the purchaser has bought the ship with the perfect knowledge of all the facts, and that he takes possession of the ship and refuses to make any compensation to the owner of the goods, who has repaired her at his own expense. We ask Lord Dufferin, would this be just, or, if such a law existed, should it be permitted to remain on the statute-book a single month after the assembling of Parliament? On this head there is an essential difference between the English and Irish landlords, because the general rule in England is that all permanent necessary improvements are made by the landlord; whilst the Irish landlord throws the whole burthen on the tenant, without even affording him the security of a lease. Now, as in estimating the profit a man is entitled to for his capital, we must take into consideration the risk he runs, it is quite evident that if the landlord keeps his tenant at his mercy, he should, according to all economic principles, be made to pay for this luxury.

Lord Dufferin says: "In either case the amount of hire for the use of the ship and the use of the land will be determined by *competition*—if ships are few and land is scarce freight and rent will rise. The labour and enterprise by which the land has been made

valuable is as clearly represented by the money I gave for it, as the industry and ingenuity exercised in its construction is represented by the price the owner has paid for the ship." Again, we must protest against Lord Dufferin's assumption that every owner of an Irish estate has either purchased it or inherited it from ancestors who have purchased it. But passing this by, the comparison utterly fails, because there is no law by which the industry and ingenuity of the shipbuilders are confiscated to the owner of the raw material who has employed them to build or to repair his ship, whilst there is a law by which the labour and enterprise by which the land has been made valuable are confiscated to the landlord, who in Ireland simply supplies the raw material. Many tenants occupy farms which have been possessed by members of the same family for one or two hundred years. In many instances a large portion of this farm was mere waste which the tenant has reclaimed and made arable. In almost every instance he has made all the other improvements; he has built the farm-house and offices, manured, fenced, and drained the lands. The purchaser knows this perfectly well. The landlord had barely a legal right derived from a state of the law which the judges have denounced from the bench as unjust and inhuman. Will Lord Dufferin assert that because one man has bought what he knew another had no right to sell, the State can no longer vindicate the rights of justice and humanity?

Again, Lord Dufferin would apply the rigid laws of political economy to the relations of landlord and tenant. And here, we must observe his lordship's reasoning is not consecutive; for having first compared the price paid by the tenant for the *use* of the land, with the price paid by the merchant for the *use* of the ship, he illustrates this by stating that: "The labour and enterprise by which the land has been made valuable is as clearly represented by *the money I gave for it*, as the industry and ingenuity exercised in its construction is represented by the price *the owner has paid for the ship*." Now this is what logicians call a *transitus a genere ad genus*: if the landlord sold only what he had a right to sell, we admit the parallel. The purchaser of the land, as distinguished from the occupier, merely chooses the purchase of the land as a mode of investing his capital. Land is not a matter of necessity to him. If he cannot get land, there are innumerable other investments open to him. If farms were to be had when required by tenants as easily as investments, we would admit that they also should be regulated by the great economic principle of demand and supply, if it would satisfy even these. The small tillage farmer who has purchased his holding, or whose industry and capital, and the industry and capital of his ancestors for generations, have converted the barren waste into arable lands, would think he received but scant justice if no more compensation were granted to him than to

the rich grazier who occupies from three hundred to two and even three thousand acres on which he has never expended a shilling. It would be most desirable that all parties should take this to heart, that the landlord should not be permitted to plunder the tenant by appropriating the produce of his capital and labour, nor the tenant to turn plunderer in his turn by appropriating that which *justly* belongs to the lord of the soil. We would be very sorry to exchange the lord of the soil for the middle man,—the Smiths and the Gibbings for the Hunters. There must be an entirely different protection secured to the small tillage farmer who has made all the improvements on the lands, and to the gentlemen graziers, and such tillage farmers as the tenantry of Mr. Pollock, who has made all necessary improvements himself and has given his rich tenants who have not to spend anything on improvements, leases of nineteen years. On this matter we might refer to the special commissioners of nearly all the newspapers who have appointed gentlemen of intelligence to inquire into the Land Question in Ireland. Our space will only permit us to cite a passage from the Commissioner of the *London Times*. The letter is dated Mullingar, September 14th:—"The landlords, though too marked off from the people, *as a rule*, respect the social arrangements, the dealings and natural rights of their tenants; they neither attempt *by unjust evictions*, nor *by iniquitous raising of rents*, to appropriate what really belongs to others, nor do they disregard the tenant-right, arising from the sale of the goodwill of farms, which, in this country is a common practice. But—besides that in the years that succeeded the famine, society in Westmeath was much disturbed by extensive evictions from estates—even now, as always will be the case when social elements occasionally jar, and when too much is left to arbitrary power, wrongs in the relation of landlord and tenant occur too frequently in this country. Sometimes the zeal of a Protestant proprietor gets the better of his sense of fair dealing. Occasionally, too, the spirit of avarice will break through the barriers of mere usage, and I have been informed of more than one instance in which purchasers in the Landed Estates' Court have set aside the equitable claims of their tenants. Now and then, moreover, landlords will abuse the extraordinary power their position gives them, and I write with a set of contracts before me of a singular and iniquitous kind, which a proprietor has lately endeavoured to compel his tenants at will to sign, in order evidently to deprive them of even the scanty protection of the common law, and to free himself from the implied obligations which local usage would impose on him, so long as they held by the tenure of the country. Westmeath presents in a marked form the contrasts of occupation and tenure which I adverted to in a previous letter. The greater part of its fine lands is now held by substantial farmers or by

graziers of a superior class ; many of these have of course the security of a lease, and in most instances the landlords have either put the lands in good order and built farmsteads before the commencement of a tenancy, or else the lands, being admirable pastures, require little or no outlay. The existing law of landlord and tenant applies therefore fairly enough to these cases. It either has no tendency to confiscate what belongs to the tenant on a change of possession, or else its harsh doctrines are excluded by contracts between independent persons. By far the largest portion of the country, however, is still occupied by small farmers, who legally are merely tenants at will, though they have added much to the value of the soil by building, enclosing, fencing, and tillage, and though they have purchased their interests in numerous instances, and it is probable that they will long maintain their ground, though the area they hold is being diminished. The existing law is not a rule of right to this body of men in their actual position ; it exposes what is in truth their property, the benefits they have added to the land, to be confiscated by a summary process : it sets at naught the equitable right acquired by a transfer for value with the assent of the landlord."

The same correspondent writing from Trim, September 17, declares that though there has been a remarkable consolidation and consequent increase in the size of farms for some years past in Meath, it has made less progress than any of the neighbouring counties with which it can be compared. He saw here even more markedly than elsewhere, the rich grazier, the poor tillage farmer holding poor land at a high rent, with all his own improvements at the mercy of his landlord, and the wretched, ragged, starved labourer to whom the rich grazier gives no employment.

Now where there is an universal and manifest injustice of this kind there must be a remedy. This remedy must be found in legislation ; but before proceeding to discuss the remedy we wish to point out a mistake into which most of those who have spoken or written on the subject of tenant-right in Ireland seem to have fallen. They all proceed on the principle that the provisions of any Bill which may be brought into Parliament on this subject must be applied indiscriminately to all classes of farmers in Ireland. Now we protest against this assumption. We maintain that any retrospective legislation must be founded on the principle of giving the tenant what in natural justice should have been his own,—namely, the produce of his own labour and capital which he has invested in the land. We maintain, moreover, that legislation on the subject of the land must not only respect all just rights of property, but moreover that its benefits must not be confined to a class, but must be such as to promote the prosperity of the whole community.

We will divide the community into two classes,—1. those who have a direct interest in the land, and 2. those who have not. The first class comprises landlords, tenants, and agricultural labourers; the second, shopkeepers, artisans, and all other members of the community who are not comprised in the first class. The tenants must, however, be subdivided into two classes, namely, the graziers and large tillage farmers on whose holdings, as in the case of Mr. Pollock, the landlord has made all the improvements. We will now proceed to state what legislation would in our opinion be at once just and advantageous to the various classes we have enumerated. We will begin with the graziers and large tillage farmers on whose holdings the landlord has made all necessary permanent improvements. We would not, as regards the past, interfere between this class of farmers and the landlord except to make them perfectly free to use their farms as they pleased. Any covenants by which they may be restrained from cultivating their lands should be declared null and void. The productiveness of the land, when properly tilled, is about four times that of the same land when used as pasture. To till the land instead of using it as pasture would certainly promote the general good of the country, and it would advance the interests of the labouring classes by creating a demand for labour and thereby increasing its price. We have said we would not interfere between this class of tenants and their landlords as to the past. But we supposed that *all necessary permanent improvements* were made by the landlord. If any such improvements had been made by the tenant himself or by those to whose rights he succeeded during the past, whereby the value of the inheritance was increased, we would in case of his being evicted or of his quitting the lands on account of the rent being raised, or for any other cause created by the voluntary act of the landlord, grant him compensation for his improvements. As to the future, we would allow the tenant, without asking any consent from the landlord, to cultivate his land, and to make any of the improvements we have enumerated in the early part of this article, when necessary. Amongst the farm buildings which should be regarded as permanent improvements, we would especially enumerate comfortable residences for all agricultural labourers permanently employed on the farm, and for their families. We should also grant loans to the farmer for the purpose of making permanent improvements such as we have enumerated. We should oblige the landlord in case the tenancy were terminated as above, to compensate the tenant for these improvements. We would also protect the rights of the landlord, for if the tenant, in circumstances in which he may reasonably be supposed to have the intention of abandoning the land, was exhausting it by constant tillage without manuring, or was making an unnecessary outlay in buildings, or in other

improvements, we would grant the landlord a remedy by conceding to him the power of obtaining an injunction to restrain the tenant, either at the quarter sessions or from any court of law or equity. Nor as regards improvements would we, on the termination of the tenancy in the manner already specified, indemnify the farmer for any outlay by which the value of the inheritance should not be increased.

By legislation of this kind no injury would be done to the landlord, and the tenant would be stimulated to acquire an interest in the soil by making improvements which would give employment to the agricultural labourer. It would be contrary to every principle of economic science to grant perpetuity of tenure to the occupiers of large grazing farms, because if they were not prevented from subletting, a class of middlemen, who were so long the curse of Ireland, would be created, or if they were prevented from dividing their farms, vast tracts of the richest lands would be permanently bound up to one individual in their most unproductive form. The Conservative lord mayor elect of Dublin declared, in a speech made not long since in the corporation, that Ireland, when her population was nearly double what it is at present, was a corn-exporting, whereas it is now a corn-importing country. We must not be supposed to be hostile to the granting of leases to large agricultural farmers, or to graziers. On the contrary, we think landlords would act more wisely by granting them good long leases. Nor, in their present circumstances, do we blame the graziers for not tilling a part of their lands, or for not making improvements which would give employment to the agricultural labourer. We simply say that in our opinion they have not made out a case which would justify the legislature in interfering between them and their landlords beyond what we have pointed out. We reserve the consideration of the claims of the other classes we have enumerated for our next number.

But look at the present state of Ireland. The land has been torn by England's might and by England's wrong from the rightful owners. The old paternal system by which the lands were held was abolished, and the feudal system forced upon a people to whom it was quite unsuited. No free trade was permitted in the land, which was tied up by entails and family settlements.

"It might be thought," says Dr. Hancock (pp. 23-24), "that the sales in the Incumbered Estates Court had effected such a change in the landed property in Ireland, that the amount of property in settlement was no longer so considerable as to require a remedy. What, however, are the facts? Mr. Griffith's valuation of Ireland gives the annual value of the real property as about £12,000,000. This being generally 25 per cent. below the letting value, gives a gross rental of £16,000,000. Now the gross amount purchased in the



Incumbered Estates Court is £23,000,000. If the estates produced twenty years' purchase on an average, this would give a rental of £1,130,000 sold, or only one-fourteenth of the rental of Ireland. Of the other thirteen-fourteenths, it may still be said that in Ireland settlements of all estates prevail much more extensively than in England, and the class of proprietors *purely in fee simple* is so small that it does not deserve to form an exception to the general rule, all proprietors being under disabilities."

No doubt some changes have been made since this report was written (1859), but it is still true that in Ireland especially the monopoly in land is preserved by marriage settlements. Is this then a state of things in which Lord Dufferin or any other man would ask to have land regulated by the principle of demand and supply? The very first condition requisite for the application of this principle is, that there should be perfect freedom to buy and sell. The prices of the very necessities of life were artificially increased by protective duties to swell the rentals of the landlords. Had there been perfect free trade in land for a century or two, perhaps it might now be safely left to be regulated by demand and supply; and perhaps if free trade in it were now established, in a century hence the equilibrium between demand and supply would be restored. But we must not defer the remedy of a crying evil for a *century and a perhaps*. It is admitted by statesmen of all parties that the condition of the Irish tenantry requires immediate redress.

We say if free trade in land were fully established, the equilibrium between demand and supply might *perhaps* be restored in a century. But we are not by any means certain that the principle of supply and demand should ever be rigidly applied to the relations between landlord and tenant in a country where the whole of the land is possessed by a comparatively small number of proprietors. The reason is, that the truth of the economic principle whereby the price and possession of the articles of commerce should be regulated by demand and supply is only proved *by experience*, and whenever we attempt to stretch it further we are simply making a leap in the dark. We know by experience that the price of food, of clothes, of plate, of horses, of carriages, of labour, and perhaps of all personal chattels, as well as of house rent, is best regulated by demand and supply. But the reason is, that if the State tells the baker that he shall only charge a certain price for his bread when flour is dear, he cannot afford to sell it at that price, and will rather remain idle than do so. If to obviate this the miller is ordered to sell his flour at a cheap rate whilst wheat is dear, he cannot afford to do so, and will cease to grind. If the farmer be ordered to sell his wheat at a low price, whilst the commodity is scarce and the demand great, he will

refuse to do so, and will either fetch it to another market, or keep it in his haggard or barn. These attempts to lower the price will inevitably raise it by creating a greater scarcity than would have existed had no such attempt been made. Any efforts directly to raise prices by mere enactments would be equally unsuccessful. But these principles essentially require two things : 1. That buyers and sellers be perfectly free to choose their own market ; and 2. That if the article be of prime necessity, it can be produced in sufficient quantity to supply the reasonable demands of all who desire to purchase it. If a man were forced in a season of scarcity to take his produce to a certain specified market and to sell it at a low stipulated price, or if, on the other hand, all foreign corn were excluded from our ports, prices would be artificially lowered in one case and raised in the other. Again, if the thing cannot be supplied in sufficient quantity to meet the demand of all those who reasonably desire it, it may be the imperative duty of the State to take care that a reasonable quantity shall be given to each one. Suppose a few individuals managed to get all the corn in a city during the time of a siege, and that they agreed not to sell one pound of flour under £50, whereby all but the enormously wealthy would be doomed to death by starvation, would it not be the duty of the governor to regulate the price so as to permit every one to live ? We have an example in the very matter of the distribution of land in some parts of Australia. It is divided into lots which are not put up to public competition, but a fixed price is set upon each, and the applicants being quite too numerous for the supply, each one obtains his lands by lottery. Moreover, the man who has got one of these lots is not permitted to obtain another. Thus even in a country where the territory is almost boundless, the principle of demand and supply, in the matter of land, is not acted on.

Now in Ireland the land has never been freely and unrestrainedly in the market. It is a necessary of life for the poor farmer, the demand is far too great for the supply, and it can neither be imported from foreign countries like corn, nor multiplied according to the demand like ships and houses. To deprive a poor Irish farmer of his land is simply to condemn him to exile in a foreign land or to incarceration in the workhouse. The Irish farmer carries with him to the land of his exile the most bitter hatred of landlord tyranny and of British rule, and the most poignant sorrow for the home and the country of his fathers. *Nos patriæ fines et dulcia linquimus arva ; nos patriam fugimus.* It is almost as great cruelty to apply the doctrines of supply and demand to this case, as it would be to tell the penniless pauper to go to market and buy his daily bread. There are higher laws than the laws of political economy, they are entirely subordinate

to the public good of the community, and it is unreasonable and absurd to try to press them into service in matters where their operation is pernicious. As the law now stands a landlord might clear his whole estates of human beings, no matter how numerous they may be, or to what ruin they would be reduced, by six months' notice to quit. No doubt, it is not likely that any landlord will at once exercise this power, but the power of eviction is exercised often enough to render it ruinous to many good and industrious families, and pernicious to the public weal of the empire.

There is an argument against the landlord being permitted to evict his tenants whenever it suits his fancy derived from the tenant right of Ulster, which must be quite familiar to Lord Dufferin:—

"The existing interest," says Dr. Hancock (p. 39), "of tenants in Ulster would require to be dealt with in any legislation. It is hard to estimate the exact amount of property at stake on the question. But as the arable land of Ulster is 3,400,000 acres, and much more than half is held by yearly tenants, the tenant-right of those tenants, which usually brings at least £10 an acre, cannot be worth less in Ulster alone than £20,000,000. How, then, is this £20,000,000, to which the law at present affords no protection, to be secured? . . . It has sometimes been proposed, as a great favour, to exempt tenant-right from some proposed legislation. As it has been demonstrated that this £20,000,000 has no legal security, to exempt it from legislation is to leave it insecure; whatever opinion any one may hold as to tenant-right, or as to legislation upon it, it is absurd to represent the exempting it from any wise legislation as a favour. Again, it is said that, after all, the Ulster tenants are safe enough. This is true on many properties, but still there are cases occurring of total confiscation of improvements. These produce a feeling of insecurity; they lead every now and again to agitation, and in some cases to frightful outrages."

The tenant-right of Ulster consists in the outgoing tenant being permitted to sell the "goodwill" of his farm. "The tenants," says Dr. Hancock, "are nearly all yearly tenants; every change of tenancy takes place with the landlord's knowledge and assent." The farm cannot be divided without the landlord's assent; but the possessor, either during his life or by his will, names the person who is to succeed to the farm, generally imposing some charges on it for the benefit of the other members of the family. These, as well as all other just charges against the farm, the landlord compels the new tenant to pay. If a tenant gets into arrears, or wishes to dispose of his farm for any other cause, he asks leave from the landlord or agent to sell his interest. Leave is given, subject to the new tenant being approved of by the landlord. This approval is never unreasonably refused, and the rent is scarcely ever raised on the occasion of the transfer of the farm. The reason is, that all the neighbouring tenants occupying lands of the same quality

hold them at the same rate, and to raise the land before the sale would be a confiscation of the tenant-right of the seller; to raise it after the sale would be clearly unjust to the purchaser. It is thus that the delicate question of fixing the rent of farms which are held from year to year is regulated, and on the whole it works pretty well on the estates of great proprietors. They generally let their lands at a fair rent, on the principle of "live and let live"; and as the rents of lands of the same quality are uniform over the whole estate, the landlords who recognize tenant-right do not, as a general rule, take advantage of the sale or transfer of a farm to raise the rent. We say they do not as a general rule; but if a misunderstanding, on account of politics or for any other cause, arises between landlord and tenant, or, as more frequently happens, between the agent and tenant, tenant-right is ignored, and the rent is raised, or the tenant even ejected out of his holding.

"In the course," says Dr. Hancock (p. 30), "of twenty or thirty years, nearly every farm changes hands from death or other causes, and on every change some money is paid to the preceding tenant, or to his creditors or representatives, by the new tenant, with the landlord's or agent's perfect knowledge or assent. I will give an illustration that came under my notice. At the last March Assizes, an action was brought by a creditor against the executor of a deceased tenant. It appeared as part of the proof of the executor having had assets, that the deceased had held as tenant from year to year a farm in the county of Down, of forty acres of land, with a good house, farm buildings, and other improvements upon it, erected by himself or preceding tenants. The estate on which the farm is situated had been purchased by the landlord or his father, and before permitting the land to be sold he had it valued, and raised the rent 5s. an acre. This land was certainly let at its full value, and yet the purchase-money amounted to £540, or £13. 10s. an acre. This money was paid into the agent's office, and the arrears of rent and some of the tenant's debts being paid out of it, the balance was handed to the executor. . . . The landlord who assented to the purchase I am referring to is an old man; if he should die, ought his successor be allowed to take advantage of the tenant, if he were disposed to do so?"

We will add, if this farm were sold in the Landed Estates or in any other court, can the purchaser say that because he has bought the landlord's interest in the land, this £540 belongs to him, and that he can turn the tenant out without injustice? No doubt such is the law, but it is a law which every principle of justice requires to be changed. Surely when a landlord has thus made himself a party to the purchase of land, he has made himself a party to a contract, which should be enforced by law.

Now we fearlessly affirm that the area of the lands of Ulster, the tenant-right of which has been purchased by the occupying tenant, or by those from whom he has derived them, is double the

area of the lands the fee of which has been purchased by the landlord or his predecessors. Why therefore should not the law secure to the industrious farmer the tenant-right which he has purchased, and the improvements which he has made with the sweat of his brow? Or is it just to secure to the purchaser of the fee not only his own property, but the just property of the tenant farmer also? Nor can this reasoning be confined to the class of farmers whose tenant-right can be shown to have been purchased, any more than the property in the fee can be confined to the same class of landlords. For those tenants who have not purchased their tenant-right might have sold it. It is a property which they justly possess, and which should be legally secured to them. How far the extension of tenant-right and its legalization all over Ireland would be a remedy for the admitted evils of the present land tenure in Ireland we shall consider hereafter, but we do not think the true solution is to be found in handing over the whole land of the country in fee-farm to the present occupiers, and only allowing a rent-charge to the landlords. This would be confining the whole advantage of the measure to the actual occupiers of the land, many of whom hold very large tracts of pasturage, and give little or no employment to the labouring classes. It would, moreover, tend to confine the whole land of the country to the present occupiers, and to exclude all others from it, which would not be at all desirable. Such a measure would not satisfy the country. It would only satisfy the present tenant-farmers and their connections.

---

## Notices of Books.

---

*La Civiltà Cattolica.* September 4, 1869. Roma.

**T**HIS number contains a very important article, on the anti-Roman movement in Germany which has been evoked by anticipation of the Vatican Council. The apparent purpose of this movement is (1) to avert any definition of Pontifical infallibility and any reassertion of the Syllabus; (2) to effect an abrogation or fundamental modification of the various ecclesiastical laws, which concern the prohibition of books and the censure of doctrinal errors; (3) to obtain the admission of laymen to a certain share in ecclesiastical government; (4) to elicit some disavowal of the Church's power in temporals. In fact, its abettors occupy a position as precisely opposite to that of the "Civiltà," as it is possible to do without expressly abandoning their Catholic profession.

It is no longer a secret, says the "Civiltà" (p. 585), that Dr. Dollinger is the prime originator of this movement; and that Prince Hohenlohe's interrogations, of which more anon, were no less really prompted by him, than were the theological replies thereto. He is the head among a number of kindred spirits: "all the threads of the movement converge at Munich; from thence come the orders of attack; from thence the agitation receives its movement and its life" (p. 586).

First of all it was necessary, to stimulate as large a proportion as possible of German Catholics into sympathy and co-operation. With this view there appeared, beginning in September 1868, a series of twelve articles in the "Augsburg Gazette." Early in the present year various pamphlets were published in the same direction. Then some more articles in the Augsburg Gazette, occasioned by the "Civiltà" French correspondence. Then came the questions addressed by Prince Hohenlohe to the universities, for the purpose (says the "Civiltà") of obtaining a predetermined answer.\*

---

\* We take from the "Guardian" the answer to these questions, as given by the theological faculty of Munich itself. They are of high theological interest. The "Univers," however, of Sept. 23, mentions that this reply was by no means unanimous, and that the dissentients have published their reply separately. Dr. Dollinger and his friends answer as follows:—

"First Question—If the propositions contained in the Syllabus and the infallibility of the Pope are to be declared articles of faith by the coming Council, what changes will be caused in the doctrine of the relations of Church and State as it has hitherto been treated theoretically and practically in Germany?"



Lastly came the petitions of Coblenz and of Bonn, to which the signatures of laymen were invited. These addresses however, adds the "Civiltà," were perfect failures, whether you regard the number or the weight of those who signed. "In vain do you look for the name of men universally recognized in the Rhine countries as good Catholics. In many important towns the most active solicitations could not obtain a single signature. At Coblenz 45 only signed out of 120 to whom the address was offered. At

---

"Assuming that, in exact accordance with the wording of this question, the propositions of the Syllabus are to be laid before the approaching Council as decrees or decisions to be issued by it, and assuming that the Council will formally adopt these propositions *nude et pure* as they stand, and will condemn whatever the Pope has condemned in them, it is very possible that some not unimportant changes will be introduced into the present relations between Church and State. We do not say more than 'it is possible,' because as yet the purely negative wording of some of the propositions has not permitted the formation of any distinct scientific judgment as to their extent and bearing. Such a judgment would, however, be possible if an interpretation of these propositions, which has not been put forward in a distinctly authentic manner since 1864, was to be adopted. But we may certainly presume that the propositions of the Syllabus will be laid before the Council in a positive form, and will therefore be confined within more certain limits.

"It will then rest with the wisdom of the Council, and the work will be intrusted to it, to take such measures in reference to the existing laws and systems of those States and countries which have sent Bishops to the assembly as will prevent the growth of unnecessary and inevitable conflicts, between these its decrees and the conscience of Catholics on the one hand, and the rightful constitutions and laws of civil society on the other. Meanwhile we have before us an attempt, which, from the position of its author, is by no means without weight, to transpose the negations of the Syllabus into positive or affirmative propositions; and this may serve to some extent, reserving what has been said above, as a test or a rule by which we may judge of the serious effect that may be given to some of the propositions.

"The work to which we refer is written by the Jesuit Father Clemens Schrader, who is now in Rome, and prominently engaged in the preparations for the Council. It is called 'The Pope and Modern Ideas. Second Part. The Encyclical of December 8, 1864. Accompanied by a Letter of Recommendation from the Pope. Vienna, 1865.' In this work, among other things, the 44th Proposition of the Syllabus is thus stated:—'The civil authority cannot interfere in questions of religion and ecclesiastical law. It cannot therefore pronounce any judgment on the instructions which are issued by the rulers of the Church by virtue of their office as a guide for the conscience.' Again, the 30th Article is thus expressed by Father Schrader:—'The immunity of the Church and of ecclesiastical persons does not take its origin from civil law'; and it is added in a footnote—'but it takes its root in the rights belonging to the Church herself and given her by God.' The necessary consequence of this is further expressed in the 31st Article:—'The ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the temporal, civil, as well as the criminal concerns of the clergy, must not be wholly removed, even without inquiry and against the protest of the Apostolic See;' and the note which explains and completes it is—'for it is founded upon the personal rights of the Church, and can only be transferred to the civil tribunals with the express consent of the Pope.'<sup>1</sup> Now,

Bonn a large number of laymen who in [knowledge of] doctrine, in learning and in zeal are inferior to none of the subscribers, formally refused their adhesion" (p. 590).

Now what are the merits of this movement? In the first place, conspicuously and almost avowedly its end is to prevent the assembled bishops from exercising a free judgment, and from acting freely on their convictions: to prevent this, partly by the pressure of lay public opinion, but far more

as this appears to admit that such a transfer can take place with the consent of the Pope, and is therefore opposed to the universal rule that the Pope cannot dispense with anything that is of Divine right, we must look for a clearer explanation of these two articles, which will perhaps be given by the Council.

"The 78th Article is thus expressed by Father Schrader:—'It was therefore not right for certain Catholic countries to guarantee immigrants the free-exercise of their religion;' and this censure is confirmed by the wording of the 79th Article:—'For it is not false that the civil equality of all religions, and the permission accorded to all men to express all kinds of opinions freely and openly, lead to the more easy corruption of the minds and morals of nations and to the spread of the pest of indifferentism.' Now, in the face of such propositions, it cannot be denied that if such or similar conclusions are to be formed, they may lead to very great troubles. For principles of an exactly opposite tendency are so firmly established both in theory and practice in all European Constitutions, and it is hardly possible for any one of them to accept any other theory than those of the civil equality of all religious sects and the freedom of opinions. Assuming then that the condemnation of these is to be imposed, in the manner described above, on all who hold the Catholic belief, it is manifest that collisions which can scarcely be reconciled must arise, between their religious and their civil obligations; and that, under certain circumstances, the results, both for the individual members and for the whole body of the Church in some countries, will be difficult and disastrous. With regard to the exclusion of the civil authority from the whole province of morals, we may suspect that Father Schrader has not correctly expressed the proposition of the Syllabus; and, of course, even if other articles of the Syllabus are converted into decrees of the Council, this article will be rendered in such a form as not to expose it any longer to the misconceptions of Father Schrader. But it is more difficult to answer the question, how far the doctrine of the relations of Church and State will be changed by the elevation of the opinion about Papal infallibility into a dogma. The attempt to answer it leads us by the natural connection of the subject to the second question.

"Second Question.—In the case already put, would the public teachers of dogmatic theology and ecclesiastical law feel themselves bound to establish, that the doctrine of the divinely ordained sovereignty of the Pope over monarchs and Governments, whether as *potestas directa* or *indirecta in temporalia*, was binding on the conscience of every Christian?

"As regards the declaration of the Pope's infallibility as an article of faith, that is necessarily most important for the internal and spiritual concerns of the Church, and has only an indirect bearing on the relations between Church and State. The first question therefore, as far as it asks what changes might be introduced in the legal relations between Church and State in the event of infallibility being raised into a dogma, cannot be answered in a moment, nor can such changes be enumerated or distinguished all at once. But when we come to examine more closely the con-

through the intervention of secular governments. For years disloyal and disaffected Catholics have been complaining about the absolutism of Rome : "she will never dare" they have said "to summon a council." She *has* summoned a Council ; and our liberal friends are aghast at the prospect. They have appealed from Pope to Council ; and now they appeal from Council to Caesar.

Then secondly, as the "*Civiltà*" points out, these disloyal Germans are

---

sequences that will follow from the Pope's infallibility as regards the doctrine of a divinely ordained sovereignty over monarchs and Governments, we must remember that certain theologians have endeavoured to prove that the infallibility of the Pope may be entirely confined to spiritual matters : as, for instance, the Benedictine Father Cartier. At the same time both the French theologians who make that their reason for attacking the doctrine of infallibility (such as Bossuet, De Marca, Cardinal de Luzerne, &c., and the Italian school of Jesuits which defends it, such as Bellarmine, Gretzer, Becanus, Rocaberti, Sfondrati, &c.) have stated that the doctrine of the divinely ordained sovereignty of the Pope over the civil authority—that is, States and their rulers—is so inseparably connected with the doctrine of Papal infallibility, that whoever maintains the last must also accept the first ; and they have based this on the fact, that the Popes themselves have proclaimed the doctrine in the most solemn manner, and have declared it to be binding on the whole Church. This, it is well known, was done by Popes Gregory VII. and X., Innocent III. and IV., by Boniface VIII. in the Bull '*Unam Sanctam*,' by John XXII., by Leo X. at the Fifth Council of the Lateran, by Paul IV. and Pius V.

"There can be no question therefore, that if the Council proclaims the doctrine of Papal infallibility absolutely and without any limitations, this Papal authority over the civil powers will also be introduced as a doctrine of the Church : which it has not been hitherto. How far however this will bring about a change in the relations of the Papal See to the several States, depends mainly on personal considerations, and cannot therefore be more closely discussed. All that can be said is, that the most eminent theologians, as Bellarmine and many others, who have maintained this political power of the Pope, have not prescribed any limits for its exercise ; but have left the use or abuse of it entirely dependent on the judgment of the Popes themselves. The position which would have to be taken up under these circumstances by the teachers of ecclesiastical law and dogmatic theology, cannot be reviewed completely and in all its bearings ; but so much may be stated with certainty, that when a general decree of the Council is issued, then will begin the work of ascertaining and explaining the consequences of its practical application to the various branches and concerns of ecclesiastical life. In this scientific work the teachers of ecclesiastical law and dogmatic theology will take that part which naturally belongs to them. Those among them who are members of the clerical order, will also have to act in this work in accordance with the instructions that may be given them by their bishops upon the basis of those doctrines of which the whole Church is thoroughly persuaded.

"Third Question.—Would the teachers of dogmatic theology and ecclesiastical law consider themselves bound to adopt in their lectures and writings the doctrine that the personal and real immunities of the clergy are of Divine right, and therefore belong to the sphere of dogma ?

"If among the other propositions of the Syllabus those relating to the immunity of the clergy are adopted by the Council in a positive or affirmative manner, they must certainly oppose the doctrine of a purely civil

in avowed opposition to the teaching of the Syllabus. But there cannot be a greater mistake than to suppose, that the non-infallibility of the Pope implies the non-infallibility of the Syllabus. In fact, as the Bishop of Nîmes states in his admirable Pastoral, on two different occasions the Syllabus has received the suffrage of the dispersed Episcopate. It received that suffrage firstly, when it was first published; and secondly, when the bishops, assembled at Rome in 1867, signed their

origin for those immunities by that of a Divine institution. This indeed has been constantly taught in the canon law, from Gratian down to the seventeenth century. The teachers of dogmatic theology and ecclesiastical law would, on their part, while continuing to set forth what, according to the canonists, has always been held on the subject of the immunities,—most probably maintain that the Pope can permit or excuse the practical disuse of certain immunities, as the circumstances of the time may require.

“Fourth Question.—Is there any generally recognized criterion by which it can be ascertained with certainty whether any given dictum of the Pope is *ex cathedrâ*, and, therefore, according to the doctrine to be laid down by the Council, infallible and binding on the conscience of every Christian; and if there is such a criterion, where is it to be found?

“There is no generally recognized criterion, by which it can be ascertained with certainty whether any given Papal dictum has been pronounced *ex cathedrâ*, and whether, therefore, in case the Papal infallibility is declared by the Council, this prerogative will also attach. Some twenty different hypotheses are to be found among the theologians who have maintained the doctrine in question, as to the conditions which should be required of a decision *ex cathedrâ*. No one of these demands, some of which are extremely various and differ very much from each other, has attained any great importance. No one of them has ever been supported by any very considerable number of theologians; each one too has been much controverted; and it may be said of all of them, that they have been arbitrarily devised, as it is not possible in this matter to draw from tradition or the written word. It appears, therefore, that if a decree as to Papal infallibility is really passed by the assembly of the Church in Rome, there must also be a definition of what is a decision *ex cathedrâ*: as otherwise uncertainty and occasions for strife would always continue.

“Fifth Question.—How far must the new dogmas which are aimed at, and their necessary consequences, produce an alteration in popular education in church and school, and have a similar influence on popular school books and catechisms?

“It is certainly quite manifest that the popular books of religious instruction, and especially the catechisms, must be altered, if Papal infallibility is to be raised to the rank of a universal and divinely revealed article of faith. The catechisms which are chiefly used in the kingdom of Bavaria, or which were used till lately (we refer especially to the Catechism of the Diocese of Augsburg, 1858, of Bamberg, 1855, of Würzburg, &c.), only refer to the infallibility of *the Church* as a teacher: and it is said that this function of teaching is exercised by the Pope and the Bishops in union with him, and that its decisions are principally given by the voice of General Councils. The catechism of the Jesuit Father de Harbe, which is now introduced in a good many dioceses, teaches indeed a very different doctrine. In this book it is stated that ‘the Church, in its capacity as a teacher, utters its decisions either through the medium of the Pope or through that of an ecclesiastical assembly under the Pope’s sanction.’ In direct antagonism to the German catechisms which were formerly in use,

very remarkable address to the Holy Father. The "Civiltà" (p. 587) lays especial stress on the latter; and speaks (p. 586) of the "adhesions" to that address "subsequently given in by the bishops who were not present." We may refer to our number for October, 1867 (pp. 530-532) where we considered in some detail the singular force and cogency of this beautiful address.

The present German movement then is simply disgraceful; and can be called by no milder name. So far as it aims at thwarting the Church's free action by appeal to the civil government, it is fundamentally anti-Catholic and in principle heretical. So far as it contravenes the Syllabus, it is nothing less than an organized rebellion against the teaching of the *Ecclesia Docens*.

The "Civiltà," in fact, while it regards this movement as the reverse of formidable, takes nevertheless a very grave view of its moral and religious character. Having described its main features, the Roman writer proceeds to say (p. 588) that "ecclesiastical history has frequently seen similar examples at the commencement of *schisms and heresies*."

Three events, more or less closely connected with this movement, have occurred, since the "Civiltà" article was published.

Firstly,—M. de Montalembert's unhappy adhesion to the Coblenz address; which he designates "a glorious manifesto of Catholic faith and reason." Our gratitude to M. de Montalembert is imperishable for noble services done in the past; and our comment on him therefore shall be much less emphatic, than it would otherwise be. His letter however unhappily contains no expression—does not even contain a hint—of that submission, with which he is prepared to receive all doctrinal decrees of the Vatican Council, whatever they may be; and we cannot refrain from drawing attention to the omission. In itself it is profoundly regrettable; and from a Frenchman in particular—for French Catholics have quite a special devotion to Ecumenical Councils—it is truly remarkable. Then further, if there is one principle more than another with which M. de Montalembert's whole career has been identified, it is his abhorrence of all secular usurpation over the Church: yet he is throwing himself into a movement, which depends exclusively, for any possibility of success, on the interference of civil governments with the free deliberations of a Council.

Secondly,—The admirable Pastoral of the German bishops. The first account of this Pastoral published in England alleged, that the bishops pledged themselves to strain every nerve against any conciliar definition of

---

this work clearly betrays an intention of vesting infallibility wholly and exclusively in the Pope. From this it becomes quite evident that an alteration of the catechism in this respect would be indispensable. In case the assembled Episcopate should accept the new dogma, it must be stated in the manuals of instruction, in a way that will be quite intelligible to the people, that all authority, all certainty in matters of faith, rests finally in the person of the Pope; and that whatever he says on this subject is infallible, whether he speaks of himself alone or with the assistance of a larger or smaller number of counsellors."

Pontifical infallibility. It might quite as plausibly have been said, that they pledged themselves to strain every nerve for procuring a conciliar condemnation of Copernicus and Galileo. Even the "Saturday Review"—which has throughout preposterously exaggerated the significance and bearing of the anti-Roman movement in Germany—admits (Sept. 25th) that this Pastoral "contains no syllable really calculated to remove or lessen the anxiety of the Coblenz petitioners." We should think *not*; indeed it inflicts on those petitioners a severe rebuke. If disaffected Catholics are really as much pleased with this Pastoral as some profess to be, they are thankful for wonderfully small mercies. Yet to be sure persons who can persuade themselves that the "Mirari vos" and the Syllabus do not sharply condemn Liberal Catholicism, are only applying similar rules of interpretation to this Pastoral, when they regard it as favouring or encouraging that condemned system.

Thirdly,—F. Hyacinthe has broken his religious vows, left his convent, and published the following letter.\* We take our translation almost entirely from the "Weekly Register."

"My Very Reverend Father,—During the five years of my ministry at Notre Dame de Paris, and notwithstanding the open attacks and secret accusations of which I have been the object, your esteem and your confidence have never failed me. I preserve numerous proofs of them, written in your own hand, which apply to my preaching quite as much as to my person. Whatever may happen I shall always retain a grateful recollection of them. Now however, by a sudden change, the cause of which I do not seek in your heart but in the intrigues of an all-powerful party at Rome, you accuse what you encouraged; you blame what you approved; and you command me to speak a language, or maintain a silence, which would no longer be the full and faithful expression of my conscience. I do not hesitate an instant. I could not re-ascend the pulpit of Notre Dame with language perverted by a command or mutilated by reticence. I express my regret to the intelligent and courageous Archbishop who opened the pulpit to me, and who has maintained me in it against the ill-will of the men of whom I have just spoken. I express my regret to the imposing auditory, which bestowed upon me its attention, its sympathy, I had almost said its friendship. I should not be worthy of that auditory, of the Bishop, of my conscience, or of God, could I consent to enact such a part before them. I withdraw at the same time from the monastery I live in, and which, under the new circumstances in which I am placed, is changed for me into a prison of the soul. In acting thus I am not unfaithful to my vows. I promised monastical obedience; but within the limits of the honesty of my conscience, and the dignity of my person and ministry. I promised it, subject to that higher law of justice and "royal liberty," which according to S. James the Apostle is the proper law of the Christian. It was the most perfect practice of that holy liberty which I went to ask in the cloister more than ten years ago in the ardour of an enthusiasm free from all human calculation;—I cannot add free from all the illusions of youth. If in exchange for my sacrifices I am now

---

\* The "Guardian" French correspondent (September 29th) mentions that the first newspaper to which F. Hyacinthe sent his letter was the "Temps"; "a journal which typifies the most dangerous and seductive infidelity of the age."



offered chains, it is not merely my right, it is my duty to reject them. The present moment is a solemn one. The Church is passing through one of the most violent, the most anxious, and the most decisive crises of its existence here below. For the first time in 300 years an Œcumenical Council is not only convoked, but declared necessary. These are the expressions of the Holy Father. It is not at such a moment that a preacher of the Gospel, even the humblest, can consent to keep silence, like those mute dogs of Israel, faithless guardians, which the prophet reproaches because unable to bark: "*canes muti, non valentes latrare.*" The saints never kept silent. I am not one of them, but nevertheless I am of their race—"*fili sanctorum sumus*"—and I have always longed to leave my footsteps, my tears, and if need be my blood, in the traces where they have left theirs. I raise therefore, before the Holy Father and the Council, my protest, as a Christian and a priest, against those doctrines and those practices which are called Roman, but which are not Christian; and which by their encroachments, always more audacious and more baneful, tend to change the constitution of the Church, the basis and the form of its teaching, and even the spirit of its piety. I protest against the divorce, as impious as it is insensate, sought to be effected between the Church which is our Eternal Mother, and the society of the nineteenth century, of which we are the temporal children, and towards which we have also duties and regards. I protest against that opposition, more radical and more frightful still, to human nature, attacked and outraged by these false doctors in its most indestructible and most holy aspirations. I protest above all against the sacrilegious perversion of the Gospel of the Son of God Himself, the spirit and the letter of which are alike trampled under foot by the Pharisaism of the new law. It is my most profound conviction that if France in particular, and the Latin races in general, are given up to social, moral, and religious anarchy, the principal cause is not indeed Catholicism itself, but the manner in which Catholicism has for a long time been understood and practised. I appeal to the Council which is about to assemble to seek remedies for the excess of our ills, and to apply them with as much force as gentleness. But if fears which I do not wish to share were to be realised—if the august assembly had no more liberty in its deliberations than it already has in its preparations; in a word, if it were to be deprived of the essential character of an Œcumenical Council;—I would cry aloud to God and man to claim another, really assembled in the Holy Spirit not in the spirit of party; really representing the Universal Church, not the silence of some and the oppression of others. "For the hurt of the daughter of my people am I hurt. I am black; astonishment hath taken hold of me. Is there no balm in Gilead—is there no physician there? Why then is not the health of the daughter of my people recovered?"—(Jeremiah viii.) And, finally, I appeal to your tribunal, Oh, Lord Jesus! "*Ad tuum Domine Jesu tribunal appello.*" It is in your presence that I write these lines; it is at your feet, after much prayer, much reflection, much suffering, much waiting, it is at your feet that I sign them. I feel that if men condemn them upon the earth, you will approve them in Heaven. To live or to die—that is sufficient for me.

FR. HYACINTHE.

What a revelation of character! If, where all is revolting, one part is more revolting than another, it is his claim of affinity to the "race" of saints. As far as F. Hyacinthe is concerned, we can, of course, feel no other sentiments than those of indignation, pity, fear of the future. But

we are confident that his act will do very real and permanent service to the Church, in more ways than one.

We are glad to observe that the French Liberal Catholic press is quite unanimous in severely condemning his course. In England even the "Guardian" and the "Spectator" are very guarded as to their comments. The "Guardian," indeed, says that he preserves "unshaken faith in every article of his creed": but what, then, are those "Roman doctrines" against which he "raises his protest"? Are there any doctrines taught from Rome which the dispersed Episcopate has not confirmed?

---

*L'Infaillibilité et le Concile-Général.* Par Monseigneur DECHAMPS, Archevêque de Malines. Septième édition. Paris : Mangin.

THIS very important work not only is an indication that the definition of Pontifical infallibility is likely to be seriously considered in the Vatican Council, but will also, we suppose, have considerable influence (humanly speaking) towards the pronouncement of such a definition. The whole of it is more or less occupied with the general doctrine of infallibility; and though immediately addressed to laymen, it cannot but have great weight with theologians also.

The illustrious author lays his foundation in the doctrine of "natural infallibility" (chap. i.) ; of the certitude engendered by reason within its own sphere. Under this head his treatment of Lamennais's philosophical system is particularly happy. That writer held, that the individual's reason cannot guarantee its own truthfulness, and that there is no sufficient basis of certitude except the common agreement (*sensus communis*) of mankind. There is one small objection to this doctrine, replies the Archbishop: viz., that it is promptly condemned by the very authority to which it appeals; and that "the common agreement of mankind" clamorously rejects it (p. 8). Reason then is capable of knowing in its own light various truths as certain. In its own light it knows, as certain, the verities of natural theology; and in its own light it knows, as conclusive, the evidence given to man for the credibility of revealed religion.

The natural infallibility then of reason leads men to the supernatural infallibility of the Catholic Church (chap. iii.) This infallibility is involved in the very nature of a teaching authority instituted by God. Moral and spiritual life cannot be based except on firm and certain convictions: whereas then it is based in great part on supernatural dogmata—since the infallibility of reason does not extend to such dogmata—some other infallibility must take its place.

It must not be supposed then (chap. iv.) that supernatural infallibility extends over the whole field of thought; that the Church can teach men infallibly, on the respective superiority of coal and wood fires, or on the best mode of constructing yachts. The Church's infallibility is given for no other purpose, than that of faithfully guarding the Deposit: she is infallible only

in condemning those propositions (or directly teaching their contradictories) "which injure or imperil faith and morals" (p. 46).

So much on the *object* of infallibility : but the author's chief concern is with its *subject*. It resides (p. 64) at all events in the *Ecclesia Docens* ; in the Catholic Episcopate (assembled or dispersed) united with its head : but does it reside in the Holy See, even apart from the Episcopate ? This is the question which Mgr. Dechamps next proceeds to consider. He draws out with singular clearness (pp. 90-98) the ordinary testimonies from Scripture and tradition ; but a still more important argument (pp. 98-104) is founded on the intimate connection of this dogma with the facts of Church history. Take e.g. the well known profession of faith, imposed by Pope S. Hormisdas on the repentant Acacians in the East (p. 99). Here are some extracts from that profession :—

*"Religion has always been preserved pure and undefiled in the Apostolic See . . . . Therefore we receive and approve all the letters of Pope Leo which he wrote concerning the Christian religion. Wherefore, as already said, following in every respect the Apostolic See, and preaching all its decisions, I hope that I may be with you in that one communion which the Apostolic See preaches, in which is the full and truthful solidity of the Christian religion. Promising also that those who are severed from the communion of the Catholic Church, that is, who do not think with the Apostolic See, &c., &c."* (Denz, n. 141).

This profession of faith was not only subscribed at the time by all the bishops of the East, but long afterwards by the Fathers, both Latin and Greek, of the Eighth Œcumenical Council. All these Fathers therefore, by implication, publicly accepted the dogma of Pontifical infallibility ; all regarded those "who do not think with the Holy See" as "severed from the communion of the Catholic Church." Again, the well known confession of Michael Palæologus was on the one hand prescribed by a Pope, and on the other hand accepted by the Second Council of Lyons. This confession declares that "if any questions shall have arisen concerning the Faith, they ought to be *defined* by the judgment" of Rome (Denz, n. 389). Then the Council of Florence declares that the Supreme Pontiff has been appointed by God "teacher of all Christians" (Denz, n. 589) ; endowed by Jesus Christ with "full power of feeding" with true doctrine "the Universal Church." But these are mere occasional instances of a principle, which pervades the Church's whole history. This is what Mgr. Dechamps so strongly urges from Muzzarelli (pp. 108-110).

"That person claims and ought to be accounted personally infallible, who pronounces absolute dogmatic decisions ; publishes them ; addresses them to all the faithful and to the whole Episcopate, without requiring the consent of bishops, whether direct or indirect, express or tacit ; commanding them to publish and execute his decisions, and forbidding them, under pain of excommunication, to oppose them ; putting down those bishops who claim to discuss and judge his decisions, and protesting that he does not wait for their voices, but enjoins on them obedience. . . .

"Now this is just what the Sovereign Pontiff has done through all ages. . . . Therefore he claims to be, and ought to be accounted, infallible ; for if he were not, his dogmatical constitutions would contain a tyrannical usurpation over

the rights of the Episcopate ; an error destructive of the Church's Faith. But God could not permit this without failing in the assistance which He has promised to His Church. Nor could the Church herself approve such an error, either by words or by obedience, as she *has* approved this claim ; for the Church never approves, even by silence, what is contrary to faith and morals."

Nothing, in fact, is to our mind more amazing, than the intrepidity with which Gallicans sustain their opinion, that Pontifical infallibility was a doctrine unknown to the early Church. On the contrary, we are quite confident that it is the only key which, even on the surface, has the slightest appearance of fitting in with the complicated facts of the past. As to Gallicanism proper—the doctrine that (1) a Pope by himself can define error *ex cathedrâ* ; but (2) that his definition of a doctrine is infallible when confirmed by the Episcopate ; and (3) that such was the view explicitly prevalent in early centuries ;—this is nothing less than the most wildly unhistorical ecclesiastical theory which was ever devised. Indeed, unsound and disloyal Catholics are beginning to see this themselves, and to take refuge in some other.

Mgr. Dechamps then regards it as absolutely indubitable, that the dogma of Pontifical infallibility was revealed by Christ, was taught by the Apostles, and is proximately definable as of faith. Whether the Vatican Council will account such definition opportune, is a very different question ; but the author strongly inclines to an affirmative answer (pp. 151—157). One reason, which he has been the first (we think) to bring forward, impresses us as extremely cogent (p. 153). The coming Council will be the first held since Gallicanism was first formulated ; to pass over therefore the four articles without condemnation, might almost seem like giving them some sanction.

It is often forgotten that the Church has never yet defined her own infallibility *at all*. If therefore the Vatican Council entertains the question, it will be the very first which has ever issued any definition on the subject ; the very first which has ever methodically considered the Church's infallibility ; the very first which has examined Scripture and Tradition, for the purpose of ascertaining over what extent of ground that infallibility extends, and in what person or body it is vested. To define that an *Ecumenical Council* is infallible, would be as simply a new definition, as to define that the Supreme Pontiff by himself possesses that privilege.

The singular value of this pamphlet, and the great weight which it is likely to carry, make us the more anxious to mention any little particular on which it may possibly do mischief. We are induced therefore to express three little criticisms, which we submit with diffidence to the judgment of theologians.

1. We think that the author (pp. 113, 4) is far from doing justice to the strength of S. Liberius's case. We would refer, for a fuller explanation of our meaning, to an article on that illustrious Pontiff in our number for last October.

2. In several places (e.g. pp. 37, 48, 81) Mgr. Dechamps says, that the Church's infallibility does not demand "any new inspiration properly so-called," but only "faithfulness to the grace promised the *Ecclesia Docens* for

preservation of the Deposit." We thoroughly understand this mode of speaking, so far as *definitions of faith* are concerned. But the author holds, of course, that the Church is also infallible in her declaration of dogmatical facts, and generally in her condemnation of any proposition, as injurious or perilous to the faith. When therefore the Church declares infallibly e.g. that the "Augustinus" contains five certain propositions in its legitimate objective sense—how can it be said that here is "no new inspiration"? She infallibly decides a thesis, which a century back no one had ever heard of. Surely in order to such infallibility she must receive "a new inspiration."

3. In various places (see e.g. p. 88) the author takes for granted that no Pontifical Act can be *ex cathedrâ*, which does not expressly *declare* an obligation of interior assent as imposed by itself on Catholics. Surely there are several undeniable instances to the contrary. For instance, he himself (p. 95) speaks of S. Leo's Letter to S. Flavian as indubitably *ex cathedrâ*; indeed, it is plain that no other notion of that Letter ever entered his mind. Yet that Letter nowhere so much as hints at its own imposing any obligation of interior assent; as any one may see by reading it through. It was partly indeed for this reason, that we printed it at length in our number for April, 1868, pp. 402–407. See our argument on this very head in p. 401. Nor should it be forgotten, that the profession of faith prescribed by Pope S. Hormisdas, on which Mgr. Dechamps himself lays so much stress, speaks of *all* S. Leo's "Letters which he wrote concerning the Christian religion" as "decisions of the Apostolic See."

However, these are specks in the sun. We thank the illustrious Archbishop of Malines most heartily for his pamphlet; which has done, is doing, and will long continue to do, inestimable service throughout the Church.

*Les Conciles Généraux. Instruction Pastorale de Mgr. l'Evêque de Nîmes.*  
Paris: Palmé.

THERE is certainly no one of the French bishops, more heartily devoted to the Holy See and more heartily in sympathy with the whole of Roman doctrine, than Mgr. Plantier, the illustrious Bishop of Nîmes; and our readers will be much interested by hearing what he anticipates from the Vatican Council. His Pastoral is divided into two parts; of which the former treats councils of the past, the latter that Council which is now so nearly looming in the future. It is to this second part that we shall confine our attention.

Firstly then, what does Mgr. Plantier regard as the chief evil of our times, the evil from which all others spring? "The universal rupture both of nations and their rulers from the public and social royalty of Jesus Christ" (p. 137). "Christian civilization is returning with gigantic steps to paganism\* and atheism also" (p. 138). "In the present deplorable state of

\* Such statements as these, however, should be taken with important reservation. See F. Coleridge's very important remarks, which we quoted in our last number, pp. 209, 210.

society, even kings who are Christians cannot be Christian kings (p. 152). Nay, anti-Catholic theories have been raised into a kind of dogmata, and consecrated as the principles of '89."

The Council's work will be doctrinal on one hand and disciplinary on the other. As to doctrine, the Syllabus will probably be adopted as the basis of its decrees (p. 187). Still (ib.) the assembled bishops will doubtless themselves handle the condemned errors "for the purpose of applying to them more precise and direct" censures; and again, "for the purpose of setting forth more didactically and rigorously the various articles of our holy Revelation which those errors deny or disfigure" or place in peril. "It will be permitted to affirm, that no doctrinal monument ever raised by the Church's hands will have presented vaster proportions and more brilliant illumination to the adoration and gratitude of posterity."

But the most difficult task of the Council will be (pp. 188, 9) "the re-adjustment of ecclesiastical discipline and canon law. . . . The revolutions which have occurred during a space of three centuries in laws, governments, the constitution of empires,—the wounds inflicted by these revolutions on canonical law,—the numerous concordats"—the rebellion of governments against the Church and her privileges,—“all these causes united have established in the world a state of things, for which the prescriptions of ancient discipline are insufficient; and which demands, for new necessities, new rules and modifications.” At the same time, the greatest care will be taken (p. 200), that all fresh legislation shall be in harmony, to the greatest practicable extent, “with the laws and usages of different countries.”

Every possible human preparation has been made for the Council's successful issue. The greatest thinkers in the Church have given their minds to the questions now imminent (pp. 190, 191); and the chief of them have been summoned to Rome by Pius IX. himself to give counsel (p. 193).

When the bishops meet, there will be the fullest liberty of discussion. “Notwithstanding the unfair insinuations which have been hazarded right and left, it will be no assemblage of puppets” (p. 200). Yet, on the other hand, it is quite possible that, in the very exercise of their freedom, the bishops may choose to define Pontifical infallibility by acclamation (p. 197). Since “all the bishops of the world hold convictions on this head which are fully enlightened and firmly established, why . . . should they not proclaim it without further controversy by a spontaneous cry of heart and of faith?” (p. 198). We are here, be it observed, exhibiting Mgr. Plantier's opinion, not venturing on any conjecture of our own.

Certain Catholics have a strange fear of some censure being passed on the modern “liberties.” Why, they ask, should the Council concern itself with politics? (p. 208). The Bishop replies, that the “politics” here spoken of have the closest connection with dogma and with morals (p. 209). With dogma, because “liberty of worships”, maintained as a *principle*, “rests on dogmatic indifference”; and with morals, because the whole question concerns the duties of a civil ruler. Moreover, these “liberties” have already been condemned by the Church again and again; and the only possible question therefore is, whether the bishops shall formally declare, when assembled, what they teach when dispersed (p. 205).



We conclude with the following quotation :—

"How many statesmen have combined with so-called liberals to hint that a multitude of prelates have groaned under the condemnations pronounced ; that in practising respectful silence towards that great Act [the Syllabus], interiorly they do not accept it otherwise than with serious reservations ; and that in a council, if they were called on to consecrate them by definitions or censures, they would not fail, either to raise serious objections or to manifest very significant hesitation. Let us await the event. These suppositions of perfidy and malevolence will be falsified. Then it will be victoriously demonstrated, even to the blind, that in the body of the Church head and hands have one only lip, one only thought." "It will be shown that between the Holy See and the immense majority of the Episcopate there exists a full intimacy of heart, founded on an entire identity of views" (pp. 217, 8).

---

*Theses dogmaticæ quas in Collegio Sancti Beunonis, Prov. Angl. Soc. Jesu propugnandas assumpsit F. Sylvester Joseph Hunter, ejusdem Societatis.*

WE notice these theses chiefly, because of their strong language on our Blessed Lady's Assumption : xciii. xvi. Thesis xvi. declares that this doctrine is certain and proximately definable ; adding an earnest hope (*toto corde expetimus*), that it may be defined in the Vatican Council. We suppose F. Bottalla is the most learned (as certainly there is no more orthodox and loyal) theologian in England ; and it is a very remarkable fact therefore, that such a thesis has been adopted under his auspices. The "*Civiltà*" mentions, that two or three works have appeared in Rome on a similar theme.

We will add the two following theses, as bearing on a controversy which has been very prominently discussed in our pages.

XXXII.—*Ecclesiæ magisterium directe et principaliter suâ amplitudine complectitur quæcunque a Deo revelata fuere : indirecte vero et secundario ad ea omnia porrigitur, quæ ad veritatem revelatam, sive asserendam, sive vindicandam, pertinent.*

XXXIII.—*Quum Ecclesiæ authenticæ Theologorum aliquam definit conclusionem, vel minoribus censuris aliquam, vel plures in globo, damnat doctrinas ; sive illas brevibus proponat propositionibus, sive easdem exponendo tradat ; suum semper infallibile exercet magisterium : cui nemo, nisi graviter peccando, assensum recusare potest.*

---

*Address of the Irish Bishops. August 18, 1869.*

WE place this very important document before our readers without delay. Nothing can be more moderate, nothing more unanswerable. In our next number we hope to treat the whole subject of denominational education.

The Catholic Archbishops and Bishops of Ireland, assembled at S. Patrick's College, Maynooth, on Wednesday, the 18th of August, 1869, His Eminence Cardinal Cullen presiding, deem it their duty to place on record at this important crisis the following resolutions respecting the Education and Land question :—

"I.—They reiterate their condemnation of the mixed system of education, whether primary, intermediate, or university, as grievously and intrinsically dangerous to the faith and morals of Catholic youth ; and they declare that to Catholics only, and under the supreme control of the Church in all things appertaining to faith and morals, can the teaching of Catholics be safely intrusted. Fully relying on the love which the Catholics of Ireland have ever cherished for their ancient faith, and on the filial obedience they have uniformly manifested towards their pastors, the bishops call upon the clergy and the laity of their respective flocks to oppose by every constitutional means the extension or perpetuation of the mixed system, whether by the creation of new institutions, by the maintenance of old ones, or by changing Trinity College, Dublin, into a mixed college.

"II.—At the same time they recognize the right, as well as the duty, of Catholic parents to procure as far as possible for their children the advantages of good secular education. Justice demands that Catholic youths should enjoy endowments and all other privileges on terms of perfect equality with the youth of other persuasions ; without which equality in the matter of education, religious equality cannot be said to have any real existence.

"III.—The bishops, without any wish to interfere with the rights of persons of a different denomination, demand for Catholics Catholic education, which alone is consonant to their religious principles.

"IV.—The assembled prelates, learning with pleasure that it is the intention of Her Majesty's present advisers to legislate for Ireland in accordance with the wishes of its people—and of this they have given good earnest—trust that the distinguished statesman now at the head of the Government will, with the aid of his able colleagues, give to Irish Catholics a complete system of secular education based upon religion ; for it alone can be in keeping with the feelings and requirements of the vast majority of the nation.

"V.—As regards higher education, since the Protestants of this country have had a Protestant University for three hundred years, and have it still, the Catholic people of Ireland clearly have a right to a Catholic University.

"VI.—But should Her Majesty's Government be unwilling to increase the number of Universities in this country, the bishops declare that religious equality cannot be realized unless the degrees, endowments, and other privileges enjoyed by their fellow-subjects of a different religion be placed within the reach of Catholics in the fullest sense of equality. The injustice of denying to them a participation in those advantages except at the cost of principle and conscience, is aggravated by the consideration that whilst they contribute their share to the public funds for the support of educational institutions from which conscience warns them away, they have moreover to tax themselves for the education of their children in their own colleges and university.

"VII.—Should it please Her Majesty's Government, therefore, to remove the many grievances to which Catholics are subjected by existing university arrangements, and to establish one national university in this kingdom for examining candidates and conferring degrees, the Catholic people of Ireland are entitled in justice to demand that in such university, or annexed to it—

"(a.) They shall have a distinct college, conducted upon purely Catholic principles, and at the same time fully participating in the privileges enjoyed by other colleges of whatsoever denomination or character.

"(b.) That the university honours and emoluments be accessible to Catholics equally with their Protestant fellow-subjects.

"(c.) That the examinations and all other details of university arrangement be free from every influence hostile to the religious sentiments of Catholics; and that with this view the Catholic element be adequately represented upon the senate, or other supreme university body, by persons enjoying the confidence of the Catholic bishops, priests, and people of Ireland.

"VIII.—The bishops also declare, that the Catholics of Ireland are justly entitled to their due proportion of the public funds hitherto set apart for education in the Royal and other endowed schools.

"IX.—The bishops furthermore declare, that a settlement of the university question, to be complete and at the same time in accordance with the wishes of the Catholic people of Ireland, must include the rearrangement of the Queen's colleges on the denominational principle.

"X.—Finally, the bishops of Ireland, deeply sympathising with the sufferings of their faithful flocks, believe that the settlement of the Land Question is essential to the peace and welfare of the United Kingdom. They recognize the rights and the duties of landlords. They claim, in the same spirit, the rights, as they recognize the duties of tenants. They believe that the comparative destitution, the chronic discontent, and the depressing discouragement of the people of Ireland, are, at this period of her history, to be attributed more to the want of a settlement of this question on fair and equitable principles than to any other cause. Therefore, in the interest of all classes, they earnestly hope that the responsible advisers of the Crown will take this most important subject into immediate consideration, and propose to Parliament such measures as may restore confidence, stimulate industry, increase national wealth, and lead to a general union, contentment, and happiness."

*The above resolutions were unanimously adopted at a meeting of all the Catholic Archbishops and Bishops of Ireland, held at Maynooth, on the 18th of August of the present year.*—PAUL CARD. CULLEN, Chairman.

*Acta ex iis decrepta quæ apud Sanctam Sedem geruntur.* Jul.\* 1869.  
Roma: Mariotti.

WE have more than once heartily praised this most useful monthly compilation. We notice this particular number, because the Editor has paid Dr. Ward the very high compliment of reprinting his whole pamphlet, "*de Infallibilitatis Extensione*", as an appendix. The Editor, in his introductory remarks, displays hearty sympathy with this REVIEW, and expresses a very kind opinion that it has really done service to the Church. God grant that the fact may be so!

We cannot but hope that the publication of Dr. Ward's pamphlet, in so influential and widely-circulated a periodical, may bring it under the notice of many theologians, who have never heard the author's name and who would never have otherwise have read his work.

\* The word "*Maio*" is printed by mistake on the cover of this pamphlet, instead of "*Julio*."

*A Critique upon Mr. Ffoulkes's Letter.* By H. I. D. RYDER, of the Oratory.  
London: Longmans.\*

IT is with very great gratification that we meet F. Ryder on the field of controversy, not as an opponent but as a fellow-labourer. And certainly his publication may be taken as a curious indication of the unanimity with which Catholics of every school repudiate Mr. Ffoulkes. For the two writers, who have hitherto most elaborately criticised that gentleman, have been two, who, little more than a year ago, were accidentally prominent as representing two antagonistic views—we must still consider vitally antagonistic—which exist among English Catholics. It gives us much pleasure however to remember, that on the last occasion when we had to criticise one of F. Ryder's works (July, 1868, p. 244),—in protesting (as we felt it our painful duty to protest) against his avowed *principles*,—we spoke emphatically on the consistent loyalty of his *tone* towards the Church: adding, that it is his tone which evidently exhibits his true mind, and that "our personal respect for him is most sincere and unqualified." And now for his very able and interesting critique on Mr. Ffoulkes.

F. Ryder does not waste time and space, by going again over ground which we had sufficiently covered: his remarks throughout are either supplementary or corrective of our own. It will be our natural course—and probably as convenient to our readers as any other—if we express our comments on the pamphlet from this point of view. It is divided into four sections: of which the first is naturally devoted to the main count of Mr. Ffoulkes's indictment.

"Mr. Ffoulkes's main charge against the Roman Church, if I understand him rightly, is this: that some 800 years ago she introduced a new doctrine, the Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son, into her '*materia fidei*,' and inserted it, under the form of the *Filioque* clause, in the Nicene Creed, in direct opposition to the enactment of the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon; that she did this against her conscience, in servile submission to the Emperor of the day; that by so doing she then and there exposed herself to the full penalty denounced upon any who shall substitute another Creed for that promulgated at Ephesus, which penalty, as Mr. Ffoulkes understands it, involves nothing less than the loss of their orders in the case of the clergy; in the case of lay persons, of their communion. Such being the lamentable condition to which the Church of Rome has reduced herself, her members, he concludes, cannot, in common modesty, reproach Anglicans with their thirty-nine articles, or throw doubt upon their orders" (p. 4).

---

\* We had actually sent this notice to press before we had the least notion that F. Bottalla's reply to Mr. Ffoulkes would appear this quarter: otherwise it might have been more convenient to notice the trio conjointly. As things are, we have thought it better to publish the present notice as it originally stood, without founding any change on the later pamphlet. We should add also, that for obvious reasons we were particularly desirous of doing every possible justice to F. Ryder's admirable essay; and we have treated it therefore at greater length than could be necessary in noticing a theologian of such established and eminent name as F. Bottalla.

The first section comprehends many different particulars. And firstly, as to the Church's wording of the dogma. We had pointed out in April (pp. 283—285) that the two phrases,—(1) "proceeding from the Father and the Son,"—(2) "proceeding from the Father through the Son,"—are but different modes of expressing one identical verity. F. Ryder adds that—

"With the [very doubtful] exception of Theodoret, in his book against S. Cyril, which was condemned in the Fifth General Council, no father, Latin or Greek, until the time of Photius, can be found who teaches that the Holy Ghost proceeds exclusively from the Father. Almost all the post-Nicene Latin fathers, who have written on the subject, teach explicitly the Procession of the Holy Ghost 'ab Utroque.' S. Hilary, in the middle of the fourth century, speaks of the Procession from the Son as not admitting of a doubt: 'non enim in incerto Dominum reliquisse.' *Several of the Greek fathers teach explicitly the same doctrine*; amongst others, S. Epiphanius and S. Cyril of Alexandria, who say, in so many words, that the Holy Ghost proceeds *from* the Son as well as from the Father.

"Since the fifth century however, the Greeks have unanimously preferred the expression 'per Filium,' as excluding most perfectly the error of a double principle; whilst the Latins have persevered in their use of the form 'ex Filio,' as avoiding most completely the danger to which the 'per Filium' was exposed, of seeming to limit the relation between the Son and the Holy Ghost to that of temporal manifestation.

"Although each party clung firmly to its own formula, *each admitted the orthodoxy of the other*" (p. 5).

There is no fact more certain in all history, than that this verity—the Holy Ghost's Procession from the Son—had been taught by successive Popes both to East and West long before the time of Reccared. We quoted at length (p. 286, note) the words of Pope S. Hormisdas, addressed to an Eastern Emperor. But before S. Hormisdas, adds F. Ryder, a greater Pope than he, the illustrious S. Leo (p. 6), taught that the Holy Spirit "de Utroque processit": and his "Letter" was published in a General Council of all Spain in 447. Further, excepting only the Monothelite heretics, no Easterns demurred in any way to the Procession from the Son before the time of the Iconoclasts; and this, though as early as the seventh century, the third Pontifical "Professio," "containing the 'Filioque,' came into use, and was *sent round to all the churches by each Pope immediately after his election.*" This is a most important fact in the controversy; a fact not hinted at by ourselves, nor indeed known to our writer. *Before* the introduction of "Filioque" into the Nicene Symbol, the Easterns were just as strictly obliged as they were *after* that introduction, to hold with divine faith the dogma which those words express.

On the other hand, the schismatical Easterns have, to a greater or less extent, abandoned the Catholic dogma itself. The "per Filium," says F. Ryder (p. 13), was insufficient to keep alive the true doctrine; and "Photius rejects the 'per Filium' itself in any sense but that of merely temporal manifestation."

But now secondly, did the Popes transgress the seventh canon of Ephesus, either by imposing the dogma, or again by inserting "Filioque" into the Symbol? "Mr. Ffoulkes insists that plain Christians might, upon the

strength of this canon, traverse the world with no other passport to the sacraments of the Church than the Nicene Creed." F. Ryder's comment on this audacious allegation is most excellent; and ends with a charming characteristic touch, which we italicise.

"Nestorius took up precisely Mr. Ffoulkes's position; he insisted that, as a 'plain Christian,' he had a right to the communion of the Church upon the strength of his profession of the Nicene Creed. And he is thus met by S. Cyril: 'It will by no means suffice that your reverence should merely profess with us the symbol of faith put out by that great Council whilome assembled in the Holy Ghost, at the city of Nicæa. . . . But, over and above this, it is necessary that you declare in writing and on oath that you anathematise what you have hitherto wickedly and impiously held, and that you promise for the future to hold and teach as do we and the rest.'

"Does Mr. Ffoulkes seriously suppose that, if he were suspected of holding Monothelism, let us say, or the doctrine of the thirty-nine articles concerning the mass and holy images, the Greek Church would receive him into her communion upon his bare profession of the Nicene Creed? Nay, I will go further: I will venture to say that if once the Anglican High Church party, with all its dogmatic shortcomings, were separated from the State, it would not receive him as he is, with the manifold suspicions excited by his recent 'Letter,' upon that one profession. If I am not much mistaken, he would hardly find entrance into any one of the bodies of Christians which he accounts 'cities of Israel,' unless he were *inserted, as he supposes the 'Filioque' to have been, by the secular arm*" (pp. 10—11).

There are two different opinions on the force of the Ephesine canon, both equally fatal to Mr. Ffoulkes. "The Latin view" of this canon holds that its simple purport was to anathematise all transgressors of the Nicene Faith. F. Ryder considers this view (p. 11) as "less open to difficulty than the Greek," and that in its favour there are "the very strongest arguments" (p. 7); but he considers that the Greek view also "has a tradition and real argument in its favour" (p. 11). Mr. Ffoulkes, at all events, derives no more benefit from the Greek view than from the Latin. The Greeks at Florence (Ryder, p. 11) did not "dream" of this canon "prohibiting the Church from imposing fresh obligatory definitions of faith"; they only alleged that it prohibited the insertion of such definitions in the Symbol. They regarded the canon therefore as purely disciplinary; and a disciplinary canon can of course be revoked at any moment by the Church's supreme ruler. The Greeks at Florence, before their conversion, did not regard the Pope as being such ruler; but as soon as they accepted the Florentine definition, they of course ascribed to him a power of repealing any disciplinary canon he might please. Supposing therefore the Greek view of this Ephesine canon could be maintained, that canon was repealed by the first Pope (whoever he might be) who sanctioned the insertion of "Filioque" into the Symbol.

As to this insertion, we would also draw attention to the following really very important parallel:—

"After all, the 'Filioque' got into the Creed very much as the Constantinopolitan additions did. These, it is now generally admitted, were no first-hand additions of the Second Council, but the gradual work



of Catholic Bishops, in the emergencies of heretical warfare, upon which the Second Council set its seal ; which additions were made, be it remembered, notwithstanding the express prohibition of the Council of Sardica, recorded by S. Athanasius and S. Eusebius of Vercelle, to compose ' another Creed beside that of Nicæa ' " (pp. 13, 14).

So much on this ill-used Ephesine canon. But Mr. Ffoulkes assigns another and quite different reason, for thinking that the Church has no power to teach as of faith the Procession from the Son. He alleges for this purpose the Chalcedonian declaration, that the Constantinopolitan Symbol, which does not contain the " Filioque," " teaches forth the perfect doctrine concerning Father, Son, and Holy Ghost " : if then its doctrine is *perfect*, argues Mr. Ffoulkes, it can admit no further development. We replied (p. 281) partly by a *reductio ad absurdum* ; for the Constantinopolitan Symbol does not even state that the Holy Ghost is God. And we further pointed out, that the Chalcedonian declaration not only does not say what Mr. Ffoulkes supposes, but does most distinctly say the precise contradictory. A very important question however still remained. In what sense did the Council of Chalcedon use this very remarkable word "*τέλειον*," and how came it to use that word ? F. Ryder's explanation of this seems to us worthy of such a theologian as Petavius : from its union of learning, sobriety, and at the same time brilliancy.

" S. Gregory Nazianzen, one of the Fathers of the Second Council, is continually speaking of the *perfect* Trinity, the *perfection* secured to the Trinity by the Divinity of the Holy Ghost, of the necessity of each of the Divine persons to the *perfection* of the others. [In one place] he has *Τριάδα τέλειαν ἐκ τελείων τριῶν*, and *τριάδος ὁρισθείσης διὰ τὸ τέλειον*; and [elsewhere] he speaks of the Divinity of the Holy Ghost, obscurely indicated before, being now, *i.e.* at the Second Council, clearly manifested to the Church. S. Gregory Nyssen, who is generally accounted the author of the Constantinopolitan Creed, speaks of a gradual development, perfecting at once the knowledge and the image of the *ἐντελὲς πλῆρωμα τριαδικόν*. Compare also Theodoret, where he speaks of the Divinity of the Holy Ghost as the *perfect doctrine of the baptized*, in contrast to that of catechumens, who knew only the Father and the Son. I interpret then the passage from the definition as simply meaning, that the Constantinopolitan Creed, by explicitly teaching the distinct personality and consubstantial Divinity of the Holy Ghost, completed the perfect doctrine of one Divinity, ' in three perfect hypostases.' "

Mr. Ffoulkes alleged, as confirming his view of the Chalcedonian declaration, a long passage from Pope Adrian's letter to Charlemagne. That monarch—so Mr. Ffoulkes set forth—made it " one of his principal charges " against the Seventh Council, that it did not expressly declare the Holy Ghost's Procession from the Son ; and Adrian replied to that charge in certain words which Mr. Ffoulkes placed before his readers. We stated in reply (p. 289) the very certain fact, that " in Adrian's whole reply concerning that dogma," no syllable is to be found of what Mr. Ffoulkes alleges. F. Ryder has been more fortunate than ourselves : for we could not light on the passage in *any* part of Adrian's letter ; whereas F. Ryder has at last found it (with a most important and significant exception however) though

in a totally different place from that indicated by Mr. Foulkes. F. Ryder's discovery makes Mr. Ffoulkes's case even worse than it was before. According to Mr. Ffoulkes, Charlemagne was complaining of too great *identity* between the new Council and the first Nicene; he was complaining that "Filioque" had not been inserted into the new definition: whereas what he was really complaining of, were the *discrepancies* between the two Councils. According to Mr. Ffoulkes, if "Filioque" had been found in the new definition, Charlemagne's objections would have vanished; whereas in real truth such insertion would only have *intensified* the particular ground of complaint to which Adrian is replying. See F. Ryder, p. 16.

F. Ryder concludes his first section (pp. 18-22) by handling admirably a theme, which we had left altogether untouched; by vigorously exhibiting the simple unmeaningness of Mr. Ffoulkes's marvellous parallel, between what was respectively done by Reccared of Spain and Henry VIII. of England.

His second section concerns the Pseudo-Decretals. Mr. Ffoulkes's indictment on this head consisted of two particulars. Firstly he alleged, that the Popes took occasion of these Decretals, to introduce into the Church not only a new discipline, but a new doctrine on the extent of their own prerogatives. We argued (pp. 296-301) that even had the change of discipline between the fourth and tenth centuries been as great as Mr. Ffoulkes supposes, such change would have been no more than a legitimate practical development of that doctrine, concerning Pontifical authority, which was revealed by Christ and held in every age of the Church. F. Ryder presses the same view. "The ancient disciplinary canons," he says very happily (p. 23), should be regarded, not "as the ligaments of the dead," but as "the swathing bands of infancy, which yield and give place to the child's growth." Nor have we even seen anywhere so vivid and life-like a description of the Pope's ecclesiastical position in history, as the following: we italicise a sentence or two.

"If, as Mr. Ffoulkes imagines, the Papal monarchy be a usurpation, and destructive of that economy which Christ meant should reign throughout His Church, at least it is undeniable that the Church, from the beginning, bore and fostered the germ within her. To the Bishop of Rome all may appeal, and from him none. *He is the judge of all, whom none may judge.* Every corner of the vineyard is open to him who is its guardian, whenever the faith or peace of the Church is in danger. No canon avails without his sanction; and it is for him to interpret the canons according to the exigencies of time and circumstance. What the ancient Church does not claim for the Pope *she allows him to claim for himself.* Restrictive laws seem to have been made for others, not for him.

"Patriarchs, the most ancient and the most august, are keenly criticised and sharply rebuked, if they speak proud things or interfere with even the humblest of their neighbours; the Bishop of Rome alone, it seems, *cannot exalt himself above his rightful place, or intrude where he is not due.* If he is rebuked, it is by heretics like the Eusebians, whom he detects and punishes; or if a Saint says a sharp word, *the Church lets it fall to the ground as though he knew not what he said.* What are so many of the epistles and addresses of the early Popes, but *very magnificats, in which they exhaust themselves upon the theme 'quia fecit mihi magna, Qui potens est!'* And the Church

*listens, now in admiring silence, now with applause.* True, the whole Church does not at once realize in its fulness the Pope's position and office, and from time to time a Bishop fails to understand the Pope's intervention, as it was with Honorius of Dalmatia, to whom Pope Gelasius thus writes, (Labbe, tom. v. p. 300)—‘we are surprised, dearly beloved, that you are surprised that the solicitous care of the Apostolic See, due more majorum to all the Churches throughout the world, should be exercised in behalf of the orthodoxy of your faith.’ But, is it conceivable that the Church would have consented to learn from the Popes the extent of their rights, if she were not conscious all along that *they were only recalling to her mind what Christ had taught her*, and were truly interpreting the privilege of Peter?

At the same time, F. Ryder considers that Mr. Ffoulkes has very greatly exaggerated the amount of disciplinary change which took place; and that he has very much more unwarrantably exaggerated the effect of the False Decretals in promoting what change did occur. This is another theme which we ourselves entirely omitted; and F. Ryder handles it with much power and learning, from p. 23 to p. 28.

The second count of that indictment which Mr. Ffoulkes based on the Decretals was, as F. Ryder expresses it, that “if the Pope be not the coiner, he is at least the issuer of false coin;” that “he had duplicates of all the genuine Letters of his predecessors in his portfolio, and if he did not actually discover that these were forgeries, it was because he felt they were, and would not look” (Ryder, p. 31). There was no part of our own article so unsatisfactory as our treatment of this objection (pp. 301–3); while, on the other hand, perhaps no part of F. Ryder's is so valuable as his reply to it (see pp. 31–39). The whole literature concerning ancient ecclesiastical archives is brought substantially before the reader's notice, and Mr. Ffoulkes's accusation is fairly faced in every particular. The two following extracts will explain sufficiently the conclusion at which F. Ryder arrives:—

“There was nothing, then, in these relics of the times of persecution in that age to awaken suspicion, whilst there was much to attract devotion. Men naturally welcomed their discovery with the same devotion, and certainly with no greater surprise, than they did the kindred discovery of the martyrs' bodies” (p. 35).

“This, then, is S. Nicholas's position. He is presented with portions of documents, for we have no proof that they were more, which accurately represent the ecclesiastical spirit of the day—a recommendation rather than a difficulty in an uncritical age. Their genuineness is attested by the Church of Gaul, a Church incomparably more learned than his own; and attested, moreover, even against that Church's interests. The genuineness of these documents was in no sense upon its trial; it was undisputed. The presumption was strongly in favour of the genuineness of documents containing doctrine so orthodox and so apposite; if any heresy had cropped up in them, then indeed it would have been another matter. But, more than this, the Pope, even if a doubt of them had crossed his mind, which is in the highest degree improbable, had not, in the Roman archives, any satisfactory test of their genuineness” (pp. 37–8).

We will pass over F. Ryder's third section (pp. 39–46). Our present bias is to dissent from its main thesis, and to regret that he introduced the

section into his pamphlet at all. But we unfeignedly distrust our own judgment on the matter, and should like time for consideration : possibly on some future occasion we may return to the subject. Here we will only say, to prevent possible misconception, that we are not aware of any reason why any Catholic is not at perfect liberty to hold that view, concerning church membership, which F. Ryder advocates ; and that this section does not yield to the other three in learning and ability.

The fourth section is of a somewhat miscellaneous character. Its most pervasive purpose is, to defend Popes, and the Western Church generally, against the curious assemblage of omnigenous imputations, with which Mr. Ffoulkes has assailed them. In particular (pp. 50—52) he exposes that gentleman's most extraordinary allegations from S. Bernard and S. Bridget.

Our limits have for some time warned us to conclude, but it was difficult to tear ourselves away from so attractive and interesting a book. It would do honour to a veteran theologian ; and is really not a little remarkable as coming from one who is as yet in his early prime. We believe that a distinguished career is open to its author ; and we are sure he will credit us with perfect sincerity when we say, that by no one will his course be watched with greater interest and sympathy, than by his recent antagonist.

*The Papacy and Schism : Strictures on Mr. Ffoulkes's Letter.* By Rev. PAUL BOTTALLA, S.J. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

ON reflection, we are disposed thoroughly to agree with F. Bottalla (p. 127), that the "real and practical scope" of Mr. Ffoulkes's Letter is far rather to express a view concerning the Church's constitution, than concerning the Holy Ghost's Procession. "If we seek to discover" its "leading idea, we shall not be able to gather it from the title-page. Mr. Ffoulkes wrote his pamphlet as an apology for his own real interior apostasy (be it material or formal) from the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church" (p. 125). If such be the case, as we think it is, F. Bottalla has addressed himself more directly to the main issue than F. Ryder and ourselves have done. At all events, it is an excellent thing that this particular side of the pamphlet shall have received careful attention, from a theologian who unites such unusual learning with so firm a grasp of orthodox principle as F. Bottalla.

It is quite an appropriate dispensation of Providence, that two writers like Mr. Ffoulkes and the Jesuit Professor are brought into immediate contrast. Mr. Ffoulkes's warmest admirers—we refer of course to non-Catholics, for he has no Catholic admirers—will not allege that *reasoning* is his forte ; but they lay stress on what they call his *learning*. In real truth however his learning is on a par with his reasoning. To constitute learning,—there must be critical power, which enables the student to appreciate the value and meaning of those things which he reads ; and there must be combinative power, to locate them in their true mutual position, and to view them in the light of those principles which are presupposed. One can hardly ask, without an

appearance of satire, whether Mr. Ffoulkes possesses combinative power : but F. Bottalla points out (p. 2) that he displays also "a really remarkable absence of critical spirit" ; that he seems wholly unconscious of "any advance having been made in critical studies" since the sixteenth century. We heartily wish he would study F. Bottalla's pamphlet ; not only for the theological instruction which he would thence derive, but also as a sample of the mode in which vast and multifarious knowledge may really be made serviceable—and serviceable indeed in the highest degree—towards acquisition of truth. We do not for a moment, of course, compare Mr. Ffoulkes's amount of mere *reading* with F. Bottalla's ; for even in this respect the interval is most wide between the two writers : but we are dwelling on the circumstance, that Mr. Ffoulkes begins and ends with mere reading, while F. Bottalla has amassed *learning*.

F. Bottalla's pamphlet lays down what may be called the whole theology and history of decretals and canons : nor are we acquainted with any other book accessible to the general reader, which goes over ground at all similar. It bears—and in some sense requires—careful and repeated reading ; and it will give those who have studied it a clear and accurate apprehension, to which they have perhaps hitherto been strangers, on the Church's doctrine concerning the Church's discipline.

The foundation of all accurate knowledge, on the authority of decretals and canons, must of course be laid in a clear intelligence of the Church's constitution. They necessarily derive their obligatory force from the Church's supreme authority ; and the first question therefore to be asked is, in whom God has *vested* that supreme authority. This formed the subject of a previous work, on which F. Bottalla has founded the present, and to which he constantly refers throughout. The Roman Pontiff is ecclesiastically absolute ; and all disciplinary authority therefore throughout the Church is derived exclusively from him. Such is the revealed doctrine ; which has been defined more and more clearly, in proportion as misbelievers have called it in question (pp. 37-42). If Mr. Ffoulkes had applied himself to encounter the arguments by which theologians establish this proposition, he would have done something to promote his cause : but whereas it is the one matter really relevant to his theme, it is the one matter which he has totally omitted to consider.

From this fundamental doctrine, two consequences at once follow. Firstly, disciplinary decretals of Popes have precisely the same authority, with disciplinary canons of councils Pontifically confirmed : for in both cases Pontifical sanction is given. Such has ever been the Church's judgment : "the same weight was always ascribed to Papal decretals as to the canons of councils." "All the ancient collections of canons . . . carefully gathered together the decretals of the Roman Pontiffs, as a most important source of law, of authority no way inferior to that of the General Councils" (p. 45. See also pp. 11 and 18).

Secondly, it follows from the dogma of Papal Supremacy, that the Pontiff has power, whenever he may judge expedient, to modify or annul any disciplinary decree he may please, whether of previous council or of previous Pope. Of this there are repeated instances. (See pp. 27, 33, 37.)

Let it be supposed then, for argument's sake, that at a certain period of

history there was a vast increase in the *classes* of cases, on which appeal to Rome was permitted. What would be the inference? Merely that at this particular period the Holy See judged it practicable and expedient, to exercise directly a large amount of jurisdiction, which it had hitherto exercised by delegation. Where is the difficulty in this?

But as a matter of fact, it is totally false that there was any such increase. Take the instance on which Mr. Ffoulkes lays his principal stress, episcopal causes. Episcopal appeals to Rome no doubt became much more *frequent* (most happily) as time went on; but these appeals were *received* by the Holy See from the very first. In the very canons of Sardica "it had been enacted, not (as Mr. Ffoulkes appears to believe) that only in extreme cases the bishops were authorized to appeal to the Pope, but that *every* bishop who should think himself to have a fair cause" might appeal (p. 27).

The great increase in *number* of such appeals is most easily explained, by the changed circumstances of the Church, and by men's constantly growing apprehension of all which is involved in Papal Supremacy. It is F. Bottalla's distinct opinion, that the False Decretals had simply nothing whatever to do with the matter. He gives one very curious illustration of this in p. 33: for these Decretals recognize no right of appeal whatever, as appertaining to simple priests; whereas, "in the middle of the ninth century," these appeals "were on the increase: the state of Europe absolutely requiring this modification" of ancient practice. As to the False Decretals, "with the exception of one or two quotations by Hadrian II. and Stephen IV., no one of the Roman Pontiffs before the middle of the eleventh century paid" them "any attention" (p. 22). Nay, so late as the year 1085 Cardinal Otto, afterwards Urban II., "spoke of them with contempt" (p. 57).

"And here," adds our author, "we must repeat what we have so often said, that no part of the doctrine or discipline of the Church in any manner rested on the False Decretals. . . . Doctrine and discipline were maintained for eight centuries without any aid from Isidore, and the last two centuries his assistance has been dispensed with and no change has ensued" (pp. 57-8).

F. Bottalla incidentally (p. 17) refers to a most unjustifiable attack of Dean Milman's on the great Pope Nicholas I.; in which that historian alleges that the Pope rested his case against Hincmar on the False Decretals. F. Bottalla points out, that on the one hand Hincmar himself believed their genuineness, and alleged them where they suited his purpose; and on the other hand that Nicholas in fact gave them no sanction whatever. The controversy between him and Hincmar "related exclusively to the question, whether Papal decretals, which had not found a place in the Collection of Hadrian, could be considered as having authority in the Church" (p. 19). In fact, "it is more apparent from the Letters of Nicholas the Great than from those of any other Pope," that he claimed to "derive his supreme authority simply and solely from the institution of Christ" (p. 20). As to the False Decretals, in a Letter written when "they were spreading and gaining acceptance in all directions," he makes no allusion to them; but "repeatedly quotes the genuine canons of early councils and the authentic decretals of his predecessors" (p. 16).

We have said enough to stimulate our readers' eagerness for reading this



invaluable work. We have never concealed our opinion—though we know many excellent Catholics think differently—that Mr. Ffoulkes's pamphlet has done far more good than harm. But if it had performed no other service than that of eliciting the present pamphlet of F. Bottalla, this service would far overbalance any mischief which Mr. Ffoulkes has it in his power to perpetrate. This is our deliberate and strong opinion.

F. Bottalla has dedicated his work to the Archbishop of Westminster "as a humble mark of respect and admiration."

*Eight Sermon-Essays.* By EDWARD REDMOND, D.D.  
London : Washbourne.

THE Archbishop of Westminster possesses the enviable happiness of having been the first English bishop to found a purely theological seminary. S. Thomas's, Hammersmith, is now (thank God !) in full activity ; and S. Edmund's,—with which so many past memories of the London and Southwark dioceses are so intimately connected—is no longer more than a "petit séminaire."

Dr. Redmond's labours as dogmatical professor having been thus brought to an end in the natural course of things, he has published this little volume as a parting gift to his late pupils. We heartily wish he had had leisure and health, to treat those subjects which he mentions in his touching dedication : "The untheological temper of laymen in this age ; the necessity of high catechetical instruction ; the importance of accuracy of thought and expression in pastoral teaching." His friends however are well aware, and grieve over the circumstance, how impossible it would have been for him to make any such exertion ; and the present sermons are very interesting, though less so than the suggested essays would certainly have been.

The author exhibits himself throughout as a member of that school, which its opponents denounce as "extreme." He lays down (p. 4) that "the voice of Rome speaks with the certainty of a revelation from God." In God's ancient laws (p. 5) he "recognises the spirit and the sanction of such institutions as the Index and the Inquisition." He speaks with enthusiasm (p. 22) on the Pope's civil principedom. He teaches (p. 21) that "ordinarily speaking grace is not given except through Mary"; and (*ib.*) he vindicates to her that title of "Co-redemptress", resting as it does on the highest ecclesiastical authority, from which some Catholics have unhappily been disposed to shrink.

There are other doctrinal indications which have much interested us. He considers (p. 4) that "the New Testament and the Fathers . . . point to a kind of substantial presence of the Holy Ghost in the souls of the sanctified." He makes a remark (p. 37) on which we have not happened elsewhere to light, but which seems to us just. He thinks that "those who are designated as 'fools' in the Sapiential Books, are especially those who have received the word joyfully," but "have no deep-set roots of perfection." "Throughout

this part of Scripture," he adds, "inconstancy is the most striking characteristic of 'the fool.'"

In fact the last sermon, on corporate reunion, is the only one with which we do not thoroughly sympathise.

The sermons were all delivered to collegiate congregations, and are expressed in the style suitable to such congregations. What hearers of this kind require, is not impassioned rhetoric, but that doctrine shall be clearly and temperately placed before them in its practical and spiritual bearings. Accordingly no flash or tinsel will be found in these sermon-essays, but we are brought at every turn to appreciate their author's thoughtful and meditative habit of mind. They will be warmly admired by reflecting readers; not perhaps equally by superficial.

---

*Discourses on some Parables of the New Testament.* By C. B. GARSIDE, M.A. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

WE said in our last number, that in no particular perhaps is English Catholic literature so deficient as in published sermons. The remark was suggested by the sermons, of which the English Jesuit Fathers had just begun a continuous course, and on which we hope in our next number to report progress. In this last quarter however, we have, not only Dr. Redmond's little volume last noticed, but this good-sized work of Mr. Garside's. We much regret that we have had such a press of Review business, as to prevent us from reading Mr. Garside through. He illustrates three parables: but we have only been able as yet to study his illustration of one, the Prodigal Son.

Of course, as our Blessed Lord's parables were delivered for practical purposes, there can be no satisfactory comment on them which does not lay stress on such purposes. Still the expositor's is one office and the preacher's another. It is the expositor's office, to place in clearest light the various allusions and full meaning of the parable, and to point out distinctly its practical bearings. It is the preacher's office, to enforce its practical tendency, and place the parable before his hearers in exclusive reference to that tendency. The expositor's danger is, that he may be too exclusively literary and historical; the preacher's danger is, that his handling of Scripture may be too recklessly didactic. Even very effective preachers have been sometimes far from discriminating in their Scriptural quotations; and have been apt to seize at once on any text which has some superficial appearance of illustrating their point, without giving their mind at all to its context and critical meaning.

It seems to us that Mr. Garside has been signally successful, in doing the preacher's work without falling into the preacher's mistake. In every page of his sermons practical and spiritual lessons of the greatest value are enforced: enforced, we may add, at once vigorously, and yet without the slightest tinge of exaggeration. Yet these practical lessons are deduced most obviously and naturally from the text; and by the time you have finished the sermons, you find you have the whole parable engraven on your memory and imagination with singular vividness and completeness.

We will give one instance of what we mean, out of the many which readers will have observed. The Prodigal goes into "a far country."

"Why into a far country? Was it his intention from the outset, as he stood for the last time on the threshold, whilst he turned his face towards the open plain before him? Did he say to himself, 'I will not be content with going a short distance; I will go, if need be, over high mountains; I will cross swollen rivers; I will brave the fiery heats of the desert; I will go as far as I can, where no messenger from my father can find me, and no inquiries can reach me from friends'? Most probably he had no such idea. He wanted to enjoy himself, and to have plenty of liberty, but had no fixed plan besides. But somehow or other he went a long way, and found himself in another land altogether. I dare say he kept his youthful spirits up well with anticipations of what was in store for him; and as he passed along and saw new things, new persons, and new customs, he wandered on without at all measuring his distance. The present, the bright, sunny, merry present, was everything to him; and he altogether forgot that a time would come when to go back would be a long and wearisome journey.

"Behold a picture of the man who is bent on pleasing himself. Like the Prodigal, he cannot do this without leaving God" (pp. 30, 31).

"At first there seems no particular change in that man; his spirits are much as usual, perhaps higher than before, because of the excitement of the pleasure which he is following; nor has he any idea of going deep into the tangled forest which he has been beguiled into entering. He has no deliberate intention to stop; but he has also no deliberate intention not to stop. But one pleasure suggests another; one desertion of God's will paves the way for a fresh desertion. Onward he goes—onward and onward. To get out of one sin he commits another; the flesh pulls harder and harder, and the Spirit of God seems to draw with a force that grows weaker. At length his conscience grows dim and mystified, so that he loses his sense of distance from God. Landmarks that ought to startle him with their signs pass unmeaningly before his dreamy eye. He knows he is outside his Father's house, but he thinks he is only a little astray; when, behold, he is 'abroad in a far country'!

"We may liken the Prodigal going away from his home, but not having yet passed the boundaries of his father's territory, to those who are giving way to a continued course of venial sin. They are becoming more and more distant from God, but they are as yet within the enclosure of His friendship; the link of grace and charity which binds them and Him is being stretched hard, until at last the deed of darkness is done; mortal sin is committed" (pp. 32, 33).

We hope in our next number to notice Mr. Garside's treatment of the two remaining parables.

*A Letter to the Editor of the Dublin Review upon the Temporal Power of the Pope, and his Personal Infallibility.* By WILLIAM MASKELL, M.A.  
London: Longmans.

OUR July notice of Mr. Maskell did not in any way turn on Pontifical infallibility: on the contrary, we said (p. 232) that if he intended merely to express the Gallican doctrine, "there is no cause of complaint." But we understood his words to imply in their more natural sense, though

"we could not be at all sure that we rightly apprehended his meaning" (p. 231), that the Immaculate Conception has not yet been infallibly taught as of faith, nor will be so taught until it has been defined by a council. In other words, we thought Mr. Maskell's expressions might well be understood to imply, that the *Ecclesia Docens* is not infallible except when assembled in council. We are very glad to find, from p. 16 of the pamphlet now before us, that he intended nothing of the kind; nay, that "we have done him a great injustice unwittingly, in suspecting that he could possibly intend" it. Although therefore Mr. Maskell considers a council "the normal seat of infallibility," he by no means considers it the *exclusive* seat of that privilege; for he holds that the Immaculate Conception is infallibly taught as of faith, though no council has ever defined it. In one word, he holds that God has premised infallibility to the *dispersed*, and not exclusively to the *assembled*, *Ecclesia Docens*.

Yet in p. 18 his words have quite an opposite sound: they run as though "the Pope in council" were the "exclusive seat of infallibility." This rather perplexes us.

So much at all events is very plain; viz. that Mr. Maskell considers the definition of 1854 to have been quite an exceptional fact. There is "a very distinct difference between this article of the Christian Faith—that is, with regard to the foundation on which it rests—and every other article of the Creed" (p. 15). We cannot quite understand this language. Whenever the Church condemns any given proposition as heretical, she defines its contradictory as a dogma of the Faith. In the case of Jansenius then, the dispersed *Ecclesia Docens* put forth five definitions of faith; in accepting the "*Auctorem Fidei*," she put forth *more* than five. All these rest "on the same foundation" as the definition of 1854: having been issued by the Holy See, and accepted by the Episcopate.

But the dispersed *Ecclesia Docens* has not only condemned various propositions as heretical; she has condemned a very far larger number as worthy of some lower censure. Are we to understand Mr. Maskell as denying her infallibility in these minor censures? There are some ominously-sounding words in p. 11, as though no determination of the Church were infallible except definitions of faith. Yet we will not rashly suppose that Mr. Maskell can intend to deny, e. g., the infallibility of the "*Unigenitus*." As we pointed out in July (p. 226), a local council, "most fully approved" by Benedict XIII., declared that this Bull is "a dogmatic, definitive, and irreformable judgment of the Church"; and that "if any one does not accept it in heart and mind," he is to be counted "among those who have made shipwreck concerning the Faith."

Among those various doctrines, which the dispersed *Ecclesia Docens* teaches infallibly and obligatorily yet not as "of faith,"—one, as we have ever alleged, concerns the Pope's civil principedom: declaring that that principedom is necessary for the Church's well-being. We quoted however in July (p. 233) a passage of Mr. Maskell's, which would universally be understood as a denial of this doctrine. We must now consider in order his various replies to our statement.

He had said, that "no one can believe this" civil principedom "to be essen-

tial in the slightest degree to the just authority . . . of the Catholic Church." By this expression, as he now explains (p. 7), he meant no more than that the civil principedom is no part of the Church's essence ; that the Church indeed, by divine promise, will remain on earth to the Day of Judgment ; but that there is no such promise in favour of the Pontiff's temporal dominion. Since this was Mr. Maskell's meaning, our only unfavourable criticism (so far) is, that he expressed himself too mildly against his opponent's doctrine : for no Catholic, remaining such, can possibly hold the tenet which Mr. Maskell disclaims.

He proceeded to say, that "some may doubt whether" this principedom be "essential in the slightest degree" "even to the well-being of the Catholic Church" ; and that "to himself it is almost a matter of indifference." Such language however, he now explains (p. 6), is not inconsistent with his holding—and in fact he does hold—that (in the words of Pius IX.) "this civil principedom of the Holy See was given to the Roman Pontiff by a singular counsel of Divine Providence ; and that it is necessary in order that the same Roman Pontiff . . . \* may be able to exercise with fullest liberty supreme authority . . . and provide for the greater good of Church and faithful."

Again, we "pressed on" Mr. Maskell's "attention" (p. 234) Card. Caterini's letter, written by the Pontiff's command, declaring, that to reject the above-mentioned doctrine on the civil principedom, is to "incur" "the dread sentence pronounced on those who will not hear the Church." Mr. Maskell replies (p. 112), as we understand him, that he quite agrees with Card. Caterini's letter ; and he says explicitly, that we "cannot hold more strongly" than he does "the lawfulness and antiquity of the temporal power, its fitness and (under God's permission) *its necessity*." Mr. Maskell goes on to designate it as "monstrous", that men "should deny the fitness, the antiquity, and probably the very many advantages of the civil principedom of the Roman Pontiff." All this is very satisfactory so far as it goes : but why then did Mr. Maskell profess, that "to himself" this very principedom "is *almost a matter of indifference*" ?

We further argued in July (p. 234), that the Catholic Episcopate has endorsed the Syllabus ; and that the Syllabus declares an obligation to be incumbent on all Catholics, of holding that doctrine on the Pope's civil principedom, which is set forth in six specified Pontifical Acts. Mr. Maskell will neither affirm nor deny that he holds this doctrine ; though he "has no wish to volunteer an opinion contrary" thereto (p. 10). But he argues that, at all events, no interior assent is due to the doctrine of these Acts, because "the bishops have never placed it before their people as *of faith*" (p. 11). Now, in endorsing the Syllabus, they *have* placed it before their people, as

---

\* We cannot understand Mr. Maskell's difficulty in the Pontiff's words which here follow—"never subject to any prince or civil power." Perhaps the following paraphrase may be intelligible to him ; which, we think, every one will admit to be faithful : "in order that the Roman Pontiff may not at any time, by being subject to any prince or civil power, be prevented from exercising with fullest liberty, &c. &c."

a doctrine which "all Catholics are bound (debent) to hold most firmly." And we should have been glad if Mr. Maskell had noticed this fact, to which we solicited his attention.

We never said (see Maskell, p. 10), that on Mr. Maskell's view, the Pope's "acts of sovereignty are contradictory to true morality." We said that, on Mr. Maskell's view, the doctrine taught by the Ecclesia Docens, on this subject, is contradictory to the rights of the Roman people, and therefore contradictory to true morality.

We have no wish to enter into controversy with Mr. Maskell on Pontifical infallibility. He is fully tolerated in holding as yet Gallican opinions; and he will of course yield a firm assent, to whatever dogma the Vatican Council may define. But he expresses so strongly his confidence in F. Newman as a theologian, that we may perhaps do some good, by pointing out how widely F. Newman differs from him on one important matter. Mr. Maskell (p. 22) regards it as displaying a somewhat uncatholic spirit, to contemplate with hopeful anticipation a new definition of faith. But F. Newman (see "Anglican Difficulties," p. 285) says that "whenever a new definition of doctrine is promulgated by the competent authority," "a ready and easy acceptance of the apparent novelty and a cordial acquiescence in its promulgation is the very evidence" of a "Catholicly-disposed" mind.

---

*A Few Words on Reunion and the Coming Council at Rome.* By GERARD F. COBB, M.A. London: Palmer.

IT is impossible to exaggerate the charitableness, forbearingsness, and truly Christian spirit exhibited in this pamphlet. We thank the author heartily for such an oasis in the desert; such a peaceful variety in these days of bitter and angry controversy. We cannot but confidently hope, that one who seems so deeply animated with piety and love of God, may be led nearer and nearer, by prayer and seeking after God's will, to the full measure of Catholic truth.

It gives us great pain then to say, that we really cannot see any argumentative purpose which the pamphlet will serve. We have taken great pains to understand Mr. Cobb, though we are far from confident that we have succeeded in the task; but so far as we do understand him, his ecclesiastical theory includes these two propositions:—

I. There is one only society on earth which, in the fullest sense, is the Church of Christ; viz., the society which submits herself to the Pope's spiritual jurisdiction. She is infallible in her definitions of faith; and moreover, the great mass of mankind are commanded by God to be in her communion, and so submit themselves to the Pope.

II. But there is an important exception to this obligation. Suppose a certain aggregate of bishops at some given period rebel against the Pope and form a separate society, without conspicuously exhibiting more unchristian qualities than their opponents. Centuries afterwards (to the end of the world?), those born of parents who are members of this society, are exempted



by God from the obligation, which He has imposed on all others, of submitting to the Holy See.

This second proposition is certainly remarkable ; and (we venture to think) not less heretical than any tenet of Arius or Nestorius. Strangeness however and heresy are no reasons—rather the contrary—why we should not carefully consider it. But the fact is—though our readers will hardly credit it—that Mr. Cobb has not adduced in its favour a single argument of any kind whatsoever, but has rather treated it as self-evident. We call on him then (1), either to accept our statement of his thesis or to correct that statement ; and (2) to adduce arguments for the said thesis, whether from ecclesiastical definitions on the one hand, or from Scripture and Tradition on the other. No possible good can be done by controverting on petty details, while this fundamental issue remains untried.

We would only correct one mistake into which he has fallen. He very naturally accepts the first of the four Gallician articles ; he holds (see our number for last April, p. 466) that “kings and princes are not by God’s ordinance subjected in temporals to any ecclesiastical power.” But it is rather too bad that he should suspect the “Civiltà” of sympathizing with such Gallicanism (p. 70) ; and that too in a passage, which expresses orthodox doctrine (one would have thought) with the most unmistakeable clearness.

We should add, in conclusion, that Mr. Cobb is most honourably distinguished from many of his brother unionists, by his consistently candid and equitable judgment towards the Holy Father and the Roman Catholic Church.

*In Spirit and in Truth ; an Essay on the Ritual of the New Testament.*  
London : Longmans & Co. 1869.

THIS is an attempt, by a Catholic writer who has chosen to remain anonymous, to prove to Protestants that ecclesiastical Ritualism and Symbolism are in conformity with the teaching of the New Testament. It has, at least, one distinctive merit—that of a very complete classification and examination of the passages both in the life of our Lord and in the writings of the Apostles which authorize the symbolical and ritualistic principle. The Gospels, when “searched” with an unprejudiced eye, yield some results that should startle Dr. Cumming and Dr. White. Their school is pleased to speak of our Lord as nearly always placed before us “under lights which are moral and spiritual, rarely ever in connection with anything simply of a ritual nature.” (Let us remark, in passing, the ingenious begging of the question contained in the word “simply” in this passage.) Now it would seem to be an undeniable fact that throughout the whole of our Lord’s life, from the stable of Bethlehem to the sepulchre in the garden, not only was He Himself the object of symbolical observance on the part of others, but He also used symbolism Himself in a multitude of those external actions which He saw fit to perform. The writer of the work before us brings this fairly out in one of his chapters ; we may quote his summing up and conclusion :—

Without going beyond the pages of the New Testament, we have found that God Himself made use of appeals to the senses and imagination far more striking, more splendid, more gorgeous than any which have been at the command of the Catholic Church, in the grandest function that ever was celebrated beneath the dome of S. Peter's. What, indeed, are silken vestments, jewelled mitres, peals of the organ, blaze of tapers, clouds of incense, or any other means used to impress the worshipper in the richest cathedral of Christendom, compared with the bright clouds, glistening raiment, heavenly voices, dazzling splendours, splitting of rocks, great earthquakes and mighty winds, which are some of the elements of God's own ritual in the New Testament ? (p. 61).

Again, at the conclusion of chapter VI. of his first part, the author says :—

From all this it is abundantly evident that the religion which Jesus Christ taught by word and example is one replete with ceremonies,—to speak, to sing, to groan, to utter strong cries with the voice, to kneel or fall prostrate to the ground, to shed tears, to cast down the eyes to earth, to lift them to heaven, to strike the breast, to lift up the hands, to cover or uncover the head in prayer, to rise or sit, to wear unusual garments, to put on sack-cloth, to sprinkle ashes on the head, to stretch out the hand, to impose hands, to write upon the ground, to breathe, to anoint with oil or with clay, to use spittle, to pour water, to shake the dust from the feet,—these, and such as these, are the rites of the New Testament. Are those prescribed to the Catholic priest in the ritual of Paul V. either more numerous, more varied, or of a different character ? (p. 106).

After thus showing, in his first part, that the character of Catholic ritual is in harmony with the New Testament, he proceeds, in a second section of the work, to prove that its origin is also justified by the New Testament ; in other words, that we can demonstrate the apostolicity of ritual from the New Testament itself. His arguments may be thus epitomized : The New Testament cannot be proved unless we admit tradition. Its canon must have been formed by tradition, and unity in its interpretation is to be secured by tradition alone. Now tradition means ritual ; at any rate, ritual is so interwoven with tradition, that the one implies the other. This argument leads the writer over the usual course of proof, but he has communicated a certain novelty to his treatment by considering tradition as equivalent to ritual, and using illustrations in accordance with this view.

But not only must ritualistic tradition have preceded the New Testament, it is also necessary as a key to its meaning, now that we have it. Scripture by itself is incomplete, unintelligible, fragmentary. The details of this argument are interesting. The writer illustrates his position by referring to the two sacred rites of Baptism and the Eucharist. The Scripture accounts of these are simply nugatory and useless for practical purposes, unless we suppose the existence of some other well-known code of regulations side by side with the written word ; and the suggestion that, according to the Protestant view, the "washing of the feet" should be the chief rite of the Christian dispensation, is peculiarly happy, and may be recommended to Dr. Cumming.

The work will be useful to Catholic preachers, as a manual of reference to the New Testament when ritualistic matters are to be treated. It ought to be useful also to Protestants, for whom it has been written. But the real

truth is, that the objections of Protestants to Ritual, like their objections to Asceticism or to miracles, are so totally and serenely *à priori* that appeals to fact are most frequently thrown away. It is quite certain that if the New Testament were a profane book, say the remains of a school of Greek philosophers, or the first accessible writings of a new Eastern sect, there is not a scholar among us who would not prove, from the ellipses, the allusions, and the suggestions (not to say the assertions) of the text, the existence of a much larger body of laws and customs than was there set down. But Protestantism has got hold of a controversial position represented by the words "in spirit and in truth." "In spirit" must mean "no Ritual"; "in truth," it is equally clear, means "no Symbolism." It is a position so absurd that scarcely any concrete Protestant has ever been found so sternly consistent as to carry it out to its full extent. The English Reformers, as one may read in the remains of such men as Cranmer or Whitgift, admitted ceremonies in due measure. Cranmer considered they had their "end and utility." Even Bullinger and Swiss Calvinism did not cry them down altogether. The very Quakers are said to observe the rite of reading the Scripture with their hats on, and the Quaker costume has only just been abolished in time to prevent it from being as Ritualistic as a Chasuble or a Dalmatic, which are directly descended from everyday clothes. It has been reserved, it seems, for Dr. Cumming, at the present lamentably late period of the world's existence, to give to the Protestant canon its full development. "There ought," he says, "to be *nothing* symbolical in a Christian place of worship. Make the building as chaste, as beautiful, as perfect, as architectural taste can make it, but let there be nothing typical or symbolical in it" (p. 109). And it is this purely gratuitous, foolish, and unscriptural assumption that we are called upon to disprove by a few loud-voiced leaders of a small local sect! People sometimes express themselves shocked at S. Jerome's strong and scornful language when he had to meet Jovinian's very similar novelties about Asceticism. We are very much inclined to sympathize with S. Jerome when we come across Jovinian's anti-types in modern literature.

The concluding part of the work treats of the actual growth of Catholic Ritual, and the Scriptural principles of which it is a consequence. Its "Pattern on the Mount" is the Life of Jesus Christ. It is an attempt, on the part of man, to make some reparation or compensation for the abasements of the Incarnation. Above all, it is a consequence of the Real Presence of Christ our Lord on earth, in the sacrament of the Eucharist. The chapter in which this last subject is treated has pleased us much. Of course, its reasoning goes far further than the establishment of the propriety of Ritual. But it is always well, we think, in controversial dealings with our brethren outside the Church, to give them as often as possible a glimpse of the wealth and riches of the land they do not know. When the Blessed Sacrament is carried, hastily and stealthily, to a sick bed through the streets of a busy Protestant city, no pious heart can help hoping and suspecting that It "passes by doing good," unknown and unthought of as Its presence may be. Much more may we be sure that the same Divine Mystery, when reverently pointed out and explained to an unbeliever, will often make his heart burn within him, until at last his eyes are opened, and he sees Who it is.

*The Hidden Life of Jesus: a Lesson and Model to Christians.* Translated from the French of Henri Marie Boudon, Archdeacon of Evreux. By EDWARD HEALY THOMPSON, M.A. Burns, Oates, & Co.

WE have to thank Mr. Thompson for this translation of a valuable little work which has long been popular in France. It was selected, he tells us, by the late Father Faber, to form one of the volumes of a series of translations for spiritual reading; of which only one volume, "The Spiritual Doctrine of Father Louis Lallemant," was actually published.

In an age and in a country where the temptation à paraître (to use an untranslatable expression) was at its strongest, Henri Marie Boudon seems to have been raised up to testify by his writings, and still more mightily by his example, to the blessedness and the power of the *hidden life*. "Those," says Mr. Thompson, "who are not acquainted with his history ought to be informed that for eight years he lay under an imputation of a most disgraceful character, which he bore not only with patience but in silence, although it was the occasion of his being deprived for a time of his ecclesiastical office, and being treated with general contempt." This circumstance gives a powerful and affecting interest to the simplicity of his words upon a subject of which his own experience enabled him to speak with such force and pathos. In some of Boudon's works certain inaccuracies of expression have been pointed out, which the author would certainly have corrected had he written after the condemnation of quietism. Nothing of the kind is, however, to be found in the present treatise; and we are told that the divine appointed to examine it previous to its publication in the year 1673, not only declared it to contain nothing in any way opposed to faith or morals, but pronounced a high eulogium on its excellence.

---

*The Hidden Life: being Extracts translated from Nepreu's "Pensées Chrétiennes."* London: J. Masters, Aldersgate Street.

AN admirable little book, the original of which, from its singularly practical character and condensed thought, we can well believe to be a favourite, as the translator tells us it is, of Dr. Newman. We give an extract, taken at random, which illustrates both these characteristics:—

"Tis a trifle, you say; an unimportant rule; a small grace; what does it matter? It matters a great deal to be faithful in little things; it is a proof of great love to wish to please in everything, to displease in nothing, however trivial, Him we love.

"If you wait for great occasions for working on God's behalf, when will you work? How rare these great occasions!

"The Son of God hath Himself declared, *He that is faithful in that which is least, is faithful also in much; and he that is unjust in the least, is unjust also in much.*—(S. Luke, xvi. 10.)

"The greatest conflagrations often originate in a spark; the deadliest sins, in some trifling fault; a man's reprobation in some grace despised. Besides, if the thing be a trifle, your negligence is the less excusable, for there is some

excuse in failing to do that which is difficult ; none in failing to do that which is easy. Sanctity depends not so much on doing *extraordinary*, as on doing *common things*, but *not in a common way*. I say, *not in a common way*, for it is not enough to do a good action, we must do it well. *Self-renunciation in trifles is not a trifle.—Imit. Christi.*

The translator has not, we think, changed his title for the better. "*Pensées Chrétiennes*" is a better name for a series of reflections upon various religious subjects, than the "*Hidden Life*," which belongs to the highest stage of Christian ascetism.

---

*The Life of Blessed Margaret Mary.* By the REV. GEORGE TICKELL, S.J.  
London : Burns, Oates, & Co. 1869.

WHEN Margaret Mary Alæoque was solemnly beatified by Pius IX. in September, 1864, it was observed that the picture of her which was discovered on the *façade* of S. Peter's, represented not merely the beatified herself, as was usually the case, but also the Sacred Heart of Jesus. It is not difficult to see what the Church wished to signify by this departure from custom. The re-appearance of Margaret Mary, after nearly two centuries had elapsed from the time she was laid in the grave in her monastery of Paray-le-Monial, is in some way connected with that magnificent devotion that it was her privilege to introduce to the world. The admirable dispensations of Providence in the whole history of the devotion to the Sacred Heart must be familiar to every Catholic. In substance it has always existed in the Church, from the very days of the beloved disciple. But the Jansenist heresy first, as we may reverently think, moved God's mercy to reveal it in its present form. Jansenism has been the most subtle and shifting of all the heresies. Not even the disingenuousness of the hard-pressed Monothelites of the sixth and seventh centuries can compare with the revelations now made of Jansenist diplomacy and mental reservation. All heresies have lent themselves to be the tools of the State, and all have weakened the love of God among the populations they have affected. But Jansenism has been unique in its capability of transforming itself when necessary, and of putting on any garment, from the purple of an Austrian emperor to the red bonnet of a revolutionist, that was most fitted to help it to its end. It has an icy breath that freezes the fountains of Faith, silences the streams of Hope, and stills the beatings of Love. When the souls of men come under its power, there happens something like what might be expected if a warm and fair region of the earth were converted, by some great change in ocean-stream or mountain-level, to arctic desolation and wintry death. At its starting, Jansenism laid its touch on dogma. The five propositions of the *Augustinus* are the bare and rigid Calvinism of necessity and final reprobation. As it went on, it began to draw men into a fatal isolation from the Holy See. It laboured at withholding from sinners those Sacraments that alone could save them. It used brute force, crippled the Church in her relations with the faithful, and stood between her and the sheep of her fold. All the usual means of resistance that the Church of God has within her were brought

into play against Jansenism—the learning of her schools, the pastoral efforts of her bishops, the devotion of her clergy and religious men, and, beyond all, the monumental utterances of her chief pastors, from Urban VIII. to Pius VI., and the *Auctorem fidei*. But, as it now seems to us, the Providence of God reinforced his Church, in this critical struggle, by an assistance which was so much the more effective, as it was more immediately the work of God's own hand. The fire of the Sacred Heart was to rout the winter of Jansenism. B. Margaret Mary died in the year 1690. Jansenism at that time was silent, but full of deadly activity. It was twelve years before the famous Case of Conscience appeared. During those twelve years the devotion to the Sacred Heart had fixed its roots in the soil of France.

B. Margaret Mary has been dead nearly 200 years, but it was only the other day that the Church decreed her the public honours of the liturgy. Meanwhile, her holy deeds and words have not ceased to edify the faithful; and her *Life*, by Languet, Bishop of Soissons, almost a contemporary, has been a favourite book of spiritual reading. But there seems to be a great and touching fitness in the moment selected for investing her with the aureola of beatification. S. Gertrude, in a wonderful passage, speaks of the days “when the world should be old and tepidity should reign” as the time when the treasures of the Sacred Heart should be made known to men. B. Margaret Mary tells us herself that it was the ingratitude of men, and the little return they made for his love, that had most pained our Lord in his sacred Passion, and that most urged Him to propose his Sacred Heart to their devotion. Now it would not, perhaps, seem clear to all that tepidity is the sin of our times. But let us consider the facts. Rénan's miserable book appeared very shortly before the Beatification of B. Margaret Mary. Having all the conditions requisite for being a popular book, it has spread everywhere. It has been, so to speak, a blasphemy that every Catholic ear has had to listen to. And after all it is only a sample of a multitude of other books. A second fact of our times is an almost simultaneous attack of the secular power in every European state upon the freedom of the Church. In other words, it may be said that within the last ten years blasphemy and indifferentism have burst out into the most appalling activity. On the other side, it is infinitely consoling to know that faith and piety are as evident, as energetic, and, so to speak, as aggressive, as impiety and unbelief. Three great marks of orthodoxy are very distinct in these times we live in: devotion to the Blessed Sacrament, devotion to our Lady, and devotion to the Pope. Now in the presence of such an eruption of Satanic influence as has never before been known, and, at the same time, of a fervour of orthodoxy perhaps equally new, is it not an appalling truth that the great mass of professing Catholics in nearly every country of Europe are looking on with calm indifference? It is not, perhaps, that men are much worse absolutely than they have generally been; but the sadness of the thought lies in the circumstances of the times. When the powers of evil are in the field with new artillery and fiercer fury, and when the ranks of the truly faithful are arming, and watching, and attacking with a fervour and spirit that makes the world ring again, indifference and apathy become no longer negative states, but positive crimes. It is often said that in France, or in Italy, or in Spain, the



good are numerous enough to swamp the bad by merely asserting their existence. Yet over the greater part of the Continent, in every assembly where men meet together to regulate the course of the state or of the city, it is always the cry that the "Liberals" are the majority. In Italian cabinet councils, in French societies, in Spanish parliaments, even in the municipal assemblies of Catholic Belgium, it is always the same—the "Liberals" are the majority. It is not too much to say that cowardice and tepidity are crying evils in the Catholic masses at the present time. They love their trade, their social standing, their cheap press, their easy morality, their scoffing literature too much, and they love the interests of the Church too little. It is the very time for the preaching of the devotion to the Sacred Heart, for this is the very evil that drew our Blessed Saviour to reveal it.

We have been led into these reflections by the perusal of a new life of B. Margaret Mary, by Father George Tickell, a member of the same society that had the privilege of directing her and assisting her, in the persons of Father de la Columbière and Father Rolin. It is to be expected that the recent Beatification of the holy virgin will have the effect of sending the devout back to her life, to study more attentively her acts and words. Besides, the peculiar character of the revelation made to her is its great fulness, and the clearness with which it states the motives and the spirit of the devotion which she was charged to spread. Hitherto, her words have been venerated, indeed, but now they have a new kind of authority, for they have been approved by the judgment of the Church. Any one, therefore, who desires to enter thoroughly into the spirit of the devotion to the Sacred Heart should read and meditate very attentively the visions and revelations vouchsafed to B. Margaret Mary. We might suggest that it would be a useful thing to draw up a well-arranged compilation of her words and teachings; it would be a manual not only of her own "spirit," but of that of the Sacred Heart.

Of Father Tickell's labours we can say with pleasure that he has given us a real biography, in which the Saint is everything and the biographer keeps in the background. As far as we have verified it, the chronology and narrative are carefully given and trustworthy. Perhaps some attempt at a description of the present state of Paray-le-Monial and its treasures of piety by an eye-witness would have enhanced the value of the book. We must confess, also, that we find Father Tickell's style a little hard and dry for a life of a saint. Sermonizing and prosing is one thing, but unction is another. If a man is fit to write a biography he is fit to give us his own impressions of his hero, in that sort of commentary which is implied in chastened fervour of expression and unobtrusive moral instruction. The absence of this is calculated to injure the success of the work as spiritual reading. Many readers will still prefer the stately and rounded phrasing of Bishop Languet, as presented in the Oratorian translation. Moreover, in a work like the present, which comes before us with pretensions which we gladly allow, there is sometimes a certain slovenliness of language which should be noticed. It is to be hoped that it is not going to be the fashion to say "*the* Mother Greyfié," "*the* Mother de Saumaise," &c.; the use of the definite article is surely quite

as French as it is to say "the Father Lacordaire" or "the Sister Rosalie." And what are we to think of such expressions as, "In her manner of conducting her novices, her instructions . . . were likely to be of a solid character." "To supply them with fresh vigour in the practice of piety, she would vary the exercises of it." "All combined by giving up their hearts, as by one consent." "One whose character was a pernicious example." "A germ afterwards embodied." "She ambitioned to share." "An eventful incident." But works like this biography are too rare, to allow us to insist on such minor blemishes as these.

---

*The Life of Madame Louise de France.* By the Author of "Tales of Kirkbeck." Rivingtons: London, Oxford, and Cambridge.

IT is difficult to speak too highly on the interest of this book. The life of any member of an order so supernatural as S. Teresa's Carmelites must be attractive; there is a special interest in following the every-day incidents occurring to those, who have so unhesitatingly given themselves up to a life, so unearthly, and so impossible to any without a true vocation. One almost feels inclined to wonder that they should have any human tastes or inclinations left, after so readily giving up all that could make life supportable to an ordinary Christian; but to read of a real happiness, totally unlike anything that can be known in the world, and united with continual and cheerful self-sacrifice, is in itself so elevating and refreshing, that a habit of reading saints' lives alone must give Catholics quite a new power of comprehension. The ordinary pleasure of perusing a nun's life is of course greatly enhanced by the fact of her having been a princess. Undoubtedly, in the eyes of God, princess is an empty title, with no more meaning than any other name. But in the eyes of man—when not raised above such a feeling by extreme sanctity or sunk below it by fanatic revolutionarism—the idea of royalty will always possess a peculiar significance; and the ordinary actions of a Carmelite nun—such as sweeping rooms, performing penances, and conforming to rules,—when gone through by a princess of France, create a feeling of admiration proportionate to the appreciation of her exalted rank. And this admiration is by no means ungrounded; for, brought up as unhappy royalty always must be, surrounded by flattering attendants and dutiful homage, continually imbibing a consciousness of natal superiority to ordinary human beings, such an acknowledgment of sinfulness as is implied by retiring into an order of life-long penance, must be in a princess little short of miraculous. But the Princess Louise's vocation must doubtless have been much aided by the fact of her having spent her earlier years at the Benedictine Abbey of Fontevrault, where her pious mother had her educated till the age of thirteen; and the example of the good Queen Marie Leczinska's own life was calculated to inspire no ordinary religious impressions.

We believe this is not the first time that the royal Carmelite's life has been produced in English; but the present volume, if, as it professes to be, an abbreviation, has certainly fixed on the most telling points of the

Princess's history. We imagine that, could we see the French original, we should find details of devotion to our Lady, which are here totally omitted; and of which we do not, of course, for a moment suppose the holy Princess to have been destitute. Still it is much to find an authoress, who is as yet out of the Church, entering so readily into the religious spirit and life as in the present instance. And we may be permitted to hope that her truly good work, of producing in a captivating and readable form the life of this saintly daughter of France, may some future day meet with a reward at present neither expected nor wished for.

---

*Joan of Arc.* By Monseigneur FELIX, Bishop of Orleans. Translated by Emily Bowles. London: Burns, Oates, & Co.

MONSEIGNEUR DUPANLOUP has a right, if any one has, to panegyrisé Joan of Arc. Next to his love of his Catholic profession comes his love for his country; and no eloquent Frenchman could live on the spot that the maid's heroism has rendered illustrious, without both himself and his countrymen feeling it to be only right and proper that he should celebrate her glory. The great French bishop walks almost daily along the banks of that Loire, that was crossed by the famous bridge, and that swept away the English men-at-arms; and his house is within a few yards of that cathedral (now rebuilt) to which her banner was borne. When the town of Orleans, on each recurring 8th of May, rings its bells and puts itself in gala train to keep its famous anniversary, the Bishop of Orleans naturally finds himself the chief actor in a *fête* which culminates in his own cathedral. To judge from the two published discourses which he has delivered on two of these occasions, he finds his own share in the historic ceremony as much a labour of love as of duty. There is no doubt that the opportunity, to a true orator and an earnest man, is a great one. He stands on a spot whose name is surrounded with a genuine historic halo; for Orleans, to a Frenchman, is as Marathon or Thermopylæ. There is the sound and the crowd of a festival. The grand façade of S. Croix towers over an excited multitude, and its imposing nave is filled with an unusual gathering. The banner of the maid, the same that was borne before her into Orleans, is hanging before their eyes; and the orator can point to it as he tells his tale. The auditory comprises, besides the faithful of the town and the country, men of mark in Church and State. In this, his latest oration, Mgr. Dupanloup pauses to salute "the officers of our glorious army, the administrators of this noble department and city, our magistrates so worthily honoured, and the whole city of Orleans so faithful in its reverence for the imperishable memory of its deliverer"; and, not least, he has to acknowledge the presence of no fewer than twelve bishops: among whom are the Bishop of Poitiers, where the maid was examined before the University; the Archbishop of Bourges, under the porch of whose cathedral the people pressed to touch her; the Bishop of S. Diè, among whose simple Picard people she had sighed to die and be buried; and, most touching of all, Cardinal Bonnechose, Archbishop of Rouen, the city that saw the flames of her martyrdom.

The discourse before us is not unworthy of its distinguished author. In his former oration, delivered sixteen years ago, he had dwelt chiefly on the external aspects of Joan's enterprise; on her inspired mission, her heroism, and her execution. On the present occasion he has chosen for his theme her personal holiness. The most remarkable feature of the discourse is its plain avowal that its author hopes to see Joan of Arc one day a canonized Saint. After quoting words which express the conviction that her name should be inscribed in the ranks of the Blessed, he adds,—“This act of veneration may some day be decreed by the Holy Roman Church to Joan of Arc; and I own that I look for that day myself and desire it with ardour” (p. 34). And the whole panegyric, which is elaborately wrought out and furnished with notes, is a plea for her admission to the honours of sanctity.

Mgr. Dupanloup may be sure that, if the case comes before the Roman authorities, no Englishman will trouble himself to appear as devil's advocate. We say this, because there seems to be a slight appearance of surprise on the part of the eminent preacher, to know that the English of the present day recognize the purity of Joan's life and her miraculous mission. Setting aside certain prejudices on the score of religious matters, it is pretty safe to say that Englishmen of every party and persuasion wish the Maid of Orleans all the honour her champions can win for her. It is impossible here to enter into the question of the *heroicity* of her virtue. But it is certain that her story is one which no Catholic or patriot can read without sympathy and something more.

Miss Bowles's translation is readable. But the task of translating the Bishop of Orleans, especially in his moments of inspiration, is a very hard one, and we cannot say that this translation gives us the aroma of the classical French of the original. Mgr. Dupanloup, in one place, quotes Shakespeare. His translator might have taken the trouble to give us Shakespeare's exact words. To be sure it is in a speech of bitter irony that the Bastard Falconbridge calls France “God's own soldier.” But we are thoroughly ashamed of Shakespeare in connection with “La Pucelle,” and it was almost cruel of the Bishop to introduce his name. We can only hope that the weak claptrap of the First Part of Henry the Sixth is not Shakespeare's at all.

---

*The Operations of War Explained and Illustrated.* By EDWARD BRUCE HAMLEY, Colonel in the Army, C.B., &c. &c. Second edition. London and Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons.

WHEN the Swiss General Dufour, who, we believe, was Louis Napoleon's master in the art of war, published his excellent compendious *Cours de Tactique* some twenty-five years ago, he gave a list of the principal authorities which he had consulted, and to which he would advise students of military history and science to refer. There were some fifty names in all—the great majority French of course, but a good number German, a few Italian, one or two Spanish, several Greek and Latin. There was not the name of a single

English author among them however, nor, indeed, with the exception of Napier's "Peninsular War," was there at the time a work in English military literature which could be regarded as entitled to a place in a catalogue, the first book in which was the Archduke Charles's "Principles of Strategy," and the last Xenophon's "Retreat of the Ten Thousand." The military critic may nowadays boast with some justice that we have changed all that. A library, and a very valuable library, of military literature in the English tongue is rapidly accumulating. Napier's magnificent "History" may be compared, not to disadvantage, with any of Jomini's works; and it has since been illustrated in detail by the publication of all the despatches and correspondence of the Duke of Wellington while in the Peninsula. The despatches of his great predecessor, the Duke of Marlborough, during the war of the Succession, after having lain in a lumber-room at Blenheim Park for upwards of a century, have also at last seen the light. A later crop of treatises and commentaries, occasioned by the Crimean, Italian, American, and German wars, has added to these standard authorities several works, which are not unlikely to live. Colonel Chesney's studies of the American War and the Waterloo Campaign, Mr. Hooper's book on Waterloo, Captain Hozier's "Seven Weeks' War," which, though hurriedly written, contains passages worthy of Napier's pen, may be mentioned by way of example. But among the labours of the modern English military school Colonel Hamley's "Operations of War" stands alone. It is a work of merit as unique in its way as is Napier's History. It is the most profound, the most systematic, and the most simple treatise on the art of war, it would be little to say, in the English language, but so far as we are aware, in any language. Its method is as clear and connected as the method of Euclid in dealing with geometry. Its style is so simple and so fine that it can be read with comprehension and pleasure by any reader of ordinary education.

The first edition of Colonel Hamley's book was published at a trying time—immediately before the commencement of the Austrian and Prussian war; and by many of his disciples and comrades the war was studied by the light of the principles laid down in the book. It is a great testimony to its value that the book bore the test triumphantly. Captain Hozier, who then accompanied the army of Prince Frederick Charles as military correspondent of the *Times* again and again referred to the rapid success of the Prussian system of tactics as illustrating some of Colonel Hamley's favourite dogmas; and it is a very striking evidence to his foresight, that at a time when the needle-gun was so imperfectly appreciated throughout the armies of Europe, and in general rather disparaged as too complicated an instrument for the rough work of war, he so wrote of its probable future effect in battle, that in his second edition he has had nothing to add on that subject except a foot-note. "To discern and provide for the new conditions under which armies will engage may in the next European war be worth to a people, not merely armies and treasure, but liberty and national life." These were the words in which Colonel Hamley anticipated the effect of the needle-gun in March, 1866, and the battle of Konnigratz was fought on the 3rd of July following. The needle-gun did not indeed destroy the liberty and national life of Austria; but while it abolished her rank as a German Power, it kept at bay the

legions of France panting for the Rhine. The armament of all Europe has since been revolutionized—and still Prussia, if we may judge from the admirable sketches which have recently appeared in the *Times* of the Prussian army's conduct during the mock-campaign of this autumn, is in direction, efficiency, and mobility the first military power in Europe. One of the most remarkable passages, by the way, in that correspondence, which we presume is from the pen of Captain Hozier, is that relating to the tendency on the part of the present Prussian authorities to prefer the column to the line formation in action. One would have supposed that the now general use of breech-loading arms of precision would have had exactly the opposite tendency. The personal quality of the troops has little or nothing to do with it, though it may be remembered what stress was laid on the faculty of fighting in line as the special and exclusive glory of the British infantry in Mr. Kinglake's hysterical history of the Crimean war—how he maundered about the “thin red line,” and the “slender red line,” and the “scarlet arch,” and the “scarlet string,” and all the romance about Sir Arthur Wellesley's “pining sickness” in India, because the French were fighting in column and the English could fight in line, and how Mr. Kinglake consequently ventured to connect “the pining sickness with the mighty resolve which was destined to change the face of the world.” But the “mighty resolve” was no novelty. Like the needle-gun and the steel ramrod, fighting in line was a Prussian method, and that before the great Duke was born. As Colonel Hamley says, “during great part of last century, a controversy was waged between the advocates of the line and the column formation . . . In Frederick's time, the Prussians generally attacked in line . . . In one instance, Frederick was obliged to attack the enemy in single line; for at Sohr he was so inferior in force, that in its usual formation his army would have been outflanked on both wings. In single line, then, he won the battle.” Mr. Carlyle, whose study of Frederick's tactics is in general so wonderfully accurate and luminous, and whose description of this action is particularly spirited and picturesque, does not, nevertheless, adequately emphasize this very remarkable incident in it.

To the present edition of his book, Colonel Hamley has made considerable additions concerning the use of railroads and telegraphs in war; but we venture to think he has not yet mastered the problem to what extent railroads are destined to be used in war, and how far, apart from their actual use as roads for steam-engines, they are likely to affect the general conditions of war. This, we presume to predict, is the part of his work which he will specially need to revise and enlarge for his third edition.

---



## Correspondence.

---

### DR. MELIA ON OUR BLESSED LADY.

[The following letter originated thus. More than a year ago Dr. Melia's volume, "The Woman Blessed by all Generations," was forwarded to us for notice. The Editor was so fortunate as to induce a most competent critic to undertake the matter, and a notice accordingly appeared in our number for July, 1868, pp. 251-253. Within the last two months Dr. Melia has written to us a very courteous letter, complaining that this notice was unduly severe. We could not possibly do more in the matter, than give our readers the means of estimating for themselves the justice of our criticism. We promised therefore, that any pamphlet, which Dr. Melia might wish to write in defence of his work, should be bound up with our present number; and this, we believe, has been done. It was also the wish both of Dr. Melia and the Editor, that our contributor should see the proof of this pamphlet, in order to make any comment which might appear to him reasonable; and hence the following letter. We have only to add that the present case must not be taken as a precedent; and that we cannot undertake to make the same concession to every other writer who may think himself too severely criticized, which we have gladly made to Dr. Melia.]

DEAR MR. EDITOR,—When you did me the honour to ask me to write a Notice for the DUBLIN REVIEW, of Dr. Melia's book on the Blessed Virgin, I set myself conscientiously to the execution of the task. I read the book carefully, making notes as I went along, and then wrote such remarks upon its merits and defects as it seemed to me to deserve. I did not expect that *all* my remarks would be pleasing to the author; but I do not conceive that this is a legitimate object of literary criticism. I aimed at being kind to the author and just to the public; and I am very sorry to hear that Dr. Melia thinks I have so grievously failed with regard to the former.

You invite me to make some reply to the letter of remonstrance which he has addressed to you, the proof sheets of which you at the same time send me. I have gone through those sheets as carefully as the time you can allow me will permit, and proceed to make some remarks upon them. Where, however, Dr. Melia's objections only amount to a difference of opinion between the author and the critic, and Dr. Melia's observations have in no way changed or modified my opinion, I think it better on every account, as well as more in accordance with usual practice, to abstain from all further comment. For this reason Dr. Melia must excuse me, if I pass over in silence his 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th remarks.

His first, however, requires an answer. Dr. Melia, in his book, had

insisted on a distinction of sense between the words "image" and "likeness" in Genesis i. 26. Upon this we—you will allow me to relapse into the editorial plural, when justifying words written under cover of that high office—we in our notice observed that although we were well aware that some of the Fathers and theologians had made a similar distinction, we thought on the whole the weight of authority was against it, and we instanced S. Augustine; but without quoting any passage from his works. We now supply the omission. In his book *De Diversis Quæstionibus Octoginta Tribus* (tom. vi. p. 51. ed. Gaume), the 51st question is precisely "*de homine facto ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei*"; and towards the end of it, he says, "*There are some who think that these two words have not been used without a reason, for they say that if they meant only one thing, one word would have sufficed.*" Then he explains the distinction these persons claimed to recognize; but he concludes, "*Sed cavendum in talibus ne quid nimis asseverandum putetur.*" We have read very carefully the 5th chapter of S. Augustine's work *contra Adimantum*, to which Dr. Melia refers, but fail to find there any distinction made between the two words; on the contrary, he seems to us more than once to imply their absolute identity. Certainly, he speaks of man having *lost the image* of God, which, according to the distinction insisted upon by Dr. Melia, is an impossibility, and is expressly declared to be such by S. Bernard, according to Dr. Melia's quotation from that Father.

Secondly, we said we were entirely incredulous as to Dr. Melia's assertion that "images of Mary under the symbol of the good shepherdess were repeated four times in various places of the Roman Catacombs." And here Dr. M. quotes against us passages from the works of Dr. Northcote and the *Commendatore de Rossi*: certainly, if we had written anything on this subject which could be shown to be contradicted by Dr. Northcote's late work on the Catacombs, we should have felt bound to reconsider our statement very carefully, and should probably have found ourselves compelled to retract; and if the authority of De Rossi could be fairly quoted against us, we should be disposed to retract without any consideration at all. We do not see, however, that either of these authors has really committed himself to the full extent of Dr. Melia's assertion, though we are bound to add that if we had seen the representation in De Rossi's second volume, or read the passage quoted from Dr. Northcote, when we wrote our notice, we should not have expressed ourselves so strongly as we did, probably we should not have made the criticism at all. We need hardly assure Dr. Melia that our incredulity was never directed against his veracity as a witness, but against his skill as an interpreter of what he saw. Symbolism is a delicate and difficult subject; and in a book intended for the instruction of Protestants, we should ourselves shrink from pressing any argument drawn from it, for which we could not adduce very convincing evidence indeed; and we are not yet satisfied, from anything we have either seen or read, that the idea of our Blessed Lady as the Good Shepherdess was ever present to the minds of the early Christians.

This brings us naturally to Dr. Melia's third ground of complaint. We had said that although he wrote chiefly for Protestants, "he had not yielded to the temptation, which was certainly incident to the position, of *minimizing*

upon so important a subject." Dr. Melia supposes that he is here rebuked for not minimizing. We had thought all readers of the DUBLIN REVIEW would have apprehended our meaning to be the exact contrary. We sincerely meant to praise him for *not* having minimized, and are not convinced by his present letter that he did so.

The 8th and longest section of Dr. Melia's letter is taken up with a defence of what we had ventured to call "the old exploded story as to the origin of the Catacombs, that the greater part of them was the work of the Roman Pagans." In answer to this, Dr. Melia quotes largely from Aringhi, Severanus, Pelliccia, Ficoroni, Boldetti, and many others, proving precisely what we said, that it was the *old* theory; and he also quotes from De Rossi and Dr. Northcote, with the view of showing that it is not yet *exploded*. We venture to express our conviction that nobody would be more astonished or more vexed to hear that it was considered to be not exploded than this same De Rossi, after all his labours to effect that end. Certainly, Messrs Northcote and Brownlow, his spokesmen in this country, have not hesitated to say in his name that "the Christian origin of the catacombs may now be regarded as *firmly established*;" and they have written a whole chapter (Book V., c. i.) to show how this is, and to explain how the opposite opinion ever came into vogue. The *Revue du Monde Catholique*, quoted by Dr. Melia, asserts the same thing; and so do all the French and German critics whose notices of De Rossi's work we have had an opportunity of seeing. Our own *Saturday Review* also, a few weeks since, said emphatically, "We quite agree with De Rossi that it is now *demonstrated* that the Roman Christians from the first excavated their own Catacombs in an orderly, systematic, and legal way"; in fact, Dr. Melia's is, as far as we know, the one solitary protest that has yet been raised against this theory; and we have only to add that we cannot recognize the strength of the arguments which he alleges in support of his protest. On the contrary, we are convinced that many of them are not relevant, and that in others he has mistaken the drift of the authors from whom he is quoting. But it would take a great deal too much time and space to follow him in detail through this part of his letter.

In conclusion, we beg to assure Dr. Melia of our sincere respect for himself personally, and our unfeigned regret if we have in any way done him an injustice. We hailed the publication of his book with great pleasure, as we hail every addition to our Catholic literature that promises to be of service in clearing away error and spreading a knowledge of the truth. If we ventured to point out flaws and imperfections in the execution of the work, this was only what we were bound to do, if criticism is to be anything more than a name amongst us; and we will add, it is only what we expect and what we hope we shall be always ready to receive, whenever we publish a book ourselves.

I remain,

Dear Mr. Editor,

Your obedient Servant,

THE WRITER OF THE NOTICE ON DR. MELIA.

## OXFORD EDUCATION.

[We have nothing ourselves to say this quarter in reference to the controversy on Catholic higher education. But Dr. Gillow has been so severely and (it seems to us) so groundlessly criticized for various portions of his letter which appeared in our pages, that we cannot refuse to give his reply all the publicity in our power.]

*To the Editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW.*

SIR,—As you were so kind as to allow me space in your April number for a letter on Catholic higher education, I trust that the same kindness will now allow me to say a few words in vindication of certain points in which that letter has been made the object of unusually severe and persistent assaults. In the May number of the *Month*, and in three letters which appeared in the *Tablet*, the letter in question received more attention from the writers in the *Month* than seemed to me to be either called for or justifiable. Feeling, however, as great a repugnance to quarrel with a periodical which always writes *ad majorem Dei gloriam*, as to disedify the Church by unnecessary wrangling amongst its ministers, I resolved to bear in silence the smart remarks made at my expense, and so to allow them to die upon the wind. To this resolve I should still have adhered had my assailants kept within the bounds of merely pointless criticism. But they have not done so, for I find that in two places in the July number of the *Month*, and again in the number for August, I am made the subject of imputations of such a damaging character that, if allowed to pass as true, they must infallibly rob me of all claims to veracity and honour. I mean the charges of *misquoting* and *misrepresenting* Mr. Pattison, and of telling people that he has said what he has *not* said. Under such imputations, if it be in my power to justify myself by proving these charges to be groundless, it becomes an imperative duty to remove a stain which every one holds in abhorrence, and which has not, to my knowledge, been ever before cast upon me. Unfortunately a groundless charge is sooner made than refuted, and when prejudice has been excited by long and repeated returns upon the same object, the clearest evidence in vindication of honesty frequently fails to outbalance the weight of adverse impressions, no matter how groundless the imputations by which they have been produced may be proved to be. I promise, however, that my defence shall be as brief as the cause will permit, nor will I travel beyond the facts of the case into comments which intelligent men can make for themselves.

As regards the method which I purpose to follow in my defence, I shall first quote at length the words of the accusation; then I shall quote from my letter the passages accused; after that the statements on which I relied will be quoted from Mr. Pattison's words as they are quoted by the reviewer in the October number (1868) of the DUBLIN REVIEW, from which I professed to take all that I advanced on the subject; and, finally, I shall quote the conclusions drawn by the reviewer in the DUBLIN whom the *Month* expressly abstains from inculpating as an accomplice in my delinquencies.

By this method I hope to make perfectly clear,—

1st. What is the gravity of the charges brought against me.

2nd. What evidence my words furnish for the charges grounded upon them.

3rd. How far the words of Mr. Pattison justify what I have attributed to him. And

4th. How far my inferences are supported by the reviewer whose statements I professed to quote, and whom, in a spirit of *fairness*, the writer in the *Month*, in order to concentrate the whole momentum of his charge upon me alone, deliberately excludes from complicity, saying, "We think it fair to say that we refer to Dr. Gillow alone."—(July, p. 107.)

The charge of *misquoting* and *misrepresenting* Mr. Pattison is in the *Month* for July, p. 18. The passage is long and sufficiently obscure. When the reader has gone through it he will find his ears still tingling with the sounds of words of vague but grave and damaging meaning, such as "mistake as to the final examination at Oxford"—"based upon a curious misquotation"—"Dr. Gillow, the author, has omitted to quote"—"quite misrepresent Mr. Pattison"—"Dr. Gillow leaves out the important words"—"Mr. Pattison does not say this," &c.

But he will find himself bewildered for answers if he ask himself such questions as these :—What is the mistake into which Dr. Gillow is here said to have fallen as to the final examination at Oxford? Is it that the requirements for the mere "pass" examination include philosophy dangerous to a Catholic's faith? or is it that honours cannot be obtained in mathematics, or in history and law, or in natural science, without having been first sought in classics? or is it that honours cannot be got at all except in one school only—the *Litteræ Humaniores*? Again :—What are the words of Mr. Pattison, which Dr. Gillow is accused of *misquoting*? In what consists the importance of the words which Dr. Gillow has *omitted to quote*? Into what error does the omission lead his readers? Is it shown that Dr. Gillow either asserts or implies that philosophy is necessary, in order to gain honours in other schools, except that of classics? What, in fine, is the precise charge that is here brought against Dr. Gillow's statements?

I invite the reader to search for answers to these questions while he reads the accusation set forth in the following passage :—

"A recent Catholic writer on the subject has also fallen into a mistake as to the final examination at Oxford, which is worth correcting all the more, as it is based upon a curious misquotation from the interesting work of Mr. Pattison, already mentioned. Putting aside, of course, the Divinity, the Thirty-nine Articles, and the like, there is nothing at all in the final pass examination, as Mr. Pattison tells us, to frighten either the 'Church party' or Catholics. 'I appeal,' he says, 'to any of the Catholic students who have taken the ordinary degree at Oxford since 1854, to say if anything has been taught them officially which has been calculated to interfere with their religious belief.' He goes on with a sentence which Dr. Gillow, the author to whom we allude, has omitted to quote, though its omission has made him quite misrepresent Mr. Pattison. Dr. Gillow does not seem to be aware that it is possible (and necessary) to 'pass' in Arts, *i. e.*, *Litteræ Humaniores*, and to take the B.A. honours in the three other schools of

Mathematics, History and Law, and National Sciences, *without seeking honours in the first-mentioned school*. Mr. Pattison's words are—'*Nor even in the honour curriculum for the other schools is danger supposed to lurk. It is the school of classics (Litteræ Humaniores) only, and specifically the philosophical subjects which have developed themselves within that school, which have alarmed the Church party. This the party must either conquer, or be content to see all the minds that come under the influences of that training—that is, all the minds of any promise that pass through Oxford—hopelessly lost to them*' (p. 299). Dr. Gillow leaves out the important words which we have italicised, and he begins the last sentence thus:—'*This party must either conquer [by expelling this philosophy from the course of teaching]*'. And he goes on to comment on the passage thus:—'*The Rector of Lincoln College here assumes as a certain fact, that neither Catholics nor Tractarians can pass through the Honour Schools in Oxford, without being hopelessly lost to the Catholic Church or the Tractarian party respectively*' (*Higher Catholic Education*, p. 12). Mr. Pattison, however, does not say this, and he is only speaking of Tractarians. He is perfectly aware that honours can be gained in *three other schools*, or any one of them, besides the *Litteræ Humaniores*."

It is difficult to answer a charge when it cannot be found out in what it precisely consists. It is evident enough that I am here accused distinctly of *misquoting* Mr. Pattison, but it is equally evident that the *misquotation* is perpetrated only by *omitting to quote*. It is equally clear that by this omission to quote I am accused of having quite *misrepresented* Mr. Pattison. But in what I am supposed to have misrepresented him—what I have made him say which he has not said—is by no means so clear. I may be mistaken, but, to the best of my judgment, the alleged misrepresentation consists in my having made Mr. Pattison say that danger to the faith of Catholics is supposed to lurk in the honour curriculum of the Schools of Mathematics, of History and Law, and of the Natural Sciences. At all events, if this be not the sum of the accusation, I know not what it is. Let, then, the reader carefully peruse the following passage of my letter, and while he reads let him try to discover anything to indicate that I make Mr. Pattison ascribe danger to a Catholic's faith in any other school besides the *Litteræ Humaniores*:—

"Mr. Pattison fully admits the antagonism which subsists between this sort of philosophical training and the views of the 'Catholic party,' or, as he otherwise calls it, the 'Church party,' by which he means all those who still cling to any points of supernaturally revealed dogma. But his sympathies are not with this party, and, while he allows that their alarms are well founded, he coolly tells them that, unless they succeed in banishing this philosophy from the *curriculum* of the university, their day is gone; for that every mind of promise that comes under its influence must assuredly yield to the power of its fascination.

'For my part,' he says, 'I think the fears of the Catholic party, whether within or without the National establishment, are *substantially* well founded. . . . It is especially the philosophical subjects which have developed themselves within that school [*Litteræ Humaniores*] which alarm the Church party. This party must either conquer [by expelling this philosophy from the course of teaching], or be content to see all the minds that come under the influence of that training—that is, *all the minds of any promise that pass through Oxford—hopelessly lost to them*' (p. 414).



The Rector of Lincoln College here assumes as a certain fact that neither Catholics nor Tractarians can pass through the honour schools in Oxford without being *hopelessly lost* to the Catholic Church or the Tractarian party respectively."

This is the passage in which my critic finds a "curious misquotation," and on which he founds his charge against me of so far misrepresenting Mr. Pattison that, whereas Mr. Pattison said that danger to the faith of Catholics was supposed to lurk only in the honour curriculum for the school of *Litteræ Humaniores*, I have made him extend that danger to the honour curriculum for the schools of Mathematics, of History and Law, and of the Natural Sciences. Yet he cannot fail to see clearly enough that by making Mr. Pattison limit the danger to "the philosophical subjects which have developed themselves within that school [*Litteræ Humaniores*]" I have made the very limitation, the denial of which constitutes the whole ground of his charges against me! He has also seen that in two places on the previous page I have made the very same limitation, and in terms still more precise.

To the honour curriculum of the other schools there is no allusion whatever in any part of my letter.

But how has my critic thus contrived to make me appear to say not only what I did not say, but even the contrary to what I did say? To make this matter clear it will be necessary to quote from Mr. Pattison the "important words" which I omitted, and also to quote from my letter the form in which I quoted the passage from Mr. Pattison. From this it will be easily seen how my critic contrives to conceal from his readers that I had clearly particularized the very thing which he charges me with omitting.

In the above extract from Mr. Pattison where omission is indicated, six or seven sentences are passed over as not referring to the subject in hand, namely, Mr. Pattison's view of the *antagonism* between the Oxford philosophy and the Faith of Catholics. The omitted part contained the italicised words of the following passage:—

*"Nor even in the honour curriculum for the other schools is danger supposed to lurk. It is the school of Classics (Litteræ Humaniores) only, and specifically the philosophical subjects which have developed themselves within that school which alarm the Church party. This the party must either conquer or be content," &c.*

Sensible that the introduction of irrelevant ideas would tend to distract the mind from the *antagonism* which it was my aim to make prominent, I omitted the italicised words, and quoted the passage thus:—

"It is especially the philosophical subjects which have developed themselves within that school [*Litteræ Humaniores*] which alarm the Church party. This party must either conquer [by expelling this philosophy from the course of teaching] or be content to see all the minds that come under the influence of that training, that is, *all the minds of any promise that pass through Oxford*, hopelessly lost to them."

Now how does my critic represent this passage? He italicises the words *the school of Classics (Litteræ Humaniores)*, which occur in the first part of the

sentence, and then adds, "Dr. Gillow leaves out the important words which we have italicised, and begins the *last* sentence thus :—'This party must either conquer, &c.,'" but he fails to inform his readers that I imported those words [*Litteræ Humaniores*] into the latter part, which I did quote, of the very same sentence, and that by so doing I supplied the very omission which forms the sole foundation of his charges. He omits altogether to notice my quotation of this part of the same sentence, and steps on to the following sentence in these terms :—"And he begins the *last* sentence thus, 'This party must either conquer [by expelling this philosophy from the course of teaching].'" The italics in these last words are his, not mine ; and thus, while he omits my qualifying words, *Litteræ Humaniores*, in the previous sentence, he calls attention to the words, *course of teaching*, insinuating thereby that, in some way or other, I suppose, that philosophy is found in the whole course of university teaching. This, however, proves rather too much, for he does not attribute to me more than the erroneous notion that philosophy is found in the *honour curriculum* of three other schools besides the *Litteræ Humaniores*. And he has a theory to account for the way by which I have fallen into this error. He says, "Dr. Gillow does not seem to be aware that it is possible (and necessary) to 'pass' in Arts, *i. e.*, *Litteræ Humaniores*, and to take the B.A. honours in the three other schools of Mathematics, History, and Law, and Natural Sciences, *without* seeking honours in the first-mentioned school."

To attribute to me such a notion as this on the sole ground of my using the words, *course of teaching*, and to give his argument no other development than this use of italics, is sufficiently gratuitous, even as he has represented my words. But if, instead of saying "Dr. Gillow begins the *last* sentence thus," he had said, Dr. Gillow quotes this very same sentence thus :—"It is especially the philosophical subjects which have developed themselves within that school [*Litteræ Humaniores*] that have alarmed the Church party," he would have shown clearly that the words *course of teaching*, which come in the very next sentence, mean the course of teaching in that school of Arts *Litteræ Humaniores*. And why did he not do this ? Surely to one in search of mis-quotations there was a most inviting temptation to quote the above words, for they actually contain a veritable *mis-quotation* ! Whether by my oversight or that of the printers I know not, but as a matter of fact the word *specifically* has been changed into *especially* ! Some capital, it seems to me, might have been made out of this misquotation ; but no, it is passed over unnoticed. If, however, it had been brought forward, it must have exposed to view the specifying words, *Litteræ Humaniores*, which come in this sentence to indicate the school of danger, and which it was therefore essential not to notice. For the appearance of these words would utterly demolish the whole foundation of the accusations, and thus this finely-inflated and highly-coloured bubble bursts and vanishes !

After this there is little cause to say much in reply to the following :—

"Dr. Gillow goes on to comment on the passage thus :—'The Rector of Lincoln College here assumes as a certain fact that neither Catholics nor Tractarians can pass through the *Honour Schools* in Oxford without being hopelessly lost to the Catholic Church or the Tractarian party respectively.'

Mr. Pattison, however, does not say this, and he is only speaking of Tractarians. He is perfectly aware that honours can be gained in *three other schools*, or any of them, besides the *Litteræ Humaniores*.<sup>7</sup>

If there be any point at all in these last words, they imply that I imagine that honours cannot be gained except in *one* school only. But not many lines before this I was made to imagine that honours could be gained in three other schools, provided the candidate first sought honours in the school of Arts. Now to which of these two theories he alludes by italicising the words *Honour Schools* I cannot say. To argue by italics seems to be his favourite method—a method which makes his meaning very much a matter of conjecture. I conjecture, then, that he wishes to insinuate that under the general term *Honour Schools* I mean to include *all* the Honour Schools in Oxford, and therefore to distribute the teaching of philosophy among them all. He should not, however, have made this mistake, seeing that I nowhere allude to any other than the school of Arts, that my argument in all that part of the letter is exclusively engaged with the honour curriculum of that school, that I had specified that school a few lines above, and that I had done the same still more explicitly in two places on the previous page. After this he could surely understand my meaning without requiring a fourth specification of the same thing within the space of two pages! The Reviewer in the DUBLIN, from whom I borrowed this comment (p. 414), makes the very same use of the term *Honour Schools* as I have done, and no doubt with as little suspicion that such use of general terms could, by any process of hyper-criticism, be understood to mean *all* the honour schools. But if we apply the same rule of criticism to the terms used by Mr. Pattison himself, he gives a far wider range to unbelieving philosophy among the *Oxford schools*. For if we neglect his explanations in other places he makes *no limitations whatever*. He says—

“This position of the Roman Catholic body towards the universities of Great Britain and Ireland must be also the position of any other party which conceives itself to be in possession of any important moral, social, metaphysical, or physical truth which has been arrived at in any other way than by an exhaustive investigation of the pertinent facts. Such a party must necessarily be made uneasy by the *present state of the Oxford schools*.”

If the general terms—Oxford schools—mean *all* the schools of Oxford, Mr. Pattison says much more than I have attributed to him when I say that “he assumes as a certain fact that neither Catholics nor Tractarians can pass through the *Honour Schools* of Oxford without being *hopelessly lost* to the Catholic Church or the Tractarian party respectively.”

The Dublin reviewer, though he goes further than I have done, is far within this interpretation of Mr. Pattison's words when he sums up his statements thus :—

“Every Oxford student either receives there no education at all, or receives there an education destructive of all belief in revealed dogma” (p. 417).

Even the *Month* admits that Mr. Pattison avows that all minds of any promise that pass through Oxford are *hopelessly lost* to the Church party.

Oh, but, says the *Month*, "he is speaking only of Tractarians." Indeed! Then "the Roman Catholic body" in the passage just quoted; also "the Catholic party," whether within or without the national establishment—"the Catholic students who have taken the ordinary degree since 1854"—"the Roman Catholic authorities"—are all Tractarians! For all these terms come within a few lines of each other in the very passage cited. Of these he is speaking, and expressing his avowal of the absolute antagonism that subsists between their religious belief and the present training of the honour curriculum for the school of arts.

In the *Month* for August there is inserted a letter from an "Oxford resident," who is described as a fellow and tutor of one of the colleges. This writer says (p. 214), "I am surprised to find Dr. Gillow classing together Catholics and Anglicans as exposed to a similar danger at Oxford." He argues that the opinions of Catholics are exposed to much less danger from the Oxford training than are those of Anglicans, because when the latter are confronted with reason and light they are soon discovered to contain in themselves what is self-contradictory, whereas every Catholic knows that his faith is strengthened and not weakened by increased knowledge and scientific research. Upon this the editor of the *Month* remarks:—"The distinction pointed out therein is certainly a true one."

All that I said on this point was that "the *Rector of Lincoln College* assumes as a certain fact that neither Catholics nor Tractarians can pass through the honour schools in Oxford without being hopelessly lost to the Catholic Church or the Tractarian party respectively." If this writer had been a lover of truth he could not have forced the meaning he has imagined upon my words, which reported only the views of Mr. Pattison, but expressed no opinion of my own upon the comparative dangers to Anglicans and Catholics. That the faith of Catholics possesses a security against the influence of the Oxford training, "because every Catholic knows that it is strengthened and not weakened by increased knowledge and scientific research," seems a strange sentiment to come from a Protestant, and one to which Mr. Pattison would certainly be the last to subscribe. He makes no exception in favour of Catholics when he says that all minds of any promise that pass through Oxford will be hopelessly lost to the Catholic party whether within or without the national establishment. I could well imagine Mr. Pattison or any other Protestant saying to a Catholic, in a spirit of irony, "Come by all means to Oxford that your faith may be strengthened by increased knowledge and scientific research in the fertile field of modern philosophical and religious thought."

If a Catholic assert that his faith is strengthened by scientific research, he supposes and includes an overruling spirit of faith and charity enlightening, guiding, and controlling his research; and if he have not this spirit, or if, allured by the force of bad example, he forfeit this spirit by dissipated indulgences, his research may soon make shipwreck of his faith. A Protestant is a stranger to the spirit of which I speak, and when he invites a Catholic to enter upon such research, he of necessity supposes him to do so in the spirit that animates himself.

But all this writing in commendation of Oxford as presenting advantages

which Catholics have reason to desire, and where their faith would be less exposed to danger than are the opinions of Anglicans (poor commendation, indeed!), as well as the fallacious plea put forth by this "Oxford resident," "that Catholics can now reside at Oxford without being exposed to the dangerous atmosphere of a Protestant college," and backed by his assumption "that Catholics are looking forward to a time when they will again take their place in those Universities which they still regard in some sense as their proper home, and as the proper school for their sons," seems too much like the voice of the tempter extolling the beauty and the flavour of that fatal fruit which the Vicar of Jesus Christ and the English bishops, acting in obedience to the express injunctions of their Supreme Pastor, have solemnly warned the Catholics of England not to touch lest they die the death; or rather it resembles much more the outspoken rebellion of the malicious serpent telling its victims that they shall not die the death, that they shall have their faith strengthened by increased knowledge and scientific research, and that they shall become like gods, knowing the difference between good and evil, as this is known and experienced in the unbelieving University of Oxford. That a Fellow and Tutor of Oxford, already enlisted under the banner that is professedly raised against the Church and Kingdom of God, should hold language like this, and so much in harmony with the instincts of his profession, can be a matter of surprise to no one. But the Catholic mode of enforcing the Gospel precept of plucking out the eye that scandalises us is not that of exciting concupiscence by describing the allurements of the objects on which it is sinful to look. When a parent is balancing the worldly advantages held in prospect to his son by an Oxford education against the spiritual dangers that threaten him, and against the duty which he owes to his ecclesiastical superiors, he may easily find in writing like this not only motives for an undue exaggeration of those advantages, but reasons also which his inclinations will too readily adopt, for undervaluing the gravity of the threatened danger, and for disregarding his own obligations to respect the warnings of his lawful superiors. By this additional weight on the side of the flesh, the unfortunate parent may be so far seduced as to turn the balance in opposition to the force of grace, to the utter ruin of the vital interests of his son. These, however, are principles upon which I cannot hope for agreement on the part of this "Oxford Resident."

I come now to the second passage of which I have just cause to complain, as it attacks my veracity in a manner still more pointed. It occurs in the *Month* for July, p. 107:—

"We cannot close these remarks without a few words as to Mr. Pattison, whose book has been somewhat unworthily treated in being made a sort of stock-piece, out of which sharp and hard sayings about his own University might be snipped for the benefit of the Catholic public. His candid and earnest confessions have been somewhat misunderstood. He has *not* said a good many of the things that people have been told that he has said. He has *not* said, for instance, that all mere graduates at Oxford are men of no education, but, which is a very different thing, that the degree itself does not prove them to be more. Still less has he said that all mere graduates are either 'foppish exquisites of the drawing-room,' or, 'in all probability barbarised athletes of the arena.'"

To this the following note is appended :—

"We think it fair to say that we refer to Dr. Gillow alone. We have not read the article from which he quotes, except for the purpose of verifying his references to Mr. Pattison's pages, which are not given in his letter."

This writer, then, has verified the quotations given in the DUBLIN REVIEW from Mr. Pattison. This is highly satisfactory to me, as he knows very well that I have quoted at second hand, and referred, not to Mr. Pattison's pages, but to those of the REVIEW.

I now give the words of my letter (p. 13) which are made the subject of these very intelligible strictures :—

"It does indeed seem strange that, at the very time when a Catholic periodical of reputation and influence is advocating the affiliation of our Catholic colleges with the University of Oxford in preference to that of London, and is doing this on the ground that Catholics would thereby be brought into competition with men of a higher intellectual standard, and one more analogous to their own, a Protestant head of one of the Oxford colleges should come forward to inform us that the mere graduate is a man of no education which it is the function of a University to impart, and that if he be not a 'foppish exquisite of the drawing-room,' he is, in all probability, a 'barbarised athlete of the arena,' and that the highest outcome of the 'honour men' is the 'able editor,' trained in the art of writing 'leading articles,' and of instructing the public on 'the results of modern thought' on such subjects, possibly, as the *extinct virtues*, with an assurance equalled only by his ignorance."

According to my critic I here affirm that Mr. Pattison informs us "that all mere graduates at Oxford are men of no education."

But why, in the first place, has he, at the very time when he charges his neighbour with misquoting, changed my words, "the mere graduate," into "all mere graduates at Oxford?" Is there no difference in meaning between these two forms of expression? When Mr. Pattison says—"the young aristocrat has lost the power of commanding the attention, and is not only indisposed for, but incapable of, work; profound idleness and luxuriousness have corrupted his nature;" does he wish us to understand him to mean that profound idleness and luxuriousness have corrupted the nature of all young aristocrats? I think not. The term *all* excludes exceptions which the form used by Mr. Pattison does not. It conveys in general the character of a class, but does not say, as the word "all" does, that every individual member without exception in that class partakes of that character. If it would be an injury to Mr. Pattison to misquote his words in the above passage by changing "the young aristocrat" into *all* young aristocrats, is it not also injurious to me to make the same change in the words which I used?

Why, in the next place, has he omitted my words—"which it is the function of a university to impart"?

Surely it is a very different thing to say of all mere graduates that they are men of no education, and to say of the mere graduate that he is a man of no education which it is the function of a university to impart. The *Month*



says that I told people that Mr. Pattison said the former, and that he has not said so. I told them that he said the latter; and so he has, and even more, for thus he writes :—

"We must not shut our eyes to the fact that the honour-students are the *only* students who are undergoing *any* educational process which it can be considered as a function of the University either to impart or exact. . . . These receive an education which benefits them in intellect and character"; and "as this result represents the *total product of the University* as it is at present constituted," &c.

Mr. Pattison here says much more than I have attributed to him; but he goes beyond even this, and says all that the *Month* asserts he does not say.

"There is no danger to principles or faith in a "pass" course, because such a course is *not education*."—DUBLIN REVIEW, Oct., 1868, p. 414.

From this it strictly follows that those who have no course of education higher than a "pass" course have no course of education at all.

Thus, as regards the first point in this accusation, I have fully proved :—

1. That I have not said what the *Month* has attributed to me.

2. That Mr. Pattison has said all that I attributed to him.

3. That, beyond this, Mr. Pattison has said what the *Month* so pointedly denies that he has said.

The Reviewer in the DUBLIN, who is exempted from all share in my supposed falsifications, sums up the statements of Mr. Pattison and Mr. Goldwin Smith in these terms (p. 417) :—

"Such, then, is the distinct testimony of both our authors. Under existing circumstances, *every Oxford student* either receives *there no education at all*, or receives there an education destructive of all belief in revealed dogma."

The other point of accusation is thus set forth.

"Still less has he (Mr. Pattison) said that *all* mere graduates are either 'foppish exquisites of the drawing-room, or, 'in all probability, barbarised athletes of the arena.'

Neither did I say this, and in order to make me say it he has changed my less definite words—"and if he" (the mere graduate) 'be not,' &c., into—"all mere graduates are." But what has Mr. Pattison really said?

1. That 70 per cent. of the so-called "students" are in no sense, even in profession, students at all.

2. That their degrees are an evidence that a youth has been able to afford, not only the money, but, what is impossible to so many, the time to live three years among gentlemen doing nothing as a gentleman should.

3. That the young aristocrat is either the foppish exquisite of the drawing-room or the barbarised athlete of the arena.

4th. That the young aristocrats lead the fashion, and are conscious of their right to do so in dress and manners.

5th. That *from this source* are propagated *through the place*, ideas of style and expenditure incompatible with the means and future position of the general body of the young men.

There are certainly elements here sufficient to elaborate out of the idlers of Oxford a fair number of fops : let us now see if Mr. Pattison's ideas of the number of athletes be such as to justify the inference, that if the mere graduate be not of the first class he will in all probability belong to the second. He says—

6th. That if any proof could convince the advocates of intermural residence of the futility of "College discipline," such a proof might be found in the *mastery* which the *athlete furor* has established over *all minds in the place*.

7th. That so entirely are the *tutors* beaten by this *athlete furor*, that, to cover the disgrace of defeat, they are obliged to affect to patronize and encourage the evil.

According to this the "*athlete furor*" has possessed *every mind in the place*, nor are even the tutors themselves free from the infection. It is then absolutely certain of the mere "pass-men," that if they be not of the class of *fops*, they certainly belong to the class of *athletes*.

Mr. Pattison considers the athlete to be the better character of the two, and he thinks that the growth of the athletic furor in late years has effected an improvement by diminishing the prevalence of foppery among the young men of Oxford.

"Any one who compares," he says, "the Oxford of to-day with the Oxford of twenty years ago, will observe that one of the most offensive features of the place is at least less prominent than it was. The idlers who, after a morning spent over ponderous breakfasts and in billiard-rooms, made their elaborate toilette and lounged forth half tipsy 'to do the High,' have many of them found occupations more healthful, if not more congenial, to the objects of a university. Practising the 'long jump' or the 'quarter of a mile,' is not an academical pursuit; but it is at least better than ogling servant-maids or talking with ostlers. As long as the University consents to receive youths who are students only in name, who come to it corrupted by the associations of wealthy uncultured homes and aristocratic schools, she must be content to welcome any influence which will counteract the evils they introduce. The barbarized athlete of the arena is at least a more desirable inmate than the fop and the profligate" (DUBLIN REVIEW, p. 412).

The Dublin Reviewer is, therefore, perfectly justified in saying,—“It is to this state of things that Mr. Pattison refers when he says, as we have seen, that with regard to 70 per cent. of those who take degrees at Oxford, the *only alternative* is between being 'either the foppish exquisite of the drawing-room, or the barbarized athlete of the arena.'”

But from this it appears that I expressed Mr. Pattison's statements in extremely mitigated terms when I said of the mere graduate “that if he be not a foppish exquisite of the drawing-room, he is, *in all probability*, a barbarized athlete of the arena.”

This expression seemed to me to be quite strong enough, and I expressed no small surprise at revelations which astonished my reason not less than they surpassed my imagination. Yet, in the face of this, the very veracious Tutor and Fellow of Oxford, whose letter is inserted in the August number of the *Month*, deliberately ignores Mr. Pattison's statements which I quoted

and ascribes my comparatively moderate statement to the creation of my own imagination or that of the DUBLIN REVIEW ! He says—

“Dr. Gillow’s pupil . . . might come and measure himself from time to time against ‘the foppish exquisites’ and ‘barbarized athletes’ into whom *his* imagination, or that of his authority, the DUBLIN REVIEW, has led him to transform so large a portion as seventy per cent. of our young men.”

It cannot be a matter of much surprise that the *Month*, although it does take credit to itself for its own “controversial fairness,” should insert, without comment on this point, the letter of this “Oxford Resident” ; for it does duty as a sort of second to sustain his positive assertion that Mr. Pattison has *not* said what I have attributed to him.

This Oxford writer does, indeed, do me the justice of allowing the DUBLIN REVIEW to share with me the alleged fabrication. The writer in the *Month*, on the contrary, not I presume moved to spare the DUBLIN REVIEW on account of any special affection for it, or for its editor, thinks it fair to say that “he refers to me alone when he affirms that Mr. Pattison has *not* said a great many of the things that people have been told that he has said.” But against this I have most conclusively proved that Mr. Pattison has said all that I have ascribed to him, and even much more ; and that the DUBLIN REVIEW has reported his statements much more in accordance with the real extent of Mr. Pattison’s words than I have done. But the editor of the *Month* is not now intent upon damaging the DUBLIN REVIEW. He has already on former occasions tried abundantly to do this, and he can return to the task when he pleases. His present object, for reasons best known to himself, is to damage me, and, therefore, he carefully separates the DUBLIN from his aim in order that the assault, concentrated upon one point, may fall with more telling effect on the trustworthiness of my little defence of our Catholic Collegiate education.

But is this doing justice to the writer in the *Month* when he says that he has not read the article in the DUBLIN from which I quote ? Well, if really he has not read that article, his plea of justification is one of *ignorantia affectata*, which is worse than no justification at all. For he knew full well that I took and professed to take all my statements exclusively from the article to which I invited particular attention. If, then, he really wished to judge honestly, and to report to others honestly whether I had dealt honestly with the materials in my hands, he ought to have seen what those materials were. But, after all, is it certain that he has not read the article ? What he says is, “We have not read the article from which he (Dr. Gillow) quotes, *except* for the purpose of verifying his references to Mr. Pattison’s pages . . . ” to which he knows I never referred at all ! But how much did he read for this purpose ? As far as this information goes he may have read every line, or he may not have read a single line. It matters little, however, whether he has read it or not, for either horn of the dilemma is equally galling.

The only two points that these writers have really proved by their criticisms are—1st. Their own persevering determination to sift out from my letter

whatever they could find in any degree vulnerable ; and, 2nd, their utter inability to make a single point, except by the most palpable misrepresentation of the clearest statements. The motives that have stimulated such feelings and arts it is not for me to investigate. They must remain, therefore, a matter of conjecture for the minds of your intelligent readers.

I remain, Sir,

Faithfully yours,

J. GILLOW.

5th August, 1869.

#### DEAN STANLEY AND REV. MR. MILLS.

SIR,—You have been good enough to allow me a little space in which I may notice a reply to my last letter, put forth by the Dean of Westminster in the July number of "Macmillan's Magazine." The question between us is still the same, and has been considered already, at some length, in a late number of the DUBLIN REVIEW (see last April, pp. 512—517). The matter in debate is not regarding the various postures, in the reception of Holy Communion, allowed and in usage at different times. It is, on the contrary, just simply this ; whether the statement made in "Good Words," that at the present day "at Communion, while others kneel, the Pope sits," is a correct or an incorrect statement. At the time it appeared I ventured to assert that it was the latter, and I produced authorities in support of my counter-statement. The Dean of Westminster replied, quoting Durandus, Bona, and Gerbet. To this answer was made that Durandus\* positively speaks for the standing posture ; that Bona† is merely quoting a work, whose authority he himself calls in question ; and that Gerbet states that the Pontiff receives "*à demi assis*," which phrase the Protestant ritualist Bingham renders most correctly by the words "*standing with inclination*."

Now in summing up this question in "Macmillan's Magazine," the Dean has repeated the above quotations, and has added some others ; and it is of these latter, and indeed of his remarks in general, that I have your permission to say a few words.

The fresh authorities adduced are Martenè, Moroni, Eustace ; and among Protestant ritualists, Neale, Maskell, and Bingham ; not to mention the "English traveller who, on Easter-day 1868, was very forcibly struck, but cannot state on oath that the Pope remained sitting." Let me endeavour in a few words to cross-question some of his witnesses.

\* The Dean is surely incorrect in translating "*consistens*" "*keeping his place sitting*." Is not its exact meaning "*standing firmly*" ? Does not "*ad mensam consistere*" signify "*standing to wait upon others at table*" ?

† It is not true (as it is re-stated) that Bona gives his own authority for the sitting posture ; he takes care to tell us that he does not. The passage quoted is not a law : it is a description of the spectacle of the Pontifical Mass.

Martene, whose work is in great measure an explanation of the rites of the very earliest Christian times, merely uses the phrase of Durandus, "in sede consistens." "The obvious meaning of this passage," says the Dean, "is, that the Pope remains in his place sitting." I have ventured to state that it means just the contrary. But then we have Moroni, who says, "In Roma il Papa comunicavasi sedendo nel suo trono"; "and these words," adds the Dean, "may be taken as a testimony to the practice of the late Pope, and to the usage of modern times." If so, how exceedingly strange that the same writer should have these words: "Ricavasi del Martene che in Roma il Papa comunicavasi sedendo nel suo trono . . . ma oggi non è più in uso tal rito." And again: "Accompanied by the Master of Ceremonies, he carries the Blessed Sacrament to the Pope, who, on his knees at his throne, adores, and at once rises (indi il Pontifice si alza, e resta in atto di adorare *fermandosi in piedi*)." And again: "Il Cardinal diacono lo porta al Papa, il quale genuflesso l'adora, come l'ostia, e si alza." Is not this testimony to "the usage of modern times"? "It is hardly necessary," continues the Dean, "to confirm these high Roman authorities by the testimony of Protestant ritualists. But that it was the received opinion amongst such writers that the Pope sits, appears from the unhesitating assertions to this effect by Bingham, Neale,\* and Maskell." The recklessness of this sentence simply fills one with amazement, and creates a difficulty against proceeding further. The only possible explanation that occurs to me is, that the writer can never have seen the works about which he speaks so confidently. For what is the fact? Why, Maskell writes as follows:—"The Popes were accustomed to receive the Eucharist sitting, but it would seem that now they stand, as other bishops do, and do not resume their seats until after the rite is finished of washing the hands. It is not out of place to add briefly that Angelo Rocca appears to doubt that the bishops of Rome ever received sitting." And what does Bingham say? "Cardinal Perron labours hard to prove that the Apostles received sitting; but his vanity is abundantly chastised and exposed. . . . As to sitting, there is no example of it, nor any intimation leading toward it in any ancient writer. . . . This posture is wholly without example in the ancient Church." And then, having quoted our very passage from Bona, Bingham concludes thus:—"We are told it is the singular privilege of the Pope to communicate sitting. I go on with the practice of the ancient Church." And all this is what the Dean of Westminster has ventured to call "a mass of testimony sufficient to establish his fact."

But now, what can be said of his treatment of Benedict XIV.? In his work (*de Sacro MSS. Sac.*), this great Pontiff states that some of his predecessors sat to receive, but this practice was then no longer known, for that the attitude of the Pope at Communion was that of one "standing at his throne." And in a letter to his Master of Ceremonies, Benedict XIV. repeats this

---

\* After a rather diligent search, I cannot find in Neale any mention of the rite at all. Of course it may have escaped my observation, and the Dean has given no reference.

statement:—"The Roman Pontiff receives standing, not sitting, as some have erroneously written." This, says the Dean, is a curious example of what may be "called the audacity which sometimes characterizes expressions of Pontifical opinion." Benedict XIV. says that formerly some of the Popes sat to receive, but that *now* they do not; and that, therefore, to say that they *do* is an error into which some have fallen. And this simple sentence is an example of "audacity," and the assertions it contains are "irreconcilable."

The whole scope of the letter of Pope Benedict, the meaning and arguments contained in which have been so singularly misunderstood and misapplied, is evident at a glance to the unprejudiced reader. It is a free communication to a dear friend (Reale), written during the holy Pontiff's illness, in which he states, that having lost the use of his limbs, he wishes to know whether he shall be obliged to content himself with receiving Holy Communion as any other invalid, or whether it may be allowed him, under the circumstances, to celebrate Mass sitting. He is not thinking in the least of our case, that of solemn Pontifical Communion, but merely whether he may be permitted to celebrate Mass every day in a sitting posture. In the letter itself, he uses these words, "*agitur de integrâ Missâ sedendo celebrandâ cujus exemplum haud extare dicitur.*" He is speaking of himself as an infirm priest, wishing to say Mass, and he sets to work to examine in this letter, whether he can be allowed to sit at part, or during the whole of it. What has this to do with our general question, as to whether, at the time of Holy Communion on the three great occasions when the Pontiff celebrates solemnly, he receives sitting?

But even in the concluding words of Pope Benedict's letter (than which nothing can be more natural and every-day), the Dean discovers a depth of design and subtlety:—"And since we have resolved to celebrate Mass sitting, it will be your duty to prepare the altar, &c. ; and confidently leaving everything to your singular dexterity, we very lovingly bestow upon you our Apostolical Benediction." This, and all such other matters of arrangement, however plain and simple, when in connection with the Pope, have, in the eyes of our author, but one intention. He is resolved to think that they are meant to deceive. That wise permission by which a sick Pontiff can still enjoy the grace and the consolations of the Holy Sacrifice, and that dexterous arrangement by means of which the Pope (generally of infirm age) can be supported on great festival days through the fatigues of a long ceremony, are all parts of a deep scheme. Successive Popes are "endeavouring to combine a prescribed attitude either with convenience or with change of sentiment." Their dicta are "characteristic specimens of that singular dexterity which Benedict XIV. attributes to his Master of Ceremonies, and which has so often marked the proceedings of the Roman Court—a minute example of the subtle genius of that institution which could produce a Syllabus," &c. No enthusiast of the Presbyterian school has ever surpassed this in his wildest imaginings.

Before concluding, I may advert to another singular mistake into which the Dean has fallen. "The Pope, in his chief cathedral, celebrates on a wooden plank or table." This is a repetition from his former article, in which (arguing against the Mass) the Dean had stated that the Pope cele-



brates on the table used by S. Peter in the house of Pudens. Had he looked into Aringhus or Martene, he would have found the following :—"Extat in ecclesiâ S. Praxidis altare in quo B. Petrus, ut pia fert traditio, immortalî Deo sacrificium offerebat, lignea autem altaris tabula, præ vetustate nimîa consumpta, cernitur, et *sub altari lapideo* locata est."

Let me revert, however, to my main subject. "The variation in the statement of Martene and Gerbet," says the Dean, "is met by the silence, or by the express contradiction of other authorities, *not indeed so high*, but still of considerable weight." That is to say, the authority of the Roman "Ordo," and that of such writers as Patricio, Georgio, Marcello, Catelani, Rocca, Urban VIII., and Benedict XIV., is less than that of Martene, who is not a rubrician, but an archaeologist,—less than that of Gerbet, who never wrote a word upon the rubrics in his life ! This will be fresh knowledge for our students in rites and ceremonies.

But we will sum up this matter in short. The position of the Sovereign Pontiff at the time of Communion, even on the few great days when he receives at the throne, is the *standing* position. Such it has been, says Marcello, "*ab antiquissimis temporibus*." We have notice of this particular rubric more than a thousand years ago. That at the time of Communion some Popes in ancient days occasionally sat, we know from the statements of our own writers to this effect. In the absence of other motive, it is quite natural for us to suppose it to have been the same as would hold good at the present time ; namely, infirmity. Dr. Baggs writes as follows : "Perhaps the most probable reason for the Pope's Communion at the throne, is, that he may more readily sit down, if the infirmity incidental to his advanced age should require it." But that the rule is that he shall *stand*, cannot for a moment be questioned. "The Pontiff receives standing in (or at) his throne." These are the words of one of the most illustrious of all the Popes. Who is the more likely to be correct, the Dean of Westminster or Benedict XIV.?

I am, Sir,

Yours very truly,

ALEXIUS MILLS.

## CORRIGENDA IN OUR LAST NUMBER.

IN p. 42 we say that theology declares "the One Divine Essence to terminate Three Divine Persons." Theological students will have observed that this was an oversight; and that we should have spoken of theology as declaring "the Three Divine Persons to terminate One Divine Essence."

The two following letters will speak for themselves. They were addressed to the "Tablet" in the course of last July.

*To the Editor of the Tablet.*

SIR,—In a letter which appeared with my signature in the current DUBLIN REVIEW, I say at page 258 :—

"Still and far more do I fear the consequences of subjecting Christian students to examinations on a subject so closely bordering on religion itself as that of moral philosophy, which avowedly encourage and even make essential to success the study of that subject under heretical and even atheistical aspects. And here I will say in passing that I am quite at a loss to understand how those who object, and, as I think, rightly object, to Catholics taking advantage of the Oxford examination, although without the condition of residence, can yet see no corresponding evil in taking a similar advantage of the examinations in philosophy at the London University."

Here I imply that there are persons who desire to subject Catholic students to the Oxford examinations in moral philosophy as at present conducted. I find on further inquiry that I was mistaken in this supposition, and I hasten to express my regret for having omitted to inform myself more fully before giving it publicity. On the other hand, all that I have said as to the danger of allowing Catholics to take part in the examinations of the London University, on the same class of subjects, remains unqualified by this admission.—I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

July 19.

FREDERICK OAKELEY.

*To the Editor of the Tablet.*

SIR,—Some expressions in the article in the DUBLIN REVIEW, on "the Life of F. Faber," have been misunderstood; the words "whining and sermonizing" applied (p. 118) to the conduct of Dr. Longley towards him having been supposed (most naturally) to be the expression of my own feeling. Allow me therefore to explain, that if what I originally wrote could have been published entire, the effect would have been exactly the reverse. Unfortunately it was necessary that the article should be shortened; and for this purpose alone half a page immediately preceding these words was omitted, without any one observing the effect which its omission would have on what followed. The article originally ran thus :—

"Years afterwards, when Dr. Longley had reached the summit of his profession, F. Faber, looking back to his Harrow course, said that he believed he owed his soul to the kind and well-judged treatment he received at this time from the head master. Complaints were made to him, that, a violent thunderstorm having led to serious talk among the boys gathered in the churchyard, young Faber had made a public profession of Atheism. The character of the school was at stake, and there was danger that parents would remove their sons from it. Dr. Longley was advised to send him away. In such a case much would no doubt depend on the character of the boy. Coleridge used to tell how, when he was a schoolboy aged about thirteen, he tried to apprentice himself to a shoemaker; and when taken by him to the master, told him that he 'hated the thought of being a clergyman. Because, sir, to tell you the truth, I am an infidel.' 'Whereupon, without more ado, Bowyer flogged me—wisely as I think, soundly as I know. Any whining or sermonizing would have gratified my vanity, and confirmed me in my absurdity; as it was, I was laughed at, and got heartily ashamed of my folly.' This, most likely, was the best course that could have been taken with a boy without any special religious impressions, and whose profession of infidelity had been a matter of conceit rather than anything else. Whether Dr. Longley was guided by a penetrating estimate of young Faber's character, or (as seems more likely) by natural kindliness, he took exactly the opposite course, and that most likely to produce an effect on a boy of singularly strong affections, who had already felt earnestly, and (for his age) thought much upon religion."

After this followed what appears in the article. Had this not been omitted, I think the words "whining and sermonizing" (the two obnoxious words being marked as a quotation), would have been understood as they were meant, as expressing merely what Coleridge in the above extract so described; but it could not have been supposed that I meant to speak disrespectfully of what Dr. Longley did.—I remain, Sir, your obedient servant,

THE WRITER OF THE ARTICLE IN THE "DUBLIN" ON F. FABER.

---

## INDEX.

---

ACTA QUÆ APUD SANCTAM SEDEM GERUNTUR, *noticed*, 484.

Allies (T. W.), Formation of Christendom, *noticed*, 210.

Aparisi y Guigarro (P.), Le Roi d'Espagne, *reviewed*, 169.

AUTHORITY OF THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY, 33-47 : Evil intellectual influence of the philosophy of Descartes, 33 ; high religious importance of true philosophy, 34 ; evil effects of Catholic philosophical differences, 39 ; the *Pall Mall Gazette* on the character of Catholic belief, 36 ; possibility of obtaining philosophical unity, 37 ; character of Father Kleutgen's work, 38 ; his view of the infallibility of the Church in sciences closely related to theology, 39 ; connection of the Church's theology with the scholastic philosophy, 40 ; attacks of Descartes and others on the scholastic philosophy, 41 ; character of Father Ramière's essay, 42 ; relation of the Catholic philosopher to the Church, 43 ; the principle of authority not adverse to, but conservative of, true philosophy, 44 ; criteria of the Church's judgment on philosophical subjects, 45 ; summary of our whole argument, 46 ; the *Saturday Review* on the scholastic philosophy, 47.

BARNET MAGAZINE (the), *noticed*, 238.

Baudry (Abbé F.), Life of Henry Dorié, martyr, *noticed*, 242.

Bottalla (F.), Strictures on Mr. Ffoulkes's Letter, *noticed*, 491.

Boudon (Archdeacon), the Hidden Life of Jesus, *noticed*, 503.

Bowden (J. E., of the Oratory), the Life and Letters of F. W. Faber, D.D., *reviewed*, 109.

Bowles (Emily), Joan of Arc, by Mgr. Dupanloup, translated, *noticed*, 508.

Browning (Robert, M.A.), The Ring and the Book, *reviewed*, 48.

Brownlow (Rev. W. R.), Roma Sotterranea, *noticed*, 215 ; *reviewed*, 393.

Butt (Isaac), The Irish People and the Irish Land, *reviewed*, 443.

———— Land Tenure in Ireland, *reviewed*, 443.

CARLOW COLLEGE MAGAZINE (The), *noticed*, 237 ; *reviewed*, 297.

Caterini (Cardinal), Letter of, on the Civil Princedom of the Holy Father, 185.

CATHOLIC CONTROVERSY, 377-392 : Recent reprehensive remarks of the "Month" regarding the DUBLIN REVIEW, 377 ; the "Month's" paper on liberal Catholicism, 378 ; naturalism, 378, 379 ; its connection with liberal Catholicism, 379, 380 ; the "Month's" opinion of the French liberal Catholics, 380, 381 ; its general estimate of the dangers of liberal

Catholicism, 382 ; connection between Jansenism, Gallicanism, Minimization, and liberal Catholicism, 383 ; our own relation to French liberal Catholicism, 384 ; the "Month's" agreement with our view of Infallibility, 385 ; two accusations against the conduct of the DUBLIN REVIEW, 385, 386 ; the "Civiltà Cattolica" on liberal Catholicism, 387, 388 ; the letter of Cardinal Caterini, 388 ; the Pope's commanded letter to M. de Beaulieu, 389 ; the position of laymen in regard to questions of philosophy and religious politics, 390 ; disadvantage of English Catholic controversialists as compared with those of some other countries, 391 ; our real object in this controversy, 392.

CATHOLIC HOME POLITICS (A GLANCE AT), 180-184 ; importance to Catholics of the questions of Irish disestablishment and popular education, 180 ; action of the House of Lords on the Irish Church Bill, 181 ; Lord Salisbury and Lord Derby, 182 ; the meeting of Catholics in St. James's Hall on the education question, 183, 184.

Cazenove (J. G., M.A.), Some Aspects of the Reformation, *noticed*, 242.

Civiltà Cattolica (the) in reply to *Le Français*, 190 ; *noticed*, 469.

Cobb (Gerald F., M.A.), Few Words on Reunion, *noticed*.

DAEMS (Rev. S.), The Double Sacrifice, *noticed*, 244.

Dechamps (Mgr.), L'Infaillibilité et le Concile Général, *noticed*, 477.

Declaration of the Irish Hierarchy, *noticed*, 482.

DUBLIN REVIEW, A Letter to the Editor of, *noticed*, 230.

Dufferin (Lord), Irish Emigration and the Tenure of Land in Ireland, *reviewed*, 443.

Dupanloup (Mgr.), Joan of Arc, *noticed*, 443.

EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT THOUGHT, 422-442 : Difficulty of knowing certainly God's existence on grounds of reason, 421 ; F. Kleutgen's statement of this difficulty, 422-425 ; his doctrine represented in two theses, 425 ; coincidence of his view with that of F. Newman, 426 ; reasoning by impressions, 427 ; distinction between reasoning and argument, 428 ; the latent grounds of reason, 429 ; F. Newman on the difficulty of representing distinct mental images, 430 ; argument the instrument of philosophy, 431 ; Catholics in the field of argument, 432 ; correctness of implicit reasoning best secured by simplicity of intention, 433, 434 ; F. Kleutgen's doctrine as to axiomatic truths, 435 ; Catholic instincts and Catholic atmosphere, 436 ; practical results from our theory, 437, 438 ; the Church's evidence of credibility, 439 ; the *Times* and *Pall Mall Gazette* on mixed education, 439, 440 ; necessity to all classes of Catholic education, 441, 442.

FABER (F.), Letter of the Reviewer of his Life and Letters, 531.

FABER (F.) THE LIFE OF, 109-143 : The perfectly unique character of F. Faber, 109, 110 ; excellence of F. Bowden's biography, 111 ; F. Faber's letters 112 ; F. Faber's early life, 113 ; his early desire to be an Anglican clergyman, 114 ; his wonderful love of scenery, 115 ; his residence at Elton, 116 ; power and beauty of his journal, 117 ; state of Oxford

when Faber came into residence, 118-120; the Broad Church and Tractarian movement, 120-121; F. Faber's studies, 122; his religious line, 123; his life at Elton, 124; his tour to Rome, 125; his management of his parish, 126, 127; the Lives of the English Saints, 128; his conversion, 129; the Brothers of the Will of God, 130; establishment of the Oratory, 131; foundation of the London Oratory, 132; his life at King William Street and Brompton, 132, 133; immense extent of the influence of the London Oratory, 134, 135; his sense of the beauty of the Protestant translation of the Scriptures, 136; passages from his letters, 137; his hymns, and series of Lives of Saints, 138; particulars regarding his books, 139, 140; his great sufferings, 141, 142; his death, 143.

Fitzgibbon (Gerald), *The Land Difficulty in Ireland*, reviewed, 443.

Franzelin (Joanne B.), *Tractatus de Sacramentis in Genere*, noticed, 222.

—————, *Tractatus de Eucharistiâ*, noticed, 222.

GALLICAN ASSEMBLY (THE) OF 1682, 328-361: Great value of M. Gérin's researches, 328; importance of establishing the truth in the Gallican controversy, 329; Napoleon I. and Louis XIV., 330; the quarrel of Louis XIV. with Pope Alexander VII., 331; way in which Louis XIV. conducted the quarrel, 332; the Paris faculty of theology and the six articles, 333, 334; action of the procureur-général and Parliament, 335; Colbert's relations with the faculty, 336; the registering of the six articles, 337; the question of the Regale, 338; the case of the Bishop of Pamiers, 339; Madame de Sévigné's character of the Pope, 340; the "petite assemblée," 341; the elections for the national council, 342; Mr. Morante's interview with the Cardinal Archbishop of Aix, 342, 343; the provincial assembly of Aix, 344; the assembly of 1862, by no means a national council, 345; deposition of Archbishop De Harnay, 346; part played by M. Bossuet, 347; his dispositions in relation to the court, 348; servility of the assembly to the king, 349; Bossuet's real intentions, 350; the opposition to the four articles, 351; registration of the declaration at the Sorbonne, 352; suspension of the faculty, 353; corruption of the French Church, 354; the crown and the Church in the 17th century, 355, 356; character of Louis XIV.'s advisers, 357; Louis's opinion of the French bishops, 358; great preachers and theologians of the age, 359; relations of the Papal and the French governments, 360, 361.

GARSDIE (C. B., M.A.), *Discourses on Parables*, noticed.

Gerdil (Cardinal), *Brief Exposition of the True Religion*, noticed, 230.

Gérin (Charles), *Recherches Historiques sur l'Assemblée du Clergé de France de 1682*, noticed, 216; reviewed, 328.

Gillow (John, D.D.), *Catholic Higher Education*, noticed, 230.

—————, *Letter on Oxford Education*, 515.

Guy (Robert C., B.A.), edition of Hilton's *Ladder of Perfection*, reviewed, 319.

HALLAHAN (Mother Margaret), *Life of*, noticed, 198.

Hamley (Colonel), *Operations of War*, noticed, 509.



Hancock (W. Neilson), Two Reports on the Landlord and Tenant Question, *reviewed*, 443.

Herbert (Lady), Life of Henry Dorié, martyr, *noticed*, 242.

Hidden Life (The), *noticed*, 503.

Hilton (Walter), The Scale or Ladder of Perfection, *reviewed*, 319.

Hosack (John), Mary Queen of Scots and her Accusers, *noticed*, 214.

Hunter (F.), Theses, *noticed*, 482.

INDIA (Religious Prospects of), *reviewed*, 262.

INDIA (THE) RELIGIOUS TENDENCIES OF, 261-296 : Character of the books of Messrs. Marshall and Strickland, 261 ; progress of Catholic missionaries in the Deccan and in other parts of India, 262, 263 ; Effects of the English language and literature on the Hindoo mind, 264 ; duty of the English nation in regard to India, 264 ; the non-Aryan races, 265 ; German-Lutheran missions, 266 ; the great impediment to Catholic missions, 267 ; caste, as a barrier to conversion, 268 ; F. Robert de Nobili, 269, 270 ; Protestant missions in India, 271 ; general character of the Protestant missionaries, 272 ; difficulty of the missionary's life in India, 273 ; discord of the Christian sects, 274 ; effect of the Catholic unity, 275 ; the new missionary propaganda of education, 276 ; relation of the Indian Government to Protestant missionaries, 277 ; origin and nature of the English Government in India, 278 ; religious views of the rulers of India, 279 ; system of education established since 1854, 280 ; conversion of the educated classes essential to any general action on the Hindoo masses, 281 ; effect of English secular education on the Hindoo mind, 282 ; the new religious system—Brahmism, 283 ; sketch of its history, 284 ; its principles and aspirations, 285 ; extracts from its tracts, 286-292 ; inconsistencies of Brahmism, 292 ; work of the Jesuits of Calcutta, 293, 294 ; great activity of the Protestant missionaries, 294, 295 ; future of Catholicism in India, 296.

IRISH CHURCH (THE) EARLY, 1-32 : Lord John Manners on the history of the Irish Church, 1 ; the Archbishop of Armagh and Bishop of Oxford on the same topic, 2 ; Dr. Todd on one of S. Patrick's canons, 3 ; general character of Dr. Moran's work, 4 ; origin and history of S. Patrick, 4-7 ; doctrine taught by him, 7 ; testimonies to the Roman origin of S. Patrick's mission, 8 ; early Irish psalms and hymns, 9, 10 ; the missal of S. Columbanus, 11 ; his letter to Pope S. Boniface, 12-15 ; the Irish theologian Claudius Clemens, 15 ; Ussher upon Clemens, 16 ; S. Cummian's letter on the Paschal question, 17 ; reference to Rome, 18 ; S. Colman and S. Wilfrid, 19 ; early Irish testimonies to the supremacy of Rome, 20 ; Gillibert and S. Malachy, 21 ; canons of the Irish Church relative to Rome, 22, 23 ; appeal of the Ulster Bishops to the Pope, 23 ; Irish pilgrimages to Rome and foreign pilgrimages to Ireland, 23, 24 ; the Irish missionaries, 25 ; Pope Zachary's letter to Witta, 26 ; S. Killian and S. Canice, 27 ; Sedulius, S. Columba, S. Aidan, and other Irish missionaries, 28 ; Irish doctrine always identical with that of the general Church, 22 ; summary of the general argument, 29-32.

JESUIT SERMONS, *noticed*, 207.

- KLEUTGEN (P. Giuseppe), *La Filosofia antica*, reviewed, 33.  
 ——— (R. P.), *L'Ontologisme jugé par le Saint Siège*, reviewed, 297.  
 ——— *La Philosophie scolastique*, reviewed, 297, 421.

LADDER (THE) OF PERFECTION, 319-328 : Great value of such works as F. Hilton's, 319 ; the study of mystical theology, 320 ; the mystic and scholastic, 321 ; the principal mystics, 322 ; special value of F. Hilton's ascetic writings, 323 ; his prominent devotion to Our Lord's humanity, 324 ; illustrations of this character of his devotion, 325 ; his remarks on humility, 326 ; his Sayings and Examples, 326, 327 ; care with which F. Guy has edited the book, 328.

LANDLORD (THE) AND TENANT QUESTION IN IRELAND, 443-468 : Generally admitted necessity of legislation, 443 ; the murder of James Hunter, 444-447 ; political effects of the Church Act, 447, 448 ; the *Irish Times* on tenant-right in Ulster, 448, 449 ; case of the Rev. Dr. O'Fay, P.P., 449, 450 ; effect of the present state of the law of equity, 451 ; argument from the case of purchasers under the Incumbered Estates' Act, 452 ; the province of the State in regard to landed property, 453 ; the Act 3 and 4 William IV., c. 27, 454 ; right of the State to regulate relations of landlord and tenant, 455, 456 ; limits of this right, 457 ; Lord Dufferin's argument from the freight paid for shipping, 457-459 ; evidence of the *Times'* Commissioner, 460, 461 ; general view of the proper legislation, 462, 463 ; demand and supply, 464, 465 ; estimated value of the Ulster tenant-right, 466 ; question of its extension, 467, 468.

LECKY (W. E. H., M.A.), *History of European Morals*, noticed, 203.

MARIE (Sœur), *The Workwoman of Liège*, noticed, 244.

Marshall (T. W. M.), *Christian Missions*, reviewed, 262.

Maskell (William, A.M.), *Present Position of the High Church Party*, noticed, 231.

Melia (Dr.), *On Our Blessed Lady* ; letter to the Editor, 512.

Meynell (Rev. C., D.D.), *Padre Liberatore and the Ontologists*, reviewed, 144, 297.

Mill (John Stuart), on Liberty, reviewed, 62.

MILL ON LIBERTY, 62-75 : Different meanings of the word liberty, 62, 63 ; Mr. Mill's various statements of its nature compared, 64, 65 ; Mr. Mill's doctrine only Pyrrhonism, 66-68 ; his argument for negative logic, 68 ; the State's duty in regard to education, 69 ; Mr. Mill's view of the functions of the State, 70 ; argument on the other side, 71, 72 ; Mr. Mill on authority in teaching, 73 ; the question of individuality, 74 ; Mr. Mill on the law of divorce, 75 ; conclusion, *ib.*

Mills (Rev. A.) Letter to the Editor, 527.

MISUNDERSTANDINGS ON CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION, 88-109 : Valuable letters of Dr. Gillow and Canon Oakeley, 88 ; purpose of the present article, 88, 89 ; original statement in the *Month* of its proposal about Oxford and Cambridge, 89, 90 ; explanation in the *Month*, of May, of the writer's real meaning, 91, 92 ; the editor's strictures upon the DUBLIN REVIEW, 92 ; argument of a writer in the *Month* on the connection of Catholics

with London University, 93-95; our own strong objection to the connection of Catholic colleges with that university, 96; allegations of the *Month* against the controversial fairness of the REVIEW, 97-103; answer on various questions of fact, 103-105; real agreement of principle, 106; letter of the editor of the *Month* to the *Tablet*, 107; the July number of the *Month*, 108.

Month (The), reviewed 88, 377; noticed, 235.

Moran (Rev. Dr.), Essays on the Early Irish Church, reviewed, 1.

NEWMAN (J. H., B.D.), Sermons preached before the University of Oxford reviewed, 421.

Northcote (Rev. J. Spencer), Roma Sotterranea, noticed, 215; reviewed, 393.

OAKELEY (Very Rev. F.), on a Liberal Education, 246.

—Letters to the *Tablet*, 531.

O'Mahony (Edmond W.), translation of Cardinal Gerdil's Brief Exposition, noticed, 230.

Oxford Education; letter of Dr. Gillow to the Editor, 515.

PHILOSOPHICAL AXIOMS, 144-169: Our anxiety to bring philosophical truths into harmony with theology and reason, 144; traditionalism, ontologism, scepticism, and empiricism, 145; statement of their respective methods, 146; absurdity of some of Descartes's positions, 147; the question "*What are truths?*" 148; and secondly, "*What are first truths?*" 149; "*What are necessary truths, and how related to God?*" 150; necessary not synonymous with universal, 151; necessary truths are uncaused truths, 152; the relation of God to other necessary truths 153; necessary truths founded on God's essence, 154; axioms necessary first truths, 155; are all non-empirical truths necessary? 156; axioms first intued in the individual, 157; the scholastic doctrine that knowledge begins with sense, 158; many axioms deducible from others, 158, 159; may axioms be synthetical, 159, 160; F. Liberatore on axioms, 161; the scholastics and analytical propositions, 162; are all axioms reducible to the principle of contradiction, 163; Suarez on the *passiones de ente*, 164; F. Liberatore and Kant, 165; without necessary truth science cannot even exist, 166; attempt to reconcile the difference between Canon Walker and Dr. Meynell, 167-169.

PLANTIER (Mgr.), Les Conciles Généraux, noticed, 480.

PSYCHOLOGISM AND ONTOLOGISM, 296-318: Explanation relating to the "Carlow College Magazine," 297-300; suggested sense of the word "psychologism," 301; subversive character of the psychologistic hypothesis, 302, 303; is contradictory to the scholastic doctrine of intellectual light, 304; F. Kleutgen on S. Thomas' doctrine, 305; the scholastic doctrine a denial of psychologism, 306; fundamental and violent antagonism of the two philosophies, 307; the Lockean doctrine of abstraction, 308; citations from Suarez and F. Kleutgen, 308, 309; true sense of the word "psychologism," 310; S. Augustine's doctrine on mind, 311; Catholics in relation to Ontologism, 312; the cases of Branchereau, Ubaghs, and

- Hugonin, 313 ; the real doctrine of Ontologists, 314 ; points of dissent from the "Carlow College Magazine," 315 ; criticism of Dr. Meynell's view, 316 ; our general contention on the subject, 317, 318.
- Pusey (Rev. E. B.), First Letters to Very Rev. J. H. Newman, *noticed*, 238.
- RAMIÈRE, (Père H.), De l'Unité dans l'Enseignement de la Philosophie, *reviewed*, 33, 144.
- Redmond (E., D.D.), Eight Sermon Essays, *noticed*, 494.
- REVOLUTION (THE) IN SPAIN, 169-180 ; extraordinary foresight of the Duke of Wellington concerning the ruin of Spain by military revolutions, 169 ; his letters to the Duc de Richelieu and General Alava, 170 ; spirit of the Spanish stratocracy, 171 ; the last army estimates, 171, 172 ; the history of Spain since 1820, a series of military mutinies, 172 ; the regencies of Queen Christina and Espartero, 173 ; Prim's enmity to Espartero 173 ; energy and wisdom of O'Donnell's government, 174, 175 ; present state of Spain, 176 ; character of Monsieur Aparisi's pamphlet, 177 ; his description of the Duke and Duchess of Madrid, 178, 179 ; analogy between the position of Don Carlos and that of Prince Louis Napoleon, 179, 180 ; deep interest of the topic of Spanish royalty, 180.
- Riess (Florian), Die Oekumenische Concil, *noticed*, 227.
- RING (THE) AND THE BOOK, 48-62 : Mr. Browning's gross prejudice against the Catholic Church, 48 ; his absurd error about the Molinists, 49 ; the sixth and seventh commandments of "*Half Rome*," 50 ; Mr. Browning's indifference to the art of composition, 50, 51 ; his faults of metre, 52 ; illustrations from Tertiumquid, 52, 53 ; Browning and Tennyson, 53, 54 ; origin of the story, 54 ; its plot, 55, 56 ; Mr. Browning's mode of telling it, 56, 57 ; the character of Guido, 58 ; his speech to the court, 59 ; the character of Pompilia, 60 ; Caponsacchi's character, 61 ; the vanity of modern authors, 61, 62.
- Roman Documents, 185.
- Rossi (Commendatore de), Roma Sotterranea, *noticed*, 152 ; *reviewed*, 393.
- (Cav. G. B.), Bulletino di Archeologia Christiana, *reviewed*, 393.
- (Joannes B.), Inscriptiones Christianæ, *reviewed*, 393.
- Ryder (H. I. D., of the Oratory), Critique upon Mr. Ffoulkes's Letter, *noticed*, 485.
- SCHEEBEN (Dr.), Die Theologischen Censuren, *noticed*, 225.
- Shortland (Canon), The Corean Martyrs, *noticed*, 242.
- Society of Jesus, Sermon by Fathers of, *noticed*, 207.
- Stanley (Dean) and Mr. Mills, 527.
- SUBTERRANEAN ROME, 393-421 : The labours of Danzetta and F. Zaccaria, 393 ; Maitland's and Burgon's books, 394 ; early collections of inscriptions, 395 ; the researches of Marini and Cardinal Mai, 396 ; Bosio's studies, 397 ; investigations of Alberti, Marangoni, and Padre Marchi, 398 ; De Rossi's first work on Roman archaeology, 399 ; his collection of Christian inscriptions, 400 ; respective parts of Dr. Northcote and Mr. Brownlow in the translation, 401 ; M. de Rossi's abstention from theological controversy, 402 ; general character of the Roman catacombs,

403 ; their illustration of the state of the early Christian community, 404, 405 ; the story of Flavia Domitilla, 406 ; the Roman law of burials, 407 ; special peculiarities of the Catacombs, 408 ; the cemetery of S. Prætextatus, 409 ; the crypt of S. Lucina, 410 ; the Papal crypt, 411-413 ; the art of the Catacombs, 413, 414 ; relation of early Christian and Pagan art, 415, 416 ; the picture of our Blessed Lady, 417 ; the paintings of the Catacombs, 418 ; the pictures of Moses and Lazarus, 419 ; inestimable value of De Ross's researches, 420.

**SUPPRESSION (THE) OF ITALIAN MONASTERIES, 76-87 :** Little attention yet generally given to the suppression of Italian monasteries, 76 ; splendour of their sites and historical associations, 77 ; the view from the hills above Assisi, 78 ; the valley of the Clitumnus and cultivation of the marshes, 79 ; the battle-field of Castel-Fidardo, 80 ; dreadful effect of the suppression of the monasteries on the religious life in Italy, 81 ; character of Mr. Taylor's work, 82 ; his testimony to monastic discipline and regularity, 83 ; his estimate of the standard of education in convents, 84 ; the practice of meditation in community, 84 ; Mr. Taylor's enjoyment of monastic life, 86 ; conclusion, 87.

**TABLET, A Letter to the, reviewed, 88.**

**Taylor (Algernon), Convent Life in Italy, reviewed, 76.**

**Tickel (Rev. George, S.J.), Life of Blessed Margaret Mary, noticed, 504**

**Tracts entitled Inquiry after True Religion, reviewed, 262.**

**Trollope (Anthony) Phineas Finn, the Irish Member, reviewed, 361.**

**TROLLOPE'S (MR.) LAST IRISH NOVEL, 361-377 :** Mr. Trollope considered as an Irish M.P., 361, 362 ; his position and qualities as a novelist, 363 ; his ecclesiastical portraits, 364 ; his studies of Irish life, 365 ; comparison of his Irish characters with Mr. Lever's, 366, 367 ; special merits of Phineas Finn, 367 ; the tea-party at Killaloe, 368, 369 ; Mr. Trollope's sketches of high society, 370 ; the character of Mr. Bunce, 371, 372 ; Mr. Monk's visit to Ireland, 373 ; Mr. Monk's views of tenant-right, 374 ; Mr. Monk and Phineas resign their offices, 375 ; defeat of the ministry on Mr. Monk's tenant-right bill, 376 ; conclusion, 377.

**WALKER (Canon), Essay on First Principles, reviewed, 33, 144.**

**Weber (Karl von), Die Oekumenische Concil, noticed, 227.**

